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B
^arbacli College lit!ran>
FROU
too. Thprnaa J. JNawbplI;
V
DIARY OF
GIDEON WELLES
IN THBEE VOLUMES VOLUBfE I
DIARY OF
GIDEON WELLES
SECBXrABT or THE NATT mn>BB UNCOLH AND JOHNSON
Wrm AN INTBODUCTTON BY JOHN T. MOBSE, JB.
AND
WITH ILLUSraATIONS
TOLDMB I 1861— MABCH 80. ISM
BOSTON AND NEW TOKK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
HAkV/.. \ UNIVEP. ■•• . LI BRAKY SE.P 14 lys^o
COPYRIGHT, 1909, AND I9IO, BY SOGAR T. WBLLX8 COnnUGHT, 191 1, BY BDGAR T. WBLLB8 AND HOUGHTON MXPPLIN COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESBRVBD
Publiskid October tqtt
PREFACE
It was the custom of my father all his life to keep a diary.' He was a prolific writer on political subjects and his even- ings were generally spent with his pen in his hand. When in Washington, it was his habit in the evening, after the family had retired, to devote his time to writing in the diary. His public duties at that period gave him no time to devote to the miscellaneous writings to which he had been accustomed. But in the diary are expressed his views on public men and measures, not only of the day but also those gathered throughout his public life. It was a relaxa- tion to him to write; in fact, being thoroughly accustomed to it, it was a pleasure.
The question of the publication of this diary has caused me much serious reflection. It is an unreserved expres- sion of what was from day to day in the mind of the writer. He probably thought that it would be useful as a record of the events of the time. Certainly he did not think it would be wholly unheeded.
But his expressions were not shaped by the considera- tion that it would be given to the world or would not be; the decision of that question he left to me. Accordingly, I have taken the advice of those in whom I know my father would have the most implicit confidence, submitting the material for consideration and review. Without exception, I believe, the decision has been that duty requires of me the publication, and the truth of history demands that under no circumstances must I fail to make this record public. It had seemed to me that the free criticism and personal allusions should have been in some degree elim-
vi PREFACE
inated, but the advice of the most eminent authorities has been adverse to any omission. I should have much pre- ferred it otherwise, but have }delded to those to whose judgment I should defer. A few strong expressions, purely personal and private, have been omitted, but the omis- sion has always been indicated and the reader may have lull confidence that the text of the diary has been in no way mutilated or revised.
I desire to express my obligations to the publishers for their careful and painstaking work. Too much credit can- not be given them for their labors and the result.
Edgab T. Welles.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION John T. Mobsb zvll
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
The Expedition for the Relief of Sumter — Mr. Seward's Interference — ^Porter and Bazion — The Relief of Fort Pickens — Conversation with Seoiator Douf^ — Mr. Seward's Intrigues — The Loss of the Norfolk Navy Yard — The Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War — The Relations of Sewiud and Stanton — Fear of the Merri- mac In Washington — " Stanton's Navy " 3
n
JULY AND AUGUST, 1862
The President broaches the Subject of Emancipation — Navy Depart- ment Worries — Conmiodore Wilkes — Disappointed Officers — Seward's Assumption of Authority — How Lincoln chose his Cabi- net — The Army's Failure to oodperate — The Military Theory of Frontaers ^— Pft>motion of W. D. Porter — Pft>posed line of Gun- boats on the Ohio — The Cabal against McClellan — Stanton on MoClellan — The Need of Better Generals 70
III
SEPTEMBER, 1862
After the Second Battle of Bull Run — Another Anti-McClellan Paper
— The Opinion about General Pope — Wilkes and McClellan — McClellan's Remarks about South Carolina and Massachusetts
— The Bickerings of the Generals — The President's Opinion of McClellan and Pope — Rumors of a Proposed Revolution — An Estimate of EUdleck — Panic-Stricken New York — A Scheme to de- port Slaves to Chiriqui — The " West Point " Policy — An Estimate of Stanton — Lincoln's Deference to Seward — The Administration of the Departments — The Want of a Military Policy — Lincoln and Seward — How Cabinet-Meetings were conducted — The Rivalry of Seward and Chase — News of Antietam — Dismissal of Com- mander Preble — The Emancipation Proclamation read to the Cabmet — Senator John P. Hale — Chase's Financial Policy —
viu CONTENTS
Chase's Opinion of Stanton — The Chiriqui Scheme — New York Politics — European Efiforts to break the Blockade 100
IV
OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1862
D. D. Porter appointed to the Western Flotilla — Porter, Davis, and Dahlgren — The Cabinet on Emancipation — Admiral Du Pont — Stanton's Threat to resign — Dahlgren's Ambitions — The Norfolk Blockade — The Currency Question — Stuart's Raid — Spanish Claims as to Maritime Jurisdiction — The Case of the Steamer Bermuda — General Scott's Influence at the Beginning of the War — The Question of raising the Norfolk Blockade — A Hoax on Seward — Transfer of the Mississippi Fleet to the Nayy — Seward and the Mails captured on Blockade-Runners 157
DECEMBER, 1862
A Private Grief — Bumside succeeds McClellan in Command of the Army of the Potomac — The Modification of the Norfolk Blockade
— The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy — The Question of New Navy Yards — Count Gurowski and his Book — Com- mander Preble's Case — The Division of Virginia — A Roundabout Proceeding of Seward's — Seward's Resignation and the Discussion in Regard to it — Chase tenders his Resignation and the President sees a Way out — Cabinet Rivalries — Seward and Chase requested to withdraw their Resignations — Depredations of the Alabama — Cabinet Discussion of the West Virginia Question — Butler super- seded by Banks at New Orleans — The Party Spirit 182
VI
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1863
The Emancipation Proclamation — The Battle of Murfreesborough — Loss of the Monitor — Criticisms of the Navy Department — Hal- leck's Deficiencies — The Employment of the Contrabands — John Covode's Gubernatorial Aspirations — The Pernicious Party Spirit
— McClemand and Vicksburg — The Court Martial on Fits John Porter — The New London Navy Yard Question — Confederate Letters — Fitz John Porter's Conviction — A Call from F. A. Conkling — The Qauge of the Pacific Railroad — Hooker i^aoed in Command of the Army of the Potomac — An Estimate of Farragut — "Weed is Seward, and Seward is Weed " — Governor Morgan elected Senator from New York — Reported Pressure for Mediation on the
CONTENTS ix
Part of the French Government — Fhq^oeed Attack <m Oharleaton
— Chase's Bank Bill — The Senate rejects the Reappointment of Collector Howard — Irregular Acts of the President — Scene be- tween Scott, McCldlan, and Seward 212
vn
MARCH AND APRIL, 1863
Closing Hours of Congress — A Call from Senator Dixon — Proposed Issue of Letters of Marque — Dday in the Attack on Charleston — Impending War with En^^and — Conversatkms with Sumner about the Letters of Marque — Conversation wiUi the President on the Subject of Letters of Marque and the Attitude of Elngland — Talk with Seward on the Relation of the Navy Department to the Letters of Marque — The First Application fOT Letters of Marque — The Expected Attack on Charleston — News of Repulse at Charleston
— The Peterhofif's Mails — Conmiander Rhind and the Ironclads at Charleston — The Elletts and the Ram Fleet — Du Font's Fail- ure at Charleston — The President takes a Hand in the Peterho£F Contention — Blockade-Runners on the Rio Grande — Du Font's Vanity and Weakness — Sumner's Conversation with Lcnrd Lyons
on the F^tertioff Matter 244
vra
MAY, 1863
Conversation with Attorney-General Bates on the Captured Mails — John Laird's Statement in Parliament — Waiting for News from Hooker — Rumors of the Battle of Chancellorsville — Disappoint- ment at the News — Stonewall Jackson's Death — Recall of Wilkes from the West India Squadron — Earl Russell's Speech on Ameri- can Affairs — Sumner's Talk with Seward about Mr. Adams and the Secretary of Legation at London — Conversation with the Pre- sident on the Subject of Captured Mails — Du Font's Charges against Chief Engineer SUmers — Du Font before Charleston — His Shortcomings and the Question of superseding him — Deplor- able Conditions in the South — Foote succeeds Du Pont in Com- mand of the South Atlantic Squadron — Dahlgren declines to be Second in Conmiand 290
IX
JUNE, 1863
The Arrest of Vallandigham and the Case of the Chicago Timea — The Removal of Wilkes — Count Gurowski on Welles's Appointment
CONTENTS
to the Cabinet — General Milroy at Winchester — The President and the Cabinet kept in Ignorance of Anny Movements — Lack of Confidence in Hooker — Alarm at Rumors of Confederate Advance into Pennsylvania — The President calls for 100,000 Volunteers — The President's Opinion of " Orpheus C. Kerr" — Illness of Admiral Foote — The Secretary of State and the Matamoras Situation — Sumner's Opinion of Hooker — Appointment of Dahlgren to the South Atlantic Squadron in Foote's Place — The French Tobacco in Richmond — Estimate of Dahlgren — The Monitors and the Fifteen-Inch Guns — Founding of ^e Army and Navy OazeUe — — Congratulations to Conmiodore Rodgers on the Capture of the Fingal — The President betrays Doubts of Hooker — Blair on the Presidential Aspirations of Chase and McClellan — Death of Admiral Foote — His lifelong Friendship with Welles — Needless Alarm for the Safety of New York — Meade succeeds Hooker — Rumors of Confederate Raids near Washington — Lee's Advance into Pennsylvania 319
JULY, 1863
First Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg — Stanton accused by McClel- lan of sacrificing the Army — F. P. Blair on Stanton's Early Seces- sionist Sympathies — Stanton's Treachery toward the Buchanan Administration — Seward's Intrigues — His Misconception of the War — Later News from Gettysburg — Vice-President Stephens's Proposed Mission to Washington — Intercepted Confederate Dis- patches — Cabinet-Meeting on Stephens's Mission — Meade linger- ing at Gettysburg — The Fall of Vicksburg — Lincoln's Receipt of the News — Rejoicings over Gettysburg and Vicksburg — Vice- President Hamlin's Request for a Prize Court at Portland — Some of the Generals Content to have the War continue — Draft Riots — The President's Dejection at the Failure of Meade to capture Lee's Army — The Draft Riots in New York — Lee recrosses the Poto- mac — Prospects of an Early Ending to the War — An Estimate of Jefferson Davis — Calhoun and Nullification — Senator Hale's Hostility — Downfall of the Mexican Republic — Impressions of Colonel Rawlins of Grant's Staff — Grant's I^ssatisfaction with McClemand 354
XI
AUGUST, 1863
Refutation of Laird's Statement as to an Application from the Navy Department — The President refuses to postpone the Draft — Connection of Howard of Brooklyn with the Laird Matter — The
CONTENTS xi
PtoTifllonB of the Draft Act discussed in Cabinet — General HaUeck and the Ahnaden Mines — The Fkesident adopts Seward's Views as to Instructions to Naval Officers — The President's Letter-Writ- ing — The Ironclads not to leave England — A Confidential Com- munication from Seward — Assistant-Secretary Fox and the Howard Affair — Ccmversation with Chase on the Subject of Slavery — General Meade meets the Cabinet — Suggestions from Boston — General F. P. Blair's Account of the Vicksburg Campdgn — Injustice of the Draft Act — A Letter from North Carolina — Solicitor Whiting's Schemes fcnr dealing with Slavery — Death of Governor Gurley of Arisona — Conversation mih Chase on the Reconstruction of the Union — Secession of the States not to be reoogniied — Death of Commander George W. Rodgers — The Case of the Mont Blanc — Toombs on Southern Conditions — The Sec- i retary of the Navy placed by Seward in a False Position as to Move- ments against the English Cruisers — The Subject of Reunion . . 303
XII
SEPTEMBER, 1863
Eetom from a Tour among the Navy Yards — Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Connection with the Draft — The President sus- pends the Writ on Military Questions — Newspaper Alarm over the Irondads building in England — Seward communicates the Assurances of the British Ministry in regard to the Rams — The News of CSiickamauga — The President laments the Inefficiency of the Generals — The Preddent's Opinion of Farragut — The Fail- ure at Sabine Pass — The English Government prevents the Laird Ram from coming out — The Russian Fleet arrives at New York — Reinforcing Rosecrans — An Irregular Proceeding of Seward's — The Conduct of the Generals at Chickamauga — A Report about the Laird Ram 431
xin
OCTOBER, 1863
Slow Progress at Charleston — Letter to the President in Reference to Instructions to Naval Officers — Seward refers the Spanish Claim of Maritime Jurisdiction to the King of Belgium — Conversation with Admiral Milne of the British Navy — A Political Letter of McCldlan's — The Ohio and Pennsylvania Elections — Lincoln's Magnanimity to Meade — General Sickles's Account of Gettysburg — Meade's "Strategy" — The Unaccredited Minister from Vene- zuela desires to purchase a Naval Vessel — General Terry and Colonel Hawley on Dahlgren — An Unjust Complaint from Admiral Du Pont 449
xii CONTENTS
XIV
DECEMBER, 1863
The Writing of the Secretary's Annaal Report — The Russian Fleets sent into American Waters for the Winter — Entertaining the Rus- sian Officers — Colfax elected Speaker of the House over Wash- bume — Senatorial Opposition to John P. Hale as Chairman of the Naval Committee — Brandegee's Appointment to the House Naval Committee — Plain Speech with Senator Hale — Insubordination of Commodore Wilkes — Rebel Letters captured on Board the Ceres — The Plot of Trowbridge, Briggs, Lamar , and Cavnach — Louis Napoleon's Attitude — The Turret Vessels gaining Friends — The Department's Policy in Regard to Ships — Conversation with Senator Doolittle on Trade-Permits and Presidential Candidates — Sailors enticed into the Army — The Year closes more satisfactorily than it began 479
XV
JANUARY, 1864
An Estimate of Sumner — The Charges against Engineer-in-Chief Isherwood — lincoln and Seward on Clay and Webster — Conver- sation with the Elder Blair and Governor Dennison — Discussion in the Cabinet as to opening Additional Ports in the South — Criti- cism of the Navy Department — Moses H. Grinnell and his Rela- tions with the Department — The Finding of the Court of In- quiry on Wilkes's Letter — John P. Hale tells of Charges of Mis- management in Connection with the Cherokee and R. B. Forbes . 501
XVI
FEBRUARY, 1864
Donald McKay compliments the Navy Department — The War De- partment suspected of instigating Attacks on the Navy Department — The President on the Dominican Question — A Talk with Chase on Financial Matters and the Charleston Situation — The Pre- sident as a Politician — A Pleasant Half-Hour with Preston King — An Estimate of the Man — Chase's Use of the Treasury Machinery to further his Presidential Aspirations — The Departmental Char- acter of the Administration — Carpenter's Picture of President Lincoln and his Cabinet — The President greets an Admirer — Chase's Electioneering — A Secret Expedition to Florida — Move- ment on Behalf of Retired Naval Officers 618
CONTENTS xui
XVII
MARCH, 1864
General Blair attacks Chase in the House — Solicitation for Political Subscriptions — Urging the Promotion of Colonel Hawley — Good News of Colonel I^hlgren — Chase's Attitude as to Permits and Trade Regulations — News of Ulric Dahlgren's Death — Grant at the President's Reception — Grant receives his Commission as Lieutenant-General — An Impression of Grant — The Exposure of Contract Frauds — The New Draft for 200,000 Men discussed in the Cabinet — A CaU from Solicitor Whiting — The Scarcity of Seamen for the Navy — Conversation with Admiral Dahlgren on General Gillmore — Conversation between Seward and the Artist Carpenter on the Great Events of the Administration • • • . 533
ILLUSTRATIONS
GiDZON WsLLBS PhoU>^fW9wrt froiiUiipieoe
WiixiAJf H. Seward 8
GxoBGE B. McClbixan 94
Hexbt W. Halueck 120
Frbsidknt Lincoln and Cabinet at the Signing of the Eman- cipation Proclamation 142
F^om the Painting by Franob Bioknell Carpenter.
John A. Dahlgrbn 164
Edwin D. Morgan 232
Charles Sumner 286
Andrew Hull Foote 346
Hannibal Hamun 366
George G. Meade 404
Charles Whjces 490
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Welles was in his fifty-eighth year at the time of his entry into the Cabinet of President lincohi, at which point these volumes take up the story of his life. A brief account of what he had done during these preceding years will have at least the interest of displaying what prepara- tion and equipment he brought to the important office whi«h he was called upon to fill.
His earliest American ancestor escaped the distinction of being one of the Mayflower band by only a very few years; he arrived, however, in time to take part in the settling of Hartford, becoming 'identified with its fortunes as early as 1636"; and serving as Treasurer, and later as Governor, of the Colony. Upon an estate in Glastonbury, bought by this ancestor from the Indians, Gideon Welles was bom July 1, 1802. He was educated at the Protestant Episcopal Academy at Cheshire, and at Norwich Univers- ity. Afterward he studied law, and the mental influence of this training was plainly perceptible throughout his active life, though he left the profession so early as Janu- ary, 1826. He then took charge of the Hartford Times, a Democratic sheet, which soon afterward gave its influence in behalf of Andrew Jackson for the Presidency. This act of political friendship, and the prominence of Mr. Welles in party politics in Connecticut naturally led to his becom- ing Jackson's chief adviser in the local affairs of that State. He continued his editorial labors so long as his leader remained in the White House; also occupying collater- ally the position of Representative from Glastonbury in the State legislature from 1827 to 1835. We are told that in matters political his '^ sagacity seemed to be almost unfailing." Certainly his views were liberal and progress- ive, in evidence whereof is the fact that, when the Supreme
xviii INTRODUCTION
Court of the State held that a disbeliever in a future state of rewards and punishments was incompetent as a witness, Mr. Welles led a persistent and at last successful struggle for legislation which reduced this requirement of faith in heaven and hell as a basis of credibility to the more mod- erate dimension of belief in a God. He further aided in effecting the abolition of imprisonment for mere debt* Under Van Buren, from 1836 to 1841, he was Postmaster at Hartford, which was then the central office for the dis- tribution of the mail throughout New England. In 1842, he was elected by popular vote to the office of State Comp- troller, and in 1843 was reelected. In 1846 he was ap- pointed by Polk to be Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing for the Navy, and held the place till the sum- mer of 1849.
With the administration of Polk and the annexation of territory as a result of the Mexican War, the slavery question became predominant in national politics. Thus far Mr. Welles had been a Democrat and a democrat, alike with the capital D and with the small letter. There is a very material difference between these two words. Demo- crat and democrat, though proof-readers have not alwajrs been awake to the important distinction. The party of that name has adopted President Jefferson as at least the most distinguished expoimder, if not the founder of the American variety of their political creed. Yet Jefferson was democratic only with very large reservations; he excited Hamilton to frenzy by his extravagant preach- ments about the rule of the masses, but in fact he never had a suspicion that the ruling masses could be so wrong^^ headed as not to take their doctrines from gentlemen of intelligence like himself, and he assumed as basic matter of course that the common people would have the common aense to select presidents, governors, and rulers generally fh>m that class of the conmiunity whose superior fitness for these fimctions Mr. Jefferson regarded as a postulate. Genuine democracy found its way into the Presidency with
INTRODUCTION
Andrew Jackson. But when, later on, the Democracy, as a political party, became the party of the Southern slavo- cracy, it certainly had no longer any right to use the adjec- tive with the little d; on the contrary it had the honesty, or the pride, to boast itself to be the party of aristocracy. At the same time, however, it retained, because it found very useful, the old Democratic doctrines of State rights and of strict construction of the Constitution. A practical concrete problem, however, was now coming into entire possession of men's minds to the exclusion of all else. There were no survivals of old questions, and political theories and principles had either to prove themselves malleable or to be rejected by their old-time followers, when the perpetuation and therefore the extension of Slavery came to the front. There was a new alignment throughout the Northern half of the coimtry, and at once multitudes of independent men, refusing to be controlled by a political misnomer, crossed over from the slavocratic and aristocratic Democracy to the new, hmnanitarian, and democratic Republicanism. There was no use in raising the cry of apostasy; for the apostates were too nimierous and too respectable to be described by so discreditable a name; and, moreover, it was quite obvious that no political consistency compelled a Democrat under Jackson and Van Buren to remain a Democrat under Pierce or Buchanan. There was certainly no continuity or succession between the destruction of the Bank of the United States, for ex- ample, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
The infusion of a great moral issue into politics, which ordinarily have little enough to do with the moralities, mevitably changed the point of view for any man who felt the old Puritan conscience strong within him. In the cus- tomary run of public business, the average man embarks on board his party as on board a ship for a long voyage, and does not get oflf at the first port because he has not always been entirely delighted with all the arrangements ; if, however, he wants to go north and he finds that the
INTRODUCTION
captain is sailing south, he is likely to take the first oppor- tunity of parting company. Thus it very naturally came about that the democratic Gideon Welles, being a dear- headed, independent, and conscientious person, ceased to be a Democrat, and became a Republican. Moreover, in a certain way it might be argued that consistency itself led him to this action, for the theory of State rights, always advocated by him, involved the repudiation of the Demo- cratic move for the establishment of slavery m the Terri- tories under cover of the national authority, this being the sure basis and prejudgment for its establishment in the later development of the State*
The change of political allegianoe induced no change of occupation, and Mr. Welles now became a contributor to the Hartford Evening Press, which was designed to be the organ of Republicanism in the State. In 1856 he had the courage, as Republican candidate for Governor, to face sure defeat in a cause in which he believed. About the same time, by choice of the Republican Convention which assembled in Philadelphia, he entered upon what proved to be an eight years' term of service as a member of the Republican National Committee; also he was chairmaii of the delegation from his State to the Convention at Chicago which nominated Abraham Lincoln.
President Lincoln's courteous patience in listening to advice, and his desire always by consultation to get the benefit of suggestions, obscured for a while in the public eye his imderlying self-reliance and the independence of his ultimate judgment. The suspicion that his course was often steered by another hand than his own has only died slowly, as careful study of his career and the accmnulation of much evidence have enforced quite the contrary convic- tion. Yet a shrewd observer might have forecast the truth at the outset, from the formation of his Cabinet; for in no other matter are political bargaining, wire-pulling, and pressure more vigorously exercised than in Cabinet-mak- ing ; yet of the seven men who constituted his ministry, his
INTRODUGTION
hand was foroed only in the selection of Cameron, and even there the forcing was perhaps not oppressive. Certainly the other six represented his personal choice, and no other among them represented it more than did Mr. Welles^ whose career up to this point had given him no controlling prestige such as that which would have made the omission of Seward or Chase a matter of criticism. So far as is known, no pressure, either political or personal, was brought to bear; and it was Mr. Welles's record, as it has been narrated above, which led Mr. Lincoln to invite him into the Cabinet. The Diary has the story of the selection in conclusive shape. Wanting a man from New England, Lincoln took an ex-Democrat, trained in public business, who had manifested his coiu'age and the earnestness of his conviction by casting loose from his old associates on the question of slavery; and who also, it may be noted, had shown a natural aptitude for politics, a quality which Mr. Lincoln, possessing it himself in a high d^ree, did not undervalue in others.
Precisely why the Navy Department was allotted to Mr. Welles is not clear. Perhaps the citizen of an inland State, who probably enough had never seen an ocean-going ship, was influenced by the flavor of maritime commerce and prowess which still in 1860 hung faintly about the wharves of New England, and Mr. Lincoln may have thought that any New Englander must be amphibious ; or he may have been affected by memory of the ofQoe held by Mr. Welles under Mr. Polk, slight as had been the nautical flavor of those commercial functions. When, how- ever, Mr. Welles suggests that Secretary Chase, though having a "good deal of ability,'' yet "has never made fin- ance his study," and again when he shoots at his favorite target. Senator Hale, Chairman of the Naval Conmxittee, the slurring words "embarrassed by no military or naval teaching,'' the reader may smile at the obvious '^tu qiuh que'' retort, which certainly lay ready at the hand of each of these gentlemen. Neither of them used it, for
INTRODUCTION
neith^ of tb«Ei had the privilege of looking over Mr. Welles s shoulder as he poured his feelings over the confi- dential pages of his Diary. But when, later on in his ad- ministration, other persons, sundry '^ disappointed men," suggested that some one with more real salt-sea experience than Mr. Welles had would fill the place better, Mr. Welles writes that there ''is a set of factious fools who think it wise to be censorious, and it is almost as amusing as it is vexatious to hear and read the remarks of these Solomons," the^ **oflBcious blockheads," who have the simplicity to alk^j^^ that the Secretary of the Navy should have had per- Si>nal experience on shipboard. One of these critics, he reei^rds, has been a shipowner, another has been a diip- master; ''successful business men, but egotistical and vauily weak. Neither is competent to administer the Navy Depajrtment." CJomforting reflections, and very possibly altogether true, yet it may be permitted to remark, obiter^ that the layman does not, by familiarity with the spectacle, cease to feel bewilderment at the utter indifference nearly always shown as to preparatory training or specialist knowledge in the allotment of cabinet places. It is sm:- prising to see that a system which might a priori be re- garded as of dubious promise has so often worked fairly well. At the same time, one cannot but wish that on some occasion, when there is one of those temporary lulls which occur from time to time in party struggles, when partisan considerations might without grave peril give good sense a passing chance, an incoming President would have the orig- inality and courage to compose a Cabinet of men able and thoroughly versed in the Departments which they are called to administer. It is possible that the results might be very satisfactory; at least, the experiment would be interesting and instructive. Of course it was not tried by Mr. Lincoln anymore than it has been by other Presidents, his predecessors and successors. He made a journalist Secretary of the Navy, and let us admit that the journalist proved to be a very good Secretary and rejoice that he
INTRODUCTION xxiu
approved himself also a first-rate Diarist. In fact, if he had been a much worse Secretary, we should readily have par- doned his shortcomings on the ground of his eminent sue- cess in a matter which now and for us is of much more interest.
Certain it is that in this Diary we have the best ''Cabi-* net Interior" which hangs upon the walls of the American room in the world's Gallery of History. It at once recalls and provokes comparison with that other famous and more bulky diary in which John Quincy Adams confided to posterity his appreciation of his own good qualities and the failings of his contemporaries. Between the two there are interesting points, both of resemblance and of contrast. Both diarists were fine examples of the moral and intel-> lectual civilization of the New England of their times. Though not quite contemporaries, they were types of a ra- cial development which became complete during the period of their joint lifetimes. They were intelligent descendants of the old Pilgrim stock, untiring seekers of knowledge, clear thinkers amid their surroundings, with little wit or humor and no imagination. They had the solid moralities, but were somewhat deficient in the gentler ones. They estab- lished high standards as much for themselves as for others; and to ordinary mortals, who seemed to fall below these standards they doled out Christian charity with much economy; yet the reflection that the delinquents, thus scored by our diarists, were largely professional politicians may lead us to a like economy of sympathy for them. Both men manifest a consciousness of perfect rectitude of inten- tion, which undoubtedly they both had; for more upright men never lived ; neither could have been induced by any possible temptation to do a selfish or mean or in any way unworthy act. It should be said, however, that Mr. Welles is not be^t by that self-admiration which from matins to vespers ceaselessly worried Mr. Adams, so that he seems forever sitting to himself for his own portrait, whereas Mr. Welles's portrayal of himself, such as it is, was made with-
xxiv INTRODUCTION
out intention; for which reason his pages are not rendered wearisome by vanity, or by disingenuous depreciation of his own merit. Both men are censorious, but Mr. Welles is almost never acrid; his judgments are severe, but not unfair, not malicious, not often ill-tempered and perhaps never really vindictive. They would seem less scathing at times, if they were tempered with humor; but, in the ab- sence of this, we have the next most enlivening quality on the occasions when he indulges in honest and hearty sar- casm. This he could do very well, as, for example, when he speaks of one Alden as ''patriotic when there was no dan- ger," actually, though erroneously, believing himself to be courageous, and ''really anxious to do something without encountering enemies.'' When he cuts, he does it trench- antly, and when he abuses, he strikes hard and straight* He is a fair fighter, and does not grumble too much at the like treatment when dealt to himself, although it must seem to him undeserved and at times proceeding from un- worthy motives. If he is not witty, he has more really valu- able merits : he is very fair and just ; he is frank and manly; he is intelligent, alert, and well-informed, with the result that no more trustworthy material than his pages can come to the table of the historian or the hands of the reader.
It is of some interest to establish what is the correct value of diaries in historical literature. When a politician sees to his dismay that a fickle and ill-advised public is giving itself over to be led astray by his perfidious oppon- ent, he is prone to seek somewhat juiceless consolation in references to the "verdict of history" or the "verdict of posterity." Both verdicts are much the same, for both dig- nified phrases signify only that vague general impression which has been sent filtering through the public mind by those historians who can write sufficiently pleasingly to secure readers. These writers are really counsel, or advo- cates, unpaid for the most part, and therefore reasonably honest; and who generally mean to examine the evidence with an open mind, and to take their volunteer brief for the
INTRODUCTION xxv
man or cause whom or which, upon that evidence, they believe to be right. Not long ago, the task of editing the private writings of any deceased public man was taken to imply the duty of excision and amendment so as to bring the printed pages into accord with supposed proprieties. It was not imlike grooming a horse for exhibition. Now, however, it is understood that such editorial action is in point of morality much the same thing as tampering with a witness or perverting his testimony. Suppress diaries or letters if you cannot print them as they were written ; but know that you are dishonest if, without avowal, you pub- lish under a man's name mutilated excerpts of what he really wrote. No other evidence can be more sacred than a diary, which the world accepts as confidential truth. Be- fore a judge or jurors the viva voce testimony of a witness in presence outweighs in real influence a dozen depositions of absent deponents, and for the historian a diary or a letter takes the place of this best and most trustworthy of all possible evidence, and is to be respected accord- ingly. In this point of view, this Diary of Mr. Welles is among the most valuable documents within reach of our historical writers. As between the two, a diary should be accorded greater value than letters, for it is apt to be more ingenuous, more honest. Thus it is not possible to imagine that any historian can possibly have access to better evidence than this Diary of Mr. Welles. Of course, either letters or diaries, if written with an eye to post- humous publication, may be intentionally miscolored; but it is much harder to be consistently disingenuous in a diary than in correspondence; the diary written in the evening is united to the day as a limb to the body; the same life-blood ^ves the vital heat and spirit to both ; the palpitation of the day's actings and talkings still throbs in the evening's ac- count of them. It is almost a part of the res jeste. The diary is written to one's self ; the letter is written to a person whose own individuality of character, opinions, and temper often unconsciously react upon the writer; the letter may have
xxvi INTRODUCTION
an exterior object, which the diary never can have, since it can have no other value for its writer than that of a correct record. The ^'personal equation/' as it is called, signifying the moral, mental, and temperamental qualities and idiosyn- cracies of the diarist, must of course be studied and allowed for, just as the navigator must study the dip and variation of the compass; otherwise historian and navigator may both go wrong. But the observant reader cannot long rest in the intimacy of the diarist without getting at least what may be called a good average knowledge of his character. If these views as to diaries are correct, it is certainly difficult to exaggerate the value and interest which attach to this Diary of Mr. Welles; that he wrote it is most fortunate; its suppression would properly have been regarded as a national disaster, as its faithful presentation is of inestimable ad- vantage.
The true function of the diary is to talk to us about individuals, not to instruct us as to events, — and how much more interesting this is! In fact, the historian may well be better informed as to events and facts than the diarist can be, for the historian has access to immense ac- cmnulations of evidence which the diarist never knew, but which through the long years have come slowly leaking into light from desks and attics and hiding-places innumerable. On the other hand, history is comparatively weak in the matter of individual character, which posterity can rarely know as contemporaries do. They see and hear the living man; they know not only his conspicuous acts but also all the little ones; they hear of him from the men who deal with him, and they know more or less of those men also; they get and sift the gossip, good and bad. If a man's con- temporaries fail to find out what he is, posterity rarely will do better; though this latter case may befall through strange belated discoveries, and, in fact, has befallen pre- cisely within the region of this Welles Diary; for President Lincoln is unquestionably better estimated to-day than he was during his lifetime, and is in some respects more ac-
INTRODUCTION ixvii
curately known to us than he was to his own Ministers. The patience with which he could wait while causes slowly produced results, his remarkable combination of respect for the opinion of others with absolute reliance upon his own opinion, his forbearance, tact, shrewdness, foresight, and fairness, are all qualities which could not be fairly seen at short range and as they were at work, but which, by reason of careful study and the ever-growing accumulation of facts, we have come to know as our fathers could not know them. Generally, however, more is lost than gained by distance in the estimation of character, and the most vivid and attractive biographies are probably far from photographic. We may read lives of Washington till our eyes ache, but are they all worth a few hours of chat about him with Lafayette, or Hamilton, or even with Jefferson? These are the witnesses we want to hear, and the nearest approach to such witnesses, where all are silent in death, we find in the diarist.
As, therefore, was naturally to be expected, this Diary contributes little new knowledge concerning events, and settles few of those many discussions to which the Civil War gave rise. On the other hand, it presents an invaluable row of portraits; so that there are indeed no other records which can at all be brought into even remote comparison ^th it for that interesting period. Mr. WeUes had ex- traordinary insight into men, and a very happy skill in depicting them; at least we are bound to think so, for there is a remarkable agreement between what he wrote in those days when our past was his present, and what our histo- rians and biographers are now setting forth as the dispas- sionate valuations of posterity. Such harmony is agreeably reassuring as to the accuracy of the judgments which we are to-day accepting. So far as Mr. Welles is concerned, his even- mindedness is a very unique quality; as a rule, the climate of the contemporary writings during our Civil War had no temperate zone; whether beneath the sunshine of hero- worship or amid cyclones of denunciation^ there was always
xxviii INTRODUCTION
equatorial fervor. It is only Mr. Welles who, so far as we know, was at once shrewd and judicial. Perhaps he was a little Rhadamanthine. If, however, there seems a ten- dency to severity, it is not due to unkindness of dispo- sition, but rather to the intensity of the times and the tre- mendous stress of feeling. Those were not ordinary days when selfish ambition and incompetence could be passed over as ordinary sins; the men who were guilty of them were to be branded, and Mr. Welles branded them; it was a time for Hebraic wrath rather than for Christian charity; moreover, Mr. Welles was as exacting towards himself as towards others, and gave a devotion as unselfish as that which he demanded. Be this as it may, whether he was severe or not, how strong and vivid is his portraiture even in his minor characters ! Thus a page or two depicts Banks with perfect accuracy; a few scattered paragraphs present Du Pont to the life; and so on throu^ many instances. Herein is proof of the real artist; this making every minor character as lifelike an individuality as are the leaders is the Shakespearian quality. Naturally, however, it is the sketches of the leaders which have the most interest, and which best illustrate the shrewd and just perception of Mr. Welles. Take, for example, McClellan. In the proces- sion of admirers which heralded the advent of this military savior none blew a more confident trumpet than did Secre- tary Chase. Later when the savior had lamentably failed to save, Mr. Chase not less vehemently denounced him, calling him ''an imbecile, a coward, and a traitor,'' and summoning Mr. Welles to cry Amen. But that gentleman recalled that he had set an interrogation mark against the name of the hero at the time of his first introduction, and said that, having afterward avoided the error of exaltation, he would not now fall into the injustice of danmation. During the time when Chase was lauding McClellan, nine- teen out of every twenty loyal Northerners were of the like mind; later at least seventeen out of every twenty sympa- thized in some measure with the condemnation. All the
INTRODUCTION
while Mr. Welles is from time to time setting down in his Diary such an average and temperate valuation as may be found in almost any modem history.
But the name of McClellan has become wearisome, and most readers will get more entertainment in Mr. Welles's picture of another of the failures, a picture which is aston- ishingly lifelikoi considering how little life there was in the subject. One may read much about the Civil War without often happening upon the name of Halleck, yet for a very long while that harmless professor of the arts of slaughter and destruction was showing how peacefully he could con- duct these processes, as he sat, obsciuely sluggish and silent, at his desk in Washington, ofQcially superintending the entire strategy of all the Northern forces, chewing his dgar, and rubbing his elbows. How that habitual gesture of his exasperated Mr. Welles! When the rubbing began, the friction seemed to spread from the Halleck coat-sleeve to the whole Welles system. All that Mr. Welles says about Halleck is at once amusing, severe, and just; and to the irritating influence which the General exercised upon the Secretary we owe some lively pictures, among pages whereon picturesque liveliness yields somewhat too much room to careful accuracy. '^ Called this morning,'' says the Diary in one instance, "on General Halleck, who had for- gotten, or was not aware, there was a naval force in the James River, codperating with the army!" Mr. Welles assured the great chieftain that such was indeed the fact; then the General, perplexed as to whether the vessels should be retained or withdrawn, went to work upon his elbows, and rubbed out the conclusion that they might as well be withdrawn. Then Mr. Welles suggested that they might as well stay, and the General immediately thought so too. It was a fair specimen of Halleck's inefficiency, and in those critical days inefficiency might be as harmful as treason. Mr. Welles chafed impatiently, while others tardily learned what he so well knew; and meantime he confided to his Diary that Halleck "is heavy-headed,"
INTRODUCTtON
'^may have some talent as a writer or critic/' but ^'in all military matters seems destitute of resources, skill, or capacity," is "more tardy and irresolute than McClellan," with much more to the like disrespectful purport. It is all just what any writer would say to-day; Mr. Welles was only writing the "verdict of history'* in advance.
Another victim furnished for the especial gratification of those imperfect Christians who derive a pleasurable sensa- tion at the spectacle of a soimd drubbing administered with whole-hearted thoroughness, is the Honorable John P. Hale, of the Senate, Chairman of the Naval Committee. For a while, Mr. Hale was mistaken for a man of some con* sequence on the alleged ground of character and ability, and before this view had been fully corrected he was able to make trouble for the Secretary, with the amusing result of calling forth many vivacious comments. Thus, Mr. Welles tells us that Hale, having at the outset defied, scorned, and derided secession, "was one of the first to flee from Washington when the storm was about to burst"; but later, the Capital being "garrisoned and shielded by a large army, this burning and eloquent patriot returned, overflowing with courage," and "in the exuberance of his ■eal" set on foot an inquiry as to the loss of the Norfolk Navy Yard. In a "patronizing way" he offered to hear any explanation which the Secretary of the Navy might offer concerning this painful incident. If he could have read what the world can now read, he would have neglected the defense of Norfolk for the defense of Hale! Later we learn and sympathetically believe that he was "lazy, noisy," a "harlequin" and "demagogue," a "Senatorial buffoon," without "application or fidelity," who is "nei- ther honest nor sincere"; and in later pages the charges become even more serious. In the improbable event that there are any persons who will care to object to the erasure of Mr. Hale's name from the roll of the country's great men, certainly ample provocation is now given to them for themselves heard.
INTRODUCTION
Of course, not many pages can be turned without en- countering Uie names of Seward, Chase, and Stanton. Of these, Stanton, the friendless one, evidently affected Mr. Welles as he kffected pretty much everyone else who came much into contact with him. No one liked him living; scarcely anyone has wished to say much for him dead. An advocate biographer has indeed presented a sort of brief for him, and Mr. Rhodes, kindliest of historians, has men- tioned his virtues; for, in fact, he had virtues, — devotion to the cause, a very greed for hard work, financial integ- rity, and merciless energy against the rascal contractors. But it cannot be forgotten that he had the odious faults of a bully ; he was violent and insolent, but only when violence and insolence were safe; he was supposed to be personally timid; he could be mean and unjust; above all he repeat- edly outraged the magnanimous forbearance of Mr. Lin- coln in a way which no American can forgive. Substan- tially every writer's pen is against him; or, at least, no writer's pen is for him. Mr. Welles rends him and tears him without mercy and returns to mangle and to toss again, nor even so provokes the reader to interfere to save the prey; we can all read the sentences with equa- nimity; many of us will read them with cheerful sym- pathy. The two men, after a few tentative feints and clashes, had inevitably to try out their comparative strength in a conclusive bout. It took place, and there- after Mr. Stanton rarely ventured into Mr. Welles's path. He had learned that the Navy Department was not a province or subdivision of the War Department and that cooperation of vessels with land forces did not imply subor- dination of the Navy to the Army. Delightfully spirited and vivid perhaps beyond all others in the Diary are the pages which narrate the conferences of President and Min- isters when first the startling foray of the Merrimac car- ried consternation, and then very soon the achievement of the beslurred Monitor, the ^'cheese-box" of the sarcastic critics, restored triumphant cheerfulness at the North.
INTRODUCTION
There are few such sketches in history as that which Mr. Welles furnishes upon this occasion, availing splendidly of a splendid opportunity. Alas, poor Yorick! If Mr. Stanton could only have known that Mr. Welles was keeping a diary, and therein depicting this scene in vivid, undying colors, would not he at once have set about keep- ing one also? And how posterity might then have been entertained! At present it is too much like sitting at the prize-ring and seeing only one pugilist.
It is an odd fact that Mr. C. F. Adams was beset by an incapacity for appreciating Mr. Lincoln, which at once calls to mind the like incapacity of his grandfather for appreciating Washington. John Adams lived and died imder the firm conviction that Washington was a vexa- tiously over-rated man; Mr. C. F. Adams carried to his grave a like certainty concerning Lincoln. He even had the imprudence to make public declaration of his unfortun- ate views, by delivering in 1873 a memorial address on Mr. Seward, wherein he said that from the birth of our government no other "experiment so rash had ever been made as that of elevating to the head of affairs a man with so little previous preparation for his task" as Mr. Lincoln had. Now it may be admitted that this allegation, construed with such literal narrowness as Jeffersonians would have used for construing the Constitution, was not grossly extravagant. The fact that the "experiment" turned out so wonderfully well that many devout persons have even seen in it the direct hand of God, of course does not prove that in the outset it was not "rash." It was only needlessly imkind on Mr. Adams's part to say that it was more "rash" than had been the selection of certain other persons who had been elevated to the same office, not only in spite of the fact that they had had little "previous prepa- ration," but in spite of the even more disqualifying fact that they had given no reason for a belief in their fitness, and some reason to fear their unfitness. Apart from his then improved qualities of combined character and Intel-
INTRODUCTION xxxiii
lecty Mr. Lincoln's '^ preparation'' had certainly been con- fined to a thorough study of the problem presented by slavery. It so happened, however, that slavery was at this critical moment so all-important as to be practically the only problem, and it also so happened that Mr. Lincoln understood it far better than any other man then living^ not excepting Jefferson Davis, or Charles Sumner, or Mr. Adams himself. But though the above cited assertion, literally taken, was not so very depreciatory to Mr. Lin- coln, the same could not be said of the general tone of the address, which stripped President Lincoln of credit and praise and conferred generously upon Mr. Seward all that was thus filched from his chief. If Mr. Adams's view of the situation was correct, the nation had been burning incense before the wrong altar.
Mr. Welles was stirred with indignation, so stirred that he came to the rescue of his great leader's reputation by writing and publishing a loyal little volume, which he called '^ Lincoln and Seward." What he said in this book has, in substance, been absorbed into our history, which has accepted Mr. Welles's views and has rejected, forgott^i, and forever buried the contrary opinions of Mr. Adams. For this reason, because it has done its work, the book is not now very familiar to ordinary readers ; but one finds a certain entertainment in comparing it with the Diary, and the comparison plainly indicates the superior value of an intimate daily outpouring of feelings, fresh and hot, as against the later expression of those feelings cooled and prepared for publication. In the book Mr. Welles civilly writes that he ''enjoyed uninterruptedly pleasant social and ofiicial intercourse" with Mr. Seward. If the signifi- cation of these words be not trimmed to close literalness, they are likely to convey an impression of friendly har- mony between the two men which is quite astonishing to the reader of the Diary. Further, the book alleges a rela- tionship of "confidence and mutual frankness on public affairs . . • among all the members" of the Cabinet, sub-
xxxLY INTRODUCTION
ject only to such occasional interruptions of perfect cordial- ity as might be provoked by Mr. Seward's pretensions to superiority. Amid the many interpretations which may possibly be put upon the word ''confidence'' in this pass* age there can perhaps be suggested some one which may justify its use. Neither are there wanting sporadic in- stances of the presence of "frankness/' that most ticklish of good qualities, the porcupine in the menagerie of virtues. For example, when Seward humbly admitted to Mr. Welles that he had learned that for the future he had ''better attend to his own business/' Mr. Welles hastened to meet him with a "cordial assent." No one will deny that on this occasion Mr. Welles evinced frankness. There are other cases also of plain speaking; yet the fact remains that he who reads the Diary will not be able to accept some of the statements which in later years found utterance in the book save as conventionalities or as spoken "in a Pickwickian sense/' or perhaps in that spirit of serene magnanimity which is supposed to prevail in making preparation for a Christian death-bed. As matter of plahi fact, the Diary is thickly sprinkled with criticisms of Mr. Seward because of his pretentious bearing, his assumption of the r61e of a premier in the Cabinet, his airs of mystery and his affectation of special information and of private knowledge in affairs, above all else by reason of his passion for meddling and his irritating forays into the inde- pendent Departments of ^is associates. The most note- worthy instance of this was the disastrous occult interfer- ence of Mr. Seward in the matter of relieving Fort Sumter. The error had to be admitted by him and ostensibly forgiven by Mr. Welles, but it was never forgotten and never ceased to rankle. Soon afterward came the long and serious dispute as to the disposition to be made of foreign mails captured on blockade-runners. Here again Seward imdertook to settle the whole business autocratically in his own office. Mr. Welles resented and resisted, and was clearly in the right; but Mr. Seward had committed himself to the English gov-
INTRODUGTION
ernment and the embarrassment was grave. All the strict- ures made by Mr. Welles concerning Seward have been made by others, and none of them lacks fomidation; yet it must be said that of all the pictures in these volumes that of Seward is the most.open to the criticism of doing scant jus- tice, if not actual injustice, to the subject. Probably Mr. Seward was rated more hi^y by his own generation than he will be by posterity; but probably also he will beheld in better esteem than would be possible if there were no other evidence concerning him than what could be drawn from this Diary. He was at once an able man and a frequent blunderer. On the whole, one feels that when speaking of him Mr. Welles is certainly less well balanced than usual. Possibly this is due to the fact that they clashed frequently, since maritime matters and foreign relations inevitably crossed in many complications. In such Mr. Welles was more apt to have sound as well as courageous views than was his associate minister.
While thus, day by day, Mr. Welles is consciously draw- ing for us the portraits of his colleagues, he is also day by day, but quite unconsciously, giving us the lines, the lights, and the shadows for his own portrait. While we are learn- ing what he thinks of others and why, we are likewise deciding what we think of him upon evidence of a kind that is next best to personal acquaintance. In the main, the conclusions are much to his credit. When we see that all his brains, his heart, his strength were strenuously engaged in the cause, we know that the same can be said of many others; when we see that he was more than respectfully obedient, that he was always nobly loyal and wisely sus- taining towards his chief, we admit that some others were the same; but when we see that he was absolutely devoid of any ulterior ambition or personal motives or any form of self-seeking, that he was ahnost indiflferent concerning his own reputation so long as he was conscious of having done his duty with all his might and all his intelligence, then at length we say that in some respects he was very
xxxvi INTRODUCnON
near to being singular. He had strong opinions as to men as well as measures, and expressed them; but he was a clear thinker, and, being by nature fair-minded, he further took pains not to permit either passion or prejudice to divert the movement of his reasoning. When his mind was made up, however, he did not easily change his opinion; and one would not be surprised if it should appear that Seward and Stanton thought him obstinate, or opinionated, or even contentious. Yet he made fewer errors than they did. He made some, of course, and if this Diary had been ex- purgated with a view to exhibiting him as infallible, a few passages which appear therein would have been suppressed. For example, he was one of those who deprecated the difficult task of blockading the Southern ports, on the ground that it was a needless recognition of belligerency involving injurious consequences; nor does it seem that he ever came to see how academic and impracticable would have been a closure by proclamation. Again he had a dis-. trust of ''the West Point idea," as it was called, which would have been unfortunate if his Department had been concerned with operations on the land instead of on the water. He shared the too prevalent faith in the possibility of making generals out of any sort of civilian material, just as it was assumed that military coats might be made at any mill. It took a sad amount of experience and many poor soldiers had to shiver before it was well recognized that a shoddy mill turned out poor stuff for hard service, and that extemporized commanders, made out of politi- cians or lawyers, were generally out of place at the top, however well they might do halfway up. He protested much against the establishment of a ''military frontier,'' with the general grouping of all residents south of it as Rebels. He said that this was the fallacious notion of technical military theorists; whereas the truth was that the shifting line of the frontier was simply the expression in military phraseology of an actual condition; not a manceuvre was ever affected by the language; and the
INTRODUCTION xxxvii
attribution of rebellion to the Southern population en bloc was simply a necessity and was not far wrong either. Disaffection was a germ disease which rapidly spread among residents in the unwholesome district. Another matter concerning which Mr. Welles expressed disappro- bation was the issue of legal-tender notes. This affected him personally, or rather the administration of his Depart- menty in a very embarrassing manner; for the simis at his disposal, voted in dollars but obtained sometimes by bills of exchange, were subject to large discount. Thus the shoe pinched. But while this was vexatious, it was not the fundamental cause of his criticism of the policy recom- m^ided by the Treasury Department and adopted by Ck>ngress, and which he conceived to be unnecessary and mischievous. Whether or not he was right no one can say; for while we know that the country struggled along under the incubus of those financial measures, we can only specu- late as to whether or not it could have fared better or even at all without them. Suffice it to say that some students of the subject have very stoutly maintained the same opinion which Mr. Welles expressed.
These views relating to matters outside Mr. Welles's own Department, and so finding no expression in action, did not diminish his reputation. Nearly or quite every great reputation gained at that period survived as many or more, as bad or worse, misconceptions ; and inevitably so, for amid such novel problems and unprecedented events the lamp of experience burned very dim and no man could walk always wisely amid strange surroundings- The only criticism of Mr. Welles which has retained some vitality is to the general effect that he showed some lack of what we have lately been taught to call the strenuous quality. Certainly he came less before the public than did the Secretary of State who aspired to be the power behind the President, or than the Secretary of the Treasury who desired to succeed the President, or than the Secretary of War whose functions as well as his methods of performing
INTR0DUC5TI0N
them were almcMst prepoeterously spectacular and despotic. Mr. Welles had no political aspirations, was not courting popularity with any eye to the future, and made no effort to render his Department conspicuous or to have his admin- istration of it lauded. Yet a comparison of the achieve- ments of the Navy Department with the achievements of other departments is greatly in its favor. Neither Mr. Stanton in arming, clothing, and feeding the men gathered by the President's calls, nor Mr. Chase in printing green- backs and selling bonds at the buyer^s price, encountered a more novel task or found less material ready at hand for it than Mr. Welles met when he had rapidly to create a great blockading fleet, an efficient fighting fleet, and a fleet adapted for the peculiar service on the great rivers. It is a matter of regret that the Diary does not contain more on the subject of the Navy; and if this is due to lack of egotism, we would rather that he had not been so free from that rather petty blemish. Judgment of his admin- istrative efficiency must still be made up about as it would have been before the publication of these volumes. For some reason, or without reason, people generally have paid insufficient attention to the naval side of the civil conffict, and are still slow to appreciate the fact which our historical writers begin of late to insist upon, that it was because the blockade strangled the Confederacy that the armies were able to slay it; nor is there even now, and perhaps there never will be, any adequate appreciation of the magnitude of that great enterprise or of the infinite difficulty in the details of its prolonged and perilous maintenance. A steady pressing to weaken its effectiveness came not only from selfish or knavish traders anxious to make money and backed by politicians, but also too often from the Foreign Department. Mr. Welles had to take a resolute stand not only against the ignoble money power with its political ^^puU," but occasionally even against Seward himself. It was Seward's inclination and to some extent his duty to regard conciliation somewhat more highly than firmness,
INTRODUCTION xxxk
whereas Mr. Welles had to set achievement far above coin cession. Mr. Welles, eariy in his experience, noted irrit- ably that Mr. Seward would probably get the better in a dispute of this kind because he would alarm the President by the '' bugaboo'' of a foreign war. It soon appeared, however, that Mr. Lincoln was little disturbed by buga- boos, and as force is the naturally powerful element in times of war, Mr. Welles was generally able to prevail over the more pacific and temporizing Secretary.
If the blockade lacked somewhat in the spectacular quality and in the condensation of the single great event, one need only turn to New Orleans and Vicksburg and above all to Mobile Bay, to have these defects abundantly supplied. Military strategy encountered no such novelty as the Merrimac, nor devised any such greater novelty as the Monitor, revolutionizing the practice of the world. Mr. Welles, of course, did not invent the Monitor, but he gave it a trial in spite of strenuous opposition on the part of ^^ practical seamen.'' He did not command at Mobile Bay orelsewhere, any more than Mr. Stanton commanded at Gettysburg. It was not the busmess of these gentle- men to command; but it was their business to choose commanders, and in this Mr. Welles showed an ability in which the rival Department was sadly lacking; for, in the language of the turf, he was apt to ''pick the win- ner," the most useful faculty which a Secretary of War or a Secretary of the Navy can have in time of war. He had singular sagacity in judgiQg men; for he was observant, and could see the moral, mental, and temperamental ma- terial which lay stored away in one man or another. He had a like shrewdness in estimating situations, and in sifting the news and rumors of events; so that his forecasts were singularly accurate. For these reasons it was natural that, while the War Department was painfully learning on many a lost and bloody battlefield who could not com- mand victory, the Navy Department sent well chosen captains from one success to another. For this it would be
INTRODUCTION
unfair not to give the credit to Mr. Welles; and his without self-praise, indicates that he deserved it.
like silver streaks through the somewhat rumpled and disordered surface of this Cabinet story run the reminis- cences of Lincoln. Written of events presently occurring, or repeating words just spoken, the Diary tells such truth as the instantaneous photograph would tell before any re- touching had been done by the artful photographer. There- fore no allowance has to be made for the influence of a pres- tige which was then only in the making and indeed was as yet somewhat dubious. Mr. Lincoln's ministers had no idea that he towered above them, and no one of them was at all overawed by him in those days. Presiding over them at the Cabinet, casually meeting them, chatting with them or lounging as was his habit in Stanton's room, Mr. Lincoln seemed only officially superior to them. One of them had expected to be President, and another meant to be, a third dared to be insolent and unruly; it seemed to be only by a chance of politics that these men stood to him as junior part- ners to a senior, or like a board of directors to the president of a corporation. Apotheosis had not taken place; Lincoln was not yet the victim of the commonplace orator, the favor- ite model for the Simday-school teacher. Deification is a post-mortuary process, and efforts to bring it about prema- turely are ill advised; a dead idol may be made secure upon a pedestal, but a Uving one is sure to slip off, lucky if it escapes with mutilation only, and not irreparable breakage. At the time of the writing of this Diary, Lincoln was not yet divua; when Mr. Chase said that to argue with him was as useless as to pour water on a duck's back, it was not blasphemy, as it would be to-day. When Mr. Seward posed as his tutor, it seemed to many persons not so much presumptu- ous as possibly fortunate; when Mr. Stanton was defiant, not a few were ready to say that it was lucky for the coun- try that a too easy-going President had a masterful Secre- tary. The council of state was at least a heterogeneous, if not quite an ill-assorted, assemblage. Mr. Seward pro-
INTRODUCTION
nounoed it a ^^ compound Cabinet/' and did not mean to imply commendation. This Diary presents almost glar- in^y the wide difference between the conduct of public business and that of private business. A partnership wherein the partners should sustain to each other such re- lations as did these members of the national administra- tion, a corporation with a board of directors so discordant and so jealous, would be in the bankruptcy court within a year or two. But in these vast competitions of the coim- tries, results come slowly; nations have no relief in bank- ruptcy; their managers may snatch and squabble and blunder, according to their measiu^ of brains and charac- ter, but all the while the people must keep on doing each day its daily business for its daily bread as best it can, paying the bills and facing the consequences, sure that it must always be governed somehow, and not over confident that a change would install a better set of governors. No one who has studied the history of oxu: Civil War, and who is willing to speak plain truth will pretend that high and generous cooperation, honest dealing, and economic effi- ciency reached an epidemic prevalence. The splendid skill with which Lincoln held together and made useful the members of this ^'compoimd Cabinet" ought to be better appreciated hereafter, by reason of the divulgements by Mr. Welles. Washington tried the like experiment, but was not able to make it work permanently. He could not han- dle Hamilton and Jefferson in double harness. Lincoln, having a much harder task, succeeded with it. In a meas- ure his success was due to the different character of the subordinate material; for of course there was not in Lin- coln's Cabinet anyone approaching the ability of Hamilton as a statesman or that of Jefferson as a politician. It was, however, much more due to a difference between the chiefs themselves, between Washington and Lincoln. Washing- ton's power lay in a certain high and dignified attitude of supremacy; Lincoln's influence lay in patience, sagacity, tact, knowledge of human nature, and skill with the indi-
xlU INTRODUCTION
vidual. For example, history has no instance of a situation more difficult or of an extrication more brilliant than was presented when, in December, 1862, the committee of Republican Senators waited upon Mr. Lii^coln with a demand for Mr. Seward's removal. Seward, forewarned, had already hastened to resign; a day or two later Lincoln, with a deftness like the feat of a juggler, secured Chase's resignation also. ''Now I can ride,'' said the President; and he did ride. It was characteristic that in this critical hour Stanton, unhampered by loyalty, was on the point oi making the confusion worse by adding his resignation; but Mr. Welles rebuked him and stood gallantly by the Pre- sident. Nor was it the only instance when, in time of stress, the Secretary of the Navy was found a clear-headed, firm, and trustworthy supporter of his harassed principal He played a like part in the matter of the occult move for dis- placing McClellan, when what was perhaps the right thing was undertaken in what was certainly the wrong way. At that time it was largely by reason of the refusal of Mr. Welles to participate that the President was saved from being placed in a very annoying position. This loyalty and trustworthiness of the Secretary Mr. Lincoln well appre- ciated, and in his turn upheld Mr. Welles in times of need or controversy; notably when Mr. Stanton arrogantly claimed the right to dominate the Navy Department and insisted that commanders of vessels on the rivers should take orders from commanders of the army on land. Mr. Lincoln made short work of this theory. It is reassuring to find these two shrewd judges of character entertaining such reciprocal esteem; and the opinion of each was a compli« ment to the other.
If this Diary had not covered the period of the Civil War, it would probably never have been published. Yet so far as furnishing valuable matter for the historian goes, it is even more useful for the four succeeding years; and the reason is not far to seek. From the exciting times of war
INTRODUCTION xliu
under Mr. Lmcoln, to the wearisome days of Reconstruc- tion under Mr. Johnson, was a transition at once swift and striking. If no other administration since the birth of the United States has made history which has been read with such absorbing interest as that of the earlier of these two administrations, so probably no other period has been so shimned as has the second by all readers who are not quite students; and there is abimdant explanation why this should be so. Wranglings carried on by politicians in Con- gress, sometimes with legal arguments and always with extravagant abuse, were not very exhilarating after the intense days of mortal conflict by land and sea. The new scene seemed rather ignoble by contrast with that which had passed. During the War there had been certainly a painful display of corruption, self-seeking, inefficiency, and disloyalty on the part of a much too numerous minority; but ^ese were faults in the superstructure; the basic mul- titude of the people, and a large proportion of their civilian leaders, had made a very fine and inspiring exhibition of enduring resolution and honest patriotism. To what events and to how many persons can one turn, dining Johnson's regime, with any other feelings than dismay, humiliation, and disgust? To no events, and to only a few persons, in good truth !
For a little while after Mr. Johnson became President there was promise of reasonably harmonious, intelligent, and even creditable action in the matter of Reconstruction. But differences of opinion and purpose, which were pro- found, soon developed, and thereupon the outcry of dis- pute, which was not prevented from being tedious because it was acrimonious, became such that for the American of to-day the narration of those angry discussions seems the arid Sahara in our national history. A condition never contemplated by the f ramers of the Constitution had to be disposed of in pretended accordance with an instrument which had not a word to say concerning such problems. It followed that every one was at liberty to assert the law in
xliv INTRODUCTION
the premises according to his own view of what was de- sirable ; and advantage of this privilege was liberally taken. On the one hand there was the theory that the Southern area was no longer an aggregation of sovereign States, but had become conquered territory to be reorganized, geo- graphically and politically, as the victors might choose. On the other hand, it seemed severely logical to say that the North had fought to prove, and by success had proved, that States could never withdraw from the Union ; where- fore they continued to be States after Lee's surrender just as much as they had been before invalid votes had under- taken to effect an imlawful secession. Upon these trunk views there sprouted many variations, big and little, like branches and twigs upon two great trees. The unf ortmiate part of it was the influence upon popular feeling, in some degree at the North, and in a greater degree at the South. For the contestants worked themselves into a mad fury about the business; and many who had remained at a safe distance from battlefields now indulged a rage which made up in savageness of feeling for the absence of danger. Ev- idently men could become much more excited when they were shouting adjectives than when they were shooting bullets, and Congress, impelled by the demagogues, took action which brought law-making into temporary dis- repute.
Apart from the technical disputations of would-be jxu:- ists, really important considerations were advanced upon both sides. Arguments for rubbing out the old State lines, with their dangerous allegiances, faced arguments for re- taining traditional sentiment and familiar obligations; demands, too natural to be called vindictive, for requiring formal avowals of error and penitence were met by sugges- tions of the wisdom as well as the generosity of concilia- tion. Who could say which would prove the better way in the greater nimiber of cases, when treatment which would be effective with one individual would be ineffective with his neighbor? One thing only can now be surely alleged.
INTRODUCTION xlv
and that is that a prompt and decisive adoption of any plan would have been better than the prolonged wrang- lings which wearied, discouraged, and above all embittered nearly every man in the land.
President Johnson and Mr. Welles were naturally led by both intellectual and temperamental influences to re- solve in much the same way those political questions which had now to be answered. So far as there is mate- rial for inferring what would have been Mr. Lincoln's posi** tion, there seems a strong probabiUty that he would have ranged himself with them, or at least not far apart from them. Of late, also, as passion has very slowly cooled and personal prejudices have at last almost ceased to con- trol judgment, students of a later generation are finding much to conmiend in the policy of Andrew Johnson. Com- mendation of his policy, however, is not apt to be accom- panied with any moderation of the condemnatory attitude towards himself. On the contrary, his personal unpopu- larity and his abimdant indiscretions are charged with the responsibiUty of aggravating the seriousness of the situa- tion far beyond what was necessary. Yet, in fact, the clash was inevitable, the opposite opinions had their foundation in the two great divisions which send one half of mankind into the radical camp and the other half into the conserv- ative; and in the situation and the problem then at hand there were present in an exceptional degree precisely those elements which rouse into activity alike the radical and the conservative spirit. In fact the conflict of parties at the North after the War could have been just as surely predicted as the preliminary conflict between the North and the South.
In Mr. Welles there was nothing of the radical ; his sound good sense held him at a safe distance from extremism; therefore, so soon as we find him applying the word ''rad- ical" to a section of the Republican Party , we know that a schism betwixt them and him is at hand. Such was the case, and when Mr. Welles, like all the rest of the coim-
xlvi INTRODUCTION
try, was swept into the f ray, he no longer found at side many with whom during recent years he had main- tained a hearty political alliance. What had happened before the War was about to happen after it; that is to say, new questions were bringing about a new alignment. The Republican Party could not keep the allegiance of all those who had adhered to it faithfully during and even before the War. But the prestige of the party name was so great that whichever section could hold i)ossession of that name and preserve an appearance of political continuity was sure to prevail. As was altogether natural in days of such ex- citement, this advantage fell into the scale of the extrem- ists, who conducted their campaign with a violence that has never been surpassed, rarely has been equalled, in political struggles. Erelong the situation was that Thad- deus Stevens and Benjamin F. Butler gave orders to the Radicals, that the Radicals controlled the Republican Party, and the Republican Party governed the coimtry. Against these forces a President and Cabinet, Republican also, but outnumbered and outshouted in their own camp, were reduced to obstructing, thwarting, and delaying measures which were sure ultimately to be carried. By all precedents such a conflict in the political family was sure to be most bitter, and such it soon became, and the spirit which thus painfully characterized it soon makes itself felt in the changed note of the Diary. Thus far there has been strong, pungent, decisive writing, but never immoderate; now we drift into that somewhat rotund and dignified style of denimciation, which already in those days was getting the flavor known as ''of the old school." With alarming adjectives and damnatory phraseology the most villainous motives are suggested, wicked schemes are shadowed forth, and awful consequences are foretold. Reading these things, we should despair of the Republic, did we not happily know that it is still doing quite well, though how it escaped from such a pirates' cave we can- not quite see. Since, however, we have the comforting
INTRODUCTION xlvii
knowledge that the escape has been successfully effected, we feel free to give a large measure of approval and sym- pathy, at least to the substance of what we read. When Mr. Welles assumed the r61e of a constitutional jurist he was far sounder than were his antagonists; it is true that the practical efficiency of the poUcies which he would have approved was not brought to the test of trial, but on the other hand it is certain that the policies which he disap- proved made no gratifying record; moreover, the lash of his castigation fell generally upon backs which we are willing to see wince.
It has been remarked that it is especially the light thrown by this Diary upon individuals which we find interesting, and in this respect this second part, so to designate it, is even better than the first. The picture of Andrew John- son is altogether the most favorable which has ever been given, at least with any authority, of that unfortimate man. It deserves to be studied with great interest, for, as has been said, Mr. Welles was a very shrewd and very fair judge of men. He had a high esteem for Johnson, which was not only the loyalty of an office-holder towards his chief, but was also a sincere esteem and genuine personal liking. It is safe to assmne that the excited partisanship of the times somewhat stimulated these sentiments; yet he was not thus prevented from often criticizing his leader, and he seems in the main even-minded and judicious. It may be that the publication of these volumes will lead to at least a partial revision of popular opinion concerning our only impeached President.
Very much is said of General Grant and this also will be read eagerly, and is of the greatest value. Not often is any one man great in war and great in peace, and the reader of these pages will see plainly enough that there was no real reason for expecting General Grant to achieve better than the imperfect success which he did in the Presidency. Nowhere else has it been more clearly shown how little there was of the politician in his nature, and how easily he
xlviii INTRODUCTION
could be ensnarled by unworthy schemers. The incidents narrated in the Diary, while showing many of his fine qualities, also betray his limitations and his failings; and there is one scene, between Grant and Johnson, which cer- tainly ought not to have been suppressed, yet which can- not be read without great regret and pain. On the whole, it is probable that most readers will find Grant not much fallen in their esteem, though he was far from conducting himself to Mr. Welles's satisfaction. It is only statues which are made wholly of marble; the ori^nal hero is usu- ally more or less patched with clay.
Charles Simmer and Mr. Welles, honest and earnest men of New England, coevals, and accustomed alike to the conflicts and to the self-control of public life, were able to meet, seem indeed to have liked to meet, in these anxious days, and discuss their widely divergent views. The Diary contains some very interesting reports of their talkings in the earlier stages when the different positions were being established. Agreeing in little, they came most directly into opposition upon the matter of giving to ex-slaves the right of suffrage. History would have no higher function than the mere gratification of curiosity if it did not show to us the more remote as well as the proximate results of human action, and so enable us to draw those far-reaching conclusions which are as oil for the lamp of experience. Now by what history shows as resulting from the gift of the suffrage made to the negro after the War, it would appear that no more evil donation was ever made by men. A useless teaching this, it may be said, since it cannot be imagined that any question at all resembling that one will ever again demand settlement. Perhaps this is true; but a far broader lesson, which is very old yet not antiquated, very familiar yet not needless, receives hereby a striking illustration, to wit: that when short-sighted mortals un- dertake to bring about a good thing by doing a wrong one, they easily make sure of the wrong, and very often lose the good. If a negro leader could then have arisen
INTRODUCTION xlix
to speak for his race and say: ^^No, we decline this tempt- iagj dangerous gift until we shall be able to use it wisely and hold it firmly, '' he would have been the most far- seeing mortal of whom we have any knowledge. The kind- ness was as if one should put money in the hands of a little child and bid him fare forth to care for himself in the crowds of city streets. WHO, he not promptly be de- coyedy beaten, robbed, and subjected to pains such as he never would have known had he not been so foolishly endowed? There were many motives for the act. Some persons were vindictive; what a bitter dose they would make the Southerner take! Some were really negrophiles, and honestly, though shortsightedly, fancied that the n^ro would have, in his vote, a weapon of self-defense and a means of making himself respected. But of course the politicians, who really carried the measure through, did so because it would insure a South as solidly Republican for some years to come — for as many years as they person- ally cared about — as it had been solidly Democratic in years past. Just here Mr. Welles saw, and Mr. Sumner could not see, the moral wrong. Was it not just as immoral' and dishonest to obtain a majority by calling these poor ignorant field hands '' voters'' and then coimting their so-called " votes " as by counting knavish fellows whose ballots were marketable like apples? Was the ''worker" who led these benighted creatures from the rice swamp or the cotton field to the polls and bid them put a certain slip of paper into the box really entitled to a clearer con- science than the "heeler" who slipped a dollar bill into an itching palm in a factory or a bar-room ? To what greater strain was it possible to subject American ''free institu- tions " than to pour into them this awful flood of imfitness? And how great was the responsibility to the country^ even to mankind, in risking the bringing of such discredit upon the new American experiment! Mr. Welles had the intel^ ligence and foresight to condemn the mischievous scheme; he declared it to be at once imconstitutional and ill-ad-
1 INTRODUCTION
vised; but Mr. Sumner, with the coun^ of fanaticism, was ready for the responsibility, while Stevens and Butler hardly knew what the word responsibility meant.
As the immediate outcome of Republican success in this businessi there ensued the two or three years of negro su- premacy in the Southern States and the riot of ignorant and vicious legislation. Tlie spectacle was so shocking that historians rarely draw it with vivid or minute accuracy; it has been hidden away out of sight, and constitutes the only really suppressed chapter in American history. Tlie only relief was that excesses which would soon have put an end to government itself were transitory; to-day, however, we aie still living among the deferred but more serious and permanent conditions which enable us to judge whether the Secretary or the Senator was arguing on the right side of the controversy. Of course it can never be known what results would have been worked out by such measures as President Johnson and Mr. Welles would have devised. That is necessarily mere matter of speculation, and when we write the word IF, we open the door through which imagination can pass into anarchic freedom. We have, however, Mr. Welles's word for it that he would by no means have withheld the vote from negroes as such; that he thought them as fit for the franchise as were the immi- grant hordes; but that taken in bulk he did not think either the one or the other mass was fit for it Now, tak- ing the privilege of the word, if the franchise had been offered to each individual negro so soon as, but only so soon as, he should give fair evidence of his competency to exercise it intelligently, would there not probably have been a steady advancement, yet so gradual that the ''negro question" would not be the difficult and cruel problem which it is to-day? The truth was that the Rad- icals of the Johnson days were really thinking of votes, and were only talking of negroes. Mr. Welles set aside temporary political expediency, and stood for good sense and sound morality.
INTRODUCTION U
Of course in the Andrew Johnson drama the spectacular act is the impeachment. Americans who so lately had been holding their breath as they watched the great struggle waged by Grant and Sherman against Robert E. Lee, now had to watch with more painful feelings the assault of Benjamin F. Butler and Thaddeus Stevens against the President of the United States. It is indeed to ** look hese upon this picture, and on this I" Fain would all cit- iia:i8 of this land hury out of sight and memory the shame of that endeavor, so discreditable in conception and pur- poBB, so disgraceful in conduct and conclurion. But the chapter got itself written and every one must read it. This Diary furnishes us our best, practically our only, opportunity to see the interior of the defendant's council- chamber; and it is interesting to do so. By this time Mr. Welles had become pessimistic ; to him evil and destruction seemed to pervade the air; darkness was around him, and ai^irebension, while the fate of his country was trembling in the balance not less dubiously and much more ignobly thaxk when triumphant Southern troops were marching into Pennsylvania. He considers what is to be done in the anticipated event of an attempt to arrest the Presid- ent before trial, oreven of an effort to depose him. Is Gen- eral Grant to be trusted? Would it be possible to turn to Sherman to oppose Grant, in case of the ultimate emerg- ency? Wild fancies and improbable terrors perturbed the staunch little band of the President's friends. To us now these seem the phantoms of panic ; but we know not the unrealized possibilities of those days. Even for us, merely reading a bit of history, there is not much gratifi- cation in thinking that in the end the nation was saved from the infinite disgrace of a verdict of conviction only because in the great body of her legislators a corporal's guard of Republicans could be found with the courage and 'the honesty to assert their political independence. That we are obliged to rejoice over so narrow a salvation of the national honor is in itself hardly honorable.
m INTRODUCTION
After this great struggle passed, lassitude ensued; there was not much for either side to do now save to wait, to drag through the tedious months which yet remained of John- son's term. The end came of course at noon on March 4, 1869, when General Grant advanced to take his turn at the difficult task, then so exceptionally difficult, of ruling the country, healing the still stinging woimds, and pleasing the people. With all his popularity and prestige he did not find that his plough was set for an easy furrow. On March 17, 1869, Mr. Welles "parted with ex-President Johnson and family," and he writes in his Diary that ''no better per- sons have occupied the Executive Mansion, and I part from them, socially and personally, with sincere r^ret." A month later he took his own departure with "reluct- ance." At his age the change signified, of coimse, that activ- ities were over, and that during his remaining years he must watch rather than share in the interesting toil and struggle of life. Apart from this reflection the removal from the capital brought also the curtailment of pleasiures which had meant much to him. He had an inborn taste for what we call "Society," and he was well fitted to play a prominent and effective part in it. In point of personal ap- pearance Nature had dealt kindly by him. Mr. Seward's intellectual greatness was certainly inadequately expressed by his wizened face and ordinary form. Mr. Chase's stately deportment, on the other hand, was such an exaggeration of Jovian grandeur as seemed to outrun severe good taste. Mr. Stanton was the incarnation of the bourgeoisie in its American type. From much better endowed rivals Mr. Welles would easily have carried off the honors of the dig- nified and handsome gentleman of the official circle. He was complacently aware of these advantages of features, form, and manner, and did not neglect their due cultiva- tion. At that time, it is true, Washington was by no means the beautiful city which the lavish profusion of "boss" Shepherd soon afterward made it, and it was only begin- ning to attract the rich and varied throng which now fills it
INTRODUCTION liii
every winter. It was then only the place where the nation's business was done; yet even thus it had a niunerous and ever changing society of able, interesting, noteworthy men with whom it was most agreeable to mingle. All this life Mr. Welles had thoroughly appreciated, and it could hardly be altogether gratifying to pack his household goods and gods for flight to a Connecticut town. It was natural that on the eve of this flitting he should write gravely, al- most sadly. Yet one would think that there must have been some sense of relief at closing such a service as that which he had been rendering to Mr. Johnson. It would have been bad enough to be engaged in conducting even a successful grapple with men who fought after the fashion adopted by Stevens and Butler and their followers; but to have been constantly forced backward, kept upon the defensive, harried and assailed by such men had been a severe test of temper and constancy. It must have been courage and honor and duty that had made Mr. Welles endure to the end, as he did with unflinching spirit, and he was well entitled to write that his duties had been "honestly and fearlessly discharged"; posterity will add also '* honorably and efficiently." However his feelings may have been mingled between a consciousness of loss and of relief, his sound good sense told him that it was "best that the brief span of life that remains to me should be passed in the land of my nativity. ' ' Thither accordingly he went, man fashion, without repining, and found such occupation as he could in literary work, chiefly for maga- zines. He died at Hartford, February 11, 1878. We bid him farewell with respect for him as a distinguished public servant and with good will towards him as an upright man ; neither can we neglect to say that all the good serv- ice which he rendered to his contemporaries was not of greater value than the legacy which he left to posterity in this invaluable Diary.
John T. Morse, Jr.
DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
VOLUME I 1861— MARCH 80, 1864
DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
1861 — MARCH 80, 1864
I
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR'
The Expedition for the Relief of Sumter — Mr. Seward's Interference — Porter and Barron — The Relief of Fort Pickens — Conversation with Senator Douglas — Mr. Seward's Intrigues — The Loss of the Norfolk Navy Yard — The Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War — The Relations of Seward and Stanton — Fear of the Merrimao in Wash- ington — " Stanton's Navy."
On the 6th of March, 1861, two days after the inaugura- tion of President Lincohi, Secretary Holt, who continued to discharge the duties of Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron not being prepared to enter at once upon the duties, called at the Navy Department with the compliments of General Scott and requested my attendance at the War Depart- ment on matters of special importance. I went immedi- ately with him to the oflSce of the Secretary of War, where were Generals Scott and Totten, and I think Secretary Cameron, and perhaps one or two others.
General Scott commenced with a statement of the peril- ous condition of the country and of the difficulties and embarrassments he had experienced for months past; re- lated the measures and precautions he had taken for the public safety, the advice and admonitions he had given
^ This first chapter is not a part of Mr. Welles's diary, having been writ- ten several years after the events narrated, but since it gives a vivid first- hand account of these events, which occurred before the actual diary was begun, it may properly be considered a part of the record.
4 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
President Buchanan, which, however, had been disregarded, and, finally, his apprehensions, perhaps convictions, that hostilities were imminent and, he feared, inevitable. He had, with the knowledge of Secretary Holt, taken the re- sponsibility of ordering a small military force to Washing- ton for the protection of the government and the public property and archives, and other troops were on their way from the West. His statement was full, clear in its details, and of absorbing interest to those of us who were to meet and provide for the conflict now at hand. Among other matters, and that for which he had especially requested our attendance that morning, was certain intelligence of a distressing character from Major Anderson at Fort Sum- ter, stating that his supplies were almost exhausted, that he could get no provisions in Charleston, and that he with his small command would be wholly destitute in about six weeks. Under these circumstances it became a question what action should be taken, and for that purpose, as well as to advise us of the condition of affairs, he had convened the gentlemen present.
The information was to most of us imexpected and astounding, and there was, on the part of such of us as had no previous intimation of the condition of things at Sumter, an earnest determination to take immediate and efficient measures to relieve and reinforce the garrison. But General Scott, without opposing this spontaneous resolution, related the difficulties which had already taken place, and stated the formidable obstacles which were to be encountered from the numerous and well-manned batteries that were erected in Charleston Harbor. Any successful attempt to reinforce or relieve the garrison by sea he sup- posed impracticable. An attempt had already been made and failed. The question was, however, one for naval authorities to decide, for the army could do nothing. Com- mander Ward, a gallant officer, had tendered his services on a former occasion when the subject was considered, and was ready at any time to take command of an expedition,
PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OF SUMTER 5
if one were ordered. General Scott said he did not expect any conclusion would be arrived at, at this meeting. He had called the gentlemen together by direction of the Pre- sident to communicate what information he had, and waa glad to have his mind relieved of overbiuthened care and responsibility with which it had been loaded for months. He especially requested me to consult with naval men, and had thought it advisable that Commander Ward, then on the receiving-ship at Brooklyn, should come to Wash- ington, as he had already been made somewhat familiar with the subject.
The meeting adjourned with an understanding that we would come together on the following day at the Execu- tive Mansion. Lithemean time the gentlemenwere to give the subject earnest consideration.
When we met on the succeeding day, the same gentle- men, with the exception of Judge Holt, were present, and there were two or three others, beside the President.
Many of the naval officers then in Washington and about the Navy Department were of questionable fidelity. A number had already resigned and most of those who were tainted with secession soon left the service; but some of them, on a further consideration of the subject, aided peihaps by adventitious circumstances, determined to abide by the flag and the Union. Whilst there were doubts and imcertainty on every hand as to who could be trusted, I knew Commodore Stringham to be faithful, and there- fore had, with the concurrence of the President, selected him to assist me in matters of detail. With him I commun- icated freely and fully in regard to the condition of Simi- ter and the abihty of the Navy to throw in supplies for its relief. Both he and Commander Ward were confident that the Navy could reinforce the garrison and furnish it with men and provisions. The President had been apprised of the condition of things at Siunter, on the 4th of March, and had referred the subject to General Scott for advice, with directions to consult the Secretaries of War and Navy.
6 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
Some, but not a very lengthened, discussion took place at this first interview at the Executive Mansion. There was a very general and very determined opinion expressed that Fort Sumter ought to be and should be reinforced. Major Anderson and all the officers of the garrison expressed in a measure the professional opinion that reinforcements could not be thrown into the fort in time for their relief with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well- disciplined men. Generals Scott and Totten declared it was impracticable, and Mr. Seward, who made many sug- gestions and inquiries, had doubts, and was evidently wholly opposed to any attempt at reUef .
No conclusion was required or expected at this inter- view. The President then, and until decisive steps were finally taken, was averse to offensive measures, and anxious to avoid them. In council, and in personal interviews with myself and others, he enjoined upon each and all to for- bear giving any cause of offense; and as regarded party changes consequent upon a change of administration, while they would necessarily be made elsewhere, he wished no removal for political causes to be made in the Southern States, and especially not in Virginia. Although disturbed by the fact that the suppUes of the garrison at Simiter were so limited, he was disinclined to hasty action, and wished time for the Administration to get in working order and its poUcy to be understood. He desired, I think on the suggestion of Mr. Seward, that General Scott should pre- pare a statement of the position of Simiter, and of the other batteries, and of preparations in Charleston and Charles- ton Harbor, — the strength of each, how far and long could the garrison maintain itself and repel an attack if made, what force would be necessary to overcome any rebel force or organized military of the State of South Carolina, should she bid defiance to and resist the Federal authorities.
No regular Cabinet-meetings were held in these days, nor for several weeks subsequently, but the heads of De- partments were frequently convened, always by special
CABINET-MEETINGS 7
summons through the Secretary of State. Sometimes there was not a full attendance, but on such occasions when there was an omission to invite any members, the absentees were considered not particularly interested in the questions submitted, or the questions did not afifect the unrepresented Departments.
The Secretary of State was, of course, apprised of every meetmg and never failed m his attendance, whatever was the subject-matter, and though entirely out of his official province. He was vigilantly attentive to every measiu^ and movement in other Departments, however trivial, — as much so as to his own, — watched and scrutinized every appointment that was made or proposed to be made, but was not communicative in regard to the transactions of the State Department. Other members b^an to inter- change views on these proceedings by which one of the heads of Departments was exclusively apprised on all measures, and at length Mr. Chase, as the second in rank and by request of his associates, inquired at one of the special meetings, whether it had not been usual in past administrations to have regular Cabinet-meetings on stated days of each week, and if it would not be conducive to unity and efficiency were the Administration to conform to past usage in that respect.
Mr. Seward very promptly replied that it was not ad- visable to consume the time of all the gentlemen on stated days and when perhaps it would be imnecessary. The President had only to send word to the State Department, at any time, day or night, when he wanted to call his Cabi- net together, or any portion of them, and he, Seward, would take upon himself to have every member notified whose attendance was required. The times were such, he remarked, that the President might find it necessary to call them, or portions of them, frequently, perhaps daily, and even oftener, together, for consultation.
It was said on the other hand, by all the members except Mr. Seward, that the stated meetings need not prevent
8 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
special calls whenever the President deemed proper, and that it was advisable, for the sake of unity and efficacy, that all the members should attend these meetings and share in the responsibility, instead of having partial gatherings.
The President concurred in these views of the majority, and it was decided that thereafter the Cabinet should assemble at meridian on Tuesdays and Fridays.
Commander Ward, who was summoned to Washington, expressed his readiness to receive orders and to carry supplies to Sumter. He had volimteered to perform this service to the late administration, but his offer was then declined. There was a belief at that time that the garrison could not be reinforced by the Navy, and to attempt it would. President Buchanan feared, bring on hostilities. This in substance was the report of Commander Ward to me. I called with him on General Scott, who I then per- ceived was now decidedly opposed to any attempt to re* lieve Major Anderson. The Navy he was confident could not do it, and an army of at least twenty thousand men would be necessary, he said, to effect it. We had no such army, and the Government could not collect and arm one, to say nothing of the discipline and training, before the garrison would starve. Commander Ward and also Com- modore Stringham at first thought that a supply of pro- visions and a small number of men might be thrown into the fort by means of two small fast tugs, which could run in in the night. Even if one of the tugs was lost, which they did not believe would be the case, the other could relieve the garrison. Of course, the tugs would be abandoned after landing the men, each one of whom was to have his sack of provisions if they could land no more. The crews of the tugs as well as the small additional military force would join the garrison and share its fate.
In subsequent interviews with Generals Scott and Totten, Conmiander Ward became less confident and was finally convinced that relief was impracticable. He
WILLIAM 11. SEWAIID
SEWARD OPPOSES RELIEF PLANS 9
zne that the scheme should be abandoned. Commodore Stringham came ultimately but reluctantly to the same conclusion, after the elaborate report of the two generals, who maintained that if supplies could be furnished the garrison, the fort itself could not hold out against the at- tack of the surroimding batteries which the Secessionists had been allowed to erect and fortify for the reduction of Sumter.
Mr. Seward, who from the first had viewed with no favor any attempt to relieve Sumter, soon became a very decisive and emphatic opponent of any proposition that was made; said he had entertained doubts, and the opin- ions and arguments of Major Anderson and his officers, confirmed by the distinguished military officers who were consulted, had fully convinced him that it would be abort- ive and useless. It was a duty to defer to these military gentlemen, whose profession and study made them experts, who had by long and faithful service justly acquired the positions they held, and who possessed the confidence of the country. It was, he was satisfied, impossible to relieve and reinforce the garrison; the attempt would provoke im- mediate hostilities, and if hostilities could not be avoided, he deemed it important that the Administration should not strike the first blow.
The President, though much distressed with the conclu- sions of the military officers, and the decisive concurrence of the Secretary of State in those conclusions, appeared to acquiesce in what seemed to be a military necessity, but was not disposed to yield until the last moment, and when there was no hope of accomplishing the work if at- tempted. In the mean time, he sent Mr. Lamon, his late law-partner, to Charleston and others also to make in- quiries, among them Mr. Fox, who, like Commander Ward, had been a volunteer imder the late administration to relieve Sumter and who never abandoned the idea of its practicability.
Commander Ward was so fully convinced by the argu-
10 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
ments of General Scott and General Totten and the opin- ions of the officers of the garrison, so dissuaded by the opposition of Mr. Seward and the general current of views which prevailed, that he wholly abandoned the project, stating, however, that he held himself in readiness to obey orders and take charge of an expedition, if the Government should at any time deem it expedient that an effort should be made. On the 11th of March he left Washington, and returned to New York.
A strange state of things existed at that time in Wash- ington. The atmosphere was thick with treason. Party spirit and old party differences prevailed, however, amidst these accimiulating dangers. Secession was considered by most persons as a political party question, not as rebellion. Democrats to a large extent sympathized with the Rebels more than with the Administration, which they opposed, not that they wished secession to be successful and the Union divided, but they hoped that President Lincoln and the Republicans would, overwhelmed by obstacles and embarrassments, prove failiu'es. The Republicans, on the other hand, were scarcely less partisan and unreasonable. Crowds of them at this period, when the storm of civil war was about bursting on the country, thronged the ante- rooms of the President and Secretaries, clamorous for the removal of all Democrats, indiscriminately, from office. Patriotism was with them no test, no shield from party malevolence. They demanded the proscription and ex- clusion of such Democrats as opposed the Rebel move- ments and clung to the Union, with the same vehemence that they demanded the removal of the worst Rebels who advocated a dissolution of the Union.
Neither party appeared to be apprehensive of or to real- ize the gathering storm. There was a general beUef, in- dulged in by most persons, that an adjustment would in some way be brought about, without any extensive resort to extreme measures. It seemed probable there might be some outbreak in South Carolina, and perhaps in one or
SEWARD'S UNFORTUNATE PROPHECIES 11
two other places, but such would, it was believed, be soon and easily suppressed. The threatened violence which the nuUifiers had thimdered for thirty years in the ears of the people had caused their threats to be considered as the harmless ebullitions of excited demagogues throughout the North, while at the South those utterances had so trained the Southern mind, and fired the Southern heart, as to cause them to be received as truthful. The South were, therefore, more united and earnest at this crisis, more determincKl on seceding, than either the Democrats or RepubUcans supposed. But, while the great body of the people and most of their leaders in the Northern States, listening to the ninety-day prophecies of Mr. Seward, were incredulous as to any extensive, serious distiu*bance, there were not a few whose forebodings were grave and sad. All the calamities which soon befell the coimtry these men anticipated. Yet such as were in positions of responsibility would not permit themselves to despond, or despair of the Republic. Mr. Seward possessed a hoi)eful and buoyant spirit which did not fail him in that dark period, and at no time were his party feelings more decided than during the spring of 1861. Old YThig associates he climg to and strove to retain. All Democrats he distrusted, unless they became identified with the Republican Party. He had probably overestimated his own power and ability to allay the rising storm, and had not the personal influence he supposed. He had prophesied during the winter peace and harmony, within a very brief period after the change of administra- tion was to be effected. These unfortimate prophecies, which became a matter of mirth with many of his friends and g[ ridicule among his opponents, were not entirely vain imaginingR or without some foundation. In the confident beUef that he could, if once in place and power, effect con- ciliation and peace, it had been an object with him to tide the difficulties past the 4th of March. He therefore had operated to that end, and so had Mr. Buchanan, though for different reasons.
12 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
Through Mr. Stanton, after that gentleman entered Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, Mr. Seward and others were secretly advised in regard to the important measures of the Buchanan Administration, and in the course of the winter Mr. Seward came to an understanding, as was alleged and as events and circimistanoes indicated, with certain of the leading Secessionists. Among other things it was ass^ted that an agreement had been entered into that no assault should be made on Fort Sumter, provided the garrison should not be reinforced. Mr. Buchanan was to observe the status thus understood during the short remaining pe- riod of his administration, and Mr. Seward, as the coming premier, was, on the change of administration, to carry forward the policy of non-reinforcement of Sumter. If not supplied or reinforced, famine would certainly effect the downfall of the fortress without bloodshed on. eitha* side. Until blood was spilled, there was hope of conciliation. In fulfillment of this arrangement, Mr. Seward opposed any and every scheme to reinforce Simiter, and General Scott, who was old and much under his influence, if not a party to the imderstanding, seconded or took a leading part in that opposition.
On the 5th of March conmiissioners from the Rebel Government arrived in Washington and soon put themr selves in communication with the Secretary oi State, but the specific object which they had in view, and the nego- tiations or understanding between him and the parties were not immediately detailed to the Cabinet. They un- doubtedly influenced the mind and course of Mr. Seward, who did not relinquish the hope of a peaceful adjustment of difficulties, and he in conversation continued to allure his friends with the belief that he should be able to effect a reconciliation.
In the many, almost daily, discussions which for a time were held in regard to Sumter, the opposition to forward- ing supplies gathered strength. Commodore Stringham, as weU as Commander Ward, on a final application which
THE PRESIDENT AROUSED 13
I made to him, by request of the Plmdent, and finally by the President himself, said he was compelled to advise against it. The time had gone by . It was too late. The mil- itary gentlemen had satisfied him it was impossible, that nothing could be gained by it, were the attempt made, that it would be attended with a useless sacrifice of blood and treasure, and he felt constrained to state his belief of the inability of the Navy to give relief.
Postmaster-General Blair, who had been a close and near observer of what had taken place through the winter and spring, took an opposite view from Mr. Seward and Greneral Scott. To some extent he was aware of the un* derstanding which Mr. Seward had with the members of Buchanan's Administration, or was suspicious of it, and his indignation that any idea of abandoning Sumter should be entertained or thought of was unbounded. With the exception of Mr. Seward, all his colleagues concmred with Mr. Blair at the commencement, but as the subject was discussed, and the impossibility and inutility of the scheme was urged, with assurance from the first military men in the country, whose advice was sought and given, that it was a military necessity to leave Sumter to its fate, the opinions of men changed, or they began at least to waver. Mr. Blair saw these misgivings, in which he did not at all participate, and finally, observing that the President, with the acquiescence of the Cabinet, was about adopting the Seward and Scott policy, he wrote his resignation, de- termined not to continue in the Cabinet if no attempt were made to relieve Fort Sumter. Before handing in his resignation, a delay was made at the request of his father. The elder Blair sought an interview with the President, to whom he entered his protest against non-action, which he denounced as the ofifspring of intrigue. His earnestness and indignation aroused and electrified the President ; and when, in his zeal, Blair warned the President that the aban- donment of Sumter would be justly considered by the people, by the world, by history, as treason to the country,
14 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
he touched a chord that responded to his invocation. The President decided from that moment that an attempt should be made to convey supplies to Major Anderson, and that he would reinforce Sumter. This determination he communicated to the members of the Cabinet as he saw them, without a general annoimcement in Cabinet-meet- ing. The resolve inspired all the members with hope and courage, except Mr. Seward, who was evidently disap- pointed. He said it was of vastly more importance to turn our attention to Fort Pickens. I told him this had been done and how ; that we had a considerable naval force there, abnost the whole of the Home Squadron, and we had sent, a fortnight before, orders to land the troops imder Captain Vogdes from the Brooklyn. He said that still more should, in his opinion, be done; that it was practicable to save Fort Pickens, but it was confessedly impossible to retain Sumter. One would be a waste of effort and energy and life, would extinguish all hope of peace, and compel the Government to take the initiative in hostile demonstra- tions, while the other would be an effective and peace- able movement. Although, as already mentioned, stated Cabinet-meetings were not then established, the members were in those early days of the Administration frequently together, and the President had every day more or less interviews with them, individually or collectively. The Secretary of State spent much of each day at the Execu- tive Mansion and was vigilant to possess himself of every act, move, and intention of the President and of each of his associates. Perhaps there was an equal desire on their part to be informed of the proceedings of the Administra- tion in full, but less was known of the transactions of the State Department than of any other.
The President, after his interview with the elder Blair, asked me if a naval expedition could be promptly fitted out to relieve Sumter. Mr. Fox,^ who had in February proposed to the Buchanan Administration a plan for the
^ Gustavua V. Fox, subsequently Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
FOX UNDERTAKES THE EXPEDITION 16
relief of Sumter, again volunteered for the service, and was accepted by Mr. Lincoln. On the 19th of March he received the following communication from General Scott :
HSADQUABTSBS OV THB ABlfT,
WaahingUm, March 19, 1861.
Dear Sib: In accordance with the request contained in a note from the Secretary of War to me, of which I annex a copy, I re- quest that you will have the goodness to proceed to Charleston, S. C, and obtain permission, if necessary, to visit Fort Sumter, in order to enable you to comply with the wish expressed in the Secretary's note.
Please, on yoiur return, to report accordingly.
I remain, with high consideration, yoiur most obedient serv- ant,
WiNFiELD Scott. Q. V. Fox, Esq.
Mr. Fox visited the fort and saw Major Anderson, and was confident he could reinforce the garrison with men and supply it with provisions. Conmiodore Stringham was tendered the command of the naval part of the expe- dition, but doubted the practicability of succeeding. The President, notwithstanding Stringham's reluctance, de- termined to accept the volimteer services of Mr. Fox, who, though then in no way connected with the Government, had formerly been an officer of the Navy. The object being the relief of a military garrison and the supplies and troops for reinforcement being from the army, the expe- dition was made a military and not a naval one, but with naval aid and cooperation. The transports which the War Department was to charter were to rendezvous oflf Charles- ton with the naval vessels, which would act as convoy, and render such assistance as woidd be required of them. The steam frigate Powhatan, which had returned from service in the West Indies and needed considerable repairs, had just arrived and been ordered out of commission, and the crew discharged the day before the final decision of the President was communicated. Dispatches were forthwith
16 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
sent revoking the orders which had been issuedi that the Powhatan be again put in conunissioni and to fit her without delay for brief service. The Pawnee and one or two other vessels, including the Harriet Lane, a revenue cutter transferred to the Navy for the occasion, thereVot being sufficient naval vessels available for the expedition, were ordered to be in readiness for sea service on or before the 6th of April with one month's stores on board. These preparatory orders were ^ven on the 30th of March.
On the 1st of April, while at my diimer at Willard's, where I then boarded, Mr. Nicolay, the private secretary of the President, brought to me and laid upon the table a large package from the President. It was between five and six o'clock in the afternoon when I received this package, which I inmiediately examined and found it contained several papers of a singular character, in the nature of in- structions, or orders from the Executive in relation to naval matters, and one in reference to the government of the Navy Department more singular and remarkable than either of the others. This extraordinary dociunent was as follows: —
(Confidential)
ExiK?unvB Mansion, April 1, 1861. To the Secretary of the Navy.
DsAR Sm: You will issue instructions to Captain Pendergrast, commanding the home squadron, to r^nain in observation at Vera Crua — important complications in our foreign relations rendering the presence of an officer of rank there of great imx)ort- ance.
Captain Stringham will be directed to proceed to Pensacola with all possible despatch, and assume command of that portion of the home squadron stationed off Pensacola. He will have con- fidential instructions to cooperate in every way with the com- manders of the land forces of the United States in that neighbor- hood.
The instructions to the army officers, which are strictly con- fidential, will be communicated to Captain Stringham after he arrives at Pensacola.
SEWARD^S INTERFEBENGE 17
Captain Samuel Barron will relieve Captain Stringham in chai^ of the Bureau of DetaiL
Abbaham Lincoln.
P. S. As it is very necessary at this time to have a perfect know- ledge of the personal of the navy, and to be able to detail such officers for special purposes as the exigencies of the service may require, I request that 3rou will instruct Captain Barron to pro- ceed and organize the Bureau of Detail in the manner best adapted to meet the wants of the navy, taking cognizance of the discipline of the navy generally, detailing all officers for duty, taking charge of the recruiting of seamen, supervising charges made against officers, and all matters relating to duties whi^ must be best understood by a sea officer. You will please afford Captain Barron any facility for accomplishing this duty, trans- ferring to his depwtment the clerical force heretofore used for the piuposes specified. It is to be understood that this officer will act by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, who will exercise such supervision as he may deem necessary.
Abraham Lincoln.
"Without a moment's delay I went to the President with the package in my hand. He was alone in his office and, raising his head from the table at which he was writingi inquired, "TF/wrf have I done wrongt'^ I informed him I had received with surprise the package containing his in- structions respecting the Navy and the Navy Department, and I desired some explanation. I then called his atten- tion particularly to the foregoing document, which I read to him. This letter was in the handwriting of Captain Meigs of the army, then Quartermaster-General ; the post- script in that of David D. Porter, since made Vice-Ad- miral. The President expressed as much surprise as I felt, that he had sent me such a document. He said Mr. Seward, with two or three young men, had been there through the day on a subject which he (Seward) had in hand, and which he had been some time maturing; that it was Sew- ard's specialty, to which he, the President, had yielded, but as it involved considerable details, he had left Mr. Seward
18 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had signed, many of them without reading, — for he had not time, and if he could not trust the Secretary of State, he knew not whom he could trust. I asked who were asso- ciated with Mr. Seward. "No one," said the President, "but these young men were here as clerks to write down his plans and orders." Most of the work was done, he said, in the other room. I then asked if he knew the young men. He said one was Captain Meigs, another was a naval officer named Porter.
I informed the President that I was not prepared to trust Captain Barron, who was by this singular pro- ceeding, issued in his name, to be forced into personal and official intimacy with me. He said he knew nothing of Barron except he had a general recollection that there was such an officer in the Navy. The detailing officer of the Department, I said to him, ought to have the implicit confidence of the Secretary, and should be selected by him. This the President assented to most fully. I then told him that Barron, though a pliant gentleman, had not my confidence, and I thought him not entitled to that of the President in these times; that his associations, feelings, and views, so far as I had ascertained them, were with the Secessionists; that he belonged to a clique of exclusives, most of whom were tainted with secession notions; that, though I was not prepared to say he would desert us when the crisis came on, I was apprehensive of it, and while I would treat him kindly, considerately, and hoped he would not prove false like most others of his set, I could not give him the trust which the instructions imposed.
The President reiterated they were not his instructions, though signed by him, that the paper was an improper one, that he wished me to give it no more consideration than I thought proper, to treat it as canceled, or as if it had never been written. He said he remembered that both Seward and Porter had something to say about Barron, as if he was a superior officer, and in some respects, perhaps, with-
DEFECTION AMONG NAVAL OFFICERS 19
out any equal in the Navy, but he certainly never would have assigned him or any other man knowingly the posi- tion without consulting me.
Barron was a courtier, of mild and affable manners, a prominent and influential officer, especially influential with the clique which recognized him as a leader. He and D. D. Porter were intimate friends, and both were favor- ites of Jefferson Davis, Slidell, and other Secessionists, who, I had learned, paid them assiduous attention.
When I took charge of the Navy Department, I found great demoralization and defection among the naval of- ficers. It was difficult to ascertain who among those that lingered about Washington could and who were not to be trusted. Some belonging to the Barron clique had already sent in their resignations. Others, it was well imderstood, were prepared to do so as soon as a blow was struck. Some were hesitating, imdecided what step to take. Barron, Buchanan, Maury, Porter, and Magruder were in Wash- ington, and each and all were, during that unhappy winter, courted and caressed by the Secessionists, who desired to win them to their cause. I was by reliable friends put on my guard as respected each of them. Buchanan, Maury, and Magruder were each holding prominent place and on duty. Barron was familiar with civil and naval matters, was prepared for any service, ready to be called to dis- charge such duties as are constantly arising in the Depart- ment, requiring the talents of an intelligent officer.
Porter had some of the qualities of Barron, with more dash and energy, was less plausible, more audacious, and careless in his statements, but like him was given to in- trigues. His associations, as well as Barron's, during the winter of 1861, had been intimate with the Secessionists. He sought and obtained orders for Coast Survey service in the Pacific, which indicated an intention to avoid active participation in the approaching controversy. That class of officers who at such a time sought duties in the Pacific and on foreign stations were considered, prima fade, as in
aO DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
sympathy with the Secessionists, but yet not prepared to give up their commissions and abandon the Government. No men were more fully aware that a conflict was impend- ing, and that, if hostilities commenced and they were witidn the call of the Department, they would be required to participate. Hence a disposition to evade an unpleasant dilemma by going away was not misunderstood.
Barron and Porter occupied in the month of March an equivocal position. They were intimate, they were popu- lar, and the e3re of the Department was necessarily upon them, as it was, indeed, upon all in the service. In two or three interviews with me, Barron deprecated the imfor- tunate condition of the country, expressed his hopes that extreme measures would not be resorted to, avowed his love for the profession with which from early childhood he had been identified and in which so many of his family had distinguished connection. There were suavity in his manner and kindly sentiments in his remarks, but not that earnest, devoted patriotism which the times demanded, and which broke forth from others of his profession, in denunciation of treason and infidelity to the flag. Porter had presented himself but once to the Department, and that was to make some inquiries in relation to his orders to the Pacific, but there was no allusion to the impending difficulties nor any proffer of service if difficulties ensued. As with many others, some of whom abandoned the Gov- ernment, while some remained and rendered valuable service, the Department was in doubt what course these two officers would pursue.
This was the state of the case when the instructions of the 1st of April were sent me. On learning from the Pre- sident who were Mr. Seward's associates, I was satisfied that Porter had throu^ him proposed and urged the substitution of Barron for Stringham as the detailing and confidential officer of the Secretary of the Navy. I was unwilling to beUeve that my colleague Mr. Seward could connive at, or be party to, so improper and gross an affair
THE BARRON INTRIGUE 21
as to interfere with the organization of my Departmenti and jeopardize its operations at such a juncture. What, then, were the contrivances which he was maturing with two young officers, one of the army and the other of the Navy, without consulting the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy 7 What had he, the Secretary of State, to do with these officers in any respect? I could get no satis- factory explanation from the President of the origin of this strange interference, which mystified him, and which he censured and condemned more severely than myself. He assured me it would never occur again. Although very much disturbed by the disclosure, he was anxious to avoid difficulty, and, to shield Mr. Seward, took to himself the whole blame and repeatedly said that I must pay no more attention to the papers sent me than I thought advisable. He gave me, however, at that time no information of the scheme which Mr. Seward had promoted, farther than that it was a specialty, which Mr. Seward wished should be kept secret. I therefore pressed for no further disclos- ures.
The instructions in relation to Barron I treated as null- ities. My first conclusions were that Mr. Seward had been made a victim to an intrigue, artfully contrived by those who favored and were promoting the Rebellion, and that the paper had been in some way surreptitiously introduced with others in the hurry and confusion of that busy day without his knowledge. That he would commit the discour- tesy of imposing on me such instructions I was unwilling]to believe, and that he should be instrumental in placing, or attempting to place, a person more than suspected, and who was occupying so equivocal a position as Barron, in so responsible a position in the Navy Department, and commit to him all the information of that branch of the Government, seemed to me impossible.
The preparations for the Sumter expedition were carried forward with all the energy which the Department could command, for we were notified the provisions of the garri-
22 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
son would be exhaiisted on the 15th of April. It was ar- ranged by the War and Navy Departments that their forces — the naval vessels and transports — should meet and rendezvous ten miles due east of Charleston lighthouse on the morning of the 11th of April. Each of the vessels was to report to Capt. Samuel Mercer, commanding the Powhatan, and the following final instructions were sent to that officer: —
(Confidential)
Nayt Dbpabtmsnt, April 5, 1861.
Captain Samuel Mercer, commanding U. S. Steamer Pow- hatan, N. Y.
The United States Steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under yoiur com- mand, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston, S. C, for the purw pose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge.
The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston per- mit the fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the force under your command; and after beiag satis- fied that supplies have been received at the fort, the Powhatan, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will return to New York, and the Pawnee to Washington.
Should the authorities at Charleston, however, refuse to per- mit, or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force ID such manner as to open the way for their iagress, and afford as far as practicable security to the men and boats, and repelling by force if necessary all obstructions toward provisioning the fort and reinforcing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition, a reinforcement of the garri- son will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. The expedition has been iatrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication, and
CAPTAIN MERGER'S ORDERS 23
cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its object.
You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the light-house, on the morning of the 11th instant, there to await the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores. The Pawnee and Pocahontas will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also the Harriet Lane, which latter vessel has been placed under the control of this Department for this service.
On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will re- turn to the respective ports as above directed, unless some un- foreseen circunistance should prevent.
I am, respectfully.
Your Obd't Serv't,
Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy.
Sealed orders were given to Commander Rowan of the Pawnee, Commander Gillis of the Pocahontas, and Cap- tain Tanner of the Harriet Lane, to report to Captain Mercer on the 11th of April, and the entire military and naval expedition was to be imder the conmiand of Mr. Fox, who was specially conmiissioned by the President and received his instructions from the Secretary of War. My instructions to Captain Mercer were read to the Pre- sident on the 5th of April, who approved them. Although but brief time had been permitted us to fit out the expedi- tion, I congratulated myself, when I went to my room at Willard's on the evening of the 6th of April, that it had been accomplished within the time given us, and that the force had probably sailed.
Between eleven and twelve that night, Mr. Seward and his son Frederick came to my rooms at Willard's with a telegram from Captain Meigs at New York, stating in effect that the movements were retarded and embarrassed by conflicting orders from the Secretary of the Navy. I asked an explanation, for I could not imderstand the nature
24 DIARY OP GIDEON WELLES
of the telegram or its object. Mr. Seward said he sap- posed it related to the Powhatan and Porter's command. I assured him he was mistaken, that Porter had no com- mand, and that the Powhatan was the flagship, as he was aware, of the Sumter expedition. He thought there must be some mistake, and after a few moments' conversation, with some excitement on my part, it was suggested that we had better call on the President. Before doing this, I sent for Conunodore Stringham, who was boarding at Willard's and had retired for the night. When he came, my statement was confirmed by him, and he went with us, as did Mr. Frederick Seward, to the President. On our way thither Mr. Seward remarked that, old as he was, he had learned a lesson from this affair, and that was, he had bet- ter attend to his own business and confine his labors to his own Department. To this I cordially assented.
The President had not retired when we reached the Executive Mansion, although it was nearly midnight. On seeing us he was surprised, and his surprise was not dimin- ished on learning our errand. He looked first at one and then the other, and declared there was some mistake, but after again hearing the facts stated, and again looking at the telegram, he asked if I was not in error in regard to the Powhatan, -^ if some other vessel was not the flagship of the Sumter expedition. I assured him there was no mis- take on my part; reminded him that I had read to him my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer. He said he remembered that fact, and that he approved of them, but he could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel. Commodore Stringham confirmed my statement, but to make the matter perfectly clear to the President, I went to the Navy Department and brought and read to him the instructions. He then remembered distinctly all the facts, and, turning promptly to Mr. Seward, said the Powhatan must be restored to Mercer, that on no accoxmt must the Sumter expedition fail or be interfered with. Mr. Seward hesitated, remonstrated, asked if the other expedi-
SEWARD'S INTERFERENCE 25
tion was not quite as important, and whether that would not be defeated if the Powhatan was detached. The Pre- sident said the other had time and could wait, but no time was to be lost as regarded Sumter, and he directed Mr. Seward to telegraph and return the Powhatan to Mercer without delay. Mr. Seward suggested the difficulty of getting a dispatch throu^ and to the Navy Yard at so late an hour, but the President was imperative that it diould be done.
The President then, and subsequently, informed me that Mr. Seward had his heart set on reinforcing Fort Pickens, and that between them, on Mr. Seward's suggestion, they had arranged for supplies and reinforcements to be sent out at the same time we were fitting out vessels for Sumter, but with no intention whatever of interfering with the latter expedition. He took upon himself the whole blame, said it was carelessness, heedlessness on his part, he ought to have been more careful and attentive. President Lin* coin never shunned any responsibility and often declared that he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault for errors im- puted to them, when I sometimes thou^t otherwise.
Mr. Seward never attempted any explanation. He was not communicative on that night, nor afterwards, thou^ there were occasional allusions, by myself, to that singular transaction. Mr. Cameron was greatly incensed; com- plained that Mr. Seward was trying to run the War De- partment, bad caused Captain Meigs to desert; said he would have Meigs arrested and tried by court martial, that he was absent without leave, was expending the mili- tary appropriations without authority from the Secretary of War. My grievance was somewhat similar. Although Lieutenant Porter had gone with the Powhatan to Pensa- oola, there was no order or record in the Navy Department of the facts. He was absent without leave; the last sailing- orders to the Powhatan were [sent to] Mercer. The whole proceeding was irregular and could admit of no justifica- tion without impeaching the integrity or ability of the
26 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
Secretaries of War and Navy. No one was more aware of this than the President, and, solicitous that there should be no disagreement or cause for disagreement in his Cabinet, he was not comforted by any reflection or examination of the subject. A large portion of the Home Squadron was off Pensacola, and no additional vessels were required nor could well be spared for that station whilst we were want- ing them and many more this side of Key West. I had, moreover, on the earnest application of lieutenant-General Scott, sent the Crusader and Mohawk already into the Gulf with orders to Captain Adams, the senior officer off Pensacola, to land the troops in order to reinforce Fort Pickens. No additional frigate like the Powhatan was needed there, while she was indispensable here. That ves- sel gave no greater security to Pickens. The troops, with the naval force already there, were abundantly able to de- fend it, as results proved. Besides, the defense was mili- tary, not naval, and could easily have been reinforced. Hence the reinforcements were stolen away from Sumter and sent to Pickens.
^ When at a later date I saw the communication of the Rebel commissioners of the 9th of April to Mr. Seward and also Judge Campbell's letter of the 13th of that month, I had one of the kejrs to the mjrstery and movements of Mr. Seward. The commissioners state that ''on the 15th of March Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured by a person occupying a high official position in the Government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within a very few dajrs, and that no measure changing the existing status prejudicially to the Confederate States as respects Fort Pickens was then contemplated; and these assurances were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplated change as respects Pickens [-Siunter] would be notified to us. On the 1st of April we were again informed that there might be an attempt to supply Fort Siunter with provisions, but that Gov. Pickens should
SEWARD AND THE COMMISSIONERS 27
have previous notice of this attempt. There was no sug- gestion of any reenforcements."
Judge Campbell and Judge Nelson of the Supreme Court were the high ofScials alluded to, and the former in his letter of the 13th of April to Mr. Seward says, ''On the 1st of April I received from you the statement in writ- ing: I am satisfied the govt, will not undertaJke to supply Fort Siunter without giving notice to Gov. P." The 1st of April was the day on which Mr. Seward, assisted by Meigs and Porter, prepared the strange series of instruc- tions to me which President Lincoln signed without read- ing, directing that Captain Barron should be made the confidential detailing oflScer of the Department with ex- traordinary powers. It was on the 1st of April that carte blanche was given to the two yoimg officers, investing them with full governmental powers and authorizing them to act independently of their superiors and of the heads of their respective departments, by which a military expedi- tion was sent out without the knowledge of the Secretary of War and a naval ship under orders was taken from her destination, her commander displaced, and her cruise broken up without the knowledge of the Secretary of the Navy, whereby the whole plan of sending supplies and re- inforcements to Fort Siunter was defeated. The Secretary of State writes the Rebel commission he is satisfied the Government wiU not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor P., when at the very moment he knew the whole energies of the War and Navy Departments were engaged by order of the President in preparations to forward supphes and reinforcements to Sumter. All was rendered abortive, however, by secretly detaching the Powhatan, the flagship to which the squad- ron was to report and which had the supplies.
On the ni^t of the 6th of April, Secretary Seward was ordered by the President to send a telegram to Porter to restore the Powhatan to Mercer and the expedition to Siunter. But the vessel was not so restored^ and on the
28 DIARY OP GIDEON WELLES
foUowing day Mr. Seward writes Judge Campbell, ''Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see/' I make no com- ments on these proceedings; by which I, and the Pre- sident, and others, as well as the Rebel commission's, were deceived. These letters of Judge Campbell and the commissioners were not disclosed to me by Mr. Seward, nor do I think the President saw them when received.
Porter's instructions, recommended by Seward and signed by Abraham Lincoln, placed that officer in inde- pendent command at Pensacola, where his senior, Captain Adams, was in command of the squadron, and the latter was to cooperate with and be subject to the request of his jimior in the great object and purpose of the force on that station. The strange and irregular proceeding embar- rassed Captain Adams and became uncomfortable to lieu- tenant Porter as well as embarrassing to the Secretary cS State. Captain Adams could not receive or recognize the Powhatan as a part of his squadron; he had received no orders from the Secretary of the Navy in relation to the vessel or to Lieutenant Porter; and while he could not dis- regard the strange instructions to which the Secretary of State had persuaded the President to affix his signature, there was nothing requiring his action as commander of the naval forces. Porter could not report or write to the Navy Department, for he was off Pensacola, when by naval re- cord he should have been in the Pacific, and [as he was] in command of the Powhatan by no order from the Secretary of the Navy, — was without orders or instructions from the proper Department, — the officer in command would not receive and forward his letters. Officers are required to send their letters to the Navy Department through their senior officers. The Secretary of State had therefore to correspond with that branch of the Navy, and awkwardly passed over the letters of the officer who was in command of a vessel surreptitiously detached and withdrawn from her legitimate duties.
I may here state that, as early as the 11th of March,
RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS 29
I had, on the application of General Scott, who feared to trust the mails, and was unwilling to send a messenger through the infected region lest he should be arrested, de- tailed the Crusader to carry an officer with instructions to Captain Vogdes to land his forces and strengthen the gar- rison at Fort Pickens. When the vessel was ready to sail. General Scott concluded not to send his messenger, but dispatched written orders to Captain Vogdes, which he entrusted to the naval officer to deliver. But Captain Adams, the senior naval officer, would not recognize the orders of General Scott, nor permit Captain Vogdes and his command to land. His justification was an armistice, whichhad been entered into by Secretaries Holt and Toucey with prominent Rebels, not to reinforce the garrison at Fort Pickens, provided the Rebels would not attack it.
Captain Adams was not entirely satisfied with his own decision. Though technically he might be justified in adhering to the armistice or order of the Secretary of the Navy, rather than obey the order of General Scott, the emergency was one when a faithful and patriotic officer would have been justified in taking a reasonable respon- sibility. To relieve himself from embarrassment, he im- mediately dispatched Lieutenant Gwathmey with a secret confidential communication to me, dated the 1st of April, stating the facts and asking instructions. Lieutenant G., although a Secessionist, was faithful to his trust. He trav- elled night and day, not even stopping in Richmond, where he belonged, and reached Washington on the 6th of April. He came to me on his arrival before he went to his hotel, and took from a belt that was strapped around his body under his shirt, the letter of Captain Adams, which he de- livered into my hands. A day or two after this affair, he tendered his resignation, which, however, was not accepted, but he was dismissed from the service.
I went immediately to the President with Captain Adams's communication, and we both deemed it abso- lutely essential that a special messenger should be forth-
30 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
with sent overland with orders to immediately land the troops. Prompt action was all-important, for the Rebellion was rapidly culminating, and the hesitancy of Captain Adams had caused a delay which endangered the possession of Santa Rosa Island and the safety of Fort Pickens. But, in the general demoralization and suspicion which per- vaded Washington, who was to be trusted with this im- portant mission? It was then three o'clock in the after- noon, and the messenger must depart by the mail train which left that evening. Paymaster Etting was in Wash- ington, and I sent for him to convey the message. Al- though not well, he prepared to obey orders, but had my consent to make inquiry for another officer, whose fideUty and energy were unquestioned, to perform the service* About five o'clock he reported to me that lieut. John Worden had just arrived in Washington, that he would vouch for him as untainted by treason, and as possessed of the necessary qualifications for the mission. I directed that Lieutenant W. should immediately report to me, and in a brief interview I informed him of my piupose to dis- patch him on a secret, responsible, and somewhat danger- ous duty through the South, and that he must leave in about two hours. He expressed his readiness to obey orders, and, though the time was short and he indifferently pre- pared, he would be ready at the time designated. I di- rected him to make no mention of his orders or his journey to any one, not even to his wife, but to call on me as soon as ready and I would in the mean time prepare the docu- ment that was to be confided to him. The fact that he was an officer of the Navy passing South to Pensacola, and yet not a Secessionist or in sympathy with them, would be likely to cause him to be challenged and perhaps searched. I therefore wrote a brief dispatch to Captain Adams, which I read to him when he called, and gave it into his hands open, advising that he should commit it to memory, and then, if he thou^t best, he could destroy the paper. When he saw Captain Adams he could from recollection make
REUEP OP FORT PICKENS 31
a certified copy to that officer, stating the reasons why he did not produce the original. Everything was successful, for, though he was questioned at one or two points and asked if he was canying a message, he managed to escape detection, and I believe was not searched.
He reached Pensacola and was put on board the Brook- lyn on the 12th of April. That ni^t the troops under command of Captain Vogdes with [a battalion of] marines were landed and Fort Pickens was reinforced. Instead of remaining with the squadron and improving the first opportunity to reach the North by steamer, Lieutenant Worden preferred to land as soon as his message was delivered, and commenced his return, going to Washington by the same route he had taken in going to Pensacola. It was not surprising that the Rebels, when they learned next day that the troops had been landed and were in Fort Pickens, connected the mission of that officer with the movement. Although he had been gone some hours on his homeward journey, the facts were telegraphed to the Rebel leaders at Montgomery, who had him arrested and confined in the prison at that place, where he remained several months until late in the fall, when an exchange was effected, and he reached the North in season to take com- mand of the ironclad and turreted Monitor, the first ves- sel of that class, and fight the Merrimac in Hampton Roads. He was among the first, if not the very first, prisoners-of- war captured by the Rebels.
The order to Captain Adams to land the troops was re- ceived by him, as stated, on the 12th, and the fort was reinforced that night. Lieutenant -Porter and the Powhatan did not reach Pensacola until the 17th, five days after Cap- tain Vogdes and his command with the marines were in the fort, — a force sufficient for its defense. In detaching the Powhatan from the Siunter expedition, no important or necessary aid was furnished by her or by Lieutenant Porter to Hckens. Had the frigate remained under Cap- tain Mercer, the attempt to relieve Major Anderson
32 DIARY OF QIDEON WELLES
probably would not have succeeded, for the Rebels of Charleston were strangely prepared and warned of the intended expedition, and th^^e were other movemecits which precipitated Rebel action.
Soon after President Lincoln had formed the resolu- tion to attempt the relief <^ Smnter, and whilst it was jret a secret, a young man connected with the telegraph ofl^ in Washington, with whom I was acquainted, a native of the same town with myself, brought to me successively two tel^rams, conveying to the Rebel authorities informa- tion of the purpose and decision of the Administration. One of these telegrams was from Mr. Harvey, a newspaper correspondent, who was soon after, and with a full know- ledge of his having communicated to the Rebels the move- ments of the Government, appointed minister to Lisbon. I had, on receiving these copies, handed them to the Re- sident. Mr. Blair, who had also obtained a copy of one, perhaps both, of these telegrams from another source, like- wise informed him of the treachery. The subject was once or twice alluded to in Cabinet without eliciting any action, and when the nomination of Mr. Harvey to the Portuguese mission was announced, — a nomination made without the knowledge of any member of the Cabinet but the Secretary of State, and made at his special request, — there was general disapprobation, except by the Resident (who avoided the expression of any opinion) and by Mr. Seward. The latter defended and juertdfied the selection, which he admitted was recommended by himself, but the President was silent in regard to it.
Two days preceding the attack on Sumter, I met Sena- tor Douglas in front of the Treasury Building. He was in a carriage with Mrs. Douglas, driving rapidly up the street. When he saw me he checked his driver, jmnped from the carriage, and came to me on the sidewalk, and in a very earnest and emphatic manner said the Rebels were deter- mined on war and were about to make an assault on Sum-
DOUGLAS'S OPINION OF SEWARD 33
ter. He thou^t immediate and decisive measures should be taken; considered it a mistake that there had not al- ready been more energetic action; said the dilatory pro- ceedings of the Government would bring on a terrible civil war, that the whole South was united and in earnest. Althou^ he had differed with the Administration on important questions, and would never be in accord with some of its members on measures and principles that were fundamental, yet he had no fellowship with traitors or disunionists. He was for the Union and would stand by the Administration and all others in its defense, regardless of party.
I proposed that we should step into the State Depart- ment, near which we were, and consult with Mr. Seward. The look of mingled astonishment and incredulity which came over him I can never forget. ^^Th^i you,'' said he, *' have faith in Seward. Have you made yotirself acquainted with what has been going on here all winter? Seward has had an understanding with these men. If he has influence with them, why don't he use it?"
I said Seward was a member of the Administration, and nothing could be done without the knowledge of himself and associates, that to meet him frankly and give him con- fidence was probably the best course under the circmn- stances.
He said perhaps it was. He could now see no alterna- tive. '^Lincoln is honest and means well. He will do well if counseled ri^t. You and I are old Democrats," he con- tinued, ^'and I have confidence in you, thou^ we have differed of late. I was glad when I learned you were to be one of the Cabinet, and have told Lincoln he could safely trtist you. Seward has too much infiuence with him."
This is the substance of the conversation, the result of which was that he consented to go with me to the State Department and see Mr. Seward if still there. It was late in the afternoon. He, Douglas, said we must take his word for the information he gave, for he could make no
34 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
disclosure of names. He knew what he stated to be true^ — that the fire-eaters were gomg to fire on Sumter.
He requested Mrs. Douglas to remain in the carriage. As we ascended the steps of the old State Department, he said he was going to see Seward because I advised it, and because there was no other course, for he was a part of the Administration, but it was unfortunate for the coun- try that he was so, because Seward did not realize the ca- kunities that were before us, and deceived himself with the belief he had influence at the South when he had none.
Mr. Seward received us cordially, heard the statement of Mr. Douglas calmly, took a pinch of snuff, said he would see the President on the subject. He knew there were wild and reckless men at Charleston and we should have dif- ficulty with them, but he knew of no way to prevent an assault if they were resolved to make one.
Douglas told me subsequently he was not disappointed at the interview. Seward, he said, was not earnest, had no heart in this matter, could not believe the storm was be- yond his ability and power to control, but he would soon enou^ learn that no mere party management or cunning would answer in such an emergency as this. Alluding to his hesitancy in going to Seward, he said he knew it was useless to make any appeal to him. Seward had no idea of the necessities of the case, and was, at that moment, as he, Douglas, knew, carrying on an intrigue with the Rebel leaders, who were deceiving him, whilst he flattered himr self that he was using and could control them.
Douglas said he had witnessed what had been going on for months without being able to do anything effectively, for he found himself in the confidence of neither party. He had tried to rally the Democracy, but the party was broken up. Slidell, Cobb, Breckenridge, and others were determined to break up the Union also. He could do nothing with them; others, like myself, had taken the opposite course, and got mixed up with old Whigs, and he had as little influence with us. Buchanan was feeble and
DOUGLAS'S OPINION OF SEWARD 35
incompetent. The great point with him and his Cabinet since the election had been to drift over the foiui;h of March. Seward had thought that he could then take the reins and manage things as he pleased, had all along treated this mighty gathering tempest as a mere party contest, which he and Thurlow Weed could dispose of as easily as some of their political strifes in New York.
When he spoke to me it was, he said, with a vague hope or idea that Mr. Lincoln might be induced to act independ- ent of Seward. He had thought of seeing me and having a confidential conversation for some time, and ought to have done so, but it had been postponed till the Siunter news gave him a start, and it was then too late. When I invited him to go to Seward, the man he wished to avoid, — for he considered Seward's mistaken notions, imintentional errors, refined party management, as calamitous as the open treason of Rhett, or Toombs, or Jefferson Davis, — my invitation and remarks awakened him to the actual facts, — that Seward was a part of the Government, and that nothing could be done without him. He had little expectation that anything could be accomplished with him. He had not, Douglas thought, risen to the occasion^ nor was he adapted to the times before us.
In detaching the Powhatan from the Siunter expedition and giving the conmiand to Porter, Mr. Seward extricated that officer from Secession influences, and committed him at once, and decisively, to the Union cause. My own im- pression is that he would have come into that channel as the difficulties progressed, for his energetic, restless, and aspiring nature would not have permitted him to occupy a neutral or passive position, and I never have beheved that when the trial test reached him, he would have proved re- creant to the flag, whatever were his personal attachments to, and friendships for, the Rebel leaders. As a lieutenant he was entitled to no such conmiand as the Powhatan, a fact of which Mr. Seward, who had little knowledge of
36 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
detailS; was ignorant, but the trust flattered and gratified the ambition of Porter. Finding himself taken into the confidence of the President and Secretary of State, and perceiving that in the matter before them the Secretaiy giving orders was acting as principal, he presumed to go farther, and was prompted by his audacity to present his friend Barron, between whom and himself there was a common sympathy, for a commanding position in the Navy Department.
Mr. Seward, who, with all his shrewdness and talent, was sometimes the victim of his own vanity and conceit, was flattered by Porter's suggestion that he could give Barron a position; it showed that he was considered by Porter, and he hoped by others, the premier, the controlling mind of the Administration, and it was a wish to confirm this impression, rather than sympathy with any Secession views of Barron, which led him into the otherwise unwarrantable and inexcusable step that was taken.
President Lincoln believed the attempt to thrust Barron on the Navy Department was the fault of Porter rather than Seward, and he never thereafter reposed full confidence in Porter, though not insensible to his professional ability. Often during the f oinr eventful years which followed, when from time to time I availed mjrself of Porter's qualities and gave him commands and promotion, the President expressed his gratification that I retained no resentment, but sacrificed personal wrongs and injustice for the good of the country.
In about two weeks from the time when I was instructed to take Barron into my confidence, he deserted the Govern- ment, went to Richmond, received a commission in the Rebel service, and was taken prisoner in the August fol- lowing, when Fort Hatteras was captured by Rear-Ad- miral Stringham, whom he was to have displaced. He was the first of the faithless naval officers who abandoned the Government and took up arms against it that was made prisoner, and, singularly enough, surrendered his sword to
PORTER AND BARRON 37
the man whom he was, by Porter's arrangement or Seward's order, to have superseded. Whether Porter was prompted by any of his Rebel associates to intrigue for Barron, or whether they concerted with him to that end, I never as- certained. The facts will probably never be known. There is no doubt that Mr. Seward was in communication with the Rebel leaders, or some of them; not that he was im- plicated in, or a party to, their rebellious schemes, but he tampered with them, felt confident, as Douglas stated, that when he obtained power he could diape events and control them. He overrated his own powers always, and under- estimated others. When he was sworn in to the office of Secretary, he expected and intended to occupy the place of premier, and undoubtedly supposed he could direct the Administration in every Department. Mr. Lincoln had, he knew, little administrative experience. Mr. Seward, there- fore, kindly and as a matter of course, assiuned that he was to be the master mind of the Government. But whilst he always had the r^ards and friendly wishes of Mr. Lincoln, to whom he made himself useful, and who was impressed with the behef that his Secretary of State had shrewdness, knowledge, political experience, and capability far greater than he actually possessed, the President in a gentle man- ner gradually let it be understood that Abraham Lincoln was chief. The incidents which I have detailed — the de- tachment of the Powhatan, the irregular command given to Porter — were improper proceedings which the President soon comprehended, and the order in relation to Barron convinced him that he must not give implicit trust to any one, but depend on his own judgment in matters of importance.
The supervising control which Mr. Seward at the com- mencement undertook to assume over all the Depart- ments except that of the Treasury, and the Treasury to an extent, was checked, so far as the Navy Department was concerned; yet, without informing himself of usage, or international, or statute laws, he frequently involved
38 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
the Government in difficulty by inconsistently surrender- ing national rights. Mr. Cameron sometimes complained of interference with the War Departm^it and army mat- ters by the Secretary of State, and on one occasion, when the latter was commending Meigs, as he often did, for great ability, Cameron proposed to transfer that officer to the State Department, where his talents were most used and highest appreciated.
The extraordinary powers and authority with which Captain Meigs and Lieutenant Porter were invested in the spring of 1861 would have alarmed the country and weak- ened the public confidence in the administrative capacity of the Executive had the facts been known. Mr. Aspin- wall and other gentlemen informed me that when Cap- tain Meigs applied to them for assistance and submitted the letters of the President and Secretary of State, cloth- ing him and Porter with unlimited authority over the mili- tary and naval service, — confessedly without the know- ledge of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, — they were alarmed for the safety and welfare of the Government. It betrayed weakness in the executive head. Much had been said and was then uttered by partisans of the incompetency of Mr. Lincoln and his unfitness. He had not been tried, and the period was portentous. But, whatever doubts existed in regard to Mr. Lincoln, they had been in a great measure dispelled when his Cabinet was appointed. Apprehension, however, revived on the arrival of Meigs and Porter in New York, and when their powers were made known. Such as saw those documents — and amongst them was Mr. Aspinwall — were astonished and almost in despair. At the best it was misgovemment and indicated want of confidence, of unity, of energy, and of proper administrative ability at Washington. They were disposed to impute the strange orders and carte blanche to the sub-officers as a blunder or mistake of the President, who was taking to himself departmental duties, and issu- ing direct to officers and subordinates commands and
MEIGS AND PORTER'S CARTE BLANCHE 39
instructions instead of passing them through the legitimate channels; but the name of Mr. Seward appeared on most of the papers, showing that he was cognizant of and recom- mended what was doing. One gentleman, more sagacious than the rest, in conversation with me some months later, imputed the whole to a contrivance of Mr. Seward, and the only unaccountable thing to him was the non-appear- ance of Thurlow Weed in the affair.
There is no doubt that the President was induced to take whatever steps he did, knowingly, in the matters referred to, through the instrumentality and by the advice of Mr. Seward, but he was not knowing to some of the important matters herein stated, and as soon as he was made acquainted with them, he at once disavowed and annulled them. It was a misfortune of Mr. Seward, and one of his characteristics, that he delisted in oblique and indirect movements; he also prided himself in his skill and management, had a craving desire that the world should consider him the great and controlling mind of his party, of the Administration, and of the country. He was in- tensely anxious to control and direct the War and Navy movements, althou^ he had neither the knowledge nor aptitude that was essential for either.
For more than a month after his inauguration President Lincoln indulged the hope, I may say felt a strong con- fidence, that Virginia would not, when the decisive stand had finally to be taken, secede, but adhere to the Union. There were among her politicians some able and influential men who favored the Nullification or Secession party, disciples of Calhoun, but it was notorious that a great majority of the people were opposed to all disunion senti- ments. These last, thou^ vastly more numerous than the fire-eaters, were passive and calm in their movements, while the Secession element was positive, violent, and active. As is usually the case, the energetic and factious element seized the reins of power, whUe the more deliberate
40 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
were submissive, hesitating and hoping that extreme measures might be avoided.
That there should be no cause of ofiFense, no step that would precipitate or justify secession, the President, al- most daily, enjoined forbearance from all unnecessary exercise of political party authority. It was, he believed, important that the Administration should ex^ its power to conciliate the people and strengthen their attachment to the Government. Whether, in the excited and disturbed condition of the country, when frantic sectional appeals were made in the cause of treason and disunion, the policy pursued was the best, may be a question. Probably a more energetic and decisive course would have been adopted, had events culminated at a later period; but the Admin- istration was just entering upon its duties, and was met at the threshold by an organized and powerful party oppo- sition, at the very time it was encoimtering and struggling with the Secessionists and before it was possessed of and could fully exercise its rightful authority.
The traffic in slaves was great in Virginia, and embodied more capital than any other product of the State. The traders who were engaged in this nefarious business were reckless and imprincipled men. Nevertheless, wealth even in their hands had its influence, and, coupled with daring and violence, became irresistible. Slaves were the great staple of the State; their sale brought annually a greater retiun of money to the State than tobacco or any other product, perhaps than all others; their bondsmen foimd a market in the States of the South, and nowhere else in Christendom. It was natiu'al, and to be expected, that all the ferocious and brutal instincts of the slave-trader should be in opposition to the Administration, and to those States which would not tolerate slavery within their borders. A heavy hand, could it have been placed on these wretches who advocated treason and urged disunion, thronged Rich- mond, and spent of their ill-gotten wealth profusely to promote secession, would have been better than attempts at
NORFOLK NAVY YARD IN DANGER 41
conciliation. The times wa:^ revolutionary, and the gentle and persuasive arguments and measures of the Admin- istration were treated as cowardly, while the violent and denunciatory anathemas and avowed hate of the Yankees by the slave-traders, ci^tivated the idle, the vicious, and adventurers, and bore away those with whom they came in contact.
Norfolk was the principal commercial port of the State, and sentiment there gave tone and opinion to lower Vir- ginia. The navy yard at Norfolk afforded employment to many, and the government patronage in party times had been supposed important. Aware of this, the Pre- sident early made special request that no important or extensive changes should be made in the navy yard at present, or without consulting him. I soon became satisfied tiiat the large amoimt of public property there was in a precarious condition. As a preventive, or matter of cau- tion, it seemed to me advisable that a military force should be placed there to protect the yard, and to serve as a rally- ing point for Union men in case of emergency. But Gen- eral Scott, to whom I appUed for troops, said he had none to spare, that he had not sufficient force to guard the Capitol or to garrison Fortress Monroe and Harper's Ferry, which were endangered, and that Norfolk was wholly indefensible. When, after two or three interviews with him, I appealed to the President, he not only con- curred with General Scott, but thought it would be inex- pedient and would tend to irritate and promote a conflict, were a military force to be sent to Norfolk. Any extraor- dinary efforts to repair the ships with a view of removing them and the public property would, in his opinion, ex- hibit a want of confidence and betray apprehensions that should be avoided.
I had as early as the 14th of March ordered the Pocahon- tas, one of the Home Squadron, which arrived in Hampton Roads, to proceed to Norfolk. This was no imusual order, and could create no apprehension or distrust.
42 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
The frigate Cumberland, the flagship of Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the West Indian and Gtdf Squadron, arrived in Hampton Roads on the 23d of March, where she was purposely detained, and on the 29th of March I gave orders for her to proceed up Elizabeth River to the navy yard and take the place of the Pocahontas, ordered to join the Sumter expedition.
There were several old-class ships, some of them valu- able but dismantled, laid up, which would require a good deal of time and labor to be put in a condition to be removed. The Merrimac, the most valuable vessel at the yard, was wholly dismantled, but the Germantown, the Plymouth, and the Dolphin, all sailing-vessels, could soon and with very little difficulty be got ready for removal or for service. We had, however, few or no seamen to man them, nor could we procure them at Norfolk, but were compelled to enlist and order them from New York or one of the North- em yards. Notwithstanding the sensitive feeling that existed on the part of the people of Virginia, as well as of the Government, I felt that we might with propriety order a sufficient force there to man at least two of the smaller vessels without creating alarm, as it would be legitimate in the ordinary course of things. The Plymouth was de- signated as the practice ship for the midshipmen, and the Germantown was nearly ready for her armament and crew. No exception could be taken to orders to man them. If the seamen reached Norfolk, and an exigency should arise rendering it expedient to move the Merrimac, they could be made available for that purpose. The Powhatan had just reached New York and was ordered out of commis- sion, but those of her crew whose time had not expired could be made available for valuable service at Norfolk, and such was the first intention of the Department, but important events for the relief of Fort Simiter rendered it necessary to detain the seamen on the Powhatan for the Sumter expedition, and to add to them the recruits from the receiving-ship. These orders took almost all the re-
NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 43
emits who were intended for Norfolk, as soon as two hun- dred and fifty were enlisted. Orders were given to Paymas- t&r Etting to proceed to New York and charter a vessel to take the men to Norfolk, and also to Commander Rowan, but the orders could not be fulfilled. The order for two hundred men was sent to Brooklyn on the 11th of April.
The fidelity and patriotism of Commodore McCauley, who was in command of the yard, were questioned by no one, and his reputation as a good and faithful officer all admitted (though not particularly efficient). I had not seen him for several years, but the inquiries which I made in r^ard to him were satisfactorily answered. Subsequent events proved him faithful but feeble and incompetent for the crisis. His energy and decision had left him, and, what- ever skill or ability he may have had in earlier years in regular routine duty, he proved unequal in almost every respect to the present occasion. He made no report or suggestion to me of disaffection or doubt on the part of any officer, and in answer to inquiries which I made of him as to the time which would be necessary to put the engines or machinery of the Merrimac in order, so that she could be moved, he sent me word that it would require at least a month. On receiving this answer, I became apprehensive that I could not depend upon him if the emergency should demand prompt action, and I at once directed the en- gineer-in-chief, Mr. Isherwood, to proceed, with whatever assistance he needed, to Norfolk, and, without creating a sensation, but in a quiet manner, to put the machinery in working condition with the least possible delay. To do this, he was directed to call to his assistance whatever force was necessary, and to work without cessation day and night until it was accomplished. Instead of a month, the work was completed within less than four days. "*
On the 11th of April, I issued orders to Commander Al- den, then in Washington, to proceed to Norfolk and report to Commodore McCauley to take charge of the Merrimac and deliver her over to the commanding officer of the
44 KABT OF GIDEON WELLEB
* ^ 1 1 . 1 1 .^ ^ ' ^ M I I w^m^', I M i ^ f , ^ * ■ "B I ' .'*«'<* I i
UMMSfdi the iHtUKtioB B tkflM diqrB were gnren onlb^, for iHiak became A iDttllK wBe too often, in some ngnBteriow wmy, made kn^^ iiiiiiigrittgb No mcKe than was ahaulutdjf neeoBaiy waa pot upon paper for Mtsyat the offieem who were acrt to Norfolk.
Enpneer Uierirood had the maefamery in armking csdflr bjr the 10th, and Ckxmnodoie McCaokj wrote me cm that day that the Merrimae woakl be ready for aonnee by the foDowing evening, the 17th. Qiief Rngifif»r bher- wood returned and reported to me on the 18th that Coaa- modore MeCaoley had defeated the pbna and parposoi of the Department; that he woold not permit the Menimae to leave; was, he thoo^ity under the influenee (rf fiqoor and bad men. In company wiUi the President, I saw General Scott again the fdfowing day , when he repeated the same opinions, but on the 19th [rie] he promised that General Deiafield or a good engineer sliouki be detailed who would cause some defenses to be thrown up.
My impreasions are tiiat Commands Aldoi called and made report on the same day with Mr. Isherwood, but he states it was on the 19th and that he returned to Nc»folk on the same evening on the Pawnee under Commodore Paulding. Alden was timid, but patriotic when there was no danger, for he was not endowed with great moral or physical courage, yet bdieved himsdf possessed of both, and was no doubt really anxious to do something without encountering enemies or taking upon himself much re- sponsibility. At Norf dk all his heroic drawing-room reso- lution and good intentions failed him. He had not the audacity nor the moral courage to meet his professional brethren who had those qualities and were determined to sustain the Secession cause. A man of energy and greater will and force, with the orders of the Secretary, would have inspired and iniBuenced McCauley, whose heart was rig^t, and carried out these orders.
While in Cabinet-meeting, I was called out by Com-
NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 45
mander Alden, who informed me, with emotion which b^ could not entirely suppress, that Commodore McCanley had refused to let him have the Merrimac, that after the fires had been kindled they had been drawn by the Com^ modore's command, that the vessel was at the wharf, and that the deportment and remarks of some of the yoimger officers left no doubt in his mind that they had control of the Commodore and of the yard. The old man, he said, seemed stupefied, bewildered, and wholly unable to act. Instead of inspiring the well-intentioned but infirm old man, Alden had struck away from the yard and had im- mediately returned to report to the Department. I took him forthwith to the President, and the Cabinet, which was then in session, when he related what had occurred.
At the consultation which took place as soon as he with- drew, I advised that inmiediate steps should be taken for the defense of the navy yard, stated the large amount of public property there, in ships, material, ordnance, m^ir chinery, tools, and stores of every description, the necefit- sity, in a naval and military point of view, of retaining possession of the yard, and the disastrous consequences to the Government of permitting such a station to be wrested from its possession, or of abandoning it to the insiu'gents. The President and Cabinet concurred in these views, and when I informed them of the opposition of General Scott to sending a military force to protect the yard, it was thought advisable that the President and myself should see him on the subject.
I went from the Executive Mansion to military head- quarters and saw General Scott, to whom I conmiunicated the condition of affairs and the necessity of a military force without delay at Norfolk. But the General was still decisive and emphatic against sending troops to defend the place, said it was an impossibility to furnish the troops, or to defend the navy yard if we had them; that any force he could send there would certainly be captured; the Navy and marines might, if on shipboard, escape, but
46 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
the troops could not; repeating continually it was enemy's country. All this and more he repeated to the President and myself at the interview, but he finally consented that a battalion of Massachusetts volimteers, which he supposed might be at Fortress Monroe, from information just re- ceived, should accompany an expedition imder Commo- dore Paulding, to withdraw the vessels and as much of the public property as could be secured, and that he would send Colonel Delafield — subsequently Captain Wright^ an intelligent officer, instead of Delafield — with them.
I had previously, on the 16th, after hearing from Com- modore McCauley that a month waa required to put the Merrimac in condition to be removed, dispatched Commodore Paulding, who waa then attached to the De- partment as detailing officer, to Norfolk, to inquire into and inform himself of the actual state of things at the yard, the reliability of officers and men, and to satisfy himself fully in regard to Commodore McCauley. If he had any doubts of the safety of the yard after examination, he was to advise me, and was to act for me in all particulars, pro- vided danger was hnmment, having plenary powers for the purpose. On the morning of the 18th, Commodore Pauld- ing imexpectedly returned and made a satisfactory verbal report or statement concerning Commodores McCauley and Pendergrast and the condition of the yard. Some of the yoimger officers, who belonged in Virginia or the South, had expressed a wish to be relieved from duty at the yard in anticipation of difficulty with the insurgents, among whom were their kinsmen and neighbors, with whom they preferred not to come in collision; but all were, he said, patriotic, deprecated hostility, and were governed by honorable motives. Commodore McCauley he indorsed as faithful, competent, and to be trusted. He was seconded by Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the Home Squadron, who had arrived in Hampton Roads a few days previous with his flagship, the Cumberland, and had orders to proceed with the frigate up the Elizabeth River
NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 47
to the vicinity of the navy yard. Commodore Pendergrast said he had consulted freely and fully with both those of- ficers, had made some suggestions and assented to others made by them, and was so well satisfied that the workmen were reliable and that the public property was in good and trustworthy hands, that he thought it imnecessary he should remain, but that it was best he should return to Washington and make report in person. Although this report was more favorable than I had expected, I greatly regretted he did not remain and act for the Department, and so informed him. I also blamed myself for not having given him explicit written orders to that efifect.^
My preliminary orders and inquiries were oral and not matters of record; my first written orders were on the 29th of March; Virginia did not pass the ordinance of secession until the 17th April. Until then it was hoped and believed by many, including the President and Secretary of State, that Virginia would not secede.
It will be borne in mind that Congress, which had just adjourned, put forth no preparation for the coming crisis, had made no extra appropriations, had not authorized the enlistment of any additional seamen; almost all our naval force was abroad; most of the small Home Squadron was in the Gulf or West Indies, nearly as remote and inaccess- ible as the Eiu^opean Squadron; and the whole available force north of the Chesapeake had been dispatched to the
^ [Mr. Welles in his manuscript here cited such orders and portions of the correspondence as became a matter of record: —
"See Order of March 29th to Pendergrast to proceed with Cimiberland to Norfolk.
"Order to Breese 31st of March for seamen — also order of 11th April for seamen.
"Order of 11th April to Alden.
"Orders of 11th April to McCauley to prepare the Merrimac and Ply- mouth.
"Orders of 11th April to Isherwood to proceed to Norfolk.
"Letter 16th April to McCauley.
"McCauley's letter of 16th April to me.
"Order to Paulding of 18th April.
"laherwood's report 18th April."]
48 DIABY OF GIDEON WELLES
relief of Fort Sumter and secretly and surreptitiously, without the knowledge of the Navy Department, sent to Fort Pickens. Without men, without funds, without l^b- lative authority, without advice, suggestion, or intimati<Mi of any kind from Congress, from the Senators on the Naval Committee, who remained in Washington tiirough the month of March, while rebellion was gathering strength, the Secretary was compelled to take the whole responsibility and to act in that great emergency. Fore- most among the men who had defied the South and treated with scorn and derision the secession theory and move- ment, was Senator John P. Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate : one of the first to flee from Wash- ington, when the storm which had gathered was about to burst, was the same distinguished Senator. When, how- ever, Congress convened in special session in July, and Washington was garrisoned and shielded by a large army, this burning and eloquent patriot returned, and, over- flowing with courage, was moved in the exuberance of his zeal to introduce a resolution to inquire into the circum- stances attending the destruction of the property of the United States at the navy yard at Norfolk, and espe- cially if there was any default on the part of any officer. Pensacola and Harper's Ferry were included in the inquiry, but the virtuous indignation of the Chairman of the Naval Committee was chiefly exercised and wholly exhausted in regard to Norfolk. His wrath was less against the Rebels than somebody else, he did not care to mention whom. When notified by Mr. Hale that his committee was in ses- sion, that certain information was wanted by them, and I was told in a patronizing way that any explanation by way of justification of the Department would be received, I directed that the whole transactions in relation to Norfolk should be thrown open for his examination, that, so far as the Department could furnish them, answers should be given to all specific inquiries, and that every facility should be extended to the Committee; but for myself I declined
NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 49
any appearance or explanation. My time, I assured the honorable chairman, was too much occupied in attending to necessary public duties to detail narratives or enter into explanations that were personal. It was my intention they should have all the facts, and I wished them fully and fairly reported, but I certainly should volunteer no attendance.
In his report as Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Hale manifests his patriotic fervor, military skill, and intelli* gence, and all the candor and fairness within him. There was a wide difference between him and General Scott in r^ard to the defense of Norfolk, for while the old hero said no troops could be had, and insisted that the yard could not be defended, that the place was without fortifications or defenses of any kind, that troops placed there would inevitably be captured, the chairman of the committee of investigation, Mr. John P. Hale, represented otherwise, and asserted in his report that ''Captain McCauley was abundantly able to defend the yard,'' which was ''encom* passed on two sides by a wall ten or twelve feet high, and ei^teen inches thick," that there was an available force of at least one himdred and fifty marines and sailors with two howitzers ''and the crew of the Cumberland of three hundred and fifty men."
The report enumerates other means also, none of which appear to have convinced General Scott, or either of the three commodores who were there with full powers, and who commanded the forces and were entrusted with the defense. There is this difference between the military and naval officers on one side, and the Senatorial Commit- tee on the other: the naval and military gentlemen were compelled to take the responsibility and act promptly according to their best judgment in the line of their profes- sion, and the performance of duty to which they had been trained. They may have erred in some respects ; it would be strange if they did not under the extraordinary circum- stances of the case. Mr. Hale had no responsibility, was
50 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
embarrassed by no military or naval teaching, was beyond danger, and made his report, criticizing and condemn- ing their conduct, twelve months after the event took place.
Mr. Horace Greeley, in his "American Conflict,'' eluci- dates and illuminates the report of Mr. Hale, which he assumes to be non-partisan and correct, by saying "Capt, Paulding might have held his position a week, and that week would have brought at least 30,000 men to his aid." Not thirty thousand men reached imperiled Washington in one week, in response to the call of the President by proclamation, aided by all the State authorities, and of- ficial and individual effort, zeal, and influence; and such as came in obedience to that national call were indifferently provided with arms, munitions, and supplies, backed though they were by the Federal and State governments. If the historian is to be beUeved, a larger army would have gathered on an appeal from the Commodore to save the navy yard, than came to defend the National Capital on the official call of the President. What thirty thousand men could have done, had they gathered at Norfolk in a week, towards defending a place in the enemy's country, without batteries or shore defenses of any kind, without engineers to construct them, without resources, with no conmiissariat or quartermaster's supplies, are matters not clearly explained in the ' ' American Conflict." It is doubted if Mr. Greeley could have got that number of men at Nor- folk, to say nothing of their equipment and supplies, when the President, with all the power and energies of the country, gathered no such number in that brief time at Washington to defend the capital of the nation.
In closing his chapter on ''the national disgrace at Nor- folk," in his ''American Conflict," Mr. Greeley, who read- ily, oracularly, and dogmatically, without investigation, adopted the statements of the factious, partisan, untruth- ful, imjust, and iniquitous report of Mr. Hale, says: "Thus ended the most shameful, cowardly, disastrous
NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 51
performance that stains the annals of the American Navy." Such is contemporary history.
In the light of subsequent events the performance may be condemned. It was certainly unfortunate and disas- trous. There were feebleness and incapacity in McCauley, and treachery and infidelity on the part of some, in fact most, of his subordinates, — matters shameful indeed, but I am aware of no evidence of cowardice, even in the pusillanimous commander. He and his associates were astoimded by the defection of Virginia, and overwhelmed with the magnitude of the rebellion, for which Mr. Sena- tor EEale had, neither in Congress nor out of it, suggested preparations, and Congress had made but feeble or no pro- vision. Mr. Greeley had in his organ, the Tribune, said if the States wished to secede, let them go. Until the storm burst, Congress had not believed that the overthrow of the government or a division of the Union was intended, nor could the members realize that such a tornado was then upon them. At the commencement they would not be aggressive; they hesitated to be the first to imbrue their hands in the blood of their coimtrymen. Mr. John P. Hale and Mr. Horace Greeley might have done differently from those officers and saved the navy yard and public property at Norfolk by tactics of their own, when military and naval men could not.
The misfortime was bad enough when truly and fairly stated, but aggravated by the misrepresentations and ex- aggerations of reckless and unscrupulous men in Congress, like Hale, and by the partisan fictions and imaginary de- lusions of journalists such as Greeley, great injustice was done to officers of courage and imdoubted patriotism, as well as to the Department and Administration. It is easy to be seen that had a younger and more vigorous officer than McCauley been in command of the yard, or a more daring and energetic officer than Alden sent there, a different course might and probably would have been adopted, and some of the vessels and pubUc property been saved. But
52 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
at the time no officer in the service had a more unexcep- tionable record than McCauIey. Not a word, not a sus- picioni was breathed of any want of ability, courage, or fidelity in that officer. Nor was there any want of con- fidence in Paulding, or Pendergrast, who were younger and more vigorous men, nor were the heroic and gallant juniors who participated with them in that disastrous performance destitute of true heroism or devoted patriotism* In scut- tling the ships, McCauley and Pendergrast committed a lamentable mistake. They were deceived without doubt, and in that terrible crisis were not equal to the emergency* They were not partisan politicians, and could not believe that so wanton, causeless, and extensive a conspiracy ex- isted ; and when the crisis came, they were confounded itnd not prepared to act. When they did act, it was in bewil- derment and error. Whether different officers would have had better success cannot be known. They might have rescued the Merrimac and some other vessels, though that is uncertain, for the Rebels had been long preparing for the event, and were the positive element; the Union men were passive. The Rebels were resolute and acted on the offens- ive; our officers were incredulous and on the defensive. They were anxious to strike and fight, while the others merely deprecated and repelled.
When Greeley says that one week would have brou^^t thirty thousand men to Norfolk to aid Commodore Pauld- ing, he betrays weakness and his unfitness as a historian. General Scott knew better. He would have sent no thirty thousand troops there, had the men been in Washington. What could thirty thousand imdisciplined, unofficered men have accomplished, but their own destruction? like the heedless and senseless cry from the same vicious source, ''On to Richmond,'' the assertion that Norfolk could have rallied to its defense thirty thousand men is the essence of partisan folly.
Senator Hale, who hurried to introduce a resolution to investigate and report in July, 1861, but delayed and lin-
NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 63
gered in communicating his invidious and unjust document until April, 1862; had an object in his movement. He desired to embarrass and assail the Navy Department, of which he was the Senatorial organ, and to which he should have given his earnest, honest, and zealous support. No- thing would have afforded him higher gratification than to have foimd the Secretary, who had mildly dispensed with his proffered agency, remiss and delinquent, and it would have delighted him had I subjected myself to his criticism and rebuke, or attempted to defend or explain to him and his committee the proceedings and errors of naval officers. I neither sought nor shunned him. The records of the Department were thrown open to him, and they were a defense and justification. He slurs over the orders, oral and written, in March and early April, preced- ing the occurrence, and says the first steps taken for the defense of Norfolk were on the 10th of April, thirty-seven days after the inauguration. Were that the fact, it would not have been, imder the circumstances, when Congress had been delinquent, tardy action. But I had on the 29th of March changed the destination of the frigate Cumber- land, which, by special direction of the President, on re- quest of the Secretary of State, was about proceeding to the Gulf, and ordered her from Hampton Roads to Norfolk to check disorderly proceedings, should any appear. In repeated verbal applications to General Scott for a mili- tary force in the months of March and April, as a precau- tionary measure, I met a refusal, on the ground of military necessity and inability to comply. He had not, he said, troops to defend Harper's Ferry, a military station, which was actually captm-ed by the Rebels simultaneously with the destruction of Norfolk. As there was not a soldier to defend the place and we had no sailors to man the vessels, I sent, on the 31st of March, to New York, general and special orders for two himdred and fifty men to be dis- patched to Norfolk, and, if there were not that number on hand, to enlist and forward them as soon as possible. All
54 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
the steamers, and almost the whole lunited naval force in all the Atlantic ports, had been sent to the relief of Forts Sumter and Pickens.
These facts were well known to Senator Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate and of the special committee to investigate the destruction of property at Norfolk, — many of them, and others, were not matters of record, — but he was careful to suppress and make no allusion to them; some that were mentioned were greatly perverted and distorted. The report was his own. Sena- tor Grimes, who was associated with him on the commit- tee, took especial pains on more than one occasion to as- sure me that he had no hand in drawing it up, that he never gave it his approval, and I think he said he never read it until after it was presented to the Senate and published. I should have been better pleased had he made this state- ment and disclaimer publicly and in open Senate. But I would not ask it.
I knew I had done my duty faithfully, honestly, and as well as I knew how. I knew that the President, to whom I was immediately accoimtable, approved of my course, and was fully satisfied with it. Congress, under all the mis- representations and intrigues of the malcontents, while re- gretting in common with the Administration and the whole coimtry the loss of the navy yard and property, were convinced that the Department acquitted itself faithfully and well.
I was introduced to Mr. Stanton by President Lincoln at the Executive Mansion in January, 1862. It was at the first Cabinet-meeting which he attended after receiving the appointment of Secretary of War. I had not previously met him, although I had then been ten months in Mr. Lin- coln's Cabinet. The period was trying; true and patriotic friends had come forward to encourage us, but Mr. Stan- ton, who was a resident of Washmgton, avoided the Presi- dent and most of his Cabinet. The times were such as to
STANTON BEFORE fflS APPOINTMENT 55
inteniipt social intercourse in the District between Union* ists and Secessionists, and the lines between them were marked. Old associations were broken up, and it was dif- ficult to form new ones, even when persons had leisure, which members of the Administration had not. A major- ity of the resident population, and particularly of those who formed the resident 61ite of society, were Secessionists, or in sjnnpathy with Secessionists. A feeling of bitterness pervaded the whole commimity, and the members of the Court Circle, which had been in the fashionable ascendant during the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, did not conceal their dislike, detestation, and hate of the Black Republicans, intensified among the masses in the District. Mr. Stanton had not been coxmted as a Republican, al- though there was an impression he had, as a member of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, approved the policy of that ad- ministration in the winter of 1861, and acted with Dix and Holt. This impression did not obtain with Mr. Black ^ and the intimate friends and supporters of Buchanan.
Although not fond of the gayeties and parties of Wash- ington, he could at times make himself companionable and entertaining; but from the day he left Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet tmtil he entered that of Mr. Lincoln, he mingled little in society, and none with the men in authority. It was represented that he eschewed the new administra- tion, ridiculed the President, and freely expressed his opposition to the measures adopted and course piursued by the Government. The Secessionists distrusted him, and neither of the parties confided in him in the early days of the War. The Administration did not consider him one of its supporters, though he was on friendly terms with Seward. He had the reputation of being an Anti-Secession Democrat, who nevertheless wished to preserve his rela- tionship with the Democratic Party, and as having no fellowship with Republicans.
* Jeremiah S. Black, first Attorney-General, then Secretary of State, in Bachanan'e Cabinet.
66 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES
When the appointment of District Attorney for Wash- ington was under consideration in the spring of 1861, Mr. Stanton and Mr. Carrington were the rival candidates. Some diversity of opinion was entertained by the members of the Cabinet in r^ard to them. Mr. Seward earnestly pressed Mr. Stanton, vouched for his loyal sentiments, and claimed that he had in a confidential way rendered great service to the Union cause while in Mr. Buchanan's Cabi- net. Mr. Bates, the Attomey-Greneral, desired the appoint- ment of Mr. Carrington, who was, I believe, not only an intimate friend, but kinsman. Himself a man of courteous manners, Mr. Bates could not, he thou^t, have the unre- served freedom with or repose the same confidence in Mr. Stanton that he could in Mr. Carrington, and the times were such that there should be implicit confidence between the Attorney-General and the District Attorney in the discharge of their frequently delicate and always highly responsible duties.
The subject was several times before the Cabinet, but as I knew neither of the gentlemen j)ersonally, I expressed no opinion, for I had none in regard to either. Mr. Chase seconded the views of Mr. Seward for Stanton, but no other one interested himself in the case, or seemed disposed to interfere in the question. At length the President de- clared the subject must be disposed of, and wished each one present to commimicate whatever knowledge he pos- sessed of either. He appealed particularly to Mr. Bl^, who resided in Washington, was a member of the bar, and knew both the gentlemen well.
Mr. Blair said that he had not for that reason wished to say much, but thus called upon he should speak the truth. In point of ability, he said, Mr. Stanton was undoubtedly the superior of Mr. Carrington. He doubted, however, Stanton's integrity, and stated a damaging fact which was within his own personal knowledge, but which it is not necessary here to repeat. The statement astonished the President and disconcerted both Seward and Chase, each
STANTON MADE SECRETARY OF WAR 57
of whom questioned whether there might not be some mis- take in this matter, but Blair said there could be none, and farther that he (Stanton) was a prot^g^ of Black, Buch- anan's Secretary of State, and in feeling with him. The President remarked he thought it judicious to conciliate and draw in as much of the Democratic element as pos- sible, and he was willing to try Stanton, though personally he had no special reason to regard him favorably; but the office came within the province of the Attorney-General, and he would turn the question over to him. The Attor- nqr-General thanked the President, and said he would on returning to his office send over the appointment of Mr. Carrington. ^
From current rumors I was not very favorably impressed in regard to Mr. Stanton. His remarks on the personal appearance of the President were coarse, and his freely expressed judgment on public measures unjust. He may have felt chagrined at the preference of Carrington.
In the fall and winter of 1861, when murmurs b^an to be heard against General McGlellan, it was said, and I suppose correctly, that Stanton was his friend and adviser. Until appointed Secretary of War, there was no intimacy between him and the members of the Administration, with the exception of Mr. Seward. I have reason to know that he was engaged with discontented and mischievous persons in petty intrigues to impair confidence in the Administration.
When it was determined that Mr. Cameron should re- tire from the office of Secretary of War, — not wholly for the reason that was given out, but for certain loose matters of contracts, and because he had not the grasp, power, energy, comprehension, and important qualities essential to the administration of the War Department of that period, to say nothing of his affiliation with Chase, — it was a surprise, not only to the country but to every member of the Administration but the Secretary of State, that Stanton was selected. He was doubtless the choice of
58 DIARY OF GmEON WELLES
Mr. Seward, who influenced the President and secured the appointment.
Seward and Stanton had been brou^t into fellowship in the winter of 1861 , when the latter was a member of Buchanan's Cabinet, and confided to the former the opera- tions and purposes of the Administration. It was this com- mimion between the two, who had been of opposing politics and parties, — one at the time a member of the outgoing, the other of the incoming Executive Coxmcil, — which led to that political and personal intimacy which eventuated in the induction of Stanton to the War Department. Mr. Seward always looked upon Stanton as his prot^^, and Stanton, who, with all his frankness, real and assimaed, had, towards his superiors in position or intellect, some of the weaker qualities of a courtier, was studious to continue the inpression that he was dependent upon and a follower of the Secretary of State. It gratified Mr. Seward, who felt his own consequence when a member of Buchanan's Cabi- net sought the opportimity and gave him his confidence, and gave Stanton an influence and hold upon his acknow- ledged leader that remained dining the whole of the lat- ter's official career. . . .
Others claimed and have been given some portion of the credit