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WiIsTOnyY

FRDERAL GOVERNMENT

HISTORY

OF

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

IN GREECE AND ITALY

BY

EDWARD A, FREEMAN

EDITED BY

J. B. BURY, MAA. ΡΟΝ ον ππωσωσω “LELOW ° 7 WE, DUB

λΤ

SECOND EDITION

London MACMILLAN AND CO.

AND NEW YORK

1899

‘Could the interior strueture and regular operation of the Achaian League be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown by it on the science of Federal Government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.”

Tur FEDERALIST, No. xviii.

First Edition, published 1863, entitled " History of Federal Government, Srom the foundation of the Achaian League to the disruption of the United States. Vol. 7. General [ntroduction—History of the Greck Federations.”

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

THE first and only volume of Mr. Freeman’s [History of Federal Government appeared in 1863. Soon after its appearance he left the subject for that of the Norman Conquest, and never resumed it. 10 is much to be regretted that he did not carry out his design, at least so far as to tell the story of the Con,, federation of the Swiss Cantons, and fully discuss Swiss Federal institutions, even if he had stopped short of the United States. The most recent Swiss historian of Switzerland, Dierauer, in his Geschichte der schweizerischen bidyenossenschaft (1. p. 265), has expressed this regret. ‘ Man kann es nur Iebhaft bedauern dass der englische Historiker nicht dazu gekommen ist in einer Fortsetzung seines Werkes die (Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, den ‘angesehensten oder Ichrreichsten’ Teil seiner Aufgahe, zu bearbeiten.”

But while the History of Federal Government as a whole was never completed, the first volume has all the value of a complete work. Ina letter written in 1861, in connexion with arrangements for the publication of his book, Mr. Freeman observed that even if the work were never finished “this one volume—an essay on Federalism and a history of its Greek form—-would be a substantial work in itself.” It was therefore after his death decided to reprint it as a History of Federal Government in Greece. The manuscript of an additional chapter, which was to have been the first in Volume II, and was written before the author deserted his subject, was discovered among his papers. It contains a full account of the defective forms of

vi PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

Federalism which have appeared in Italy, comprising the Leagues of early Italian history, and the Lombard Confederation of a later age. This discovery has enabled us to adopt the more com- prehensive title, 4 Ilistory of Federal Government in Greece and Italy. A fragment on the German Confederacy (which was to have been the beginning of Chapter XI) has been added.

The present work, then, is merely a reprint of the older volume, with the addition of a new chapter on Italy, and a new fragment on Germany. The original text has not been altered, except in a few cases where positive mistakes—afterwards recognized as such by the author—had crept in. ‘The references to authorities have been revised. No additions have been made to the footnotes by the editor, except such as were indicated by Mr. Freeman himself in an interleaved copy of his work. The editor has reserved for an Appendix all observations and corrections which seemed required to bring the history of Greek Fedcralism up to date. Inscriptions have been published since the appearance of Mr. Freeman’s work, which throw considerable light on some points tin the Achaian and /Etohan Constitutions. A work of much value, though hardly marked by the lucidity of exposition which we are accustomed to expect in French writers, has been devoted to these Leagues by M. Marcel Dubois, and has been found very useful. It may be observed that M. Dubois, while his views differ in many respects from those of Mr. Freeman, fully recognizes his “ érudition irréprochable.”

The only matter of importance in which Mr. Freeman’s account of the Achaian and Aftolian Federal systems needs modification is the Constitution of the Senates. We have now direct evidence that the AXtolian Senate was a body of Repre- sentatives chosen by the States. We have no such direct evidence for the Achaian Senate, but we have some distinct indications pointing in that direction, as M. Dubois has shown ; and the analogy of the Aitolian League confirms these indica- tions. On the other hand, there is not an atom of evidence

See Appendix II p. 651, note to p. 262,

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR Vii

for Mr. Freeman’s guess that the Achaian Boulé was chosen by the Federal Assembly.*

This being so, certainly for the Attohan, and probably for the Achaian Senate, a parallel and contrast may be drawn between the Federal Assemblies of these old Leagues and the Federal Assembly of modern Switzerland. The object of both the ancient and the modern Federations was to provide that hoth each State as a whole, and each citizen individually, should have a voice in the Federal Assembly. They necessarily set about accomplishing this object in very different ways, because Primary Assemblies were the rule in the age of the Greek Leagues, and Representative Assemblies are the rule in modern times. The Federal Assembly, which met at Thermon or Aigion, consisted of two parts: the Bouleutai or Senators, elected by the States, and all the Mtolian or Achaian citizens who chose to attend. So, too, the Federal Assembly which meets at Bern consists of the “Council of States,” composed of Representatives elected by the States, and the “ National Council,” composed of Representatives who are elected directly by the people in the electoral districts, into which each Canton is divided. Thus the Council of States, corresponding to the Boulé, represents the States, while the National Council is the clement which in an age of Representative Assemblies responds to the mass of citizens (πλῆθος) In an age of Primary Assemblies, Of course, the differences between the two systems are endless. The Greek system had, in particular, the advantage that un- represented minorities—even minorities of one—-could attend the Federal Assembly and speak for themselves. And it is also evident that, as the Greck Bouleutai were almost certainly elected in the Assembly of each State, a Representative of Patrai might be assumed to represent the majority of his fellow- citizens in a measure in which the member of the Council of States clected by the State Government of Bern could not be assumed to represent the opinions of the majority of the Bernese. Consequently, the citizens of the Greek Leagues often con-

1 See Appendix IT p. 643, note to p, 239.

Viil PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

sidered -it unnecessary to attend the Assemblies themselves, knowing that their interests were represented by the Bouleutai ; and hence the second part of the Assembly was of a very fluctuating kind. Sometimes the Assembly seems to have con- sisted altogether of the Boulé. Both the Greek method and the Swiss method resulted in dividing the Assembly into two constituent parts; but while the nature of Representative in- stitutions secures that both parts of the Swiss Assembly are permanent Chambers, under the Greek system, one part—the Representative—was permanent, while the other part fluctuated and sometimes vanished altogether.

No references to contemporary events have been altered, and the reader must bear in mind that he is reading words which referred to the situation of Europe and America in 1862 and 1863. He must remember that the war between the North and the South had not yet been decided, and that two Federal Governments then existed together in America, the Confederate States and the United States. He must remember that France was in the hands of the “Emperor ” Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, and the absurd proposal of a Confederation of Italian princes with the Pope at its head—put forth “only to become the laughing-stock of Europe” (p. 75)—was then an event of a couple of years ago. Elsass and Lothringen were then French (p. 273); the Ionian islands were under English “ protection ” (p. 270). If Mr. Freeman had himself issued a new edition of his work, he would doubtless have brought the book up to date in this respect, and substituted new comments on the historical developements in Europe which have taken place since he wrote. He ventured to -foretell (p. 91) that “the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged ambassadors before the year 1941, or even before the year 1869.” He would have had something to say on the actual issue of the war which falsified that prophecy. He speculated on the theoretical possibility of a Federal State of monarchical constitution ; he would have had some observations to make on the great mon-

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR 1x

archical Bundesstaat which was established in 1870, and which seems likely to last “longer than through a single generation ” (p. 75). He would have pointed out that, though Federal in form, it is not “a real Federation.” The position of Elsass and Lothringen, incorporated in the ‘‘ Empire” as Prussian depen- dencies, but not members of the Federation, is another instance of subject districts in a Federal State, and one wonders whether they will be ultimately elevated, hike Ticino, to the position of equal states. Mr. Freeman did not refer, in his Federal analogies, to the compulsory Referendum of the Swiss Constitution of 1848 ; but he would now, doubtless, have had some remarks to make on the optional Referendum introduced in 1874—that curious and ingenious attempt to find a substitute for the advantages of the Greek Ekklésia, in circumstances in which such an Ekklésia is not possible. The Referendum may be said to constitute a fourth exception (sce p. 53) to the Representative system in modern Europe and America.

Touching South-Eastern Europe, the remarks with which Mr. Freeman closed his first volume are as applicable to-day as they were in 1863. Bulgaria is now only nominally a vassal state ; the Bulgarians have won their freedom, and have shown that they are, perhaps, more worthy to possess it than any other state in the [lyric peninsula. But the “tinkering” policy of the Treaty of Berlin has not madc it less true, and further tinkering by any such treaties in the future will not make it less true, that the only safeguard against Austrian and Russian aggression 1s a South Slavonic Federation, just as the only safe- guard of Greece against absorption in the Macedonian monarchy was found in the Federal tie. In the present circumstances of the European world, the Illyric peninsula seems naturally marked out as a field for a most interesting experiment in Federal politics. One .may hope that the only question is whether the Margos or Washington of the Southern Slaves will delay his appearance until the peninsula has been entirely delivered from Turkish bondage, or whether a Federation will prove the instrument of that deliverance. °

Χ PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

Another question of the day which Mr. Freeman would, doubtless, have touched upon in a new edition of his work is that of an “Imperial Federation,” as it is called, of the British Empire. The self-contradictory character of this idea, which he clearly showed, would have furnished him with a new illustration, by contrast, of the true meaning of Federalism. No one who masters his lucid cxposition of the nature of Federal Government in Chapter II is hkely cither to be misled by such a phrase or to fall into the opposite error of the vulgar politician, who never loses an opportunity of confounding a bond of dependency with a tio of federation. To suppose that this error is due to a reminiscence of the fact that the states and kingdoms which the Romans termed “federate” were in every sense dependencics on Rome and not her equal allies, would be to credit those who commit it with more historical knowledge than they are at all likely to possess.

The Index has been prepared by Mrs. A. J. Evans,

ΤΟ

SPYRIDON TRIKOUPES,

LATE GREEK MINISTER AT THE COURT OF LONDON

My pEAR Mr. TRIKOUPES,

There is no man to whom I can inscribe so fittingly as to yourself a volume which deals mainly with the restoration of Grecian freedom after a period of foreign oppression. As the native historian of regenerate Greece, you fill a position strikingly analogous to that of the illustrious writer who forms my chief guide throughout the present portion of my work. Like Polybios, your youth was spent among men and exploits worthy of the countrymen of Aratos and Philopoimén; like Polybios, too, your later years have been spent in recording, in the still living tongue in which he wrote, the great events of which you were an eye-witness and a partaker. You have helped to win for your own immediate country an honourable name among the divisions of the Greek race; you have helped to place /‘tolia on the same level as Achaia, and to raise the name of Mesolongi to a reputation no less glorious than that of Megalopolis. And in one

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ΧΙ] DEDICATION

respect you are more happy than your great predecessor. Polybios lived to see a time when the freedom of his country was wholly extinguished, and when all that he could do for her was to procure for her some small allevia- tion of her bondage. You have lived to see your country answer the calumnies of her enemies by conduct which they cannot gainsay; you have seen Greece once more draw on her the eyes of admiring Europe by one of the justest and purest Revolutions in all recorded history. While all that he could do was to obtain some contemp- tuous concessions from an overbearing conqueror, you are called on to take your share in the deliberations of an Assembly where every honest heart in Europe trusts that twice-liberated Hellas will be at last allowed to fix her own <lestinics. Whatever may he the resalt of those deliberations, whether a King is again to sit on the throne of Theseus or a President again to bear the seal of Lydiadas, that they may lead to the full establishment of law and freedom in the land where law and freedom first arose is the carnest wish of

Your sincere and obliged friend,

EDWARD A. FREEMAN.

SOMERLEAZE, WELLS,

January 3rd, 1868.

PREFACK

[I trusY that no one will think that the present work owes its origin to the excitement of the War of Secession in America. It is the first instalment of a scheme formed long ago, and. it represents the thought and reading of more than ten years. All that late events in America have done has been to increase my interest in a subject which had already long occupied my thoughts, and, in some degree, to determine me to write at once what otherwise might have been postponed for some time longer.

The present volume is mainly devoted to the working of the Federal system in Ancient Greece. The Federal period of Grecian history is one which has been generally neglected by English scholars, and I trust that 1 may have done something to bring into more notice a period than which none is richer in political lessons. But it must be remembered that I am not writing a history of Greece or a history of Achaia, but a history of Grecian Federalism. From this difference of object it follows that I have treated my subject in a somewhat different manner from that which I should have thought appropriate to a regular history of Greece or of any other country. First, As a historian of Federalism, 1 look to everything mainly as illustrating, or not illustrating, the progress of Federal ideas. I dwell upon events, or I hurry over them, not according to their intrinsic import- ance, but according to their importance for my particular purpose. I have disposed in a line or two of battles which were of high moment in the history of the world, and 1 have dwelt at length on obscure debates and embassies, when their details

XIV PREFACE

happened to throw light on the Achaian Constitution or on the mode of proceeding in the Achaian Assembly. It so happens that much of the information most valuable for my purpose comes in the form of details of this kind, which a general historian would, naturally and properly, cut very short. I mention this merely that I may not be thought to have either depreciated or overvalued subjects which, writing with a special object, I have looked at mainly from the point of view dictated by that object.

Secondly, In writing the history, not of a particular country, but of a form of government which has existed in several coun- tries, 1 have constantly endcavoured to illustrate the events and institutions of which 1 write by parallel or contrasted events and institutions in other times and places. I have striven to make the politics of Federal Greece more intelligible and more inter- esting, by showing their points of likeness and unlikeness to the politics of modern England and America. I should have done this, in some degree, in a history of any sort, but I have done it far more fully in a history of a form of Government than I should have done in an ordinary history of Greece or of any other country. And 1 trust that I have not compared ancient and modern politics in the mere inverest of any modern party. I have certainly not written in the interest of either the North or the South in the American quarrel. I see too much to be said for and against both sides to be capable of any strong partizanship for cither. Possibly this may not be a bad frame of mind in which to approach the history of the quarrel, when the course of my subject brings me to it. At present, what I have had to do has mainly been to argue against the false infer-. ences on the subject of Federalism in general which some have drawn from recent American history. And, if I do not write in the interest of cither side in the American dispute, neither am I conscious of writing in the interest of any English political party. I am conscious of holding strong opinions on many points both of home and foreign politics ; for historical study does more than

PREFACE ΧΥ

anything else to lead the mind to a definite political creed ; but, at the same time, it does at least as much to hinder the growth of any narrow political partizanship. A historical student soon learns that a man is not morally the worse for being Whig or Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Royalist or Republican, Aristo- crat or Democrat, Unionist or Confederate. He soon learns to sympathize with individuals among all parties, but to decline to throw in his lot unreservedly with any party. But he will not carry his political toleration so far as to confound political differ- ences and moral crimes. Indignation at successful wickedness is a feeling of which no honest man will ever wish to rid himself ; no honest man, above all no honest student of history, will ever bring himself to look on the Tyrant whose very being implies the overthrow of right with the same eyes with which he looks on the mere political adversary whose motives may be as honour- able as his own.

In writing the present volume, I have endeavoured to com- bine a text which may be instructive and interesting to any thoughtful reader, whether specially learned or not, with notes which may satisfy the requirements of the most exacting scholar. In the text therefore I have, as far as possible, avoided techni- calities, and I have thrown the discussion of many points of detail into the notes. I have throughout been lavish in the citation of authorities, as 1 hold that an author should not require his readers to take anything on his bare word, but should give them the means of refuting him out of his own pages, if they think good. If I have overdone it in the matter of refer- ences, 1 am sure that every real student will allow that it is a fault on the right side. I have felt such deep gratitude to those authors who really act as guides and not as rivals to the original writers, and I have felt so aggrieved at those who follow another course, that I was determined to do all I could to avoid blame on this most important score.

The nature of the authorities for this period of Grecian

Xvi PREFACE

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history has been explained in several passages of the volume itself, and the chief among them, Polybios and Plutarch, ought to be familiar to every scholar. But besides the evidence of historians, there are few parts of history on which more light is thrown by the evidence of coins. In this branch of my subject, I am bound, at every step, to acknowledge the benefits which I have derived from the numismatic knowledge of my friend the Hon. John Leicester Warren. <A careful comparison of his numismatic and my historical evidence has enabled us together to fix several points which probably neither of us could have fixed separately. I should have drawn more largely on Mr. Warren’s resources, which have been always open to me, were scholars not likely to have the benefit of his researches into Greek Federal Coinage in a separate form.

At the risk of offending some eyes by unaccustomed forms, I have spelled Greek names, as closely as I could, according to the Greek orthography. This practice is now very general in Germany, and it is gradually making its way in England. Mr. Grote first ventured to restore the Greek kK; Professor Max Miiller, in the Oxford HKssays, went several degrees further. For the Latin spelling, nothing can be- pleaded but custom—a custom, which is merely a part of that unhappy way of looking at everything Greck through a Latin medium, which has so long made havoc of our philology and mythology. In exactly the same way, serious mischicf—I believe I may say serious political mischief—has been done by our habit of looking at nearly every- thing in modern Europe through a French medium, and of speaking of German, Italian, and Flemish places by French corruptions of their names. Strange to say, while we clothe Italian names in a French dress, we usually clothe Modern Greek names in an Italian dress. Inexplicable confusion is the neces- sary result; names which have not altered since the days of Homer are written in endless ways to adapt them to a Western pronunciation which is hardly ever that of Englishmen. The island of J/élos has never changed its name, and its name is

PREFACE XVII

sounded in the same way by a Greek and by an Englishman. It seems eminently absurd to talk about AZélos in the history of the Peloponnésian War, but, if the island happens to be mentioned in a modern book or newspaper, to change 105 name into that of Milo the slayer of Clodius. The only way to preserve consist- ency is to write every Greck name, old or new, according to the native spelling, and to leave cach reader to pronounce according to accent or quantity as he pleases. This 1 have done through- out, with two exceptions. When a name has a really English, as distinguished from a Latin or French, form, such as Philip, Ptolemy, Athens, Corinth, I should never think of making any change ; indeed I rather regret that we have not more forms of the kind. Again, a few very familiar names, like Thermopyle, Bosotia, etc., though the form is not thoroughly English, I have left as they are usually spelled. ‘The change which has the most unusual look is the substitution of the Greek ai for « in the ending of plural feminine names. In many cases, however, there is also a singular form in use, which I have preferred wherever

I could.

I trust that the sccond volume, containing the history of the Swiss and other German Leagues, will follow the present with all reasonable speed. But it involves a minute examination of some very obscure portions of history, and I cannot fix any certain time for its appearance.

SOMERLEAZE, WELLS, Janwary 2nd, 1863.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Object of the work . . . . . . . . . . 1 Federalism a compromise ; therefore hard to define —. . . . 1 General definition for historical purposes —. . , . . . 2 Definition of a perfect Federal Government . . 2 Internal Sovereignty of the several members, combined Ww ith the Sovereignty of the Union in all external matters Wider range of the history . . Four great examples of Federal Government 1, The Achaian League, B.c, 281—146 . . . . 2. The Swiss Cantons, A.D, 1291—1862 . . . . . . τ 8, The United Provinces, A.D, 1579—1795 4. The United States, a.p. 1778—1862 Characteristics of the Four Great Confederations . The German Confederation . Other ancient examples ; in Greece ; in ‘Italy ; ; in Lykia Other German Leagues ; the Hanse Towns Other American Confederations

bo

AAaanrr 2 LS LP Hh mH WW CO

CHAPTER II

» CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Illustrations of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal Commonwealth . . . . . , . 7

Two conditions of a true Federal Government . . 8

Two classes of Federal Commonwealths; First, the “ ΔΊ ystem of Con- federated States,” where the Central Power deals with the State Governments only . . . . . . . . . 8

ΧΧ CONTENTS

PAGE Second, the ‘ Composite State," w where the Central Power acts directly on all citizens . 9 The distinction one rather of nieans than of ends, ‘and not always to be drawn in history . . . . 10—11 Different classifications of governments ; ; ist, into Monarchy, Aristo- cracy, and Democracy; 2nd, into Absolute and Constitutional Governments . . . . . . . . . . 12 Need of a cross division . . . . 12 Federalism a compromise between Great and. Small States . . . 18 Division into Great and Small States irrespective of their several forms of government. . . . . . . . 18 Definition of Large and Small States . . . . . . . 14 ‘Characteristics of the Independent City . . . . , . 15 ‘Patriotism confined to the City. . . . . . . 15 Full developement of city-independence in Greece . . . 16 /Early and comparatively unimportant approaches to Constitutional Monarchy and to Federal Republicanism . 16 Municipal character of the Greck Commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike . . . . , . . . . 16 —17 Civic Tyrannics . . . . . . . . 17 Condition of Dependent Cities 3 in Greece . . . . 18 Difference between a dependent City and a member of a a Federation . 18 Comparison of dependent cities with Enylish Colonies . . : . 20 No means of general Mneorporation supplied by the system of Inde- pendent Cities. 21 Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens j in the case s of the old Attic Cities . . . . οι 22 Its impossibility in the case of the later athonian Empire . . . 22 Dependencies of mediwval and modern Italian cities, and of Swiss Cantons . . . . . , . . 28 Effects of incorporation at Romo . . 23 Town-autonomy in medixval Europe ; the independence of the cities modified by the claims of the Emperors . . . . . 24—25 General view of the system of Independent Cities . . . 26 Varieties in internal Constitutions and in external relations . . 26—27 Different relations between the City and its Territory . . . 28 Comparative gain and loss of the system _.. . . . . . 29 Advantages of small Commonwealths . . . . . . . 29 Political Education of the individual Citizen . . . . . 29 Comparison with the English House of Commons . . . δὲ Contrast with the Florentine Parliament . . . . 81 Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism . 82 Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English member . . . : . . . . 88

Position of the English Ministry . . . . . . . . 88

CONTENTS ΧΧῚ

PAGE

Received duties of the private member ; different duties of the Athenian Citizen . . . . . . 84 The Assembly a Government as Ww ell as ἃ Parliament . . . . 998 Functions of the Senate and of the Generals . . . . . 385 Nothing analogous to “ Office’? and “ Opposition ” . . . . 35 Direct Diplomatic action of the Assembly . . . . . . 86 Effect of these powers on individual citizens . . . . . 96 Athens the highest type of the system . . . . . . . 37 Opportunity for the developement of genius. . . . . . 38 Intensity of patriotism in small States . . . . . . . 88 Identification of all citizens with the City. . . . . . 89 Bad side of the system of city-commonwealths . . . . . 89 Their greatness less permanent than that of greater States. . . 40 Common fallacy as to the weakness of small States . . . 40

Different positions of small States where they are merely exceptions, and where they are the general rule. . . . . . 4] ---42 Position of Free Cities in the Middle Ages. . . . . . 42 Constant warfare among Free Cities. . . . . 42

Force of antipathy between neighbouring tow ns ; ᾿Ξ examples in Greece aud Italy . . . . 42—43 Comparison hetween citizen- soldiers and professional soldiers . . 44 Severity of the Laws of War . . . . . . 48 Increased bitterness of faction in small States . . . . . 46 Local disputes commonly more bitter than general ones . . . 48 General balance of gain and Joss in small States. . . . 48

Definition of large States, irrespective of their forms of gover ‘ument . 50 Two immediate results ; smaller importance of the Capital ; represen-

tative character of National Assemblies . . 50 Position of the Capital in a large State; its influence either indirect or violent . . . . : . 50—51 Necessity of representative institutions | in a Free State of large size » 82 Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government . . §2 Exceptions to the representative system in modern Europe and America 553 Election of Polish Kings . . . . . 54 Napoleonic Universal Suffrage ; its delusive nature . . . » 55 English and American ways of attaining the same object. . . 56 Election of the American President practically another exception . 56 Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage . . . - 57 General view of the system of large States. . . . . . 57 Extent of local diversity in large States . . . 58 Opposite systems of Centralization and of Local Freedom independent of the form of the Central Government . . . . . . 459 “Difference between Municipal and Federal rights . . . . 59

General characteristics of large States ; balance of gain and loss . 60—61 Advantages of great States . . . . . . . . . 61

Xxil CONTENTS

Peace secured to a large country

Lessening of local prejudices

Lessening of the evils of War

‘Lessening of party strife

Disadvantages of large States

Inferior political edueation

Ignorance and corruption of many clectors

Different forms of bribery at Athens and in England

These vices inherent in the systein .

Balance of advantage in favour of large States . . .

#ederal Governmenta system inter mediate between Greatand Small States

It combines, though in an inferior degree, the special advantages of both systems

‘Federalism a compromise ; ; therefore suited only to certain positions 69—70

Popular prejudices on the subject .

No general deductions to be made from recent Ameri ican events

Instance of similar disruptions in Monarchics ,

No case against Iederalisin in general, nor against the or riginal American Union

Testimony of the Southern States: to the ¥ ederal Principle

A large State may be a Republic without being a Federation

No argument to be drawn from failures in Mngland and France

A Federation may consist of Monarchics .

Imperfect approaches to kingly Federalism in the Ko udal system

A strictly Federal Monarchy unlikely to last

Other approaches to Federal Monarchy

Instance of two or more Kingdoms under one King

Members of a Federation may be either Cities or Staces of considerable 8170 . .

Difference of scale in Kur ope ‘and America to be considered

General view of Federalism as an intermediate system . . .

Intermediate position as regards government of the whole territory

Intermediate position as regards Political Education .

Comparison of a State with a Kingdom, and with a consolidated Republic . . .

Circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable

General result of Modern Federalism. .

‘Results of the American Union .

Its comparative permanency as compared with Fr: ance .

Evils which the Federal Union has hindered . . Alleged weakness of the Federal tie ; true in a sense, but not necessarily injurious . . . .

Circumstances under which a, . Feder al Union may be lasting ircumstances under which it may be useful as a transitional state Cases for consolidation, and for separation

67 69

69

70 71 72

72 72 73 78 74 74 75 75 76

CONTENTS XXiil

PAGE Easiness of separation when needed ; its good side . 89 ‘Probability that a Federation will be less anxious than a kingdom to recover revolted members _. . . . . . 91 Inconsistency of striving to retain unwilling ‘members . . . . 91 -Witness of Switzerland in favour of the Federal system . . . 92 Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . 94 CHAPTER IIT OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government . . . 95 Origin of the Error ; opinions of modern writers . . . . . 96 The Council a Religious, not a Political, body . . . . 97 The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several . . . . . 98 Its incidental political action . . . . . . . 98 Amphiktyonic Crusades . . . . . . 99 The Council becomes the tool of par ticular States . . . . 100 No inherent force in its Decrees . . . . 100 Indirect importance of the Council in the History of Feder alism . . 101 Its close approach to a Federal system, without ever growing into one . . . . . . 101 Its constitution unsuited to histor ical Greece . . . . . 103

The Amphiktyony an Union of Tribes, not of Cities. . . . 103 Unfair distribution of the Votes 5 analogy of the unreformed

Parliament . . . . . 103—104 These incongruities less palpable i ina religious body . . . . 104 Amphiktyonic championship of Philip . . . . 105 Reforms under Augustus ; new arr angement of the votes . . 105-—106 Approach to Representative forms in the Council . . . . . 108 The Amphiktyonic body Representative, because not really a

Government . . . . 109 Political nullity of the Council “during the greater part of Grecian

History . . . . . . . . . . . 109

CHAPTER [IV

OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE § 1. Of the Northern Leagues

An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder

portions of the Greek nation . . . . . . 112 The Phékian League as described by Pausanias . . . . . 118 Probably a revival of an earlier League . . . . . . 118

The Akarnanian League _.. . . . . . . . . 114

XX1V CONTENTS

PAGE Various Notices, Βι0. 481—167 . . . . . . . 114—115 Constitution of the League . 116 The Epcirot League . . . . . 116 Early Republican developement i in xe haonia and Thesprotis . 117 Constitutional Monarchy in Molossis . 117 Foundation of the Federal Republic of Epciros, Β.6, 239229 117 No real Federalism in Thessaly . . . . 118 Position and Power of the Thessalian Tagos . 118 Monarchy of Jasin, B.c. 372 . . . 119 Undisguised Tyranny of his successors, b.c. 370 -359 . 119 Thessaly a dependency of Macedonia. . 119 Legislation of T. Quinctius Flamininus, B.¢. 197. 120 ξ 2. Of the Bwotiun League History of the Bwotian League ; its warnings 120 Dangers of an overwhelming Capital in a Federal State 120 Legal and practical position of Thebes in the Bovotian League 122 The circumstances of Beotia suited to a Synotkismos, not to a Federal system . . . . 123 Effects on general Grecian History 123 Three Periods of Bceotian History 124 Tirst Period, p.c. 776—387 . 124 Beecotia both an Amphiktyony and a Political League . 124 Use of the words ‘‘ Beeotian” and ‘*Theban” by Τὶ hucydidés and AXecnophon . . 125 Constitution of the League . 125 Subject Districts or Subordinate Leagues . . . 126 Office of the Bocotarchs and of the Four Βοηδύοθ., . . . 126---127 Federal and Local Archons . . . ; . . , . . 128 Theban Archon a mere Pageant; real power vested in the Polemarchs 129 Power of Thebes shown in the Tlistory of Plataia . . 129 Secession of Piataia from the League . 129 Ill-feeling between Thebes and other Towns 130 Theban claims at the Peace of Antalkidas 131 Dissolution of the Breotian League, B.c. 387 132 Second Period, B.u. 387—334 132 The Peace carried out in the interest of Spar ta . . 132 Spartan garrisons in the Cities ; Restoration of Plataia . . 133 Oligarchic and Democratic Parties . . 133 Weakness of the Democratic element in Boootia 133

Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy, becomes, by her ‘Revolution

[n.c. 379], the centre of Democracy . . . ἢ . 1838—134

Career of Pelopidas and Epamcinoéndas . . . . . . Bad results of Theban supremacy . . . Nominal revival of the League. . . . . . . .

134 134 134

CONTENTS XXV

PAGE Real subjection of the Lesser Cities to Thebes . . . . . 1885 Destruction οὗ Beotian Towns . . . . . 186 General dislike towards Thebes thr onghout Gr cece . . . 197 Gradual growth of the Theban claims . . . . . 138 Parallel between Thebes in Baotia and Sparta in Lakéui ia. . . 189 The claims of Thebes exclude all true Federalism in Boeotia . . . 140 Restoration of the destroyed Towns . . . . 140 Destruction of Thebes by Alexander [800] 335). " Zealous co-operation of the Bceotian Towns . . . . . . . . . 14] Third Period, 5.0. 8335—172 . . . . . . . 141 Restoration of Thebes by Kassander, 1.0. 316 . . . . 14] Restoration of the League with a modified Headship in Thebes . . 142 Insignificance of Bovotia in later Greece . . ; . . . 142 Constitution of the League . . . . . 148 Dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius, b.C. 171 . . . 144 § 3. Of Various Altempts at Federal Systems—TIonia, Olynthos, Arkadia, οἶς. Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Union . . . . . . 145 Advice οἵ Thalés to the Ionians . . . . 145

Degree of connexion among the Ionian Cities ; no true Feder al Union 145—146 Their relation essentially Ainphiktyontic ; its differences from the elder

Amphiktyonies . . . . . 145—146 Thalés probably intended a tr ue Federal Union . . . . 147 His advice not taken ; its rejection a striking illustration of Greek

political ideas . ~ « 147 Attempted League of Olynthos dissoly ed by Spar ta, B.C. 382 . . 149 Fata) results to Greece from its dissolution . . . . 149 Views of Mr. Grote too favourable to the designs of Olynthos . . 150 Proceedings of Olynthos as described by Klcigenés . . . 150 The terms offered acceptable to the Macedonian Towns, but rejected hy

the Greeks of Chalkidiké . . . . 151

Their real nature not Federal Union, but absor ption into Olyuthos . 152 Federal Union of Arkadia, B.c. 8570.» . . . . . . . 154

Little previous importance of Arkadia . . . . . . 154 History of Mantineia ; her destruction and restoration . . . 154—-155 Arkadian Union hitherto merely Amphiktyonic . . . . 155 Lykomédés designs a true Federal Union . . . . . . 155 Temporary success of the Federal scheme . . . . . 156 Foundation οὗ Megalopolis . . . . . . . . 156 General adhesion of Arkadia to the League . . . . 157 Constitution of the League ; the Assembly of Ten Thousand . 157—158 Probable existence of a Senate. . . . . . . . 158 Institution of a sole General . . . . . 159

Foundation of Megalopolis ; ; its advantageous position . . . 159—160

ΧΧΥῚ CONTENTS

PAGE Decline of the Arkadian League ; history of Megalopolis . 160—161 Pretended scheme of Federal Union in Euboia, B.c. 351 162 Evidence of the growth of Federal ideas in Greece 162 § 4. Of the Lykian League The Lykian League ; its excellent Constitution . . . 162 Strabo’s description and testimony to its practical working . . 163—164 Merits of the Lykian Constitution ; no Capital 164 The Assembly Primary, not Representative . 164 Apportionment of votes to numbers 165 Approach to Representative Government 166 A Senate not mentioned, but to be inferred from analogy 166 Federal Magistrates 166 Date and Origin of Federal Gover nment in Lykia. 167 Relation of the Lykians to the Grecks . 167 Traces of Federalism before the subjection of Rhodes 167 Lykia subject to Rhodes, b.c. 188 167 Lykia independent, B.c. 168 168 Origin of the Constitution described by Strabo 168 Destruction of the League by Claudius, A.D. c. 50 169 CHAPTER V ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE § 1. General Character of the History of Federal G'recee

Common neglect in England of the History of Federal Greece . 171

Earlier Grecian History mainly the History of Athens; nullity of Athens in the Federal Period . . 172 Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece . 174 Wide spread of Hellenic culture . . . 174

Importance of this age in Universal History and i in the History of the Greek race . 175 Effects of Alexander’s Conquests . 175 Character of the age of Polybios . 175 Comparison between Thucydidés and Polybios 176 Beginnings of the Federal Revival, 8.0. 281. 177 Gaulish Invasion . . 178 Reconstruction of Macedonia under the Antigonids 178 Revival of the Achaian League . 179 Opposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia ; position of the ‘Antigonid Kings 179

Condition of Greece under Philip and Alexander, and under the Successors . Position of revived Macedonia and Greece

*

. . 179—180

180

CONTENTS XXVIII

PAGE Comparison of Macedonia in Greece with Austria in Italy . . . 181 Generous aims of the Achaian League . . . . 183 An earlier establishment of federalism in Greece not desirable . . 183 Effects of the League . . . . . . . . . . 184

§ 2. Origin and Early Growth of the Leayue

Growth of Federal ideas in Greece in the Fourth Century Bc. . . 185 Further Federal reaction against Macedonian influences . . . 185 Early History of Achaia ; early Union of the Achaian Towns . . 186 Probable greater laxity of the bond during the Old League . . . 187 Achaia during the Peloponnésian War . . . . . 187 History of Pellénd ; ; Tyranny of Chairoén, B.C. 368—385 . . 187—188 Achaia under the Successors and under Antigonos Gonatas, B.c. 314—

288 . . . . . . . . . 189 Final dissolution of the Old League . . . . 190 The Twelve original Cities ; loss of Helike and of Olenos . . . 190 Traces of F ederal action under the Old League. . . 191 Beginnings of the revived League; Union of Patrai and Dymé [B.c. 2801,

of Tritaia and Pharai_. . . . . . . 191 Union of Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia, B.C, 275 . . . . . 192 Extension of the League over all Achaia. . . . . . 192 Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War . . . . . 192 Quict and peaceful growth of the League. . . 193 Markos of Keryneia probably the true Founder of the League . . 198 Iseas οὗ Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny . . 194 Nature of the Greek Tyrannies ; difference between their earlier and

later forms . . . . . . . . . . . 194

§3. Ofthe Achaian Federal Constitution

Probable formal enactment of the Federal Constitution, B.c. c. 274 . 198

Sources of information. . . . . . . 198 The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only . . . . 198 Democratic Constitution of the League. . . . . . . 198 Differences between Achaian and Athenian Democracy . , . . 199 Independence of the several Cities . . . . . . . 199 Subject Districts or Dependent Towns . . . 200 Tendencies to assimilation among the members of the ‘League, both in Achaia and in America . . . . . . . . 200 The League really a National Gover nment . . . . . 202 No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities . . . 202

Comparison with America ; the restriction less strict in Achaia . 202---208 Particular Embassies by licence of the Federal body . . . . 204 Later exceptions under Roman influence. . . . . 204 The Federal Assembly ; its Democratic Constitution . . . . 205

XXV111 CONTENTS

PAGE Aristocratic elements in Achaia . . 206 Contrast with Athens ; the Achaian Constitution ἃ nearer approach to modern systems . . 206 Causes of the difference, arising mainly from the ereater extent of terri- tory in Achaia. . . . . . . . 207 The Assembly practically Aristocratic . . . . . . 207 Its nature not understood by Continental scholars . . , . 208 Analogies in England . . . . . . . . . . 209 Practical Democratical elements. . . . . . . . 210 Votes taken by Cities, not by heads . . . . 211 Advantages and disadvantages of this system of voting . . 21 1--.91Ὁ General merits of the Achaian Constitution . . . . 214 Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly ; consequent restric- tions on its powers . . . . . 214—215 The Initiative practically in the Government . . . . 215 Place of Μοοίπιρ ; first Aigion, afterwards other Cities ; advantages of Aigion . . . . 215--216 Greater power of Magistrates 11) Achaia than at Athens . . . 216 The Achaian Magistrates form a ‘‘ Government” . . . . 217 Comparison with America and England . . ι. . , . 217 Various Federal Offices . . . . . . . . . 219 The Ten Ministers; probably chosen from all the Cities indis- criminately . . . . , . . . 220 Relations of the Ministers to the General . . . . . . 221 An Achaian ‘‘ Caucus ” . . . . . . . . . 222 The President or General. . . . . 223 Powers and number of the Generals in other Greek States . . . 223 Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One . . 228 Extensive powers of the Office; comparison with a modern. First Minister . . . . . . . . 224 Comparison of Aratos and Per iklds . . . . . . 225 Greater importance of Office in Achaia than at Athens. . 220 Comparison of the Achaian General, the American President, and the English First Minister . . 227 Closer approach to the English system in Achaia, owing to the General being himself a Member of the Assembly . . 227 Greater power in the General necessary in a Federal than in a a City Democracy . 228 Chief Federal Offices unpaid, but without a property qualification 229-230 Power of summoning Assemblies vested in the General in Council . 231 The Ministers act as Speakers of the Assembly. . . . 231 Joint action of the General and Ministers in diplomatic matters . . 232 Unrestrained power of the General ἴῃ War . . . . 288 Union of military and political powers contrary to modern usage . . 298

The General’s title military, but his badge of office civil . . . 284

CONTENTS ΧΧΙΧ

wee me στ ee --.

PAGE

Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers; their _ gradual separation , . . . 234—235 The Achaian system a reaction ; its disadvantages . . . 235

The Presidential interregnum aggravated by the union of powers. 235—236 Question of re-election of the President ; the Achaian General incapable

of immediate re-election . . . . . . . 236—237 The Senate . . . . , . . 299 Financial and Military policy of the League . . . . . . 241 Military Contingents ordered by the Assembly . . . . . 242 Mercenaries ; Federal garrisons . . 242 General comparison between the Achaian League and the United

States ; their close general resemblance . 243 Differences between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of

States . . . . 248—244 Analogies and div orsities in the position of the President . . . 244 No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate. ι, . . 246 Closer analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing . , . . . . 247 Higher position of the Achaian Ministers. . . . 248 Achaia tlhe more democratic in theory, and America in py actice . . 248

The American Constitution not a conscious imitation of the Achaian . 249

Remarkable treatment of the Achaian History in the ‘* Federalist” .7 . 249

An unconscious likeness to the ancient parallel, more valuable than a conscious one . . . . . . . . . . 251

CHAPTER VI ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ASTOLIAN LEAGUE

General resemblances and differences between the Leagues of Achaia

and /Mtolia ; their practical teaching . 252 Early History of fKtolia ; probable carly. appr oach to Federal Union 254255 AXtolian acquisition of Naupaktos. B.c. 338 . . . . . 255 The League in the reign of Alexander. B.c. 336—-323. . . . 256 Share of the tolians in the Lamian War. B.c. 323-322 . . . 256 fKtolia during the Wars of the Successors. . . . . . 257 Glimpses of Atolian Constitution at this time . . . . . 257 Share of the ΖΕ 0]18}}5 in the Gaulish War. Bc. 280 . . . . 257 Annexation of Hérakleia _. . . 258 Earlier developement of Etolia in some points ; ; closer union of tho

Cantons . . . . . 258 AKtolia a League of Distr icty rather than of Cities . 259 Democratic character of the League tempered with Aristocr atic |

elements . . , . . . . . . 260—261 Powers of the Assembly . . . . . . . . . 261

The Senate or Apoklétoi . . . . . . , . . 262

ΧΧΧ CONTENTS

PAGE Federal Magistrates. . . . . . . . . . 263 Powers of the General . . . . . . . 263 Foreign Policy of the League ; contrast with Achaia . . . . 265 Variety of relations in the ΖΕ το] δὴ League . . . . . , 268 Differences of position among the conquered states . . . 269 Comparisons with the different relations of British Dependencies . . 270 Comparison between /Etolia and Switzerland . . . . . 271

CHAPTER VII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA.—B.Cc, 281—222

81. From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Deliverance of

Corinth B.C. 281—-243 BC.

284-272 Revolutions of Greece and Macedonia during the first years of the League . . . 276

State of Peloponnésos ; ; favourable position of the Achoian League . . . . . . 276—277 261—251 Ten years blank in Grecian history . . . . . 277 255 Institution of the sole Gencralship . . . . 277 Biographical character of the Achaian history . . . 278 680—580 History of Sikyoén ; its carly Tyrants . . . . . 279 365 Euphron founds Democracy . . . . . . . 279 308—301 Sikyén under the Successors ; . . . . . 279 301—251 Second period of Tyrants. . . . . 280 Administration of Timokleidas and Kleinias . . . . 280 264 Tyranny of Abantidas ; escape of Aratos to Argos . . 280 252—251 Tyrauny of Paseas and of Nikoklés . . 281 251 Deliverance and internal pacification of Sikyén by Aratos 282-284 251 Annexation of Sikyén to the Achaian League . . . 285 Importance and novelty of the step. . . . . 285 Sikyén admitted on equal terms . . . . . 4+ 286

251—245 Position of <Aratos; his relations to Antigonos and Ptolemy . . . . . 287—288 245 Aratos elected General of the League . . . . . 288 His permanent position and character . . . . 288—289 Effect of the union of civil and military powers. . . 292 245—244 First Generalship of Aratos . . . 292 War with Atolia; defeat of the Beotians at Chairdneia 292—293 243-—242 Second Generalship of Aratos . 293—294 Deliverance of Corinth, and its accession to the League . 294

Accession of Megara, Troizén, and Epidauros ἢ . 294—295

CONTENTS ΧΧΧῚ

B.C. PAGE Position of Athens and Argos . . . . . . 295 Achaian invasion of Attica . . . . . 295 Vain attempt to attach Athens to the League . . . 296 Condition of Argos: succession of the Argeian Tyrants . 296 Tyranny of Aristomachos the First . . . . . 297 Aratos encourages conspiracies against him . . . . 297 Greek view of Tyrants and Tyrant-slayers . . 297 Death of Aristomachos the First: succession of Aristippos

the Second . . . . . . . 901

248---242 Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos . . . . 801

Suit at Mantineia between Aristippos and the League . . 3802

Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes the ally of the League . . 3802

Aratos’ pension from Ptolemy . . . 808 Illustration of the Achaian Constitution supplied by the first

two Generalships of Aratos . . . . 3803— 804

§ 2. From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos

B.C. 243—228

241—240 Third Generalship of Aratos . . . . . . . 3805 Relations of the League with Sparta . . . . . 3805 Contrast between Agis and Aratos . . . . .. 806 Nifference in their plans for the campaign ; Ags retires 306—307 Capture and recovery of Pellené . . . . . 3807 Truce with Antigonos ; alliance with Ktolia . . . , 908 239 Death of Antigonos Gonatas . . . . . . 308 The Démétrian War . . . . . . 908 239 Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on - Peiraiens . . . 309 Illustrations of the position of Aratos . . . . . 3809

239—229 Various attempts on Athens; feeling towards Aratos there. . . . . . . 910 243—229 Attempts of Aratos on Argos . . . . . . 811 Klednai joins the League . . . . . . . 312

Death of Aristippos the Second: tyranny of Aristomachos the Second . . . . . . 812 Rival celebrations of the Nemean Games . . . . 813 Extension of the two Leaguesin Arkadia . . . . 314 Revolutions of Mantineia . . 315 Union of Megalopolis with the Achaian ‘League ; ; its effects . 3815 Character of Lydiadas . . . . . . . . 3815 233 Lydiadas chosen General . . . . . . . 817 Rivalry of Aratos and Lydiadas_. . . . . . 818

231 Second Generalship οὗ Lydiadas . . . . . . 3819

XXX11 CONTENTS B.C, PAGE 239—229 Affairs of Northern Greece ; Revolution in Epciros . . 820 First political intercourse with Rome . . . . 321 Hostility of the Αὐξο]δηῃ5 towards Akarnania . . . 3821 239—229 Akarnanian Embassy to Roine 321 231 Siege and relief of Mededn ; Bitolian Assembly in the camp. . . 922 230 Ravages of the [lyrians in Peloponnésos and Epeir os. . 924 Alliance of Epeiros and Akarnania with the Illyrians . . 924 229 Joint expedition of the two Leagues to relieve Korkyra . . 3825 Death of Markos . . . . . . . . . 920 Démétrios of Pharos. . . . . . . . 926 Interference of Rome . . . 926 229 Korkyra, Apollonia, and Bpidamnos become Roman allies . 826 Humiliation of Illyria . . . . 3826 228 Roman Embassies to the two. Leagues, and honorary Embassies to Corinth and Athens . . . . . 327 Eventual results of Roman interference . . . . . 928 229 Inaction of Macedonia ; death of Démétrios . . , . 928 229 ---221 Protectorate and reign of Antigonos Désén . . . 829 Advance of the League after the death of Démétrios . . 929 229 Application of the Athenians to Aratos when out of office . 880 Aratos buys the Macedonians out of Attica . . . 880 Progress of the League ; union of Aigina and Hermioné . 991 Unauthorized negociations of Aratos with Aristomachos of Argos. . . . . . . . 331 Lydiadas interferes as General . . 332 229-228 His proposal for the union of Argos rejected at the instance of Aratos, but carried on the motion of Aratos as General . . . . . . . . . 832—333 Aristomachos General . . . . . . 333 Union of Phlious with the League . . , . . 3834 Estimate of the conduct οὗ Aratos . . . . . 984 228 Commanding position of the Achaian League . . . 834

§ 8. From the beginning of the war with Kleomenés to the opening of

371—227

241 236—222 226—225

negociations with Macedonia

B.C. 227—224 Internal condition of Sparta . . . . . . 3835 Reform and fate of Agis . . . . . . . 837 Reign of Kleomenés , . . . . . . 837 Revolution of Kleomenés . . . . 887 Relations between Sparta and the League . 338

Different position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos 339 War acceptable on both sides . . . . . . 940

CONTENTS XXX

Position of the /Etolians; their inaction throughout the

Kleomenic War 341 Their acquisitions in Thessaly . 341 228 Spartan acquisition of the Atolian towns in Arkadia 342 Achaian interests involved in this annexation 342 Deliberations of the Achaian Government 343 Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos 343 227 Kleomenés fortifies Athénaion . . . . . 844 Achaian declaration of war; annexation of Kaphyai to the League . . . . . . . 344 227—226 Generalship of Aristomachos ; battle hindered by the inter- ference of Aratos . . . . 3844—346 226 Indignation against Aratos ; Lydiadas stands against him for the Generalship . . . . . . 3846—347 226—225 Twelfth (Ὁ) Generalship of Aratos . . 347 Aratos’ campaign in Elis ; his defeat at Mount Lykaion 347 Mantineia surprised ἿΣ Aratos and re-admitted to the League . . . . . 347—348 Results of the recovery of Mantineia ; temporary depression at Sparta . . . . 349 226 Battle of Ladokeia ; death of Lydiadas . . . . 850—351 Utter defeat of the Achaians ; indignation against Aratos 351 Assembly at Aigion ; strange vote of censure on Aratos 352 Aratos contemplates resignation, but recovers his influence 353 225—224 Generalship of Hyperbatas 353 Kleomenés’ Revolution at Sparta . 353 His successes in Arkadia ; he recovers Mantineia . 354 224 Third victory of Kleomenés at Hekatombaion . 354 Position of Aratos and of Kleomenés_ . . . 355—356 Probable nature of the supremacy claimed by Kleomenés 357 Aratos begins to look to Macedonia . 359 Difference between his view and that of Plutarch or of modern writers . . . . . . . 359—3860 § 4. From the Opening of Negoctations with Macedonia to the end of the War with Klcomenés B.C. 224—221 224 Twofold negociations with Sparta and Macedonia . 361 Beginning of negociations with Kleomenés . 361. 224—-223 Aratos declines the Generalship ; Timoxenos elected 362 Beginning of negociations with Antigonos . . . 362 Dealings of Aratos with Megalopolis ; commission from Mega- lopolis to the Federal Assembly 363 Megalopolitan envoys allowed to go to Macedonia 364

Cc

PAGE

ΧΧΧΙΝ

223

223

223

223

223—222

223—222 223 222 222 221

221

CONTENTS PAGE Their favourable reception by Antigonos ; letter from Anti- gonos read in the Federal Assembly ; speech of Aratos thereon . . . . 3864—366 Negociations with Kleomenés ; strong feeling i in his favour . 367 Negociations interrupted by Kleomenés "aliness . . . 367 Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos; Antigonos demands Akrokorinthos . . . . . 3867—368 IKKleomenés breaks off the negociations . . . . 869 Universal indignation at the thought of surrendering Corinth . . . 370 Appearance of extreme factions in the Achaian cities ; they lean to Kleomenés . . . . 870---571 His schemes appeal to Town- Autonomy against the Federal principle . . . . . 3871 Kleomenés wins the Arkadian and Argolic Cities . . . 872 Violent proceedings of Aratos at Sikyén . . . 878 Corinth calls in Kleomenés; Megara joins the Boeotian League . . . . 3738—374 No real argument against Federal Government to be drawn from these events . . . . . . . . 8724, Effects of the loss of Corinth . . . . 376 Aratos invested with absolute power, and defended by a guard. . . 377 He refuses the offers of Kleomenés, ‘and asks for help of HEtolia and Athens . . . 3878 Final vote of the League to invite “Antigonos and ‘cede ‘Akro- korinthos . . . . . . . . 3879 Estimate of the conduct of Aratos . . . . 3879 Lowered position of the League from this time . . . 379 Comparison between Cavour and Aratos . . 3880 Change in the character of the War; Kleomenés now the champion of Greece . . 982 Degradation of the League ; monstrous flattery of “Anti- gonos. . . . . . . 3883 Recovery of the revolted cities . . . . 884 Argos returns to the League ; ; execution of Ar istomachos . 884 Antigonos put in possession of Akrokorinthos . . . 385 Fate of Mantineia . . . . . . . 3885 Tegea united to the League . . . . . . . 886 Antigonos keeps Orchomenos . . . 886 Kleomenés takes Megalopolis ; first mention of Philopoimén . 386 Battle of Sellasia ; defeat and exile of Kleomenés . . . 887 Antigonos’ treatment of Sparta. . . . . . 887 Death and character of Antigonos . . . . . . 887

New position οὗ the League . . . . . . . 888

CONTENTS XXXV

CHAPTER VIII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO

B.C.

221

221—220 221 220

220—219 220

222—220

220

THE PEACE OF EPEIROS

B.C. 221—205

PAGE State of Greece after the fall of Kleomenés . . . . 389 Grand alliance under Macedonian headship . . . . 889 Internal and external condition of the Achaian League . . 390

Undiminished influence of Aratos; his relation to the Mace- donian Kings . . . . 991-- 892

Character of Philopoimén ; comparison between him and Aratos . . . . 892—393

Withdrawal of Philopoimén from Peloponnésos ; probable explanation of his conduct. . . . . 8938—394 Accession of Philip . . . . . . . . 394 Causes of the Social War . . . . . . . 994

81. The Social War B.C, 221—217

Third Generalship of Timoxenos . . . . . . 895 Phigaleia held by the Atolians . . . . 3895

Dorimachos plunders Messéné; extensive incursions of the fEtohans . . . . 895—396 Invasion during a Presidential Election . . 896—397 Aratos General ; he enters on office before the legal time 897—398 Military Assembly at Megalopolis . . . 398 Disgraceful campaign of Aratos ; his defeat at Kaphyai . 398 Accusation and defence of Aratos in the Assembly . . 899 Votes of the Achaian and A‘tolian Assemblies . . . 998 Relations between Ztolia and Messéné . . . . . 400 Achaian Embassies to Macedonia and Epeiros . . . 40] Etolian incursions in Peloponnésos . . . . 402 Insincerity of the Atolian Government . . . . 402 Affairs of Kynaitha ; return of the exiles. . . 402—403 Horrible sack of Kynaitha by the Ktolians . . . . 408 Unsuccessful attempt on Kleitér . . . . . . 408 Philip at Corinth . . . . . . . . . 404 Affairs of Sparta . . . 404 Philip sits in judgement on the Spartan parties at Tegea . 405 Declaration of Philip in favour of Sparta. . . . 406 Aratos’ liberal views of International right . . . 406 Congress at Corinth ; war agreed upon. . . 406—407

Opening of the Social War ; decree of the Congress of Corinth 407

XXXVI CONTENTS B.C PAGE Philip’s Letter to the AMtolians; shifts of the tolian Government . . . . . . . . . 407 220—219 Skopas /Mtolian General . . . . . . 408 220 The Achaian Assembly ratifies the decree . . . 408 Behaviour of Akarnania, Epeiros, Messéné, and Sparta 408—409 Comparative strength of Coalitions and Single Powers . . 409 Warnings against general inferences as to “forms of govern- ment. . . . 410 220—219 AXtolian Embassies in Peloponnésos ; > M achatas wins over Elis 411 State of Sparta ; parties of Old and Young . . . . 411 Intrignes of the Kleomenists with Aitolia . . . . 412 First and unsuccessful mission οὗ Machatas . . . . 412 220—219 Revolution at Sparta; Agésipolis and Lykourgos chosen Kings 413 Second mission of Machatas; Sparta joins the /Mtolian Alliance, and begins war with*Achaia_ . . . . 414 219 Beginning of the Social War ; its character . . . . 414 Paramount importance of Philip; his virtues and military skill . . . . . . 414—415 219---218 Generalship of the younger Aratos . . . . . 415 Successes of Philip . . . . 416 AKtolian ravages in the Cantons of Dymé, Pharai, and Tritaia . . . . . . 416 ‘*Sonderbund ” of the three Western Cities . . . . 417 Loss and recovery of Aigeira . . . . . . 418 219—218 Dorimachos tolian General: sacrilege of the Attolians at Dion and Dédina . . . . . . 419 Psdphis annexed to the Achaian League . . . . 419 Philip’s conquests of Phigaleia and Triphylia . . . 419 Relations between Philip and the League . . . 420 Personal relations between Philip and Aratos . . . 420 Plots of Apellés against Aratos and the Achaians . . . 421 218 Philip’s interferences with the Achaian election . . 422—423 218—217 Generalship of Epératos ; connexion of this election with the events of the preceding year . . . . . 423—424 Philip recovers Teichos . . . 424 Further schemes of Apellés ; Aratos_ restored to Philip’s favour . . . . . 424---426 218 Influence retained by Aratos in the Achaian Assembly . . 426 Treason of Apellés against PAIND 5 Philip crushes the plot. . . . . . . 427 218—217 Weak administration of Epératos . . . 428 217—216 Aratos general ; decrees of the Achaian Assembly . 428—429 217 Aratos’ mediation at Megalopolis; combination of full

Federal sovereigniy with strict regard to State rights . . . . . . . . . . 429

CONTENTS XXXVll

B. ς.

218—217

217

217—216

§ 2.

216

215

214 213

214 211

218 218—217

210

PAGE Philip’s success in Northern Greece _.. . . 430 Mediation of Chios and Rhodes ; failure of the proposed Con- ference . . . 4380—431 Second mission from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, and Egypt. 431 Philip turns his mind towards Italy . . 432 Opening of a new period ; close connexion of the history of Eastern and Western Europe from this date . . 432 Influence of Démétrios of Pharos; he counsels interference in Italy. . . . . . 433 Opening of the Congress of Naupaktos . . 434 Speech of Agelaos; his policy compared with that of Iso- kratés . . . . . . . . . 435—437 Peace of Naupaktos . . . . . . . . 438 Agelaos Aitolian General . . . . . . . 438 From the End of the Social War to the End of the First War with Rome B.C, 217—205 Analogy between the Peace of Agelaos and the Peace of Nikias . . . . 439 Connexion of the Macedonian and Punic Wars . . 499 Beginning of Roman influence in Greece . . . . 439 Impolitic conduct of Philip . . 440 Philip’s treaty with Hannibal; its various forms and “prob- able explanation . . . 441 Hellenic position assumed by Philip j in the Treaty . . 442 Philip’s relations with Peloponnésos . . 444

Affairs of Messéné ; interference of Philip and Aratos . 444445 Last infiuence of Aratos over Philip. . . . . 445 Philip’s second attempt on Messéné . . 445 Death of Aratos; comparison between him and Philo- poimén . . . . 446—447

Beginning of the Roman War ; Roman ‘policy of alliances . 447 Position of Rome ; her alliance with Atolia . . . 448---449

Plots for the “σθαι οι ” of Akarnania . . . . . 449 Roman conquests . . . . . . . . . 449 Invasion of Akarnania; heroic defence of the Akarnanians

and retreat of the Atolians . . . . . 449—450 Condition of Sparta; sedition of Cheilén . . . 450 Banishment and return of Lykourgos . . . . . 451 Reign of Machanidas . . . . . 461 ZEtolian and Akarnanian embassies at Sparta ; 3; speech of

Lykiskos . . . . . . . 451

Sparta in alliance with ‘Etolia . . . . . . 453

ΧΧΧΥΙΙῚ CONTENTS

B.C. PAGE 210 Naval warfare of Sulpicius ; desolation of Aigina . . . 453 209 The League asks help of Philip . . . . 453

Philopoimén General of Cavalry ; he reforms abuses . 453—454 209 King Attalos chosen General of Attolia . . . 455 Attempts at mediation on the part of Rhodes, ete. . . 455 Philip at Argos. . . . 456 209 Conference at Aigion ; demands of the Mitolians . . 456—457 Negociations broken off by Philip . . . . . 457 Philip repulses the Romans . . . . . . 458 His alternate debauchery and activity . . . . . 458 Exploits of Philip and Philopoimén . . . . 458 208—205 Character of the last years of the War . . . . . 459 207 Philip’s attempt on Hérakleia . . . . . 459 208 Philip’s cessions to the Achaian League . . . . 460 208—207 Philopoimén General of the League; his reforms . . 461-—462 The Three Battles of Mantineia . . . . . . 464

207 Third Battle of Mantineia; complete victory of the Achaians . . . . . . 464—465 Philopoimén ravages Lakénia . . . . . . 465 Nabis Tyrant of Spar ta . . . . . . 465 Peace between AXtolia and Macedonia . . . . . 466 205 Conference αὖ Phoiniké ; general peacc. . . . . 466 Note on the Generalships of Αταΐοβϑ . . . . . 468

CHAPTER ΙΧ

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM 'THE PEACE OF EPEIROS TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE

Character of the Period . . . . . . . 471

81, From the Peace of Epetros to the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus

B.C. 205—194

202—200 Aggressive proceedings of PAABD 5 ; his dealings with the Achaian League . . . . . . . 472 200 His devastation of Attica . . . . . . 478 Justice of the war on the Roman side . . . . . 478 200—197 Second Macedonian War . . . . . 478 Real good-will of Flamininus towards Greece . . . 474 Union of Greek States under Rome . . . . . 475 Relation of the Federal States to Rome . . . . 478 Condition of Aitolia ; Generalship of Damokritos . . 476

200 Indecisive Meeting at Naupaktos; Aitolians join the _ Romans . . , . . . . . 476

CONTENTS ΧΧΧΙΧ

Β. Cc.

205—204 202—201 201—200

199 198

198—197 197 198

§ 2.

194 1938—192

192

Position of Achaia ; influence of Philopoimén

Reunion of Megara with the League

War with Nabis; deliverance of Messéné

Generalship of Kykliadas

Philopoimén goes again to Crete . .

Philip at Argos; his vain attempt to gain the League .

His pretended cession of Triphylia and Orchomenos

The League joins the Roman Alliance; terms of the treaty

Constitutional details. supplied “by the account of the debate . . . . . . .

Share of the League in the war

Unsuccessful siege of Corinth by Lucius Quinctius

Argos betrayed to Philip and ceded by him to Nabis

Exploits of the Achaian troops at Kleénai and in Asia .

State of Epeiros ; attempts at peace ; Charops acts for

PAGE

477 477 477 477 477 478 478

479

479 480 480 481 482

Rome . 482 Beeotia constrained to join the Romans 483 Firm adherence of the Akarnanians to Philip 483 Submission of Akarnania . 484 Proclamation of Grecian Freedom . 484 New Federations in Thessaly and Euboia 484 Recovery of Argos. 485 Relations of the Eleutherolakénic towns to Achaia 485 Nabis retains Sparta ; discontent of the tolians . 485— 486 Withdrawal of the Roman garrisons . 486 From the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus to the death of

Philopoimén

B.c, 194—183 Affairs of the Achaian League 486 Eminence of Megalopolis ; parallel of Vir ginia 486 _ Megalopolitan Presidents 486 Absence of Geographical Parties . 487 Influence of Philopoimén ; his internal and external policy 487 Other Federal statesmen: Lykortas, Diophanés, Aristainos . 488 The Macedonian party extinct. . 488

Discontent against Philopoimén at Mogalopolis ; ; he raises the

smaller towns into independent States . . . 488—489 Philopoimén’s fourth Generalship . 490 War with Nabis ; independent action of the League 490 Antiochos invited by the Attolians . . . 490 Treacherous resolution of the Aitolian Senate . . . 491 Murder of Nabis by the Attolians . . : . . . 491

xl CONTENTS

B.C. PAGE

192 Philopoimén unites Sparta to the Achaian League . . . 492 The union not forcible, yet contrary to Spartan feeling . . 492

192 Antiochos elected tolian General ; his relations with Achaia, Beeotia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Elis. . . 493—494 191 Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopylee . . 494 191—189 το] δὴ War ; submission of AZtolia to the Roman “ Faith "494 Working of the /Etolian Constitution . . . . . 495

189 AXtolia becomes the Dependent Ally of Rome . . . 495

191 Union of Elis and Messéné with the Achaian League . - 496

Dealings of Flamininus with Messéné . . . 497

Annexation of Zakynthos prevented by Flamininus . . 497

The League extended over all Peloponnésos . . . . 498

Relations between Achaia and Rome . . . . . 498

Roman intrigues with the newly-annexed cities. . . 499

191 First disturbances of Sparta composed by Philopoimén . - 500

189 Spartan attack on Las . . . . . . . . 500

Secession of Sparta . . . . . . . . 501

189—188 Embassy to Rome . . . . . 601

190—188 Philopoimén’s two successive "Generalships . . 501

188 Execution ofSpartansat Kompasion; changesintheS; partan laws 502

Impolicy of Philopoimén’s treatment of Sparta. 502 Continued disputes at Sparta; policy of the moderate party

there. . . . 503—504

Roman intrigues for the dissolution of the League . . 504

182 Formal reunion of Sparta. . . . . . . 504

Quiet incor poration of Elis . . . . 505

183 State of parties in Messéné ; revolt under Deinokratés . . 505

Capture and execution of Philopoimén at Messéné . . 505

182 Re-admission of Messéné to the League . . . 506

Three Messénian towns admitted as independent States . 507

180?Schemes of Chairén at Sparta . . . . . . 507

191—183 Constitutional notices . . . . . . - 507

189 Yearly meetings removed from Aigion . . . . - 508

Constitution of the Senate . . . . . 508

185 Rejection οὗ Eumenés’ offer to pay its members . . . 508

Legal resistance to Roman encroachments . . . . 509

185—183 Assemblies refused to Q. Cecilius and to Flamininus . 510—511

§ 3. From the Death of Philopoimén to the Battle of Pydna B.C. 183—168

Condition of the League at the death'of Philopoimén . . §12

Parties in the League; the elder Roman party not wilfully unpatriotic. . . . . 612

Growth of the extreme Roman party under Kallikratés . . 512

CONTENTS xli

B.C.

180—179

180

179—178 172—168

173 171 169 167

157 171 167

169 167—157

173 171

174 173—171

171 170

170 170—169 169

169—168

PAGE Presidency of Hyperbatos . . . . 513 Slavish doctrines οἵ Hyperbatos and Kallikratés : ; " opposition of Lykortas . . ᾿ . . §13 Embassy of Kallikratés to Rome ; reseript of the Roman Senate . . . . . . . . 513—514 Kallikratés elected General . . . . 514 Effects of the war with Perseus on the Federal states . . 514 Greek patriotic feeling now on the Macedonian side . 515 Character of Perseus. . . . . . . 515 Character of L. Amilius Paullus . . . . . . 516 Dependent condition of Aftolia ; civil dissensions . . - O16 Roman and Macedonian parties ; Lykiskos General . 517 Perseus in /Etolia; part of the country joins him . . 517—518 Massacre by A. Beebius . . . . . . 518 Dissolution of the Aitolian League . . . . . 518 Death of Lykiskos . . . 518 Affairs of Akarnania ; debate i in the Akar nanian Assembly 518—519 Leukas separated from Akarnania. . . - 4519 State of Epeiros ; parties of Kephalos and Charops . . 519 Geographical parties in Epeiros . . 920 Conquest and desolation of Epeiros ; tyr anny of Charops . 520 Condition of Boeotia ; alliance with ‘Per seus . . 521 Intrigues of Q. Marcius ; dissolution of the Beeotian League 521522 Achaia during the war with Perseus . . 522 Decree of non-intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia . 522 Debate on its proposed repeal . . . . . . §22 Missions of Marcellus and the Lentuli . . . . . §23 Roman dealings with individual cities . . . . . 623 Demands of Atilius and Marcius . . . . . . 524 Mission of Popillius and Octavius. . . . . . §24 Further inroads on Federal rights. . . . . . 625 Convention of the Moderate Party . . . . . 625 Archén General . . ΝΕ . . . . . 526 Embassy from Attalos ; debate on the restoration of Eumenés’ honours. . . . . . . 526 Negociations with Quintus Marcius . . . . . 526 Polybios opposes Appius Claudius. . 528

Embassy from the Ptolemies ; debate at Sikyén on the Egyptian question . . . . . . - 628—529

8 4. From the Battle of Pydna to the Dissolution of the Achaian League

B.c. 167—146

Effects of the Conquest of Macedonia on the relations between Rome and Achaia . . . . . . 530

xl CONTENTS

B.C. PAGE

167 Embassy of Domitius and Claudius; demands of the Romans . . . . . . . 531

Challenge of Xendn ; deportation of the Thousand Achaians 531—532

164—151 Embassies on behalf of the exiles ; insidious reply of the Senate 532 Position of Polybios at Rome 533 151 Release of the Exiles . . ὅ88 Character of Roman dealings with foreign nations. 534 Dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis . 534

166—159 Mission of C. Sulpicius Gallus ; separation of Pleurdn from the League 535 152 Debate on the Cretan Alliance 535 151 Return of Stratios and Polybios 536 Causes of the final war with Rome 536 156—150 Disputes between Athens and Ordpos . 536 Menalkidas of Sparta General of the League . 537 150 Achaian interference at Ordpos 537 150—149 Generalship of Diaios . . 538 149 Disputes with Sparta ; Diaios before Sparta . 538539 Death of Kallikratés . . . 539 Damokritos elected General . . . . 539

149—148 Fourth Macedonian War; mediation of Q. Cacilius Metellus 5389—540 148 Victory and banishment of Damokritos 540 148—147 Second Generalship of Diaios ; suicide of Menalkidas 540—541 147 Embassy of L. Aurelius Orestes ; tumult at Corinth 541—542 Embassy of Sextus Julius Cwsar . δ48 Kritolaos elected General ; sham Conference at Tegea 543 147—146 Unconstitutional proceedings of Kritolaos 544 Efforts of Metellus to preserve peace . 645 146 Tumultuous meeting at Corinth ; violence of Kritolaos . 544—545 Beginning of war with Rome ; further efforts of Metellus 546 Secession and siege of Hérakleia . 547 Battle of Skarpheia ; defeat and death of Kritolaos 547 Diaios succeeds to the Generalship . 547 Negociations between Sdsikratés and Metellus . 548 Cruelty and corruption of Diaios ; death of Sésikratés . 549

Mummius at the Isthmus ; battle of Leukopetra and sack of Corinth . . . 549 Achaia not yet formally reduced to 8 Province 550

146—145 Dissolution of the League, and abolition of Democracy in the cities . . . 551 145 Polybios legislates for the Achaian cities 551 Nominal revival of the League . 552

CONTENTS xii PAGE Devotion of the Peloponnésian people ; later parallels 552 Errors of the League, mainly the result of Roman intrigue . 553 General results of the Achaian League . 554 Roman opposition a witness to its value 554 The Achaian League a natural model for liberated Greece 554

Future of South- Eastern Europe; Monarchic Federalism probably the true solvent 555

CHAPTER X OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY

Recapitulation . . . . . . 557 Indirect influence of Greece ; direct influence of Rome. 557 Connexion of Italian history with the subject of Federalism 558

Italian history a transition between the Greek and the medieval Federalism 558

§ 1. Of the Federations of Ancient Italy

Prevalence of Federalism in Ancient Italy 559 Its causes 559 These causes of gener al application 559 Instances of Confederations beyond Greece and Italy 559 Greater importance of the Italian Leagues 560 Uncertainty of the ethnology of Ancient Italy . 560 Early existence of Federations in Italy—-Nature of the evidence 561 Late preservation of old Italian Constitutions 561 League of ErruRIA 562 The Twelve Cities 562 Constitution of the States 563 Amphiktyonic origin of the League 563 Constitution of the Federal Assembly . 568 Traces of Federal Kingship . 564 Laxity of the Federal tie 564 Power of war and peace in the League, ‘and also i in 1 the States 564—565 The accounts of our authorities how far trustworthy 565 Probable scheme of the League 565 League of SAMNIUM 566 Absence of details 566 The Samnite Cantons . . . 566 Effect of the separation of Capua . 567 Analogy with Aitolia and Switzerland . 567

xliv CONTENTS

PAGE Samnite struggle against Rome . . . . . . . . 567 Lessons of Samnite history . . . . . . . . . 568 League of LATIUM . . . . . . . . 568 Abundance of untrustworthy details . . . . . . . 568 Treaty between Rome and Carthage, B.c. 508 . . . . . 569 Nature of the League . . . . . . . . . . 569 The Thirty Cities . . . . . . . . . 570 Relations of Rome to the League . . . . . . . . 570 Probable origin of Rome . . . . . - $571 Latin proposals of union with Rome, B.C. 337 . . . . 57] Close union of the Latin towns illustrated by the pr oposal . . . 571 Dissolution of the League, B.c. 8384. . . . . . 572 ξ 2. The Roman Commonwealth and the Italian Allies Rome not a Federal State; but containing qwasi-Federal elements . 572 Gradual incorporation of other States with Rome . . . . . 572 Three great classes in Italy: Romans, Latins, and Italians . . . 573 The nature of the struggle between Patrician and Plebeian . . . 574 Quasi-Federal nature of the Roman Tribes. . . . 575 Near approach of the Roman system to Federalism and to Repr esenta- tion. . . 575 The greatness of Rome mainly due to her quasi- Federal elements . 576 The Socran WAR, B.c. 90—89 . . . . . . . 576 Its historical importance . . . . . . . . 576 Probable results on the Italian side . . . . . . . 577 Nature of the Authorities for the period . . . . . . 577 Character of the Roman dominion . . . . . . . 578 Condition of the Italian Α11165. . . . . . . . 578 Claim of Roman citizenship for the Allies . . . . . . 579 Advantages and disadvantages of such admission . . . . 579 Difference of feeling among the Italians ; among the States 1 near Rome ; among the Samnites and Lucanians ; ; among the Etruscans and Umbrians. . . . . 580 Federal or Representative institutions the true remedy. . . 581 The claim of the Allies opposed by the worst, and supported by the best men of both parties at Rome . . : . 581—582 Tribuneship of Marcus Livius Drusus, B.c. 91. . . . . . 582 Beginning of the SocraL WAR B.c. 90. . . . . 583 Analogy between the Italian Allies and the American Colonies . . 584 Federal Constitution of the seceding States . . . . . . 585 Italicum the capital of the League . . . 585 ‘Constitution of the Federal Government borrowed from 1 that of Rome . 585 Rome the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation . . . 586

The Social War, 8.0. 90—89 . . . . . . . . 686

CONTENTS

Successes of the Allies .

Movements in Etruria and Umbris ia

The Senate yields the demands of the Allies

The other States accept citizenship, but Samnium and Lucania still hold out

Legislation of P. Sulpicius, B.C. 88

Illusory nature of the franchise granted to the Allies

Their discontent .

Their cause embraced by Marius and Sulpicius

The Civil War, B.c. 88—82 .

The Samnite War still continues .

Last stage of the war; the Samnites before Rome, 1 B.C. 82

Battle at the Colline Gate

Permanent devastation of Samnium by ‘Sulla

§ 3. Of the Lombard League

Gradual incorporation of the Provinces with Rome

Rome forsaken by the Emperors . .

The Imperial succession always maintained .

The Kingdom of Italy, A.p. 568—1250.

Union of the Crown of Italy and Germany, A.D. 961

Weakness of the royal authority, 1039—1056

The Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 1021—1194 ; condition of Rome : ; Northern Italy in the twelfth century ; predominance of the Cities ; their practical independence . . . . .

Reigns of Lothar II. and Conrad ITI. (1125—1152)

Imperialist reaction ; election of Frederick (1152)

Character of Frederick . .

His position not to be confounded with that of moder n “Austri ia .

The War not strictly a national struggle, but astruggle between royalty and municipal freedom . .

Frederick enters Italy, A.p. 1154.

Collision of claims between the Emperor and the Cities

Early successes of Frederick .

Destruction of Milan, A.p. 1162

Oppression of Frederick’s agents . .

Four opportunities for the Union of Italy : (1) 3 in . the ‘Social War; (2) under the Lombard League ; (3) under Manfred ; (4) under Victor Emmanuel .

Distinction of northern and southern Italy .

The Campanian Republics, A.p. 889—1138 .

The Cities supported by the Pope, Eastern Emperor, and King of Sicily, A.D. 1166 . .

Parallel with the revolt of the Netherlands .

xlvi CONTENTS

PAGE First movements in the Veronese March, A.p. 1155 . . . . 602 Beginning of the LomBARD LEAGUE . . . . . . . 602 Relations of Venice and the Lombard Cities . . . . . . 602 Action of the Emperor Manuel . . . . . . . . 602 Condition of the Eastern Empire . . . . . . . . 603 Manuel aspires to reunite the Empires. . . . . . . 603 Growth of the League, A.p. 1164—1168 . . . . . . 604 Accession of Lodi . . . . . . . . . . 604 Foundation of Alexandria . . 604

Indirect importance of the Lombard League in Federal History ; ; ala- logy with America and the Netherlands . . . . . 605

Congress of the League . . . . . . . . 606 The League not a true Federation ; and why it did not become such . 606 Personal character of Frederick ; he yields in time . . . . 607 Second Lombard League . . . . . . 607 No definite moment of separ ation in Italy . . 607

No such tendency to union in Italy as in the Netherlands and Ameri ica 607 The Lombard cities really sovereign ; the Dutch and American pro-

vinces not so. . . . . . . 607—608 Vigour and constancy of the ‘Confeder ates . . . . . . 608 Peculiar policy of Venice ; siege of Ancona, A.D. 1174 . . . . 609 Course of the war ; siege of Alexandria, A.D. 1174—-1175 . . 609 Negociations between the Emperor and the cities broken off by the Papal

Legates . . . . . . . . . . 609 Battle of LEGNANO, A.D. 117 6 . . . . . . 610 Change in Frederick’s policy ; negociations for peace . . . . 610 Frederick reconciled with Venice and the Church. . . . . 610 Rights of the Empire as understood by the Lombards . . . 610 Truce for six years between the Emperor and the League, A.D. 1177 . 611 Various cities join Frederick : Cremona, Tortona, and Alexandria . 61] Peace of Constanz, A.D. 1183; the treaty is in form a pardon, but

amounts to surrender of direct sovereignty . . . . 612—613 The Second Lombard League . . . . . . . 614 The First League primarily political the Second League primarily

ecclesiastical . . . 614—615 Union of Italy under Frederick or Manfr od hindered by the Pope 3 ;

good and evil which it would have prevented . . 615 Italian nationality a purely modern idea. . . . . . 615 Question of Italian Confederation or Consolidation . . . 616 Italian Federation discredited by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte . . 616 Arguments on behalf of, and against, Federalism in Italy. . . 616 The question decided by the Italians . . 617 Federalism no longer appropriate in Italy ; local independence the

true policy . . . . . . . . . 617

Future restoration of the Empire . . . . . . . . 617

CONTENTS xlvii

FRAGMENT OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY PAGE Influence of the Empire on Germany . . . 618 The three Imperial Kingdoms: Germany, Italy, and Burgundy . 618—619 Closest connexion between Germany and Burgundy . . 619

Connexion between Germany and the Empire growing into identity . 620 The German Confederation, a lax Staatenbund ; its theory and practice 621 Its peculiarities ;: (1) Most of its members principalities ; (2) it arose

from the splitting up of a more united State . . . . . 621 Process of disunion in Germany . 622 Germany really a Federation since Peace of Westphalia, A.D. . 1648. 1806 622 The Kingdom of Germany . . . . . . . . 623 Comparison with England and France . . . . . . . 625 Origin of the German Kingdom . . . . . . 623 Different history of England, 800-— 1087 ; "France, 888— 1202; and

Germany, 986—973, 1039—-1056 . . . 624

Circumstances which strengthened the Royal authority in Germany . 624 Retention of National Assemblies in Germany and England, but not in

France . . . . 625 The Royal Domain ; the Fre ee Cities ; ; the Ecclesiastical Princes . . 625 Contrast between German and French Kings . . . . . 625 Contrast between the later history of the Kingdoms _. . . . 626

Causes of disunion in Germany : (1) The Crown elective ; chiefly owing to its connexion with the

Empire . . . . . . . 627 The Empire essentially elective . 628 Ways in which the Imperial and elective character of the

German Crown diminished the royal authority . . . 628

(2) The German Confederation mainly composed of Principalities . 629 Connexion between this cause and the weakening of the

monarchy . . 629 Origin of the German Pr incipalities ; ; royal officers become

sovereigns . . . . 629 The Diet a Federal Congress rather than a National Par liament . . 629 Governments, not peoples, represented in the Diet . . . . 680 The Diet sinks into a diplomatic Congress . . . . . . 630 Other peculiarities of the German Confederation . . . . . 630 Loss of the ancient divisions . . . . . . . 630 Comparison with England and France . . . . . . 630—631 Splitting up of the ancient Duchics . . . . . . 631 Constant partitions and annexations . . . 631

Different position of the arriére vassals in France ‘and i in Ger many . 632 Vast number, and singular disproportion in size of the German States . 633 Position of Austria and Prussia. Parallel with Beotia . . . 633

xl viii CONTENTS

APPENDIX I,

1. Note on the Cities of the Achaian League. 2. Note on the Cities of the Lykian League .

3. The Federal Coinage of Akarnania 4. The Federal Coinage of AXtolia .

APPENDIX II. Additional Notes by the Editor

INDEX

PAGE 635 637 638 638

639 659

Ι DEFINITION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3

from any higher power, but, as a matter of absolute right, by

virtue of its “inherent powers as an independent commonwealth.

But in all matters which concern the general hody, the sove-

reignty of the several members will cease. Mach member is

perfectly independent within its own sphere ; but there is another

sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence, vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one Sove-

class of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which rea οὗ

it is as incapable of separate political action as any province or ;, all

city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic. The making{external

of peace and war, the sending and receiving of ambassadors,(™tters.

generally all that comes within the department of International

Law, will be reserved wholly to the central power. Indeed, the

very existence of the several members of the Union will be

diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which will never b

called upon to deal with any power except the Central Govern

ment. A Federal Union, in short, will form one State in relation

to other powers, but many States as regards its internal adminis-

tration. This complete division of sovereignty. we may look

upon as essential to the absolute perfection of 7 the Federal ideal.

But that ideal is one so very refined and artificial, that it seems

not to have been attained more than four or five times in the

history of the world. But a History of Federal Government

must embrace a much wider range of subjects than merely the

history of those states which have actually realized the Federal

idea. We must look at the idea in its germ as well as in its Wider‘

perfection. We shall learn better to understand what perfect range οὗ

Federalism is by comparing it with Federalism in a less fully- torical

developed shape. In order thus to trace the Federal principle view.

from its birth, we shall have to go back to very carly times, and;

in some cases, to very rude states of society. But of course it

will not be needful to dweil at much Tength on those common-

wealths of whose constitution and history it would be impossible

to give any detailed account. For some commonwealths, which

may fairly claim the name of Federal Governments in the wider

sense, a mere glance will be enough. Our more detailed examina-

tion must be reserved for a few more illustrious examples of

Federal Union. There are a few famous commonwealths which, Choice of

either from having perfectly, or nearly perfectly, realized the tor mesial

Federal idea, or else from their importance and celebrity in the ijustra-

general history of the world, stand out conspicuously at the very tion.

Four great examples of Federal Govern- ment.

The ACHAIAN LEAGUE, Bc. 281- 146.

The SwIss CANTONS, A.D. 1291-- 1862.

The UNITED PRo- VINCES, A.D. 1579- 1795.

The UNITED STATES, A.D. 1778- 1862.

Character- istics of

4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAP.

------- re ee .... -Ὁ...ὦ..

first glimpse of the subject, and whose constitution and history will deserve and repay our most attentive study.

Four Federal Commonwealths, then, stand out, in four differ- ent ages of the world, as commanding, above all others, the attention of students of political history. Of these four, one belongs to what is usually known as “ancient,” another, to what is commonly called “medieval” history ; a third arose in the period of transition between medieval and modern history ; the creation of the fourth may have been witnessed by some few of those who are stil] counted among living men. Of these four, again, one has been a thing of the past for many centuries ; another has so changed. its form that it can no longer claim a place among Federal Governments ; but the other two, one of them among the least, the other among the greatest, of inde- pendent powers, still remain, exhibiting Federalism ἢ ina perfect, or nearly perfect, form, standing, in the Old World and in the New, as living examples of the str ength and the weakness of the most elaborate of political com)inations.

These four famous Commonwealths are,

First, the ACHAIAN LEAGUE in the later days of Ancient Greece, whose most flourishing period comes within the third century before our own era.

Second, the Confederation of the Swiss CANTONS, which, with many changes in its extent and constitution, has Jasted from the thirteenth century to our own day.

Third, the SEVEN UNITED PROVINCES of the NETHERLANDS, ncn marr nS ae whose Union arose in the War of Independence against ‘Spain, and lasted, in a republican form, till the War ofthe French Revolution.

Fourth, the UNITKD STATES of NortH AMERICA, which formed a Federal Union after their revolt from the British Crown unde George the Third, and whose destiny forms one of the most mt portant, and certainly the most interesting, of the politica problems of our own time.

Of these Four, three come sufficiently near to the full realiza- tion of the Federal idea to be entitled to rank among perfect

Ι FOUR GREAT FEDERAL COMMONWEALTHS 5

Federal Governments. The Achaian League, and the United the Four

States since the adoption of the present Constitution, are indeed Great Con-

the most perfect he most parfect developments of the Federal principle which pera

the world has ever seen. The Swiss Confederation, in its origin

a Union of the loosest kind, has gradually drawn the Federal

bond tighter and tighter, till, within our own times, it has

assumed a form which fairly entitles it to rank beside Achaia

and America. The claim of the United Provinces is more doubt-

ful;! their union was at no period of their republican being so

close as that of Achaia, America, and modern Switzerland. But

the important place which the United Provinces once filled in

Kuropean history, and the curious and instructive nature of their

political institutions, fully entitle them to a place in the first

rank for the purposes of the present History. All these four

then I purpose to treat of at some considerable length. Over

less perfect or less illustrious examples of the Federal system I

shall glance more lightly, or use them chiefly by way of contrast

to point out more clearly the distinguishing characteristics of

these four great examples. Thus, for instance, the modern The Ger-

German Confederation is, in point of territorial extent and of m8 Con- . . federation.

the power of many of the states which compose it, of far greater

importance than any of the European instances among the Four.

But its constitution is so widely removed from the perfection of

the Federal idea that, for our present purpose, this Union, which

includes two of the Great Powers of Europe, is chiefly valuable

as illustrating by contrast the more perfect constitutions of

Achaia and Switzerland. On the other hand there can be little other

doubt that there were in the ancient world several other Con- ancient

federations, whose constitutions must have realized the Federal °“""? les ;

idea almost as perfectly as the more famous League of Achaia.

But some of these possessed so little influence in the world, that

they can hardly be said to havea history. In the caso of others

we know absolutely nothing of the details of their constitutions.

Northern Greece, especially, in the later days of Grecian freedom, in Greece ;

abounded in small Federal States, but we have no such minute

knowledge of their history and constitution as we have of those

of Achaia. Even the great and important League of Aitolia, so

long the rival of Achaia, is far better known to us in its external

history than in its internal constitution. Again it is clear that in Italy ;

the Thirty Cities of Latium, and probably some other similar

1 See Motley’s Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii, 514.

in Lykia.

Other German leagues ;

the Hanse Towns.

Other American Confede- rations.

6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAP. I

Leagues among the old Italian commonwealths, must have been united by a Federal bond of a very close kind. But we know hardly anything about them except what may be picked up from the half-mythical narratives of their wars and alliances with Rome. Lykia too, beyond all doubt, had a Federal constitution which was in some respects more perfect than that of Achaia itself. But then Lykia has nothing which can be called a history, and its Federal constitution arose at so late a period that its independence was provincial rather than strictly national. So, in later times, the Swiss Confederation was really only one of several unions of German cities, which happened to obtain greater importance and permanence than the rest. One of these unions, the famous League of the Hanse Towns, still exists, though with diminished splendour, in our own day. So, in days later still, the precedent of Federal union given by the English settlements in North America, has heen followed, though as yet with but little success or credit, by several of the Republics which have arisen among the ruins of Spanish dominion in the same continent. All these instances, Greck, Italian, German, and American, will demand some notice in the course of our present inquiry. But they will not need that full and minute attention which must be reserved for Achaia, Switzerland, the United Provinces, and the Umited States.

Before, however, we go on to describe in detail the constitu- tion and history of any particular Federal state, it will be desirable to make some further remarks on Federal Government in general, and to draw out at some lenyth the points of contrast between that and other political systems.

CHAPTER If

CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS

I HAVE already given something like a defini Government in its perfect form, premising thi form is not to be looked for in all the examples w under our present survey. We have seen that it found in all even of the four illustrious Confeder: have selected for special examination. Compared stitutions of Achaia and America, the Federal ec Swiss Cantons before the French Revolution, and ever the Seven Provinces, will appear to be only remote : the Federal idea. But in the present Chapter, whe to contrast Federalism with other political systems, my picture of a Federal Government wholly frox perfect examples. Much, therefore, that I shall : quite inapplicable to the Umted Provinces or to the League, much more so to the so-called German Conft our own day.

A Federal Commonwealth, then, in its perfect which forms a single state in its relations to other which consists of many states with regard to its int ment. Thus the City of Megalopolis in old times New York or the Canton of Ziirich now, has absoh rate existence in the face of other powers:- it can or peace, or maintain ambassadors or consul;. Federal Government of Achaia, America, or Sve only body with which foreign nations can haves But the internal laws, the law of real property, . even the electoral law, may be utterly different and at Sikyén, at New York and in Illinois, a Geneva. Nor is there any power in the Ass

IISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~~ cnap

Δ.

/ashington, or the Federal Council at Bern,

rsities into harmony. In one point of view

gle commonwealth, as truly a national whole

nn; in another point of view, there is a col-

ign commonwealths as independent of one

and Spain can be. We may then recognize

fect Federal Commonwealth any collection of

is equally unlawful for the Central Power to

he purely internal legislation of the several

ὁ the several members to enter into any diplo-

with other powers. Where the first condition

_ the several members are not sovereign ; their owever extensive in practice, is a merely muni- nce. Where the second condition is not obtained, wever ancient and intimate, is that of a mere her than that of a real Confederation. But another

ll here arise. Even among those commonwealths secure to every member full internal independence, every member any separate external action, there

; diversities as to the way in which the Central ses its peculiar functions. It 1s here that we reach of Federal Governments into two classes which has wn by most of the writers on the subject.? In the e Federal Power represents only the Governments «al members of the Union; its immediate action is those Governments; its powers consist simply in issuing to the State Governments, which. when within the s of the Federal authority, it 1s the duty of those

e exceptional case, to be discussed in the course of the history, tate holding diplomatic intercouse with foreign powers by express deral power. Sce an instance in Polybios, ii. 48. This is most ‘ase in which the exception proves the rule.

thli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes, i. 554, ‘erschied zwischen Staatenbund und Bundesstaat ist in dem ranismus beider zu erkennen. Auch in dem Staatenbunde ‘aten zu einem Staatsganzen verbunden, aber dieses ist ‘r wieder als ein besonderer, von den Einzelstaaten ver- taat organisirt, sondern die Bundesgewalt ist entweder tibertragen oder aus den staatlichen Spitzen der Einzel- esetzt. In dem Bundesstaate dagegen gibt es nicht bloss ‘aten, sondern auch einen vollstandig organisirten Zentral- achiische Bund zur Zeit von Philopoemen nicht mehr ein ein Bundesstaat ; so sind die nord-americanischen Frei-

die Schweiz seit 1848 als Bundesstaat organisirt.’’]

II TWO CLASSES OF FEDERATIONS

Governments to carry out. If men or money be .

Federal purposes, the Federal Power will demand the.

several State Governments, which will raise them in suc

as each may think best. In the other class, the Federal 1

will be, in the strictest sense, a Government, which, in the o.

class, it can hardly be called. It will act not only on t. Governments of the several States, but directly on every citizen of those States. It will be, in short, a Government co-ordinate ) with the State Governments, sovercign in its own sphere, as they poy, are sovereign in their sphere. It will be a Government with direct. the usual branches, Legiskutive, Executive, and Judicial ; with 4! citia the direct power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a Government; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all the usual apparatus of a Government, all bearing directly upon every citizen of the Union without any reference to the Govern- ments of the several States. The State administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as 1f there were no such thing as an Union; the Federal administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as a separate State. This last class is what writers on International Law call a Composite State, or Supreme Federal Government.1 The former class they commonly remand to the head of mere Confederacies, or, at most, Systems of Confederate States.2 Yet it is quite possible to conceive the existence of a Federal Commonwealth, in which the Federal Power shall act solely upon the several State Governments, which yet shall fully answer the two conditions of external unity and internal plur- ality. The American Union under the Confederation forbade diplomatic action to the several States ;* it therefore formed a single commonwealth in the eyes of other nations. Yet the Federal Power acted only on the several State Governments, and

1 This is what, in the Federalist, No. 9 (p. 47, ed. 1818) is called a Con- solidation of the States. But Hamilton is here only using the language of objectors, and the name consolidated would seem better to apply to non- Federal commonwealths, as distinguished from Federal. It is so used by Μ, de Tocque- ville, Démocratie en Amérique, i, 271.

2 See Wheaton’s International Law, i. 68 ; Austin’s Province of Jurisprudence, p- 217; Calhoun’s Works, i. 163; Federalist, Nos. 9, 21, 89 et passim. The distinction between the two classes is most fully and clearly drawn by Mr, J. 8. Mill (Representative Government, p. 301), by Professor Bernard (Lectures on American War, Oxford, 1861, pp. 68-72), and by Tocqueville (Democratie en Amérique, i. 250, 265 et seqq. ).

3 Articles of Confederation, Art. vi. § 1.

Inade- quacy of the system of requi- sitions.

.CTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ΟΗΑᾺΡ

drectly on individual citizens. The Swiss Confedera-

1815 even allowed diplomatic action to the several

s within certain prescribed limits! Yet, on the whole,

the Swiss Confederation, and much more the American ° acderation of 1778, had far more in common with perfect deral, or “ Composite” States, than with lax Confederacies uke the German Bund. The real difference between the two classes seems to be that the one is a good, the other a bad, way of compassing the same objects.2— Both America and Switzerland found by experience that, without the direct action of the Federal Power upon individuals, the objects of the Federal Union could not be carried out. The several State Governments are indeed, under the other system, constitutionally bound to carry out all requisitions which do not transcend the limits of the Federal authority. But we may be sure that the State Governments will always lie under a strong temptation to dis- obey such requisitions, not only when they really transcend the limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply displeasing to local interests or wishes. Such a compact, in short, may constitutionally be a Federal Union, Int practically it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance.* Still a Confederation of this sort aims, however ineffectually, at being a true Federal Union. The American Confederation of 1778 professed, while the German Confederation does not profess,” to form one power, one nation,® or whatever may be the proper word, in the face of other powers and nations. The articles of Confederation wholly failed to carry out their own purpose ; and

1 See Wheaton, i. 90.

2 “The attributes of Congress under the Confederation and under the Con- stitution were (with some not very important exceptions) the same. What was done was to make them real and effective in the only possible way, by making them operate directly on the people of the States, instead of on the States them- selves.”’—Bernard, p. 69.

3 See Mill, p. 301.

4 Mill; Cf. Bernard, p. 68. See also Marshall’s Life of Washington, iv, 256-62.

5 On the German Confederation, see Mill, p. 300.

6 Τὶ do not feel called upon, at all events at this stage of my work, to enter into the great American dispute between National and Jedeval (see Federalist, Nos. 39, 40 ; Tocqueville, i. 268 ; Calhoun, i. 112-161; Bernard, p. 72). I con- fess that it seems to me to be rather a question of words. A power which acts in all its relations with other powers, as a single indivisible unity, is surely a nation, whether its internal constitution be Federal or otherwise. So to call it in no way takes away from the independent rights of the several members. In the

language of Polybios, the word ἔθνος is constantly applied to the Achaian and other Federal commonwealths ; indeed he seems to use it as the special formal

II SYSTEM OF REQUISITIONS

the closer union of 1787, under the existing constitu

the result. Still, for my immediate purpose, it does n

needful to attend very closely to the distinction between

two classes of Federations. In many of the ancient Lea,

with which we shall have to deal, it is evident that, on the «

hand, the League formed a single state in the face of all oth. states, and that, on the other hand, the independence of the several members was strictly preserved. But it is not always Th easy to say how far the Federal Assembly and the Federal tt _ Magistrates exercised a direct power over the individual citizens ἐς ὍΝ of each city, and how far it was exercised through the Assemblies in history and Magistrates of the several cities. We know, for instance, that in the Achaian League there were Federal taxes ;! we do

not know whether they were directly Bathored hy Federal collectors, or whether they were merely requisitions to the several cities, which their Assemblies and Magistrates apportioned

by their own authority. The latter arrangement is just as likely

as the former; but, if it could be shown to be the plan actually

in use, it would hardly have the effect of degrading the Achaian League from the rank of a Composite State to that of a mere Confederacy.” It is enough to enable a commonwealth to rank,

for our present purpose, as a true Federation, that the Union is

one which preserves to the several members their full internal independence, while it denies to them all separate action in relation to foreign powers. ‘The sovereignty is, in fact, divided ;

title of such bodies. See, for instance, xx. 3, where ἔθνος, the Federal State, is opposed to πόλις, the single city-commonwealth.,

According to Tocqueville (i. 268) the American constitution is neither National nor Federal, but some third thing, for which no name exists. He calls it “un gouvernement national incomplet.”

The truest difference between a Federation and a perfectly consolidated Government is that already given. In a Federal state the several members retain their sovereignty within their own range ; that is, the Federal power can- not alter their internal institutions. In an ordinary monarchy or republic, the supreme central power, in whomever it is vested, can alter the institutions of any province or city. See Bernard, p. 71.

1 Pol. iv. 60 ai κοιναὶ εἰσφοραί.

* The system of requisitions is indeed in no way confined to Federal common- wealths ; it is quite compatible with monarchy, and indeed it has always been exceedingly common under barbaric despotisms, The Sultan requires a certain contribution from a district, which the authorities of the district levy as best suits them. ‘The royal administration is thus eased of a certain amount of trouble, and the district at once acquires a certain amount of municipal freedom. But that freedom, great or small, exists merely by concession or sulferance, not of right, as in a Federal State.

it ;

VACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT © cnap.

yament of the Federation and the Government of the

;ave a co-ordinate authority, each equally claiming

;1ce within its own range. It is this system of divided reignty which I propose to contrast at some length with

, other principal forms of government which have prevailed ‘different times among the most civilized nations of the world.

Forms of government may be classified according to so many principles that it is needful to state at the onset what principle of division seems most suited for the comparison which I have taken in hand. The old stereotyped division into monarchy,

Monarchy, taristocracy, and democracy, is sufficient for many purposes. A

Aristo- cracy, and Demo- cracy.

Absolute and Con- stitutional Govern- ments.

A cross division needed.

‘more philosophical division perhaps is that which does not look so much to the nature of the hands in which supreme power is vested, as to the question whether there is any one body or individual which can fairly be called supreme. ‘This is the division of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively, into absolute and constitutional examples of their several classes.! Thus the old Athenian commonwealth, where all power was directly exercised by the People, was an Absolute Democracy. An American State, on the other hand, where ‘the People is recognized as the ultimate soverelgn, where all power is held to flow from the people, but where a delegated authority is divided in different proportions between a Governor, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, is said to be an example of, Constitn- tional Democracy. In this way of looking at them, an Absolute Government of any of the three kinds has quite as many points in common with an Absolute Government of one of the other kinds, as it has in common with a Constitutional Government of its own class. But neither of these divisions seems suited to our

present purpose? A Federal commonwealth may be either _aristocratic or democratic; or some of its members may be

aristocratic and others democratic; those Aristocracics and Democracies again may exhibit either the Absolute or the Con-

1 See Calhoun’s Works, i. 28, 34 et seqq.

* [Cf., on the classification of constitutions, Piitter, Historische Entwickelung der heutigen Staatsverfassung des teutschen Reichs (3rd ed.) ii. 159. He observes that, in discussing the constitution of the ‘‘German Empire,” ‘‘man dachte nicht daran, dass zum Massstabe der verschiedenen Regierungsformen sich noch eine hdhere Abtheilung einfacher und zusammengesetzter Staaten denken liess, und nur auf erstere jene dreyfache Eintheilung (namely, monarchic, aristocratic, democratic) passte.” He failed to recognize the theoretic possibility of a Federal

Monarchy. |

II CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTS 13

-- te .. -- a att

stitutional type of their own classes; indeed, though Federal

States have commonly been republican, there is nothing theorcti-

cally absurd in the idea of a Federal Monarchy. The classifica

tion of governments, which we must make in order to work out

the required contrast between Federalism and other forms, will

be in fact a cross division to the common classification into Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies. Federalism, as 1

have already said, is essentially a compromise; it is something intermediate between two extremes. A Federal Government

is most likely to be formed when the question arises whether

several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or shall

be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tic harmonizes

the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount

of union with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Federalism Government then is a mean between the system of large states ἃ Smt wnd the system of small states. But both the large states, the tween small states, and the intermediate Federal system, may assume a Great and democratic, an aristocratic, or even a monarchic form of govern- ama" ment, just as may happen.

The two extremes then, with which the Federal system has to be compared, are the system of small states and the system of large states. Speaking roughly, the one is the ordinary political system of what is called classical antiquity, the other is the or- dinary political system of modern Europe. The system of small states finds its most perfect developement in the independent city-commonwealths of Old Greece; the system of large states finds its most perfect developement in the large monarchies of Europe in our own day. It is not too much to say that the large and the small state alike may be either monarchic, aristo- cratic, or democratic. As a general rule, small states have flourished most as republics, and large states have flourished most as monarchies, and the natural tendency of the two classes of states seems to lie in those two directions respectively. But The there is no sort of contradiction in the idea of a small state being Division

. . . irrespec-

monarchic or of a large state being republican. Many small 4, or principalities have enjoyed a fair amount of prosperity and good their government, and the experiment of governing a large country as several ' a single republic has been so seldom tried that we are hardly in govern. position to decide whether it is necessarily a failure or not.! ment.

1 See Tocqueville, i. 270, 271 ; ii. 250.

Definition of Large and Small States.

14 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — crap.

But, this question apart, it is clear that a small republic may be cither aristocratic or democratic, that a large kingdom may be either despotic or constitutional. And it is also clear that, while free states, great and small, have certain points of resemblance, large states and small states respectively have also some points of resemblance, irrespective of their several forms of government. [0 is in these points, where large states, whatever their constitu- tion, form one class, and small states, whatever their constitution, form another, that Federalism takes its position, as a mean between the two, sharing some of the characteristics of both. I may add, that while Federalism, as a compromise, is liable to some of the inherent disadvantages of a compromise, it mani- festly, in those positions for which it is suited at all, goes a good way to unite the opposite advantages of the two opposite systems between which it stands as a mean term.

I shall therefore now proceed, first to contrast at some length the two great systems of large and of small states, and then to show the way in which a Federal Government occupies a position intermediate between the two.!

Speaking roughly, 1 understand by a small state one in which it is possible that all the citizens may, if their constitution allows or requires it, habitually assemble for political purposes in one place. By a large state I understand one in which such personal assemblage is impossible; onc, therefore, where, if the state he constitutional, the constitution must be of the representative kind. The large state, however, to have all the characteristics and advantages of a large state, must commonly be much larger than is absolutely necessary to answer the terms of this definition. But I by no means intend to confine the name to what are commonly understood by the name of Great Powers. All the Kingdoms of Europe, and even some principalities which are not Kingdoms, will count as large states for the purposes of this inquiry. All alike share the characteristics which distinguish them from the system of small states. The most perfect form of this last is found when every City, with its immediately sur- rounding territory, forms a commonwealth absolutely independent and enjoying all the rights of a sovereign power.

1 It may be objected that ἃ Federation may consist either of small or of large states as they are here defined. I shall recur to this point presently.

ΤΠ CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDEPENDENT CITY 15

--,--................-..... a ee

This was the political system usual in the commonwealths of ancient Grecce and Italy, and it has been fully elucidated by the various great modern writers on Greck and Roman history, but most fully and elaborately by Mr. Grote. The ruling idea of the politicians of those ages was what Mr. Grote calls the “autono- Character- mous city-community.” A man’s “country,”! in those days, ners of the was not a region, but a city ;* his patriotism did not extend dent City. over a wide surface of territory, but was shut up within the walls of asingle town. His countrymen were nota whole nation of the same blood and language as himself, but merely those who shared with him in the local burghership of his native place. A Patriotism man, in short, was not a Greek or an Italian, but an Athenian ¢Bfined to

; . . . the City.

or ἃ Koman. Undoubtedly he had a feeling, which may, in a certain sense, be called a patriotic feeling, for Greece or Italy as wholes, as opposed to Persia or Carthage. But this fecling was rather analogous to that which modern Europeans entertain for the great brotherhood of European and Christian nations, than to the national patriotism which an Englishman or a Frenchman entertains for England or France. The tie between Greek and Greek was indeed closer than the tic between European and Kuropean, but it was essentially a tie of the same kind. Real patriotism, the feeling which we extend to regions far larger than the whole of Greece, did not reach beyond the limits of a single Grecian city. This state of things is by no means peculiar to ancient: Greece and Italy ; traces of it are still to be seen in modern Europe ; and it existed in its full force in some European states down to very recent times. But it was in the brilliant times of ancient Greece and Italy that this system found its fullest developement, and that it made its nearest approach to being universal over the civilized world. In modern Europe independent cities have existed and flourished; a few indeed even now retain a nominal existence. But such independent cities have been, for the most part, merely exceptional cases, surrounded by larger states whose form of government was monarchical. In ancient Greece and Italy the independent city was the ruling political conception, and in ancient Greece, in the days of her greatest glory, it was the form of political life almost universally received.

1 ἸΙατρίς. The same use of the word is common in modern Greek.

* Aristotle excludes from his definition of πόλις anything at all approaching to the size of a nation. Babylon is hardly a city—@ye περιγραφὴν ἔθνους μᾶλλον ἢ wodews, —Polit, iii. 8, 5. Of. Polyb. ii. 37.

Full de- velope- ment of city-inde- pendence in Greece,

Karly ap- proaches to Consti- tutional

Monarchy,

and to Federal Repub- licanism.

Their com-

parative wnimport-

ance before

the Mace- donian period.

Municipal character of the Greek Common- wealths,

CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

16 CHYAP.

--- ee et

Indeed the greater and more civilized the state, the more completely do we find the idea of municipal republicanism carried out. Neither of the other alternative forms of freedom, the constitutional monarchy and the Federal republic, was at any time absolutely unknown in the Grecian world. The polity of the Homeric age, the King or chief of each town, with a King of Kings at Mykéné as suzerain over at least all Peloponnésos, might conceivably have grown into a monarchy, first of the feudal, and then of the modern constitutional type. And, in the half-Greek states of Epeiros and Macedonia, we actually find that the heroic royalty did develope into something which may he fairly called a rude and early form of constitutional monarchy. The Epeirot Kings swore obedience to the laws; the Mace- donian, though a subject of a king, looked on himself as a freeman, and there were Macedonian assemblies which, however great may have been the royal influence, did impose at least some formal restraint upon the royal will! On the other hand, the robbers of Aiutolia, the respectable but obscure townships of the Achaian shore, and some other of the less advanced and less important members of the Hellenic body, possessed, as far back as we can trace their history, some germs of a polity which may fairly entitle them to rank among Federal commonwealths. But both the monarchic and the Federal states lagged for a long time far behind the purely municipal ones. In the Greece of Herodotos and Thucydidés, they play no distinguished part. In the Greece of Xenophin and Isokratés, they still remain far from prominent ; for the greatness of Thebes is really a muni- cipal and not a Federal greatness. In short, constitutional monarchy never attained any full developement in the ancient world, and Federalism became important only when the most brilliant days of Greece were past. Both in Greece and Italy, the most important states so early threw aside regal government altogether that the idea of the King ruling according to Law, though certainly not unknown to Greek political thinkers, had no opportunity to assume any fully-developed form. And though a day came when nearly all Greece was mapped out into Federal Republics, that day did not come till the system of perfectly

1 On the Macedonians and their Kings, see Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. (April, 1857), 317-20, and the note aud references in p. 327, See also Polybios, v. 27, 29; cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls, p. 23. Of the Molossian kingdom T shall have occasion to speak in my fourth Chapter.

II THE GREEK CITY-COMMONWEALTHS 17

independent separate cities had run its short and glorious career. Throughout the most brilliant days of Greece, all the greatest Greek states were strictly sovereign municipalities. The political franchise of the state was co-extensive with the municipal franchise of the city. And this was equally true whether the form of government of that city was aristocratic or democratic. The difference between a Greek aristocracy and a aristo- Greek democracy was simply whether legislative power and °Ttic and + oy aye . : democratic eligibility to high office were extended to the whole, or confined to giiko, a part, of the class of hereditary burghers. In no case did they extend beyond that class; in no case could the freedman, the foreigner, or even the dependent ally, obtain citizenship by residence or even by birth in the land. He who was not the descendant of citizen ancestors could be enfranchised only by special decree of the sovereign Assembly. In the democracy and the oligarchy alike the City was the only political existence, the one centre of patriotism. To live at a distance so great that it was impossible to appear habitually at Assemblies held within its walls was felt to be equivalent to sentence of exile.t The essentially civic character of a Greek state was not even affected by the occurrence of that irregular form of Monarchy to which the Greeks gave the name of 7'yranny.2 Even the Tyrant is still Civic the Tyrant of the City; however oppressive his internal rule Tyranties. may be, he identifies himself with the military glory and out- ward prosperity of that particular city, and does not think of merging its separate being in any larger kingdom. He may conquer other cities by force of arms, but those cities are not incorporated like the annexations of modern potentates. Their inhabitants do not become the fellow-subjects of the inhabitants of the Tyrant’s own city; the conquered city remains a dependency of the conquering capital. It was not till Greece had, in the

1 «The natural limit of a democracy, is that distance from the central point, which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand.”— Federalist, No. xiv. p. 71. This is equally true of all Greek commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike.

2 I shall, in my fifth Chapter, have occasion to speak more at length of the Greek Tyrannies. I will here only remark that I use the word throughout in its Greek sense. The Greek τύραννος is one who holds kingly power in a state whose laws do not recognize a King. He differs from the King (βασιλεύς) in the origin of his power, rather than in the mode of its exercise. The King may rule ill ; the Tyrant may (though he seldom does) rule well; still the authority of the King is lawful, that of the Tyrant is unlawful. In short, the word Hmperor, in its modern sense, exactly translates τύραννος ; but one cannot talk of an Emperor of Megalopolis.

Condition of Depend- ent Cities in Greece.

Difference between a dependent City and a member of a Federa- tion.

18 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~— cuHap.

days of Macedonian influence, become familiarized with ex- tensive monarchies, that the old Tyranny of Dionysios gradually grew up, in the hands of Agathoklés and Hierdén, into something like a Kingdom of Sicily. Everywhere, whatever might be the internal form of government in the particular city, the autonomous town-community, owning no sovereign, no feudal or Federal superior, beyond its own walls, was the ruling political idea of Greece in her best days, and the more advanced and civilized was the state, the more closely did it cling to that one favourite ideal of a commonwealth.

As in many other cases, we shall be better able to take in the force and prevalence of the rule by looking at cases which formed exceptions to 1.1 The sovereign and independent city was indeed the political ideal of Greece, but there were many Grecian cities which were far from being sovereign and inde- pendent. But this was simply because the force of some stronger city stood in the way of their sovereignty and independence. ‘There were many towns which were not independent ; but every town looked on independence as its right; every town which was not independent deemed its loss of independence to be an injury, and was constantly looking out for opportunities to recover the right of which it felt itself deprived. The call to make all Greeks autonomous was the popular cry set up by Sparta against imperial Athens.? But the condition of a city thus shorn of its sovereignty sets more clearly before us what the nature of the city-soverecignty was. Such a dependent city, as Mr. Grote has shown in the case of the allies of Athens, was by no means necessarily subjected to anything which we should call foreign oppression. It might, and in many cases did, retain its own laws, its own local administration, its own political constitution, oligarchic or democratic according to the strength of parties within its own walls. It might, or it might not, be subject to a tribute to the superior State; it might even, in some favoured cases, retain fleets and armies of its own, raised by its own government and commanded by its own officers. It is clear that a city in such a condition retains a degree of local independence far greater than is allowed to any merely municipal body in the least centralized of European kingdoms. Its condition at first sight seems rather to approach to the

1 On the relation of Dependent Alliance, see Arnold, Later Roman Common- wealth, i. 165, * Thucydidés, 1, 139 et al,

II DEPENDENT CITIES IN GREECE 19

—

purely internal sovereignty of a Swiss Canton or an American State. What it lacks of full sovereignty is exactly what they lack ; it lacks a separate being among the nations of the earth ; it cannot make war or conclude foreign alliances; its public quarrels are decided for it by a tribunal external to itself. Where then lies the difference? It is this. The municipality in a Constitutional Monarchy, the State in a Federal Republic, has indeed no direct corporate voice in the general administration, but that general administration is carried on by persons or bodies in whose appointment the citizens of the municipality or of the State have a direct or indirect voice. But a dependent city in Greece had its foreign relations marked out for it by a power over which it had no control whatever. An English town, as such, has nothing to do with peace or war, or with general taxation and legislation. But then laws are made and taxes are imposed by an Assembly to which that town sends representatives ; peace and war are virtually made by Ministers who are virtually appointed by that Assembly. An American State, sovereign as it is within its own sphere, has no more corporate voice than a mere municipality in those high national concerns which are entrusted to the Federal Government.! But then the Government to which those concerns are entrusted consists of a President and Congress in the choice of whom the citizens of that State have a voice no less than in the choice of their own local Governor and Legislature. Thus, in both cases, if national questions are not submitted to the smaller body in its corporate capacity, 1t is simply because, in relation to such questions, the citizens of the smaller body act directly as citizens of the larger. But in relation to this same class of questions, the citizens of a dependent Greek city had no means of acting at all. The most favoured ally of Athens, Chios, for instance, or Mityléné, quite as independent internally as an American State, had absolutely no voice, in any shape, in the general concerns of the Confederacy. So far were Chios and Mityléné from themselves declaring war and peace that they had no sort of control over those who did declare war and peace. Their fleets and armies were at the absolute bidding, not of a

2 The Federal Senators in the United States are indeed elected by the State Legislatures, and are held specially to represent the State Sovereignties. But the State Legislatures themselves are not consulted, and the Senators, when elected, vote as individuals, just like the Representatives,

20 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ΟΗΔΡ,

President in whose election their citizens had a voice, not of a King governed by Ministers whom their citizens indirectly chose, but at the bidding of the Assembly of the City of Athens, an Assembly in which no Chian or Mitylenean had a seat. A public dispute between Methymna and Mityléné was not judged, like a dispute between New York and Ohio,! by a Supreme Court nominated by a President of their own choice, but by the local tribunals of a distant city, over whose nomination they had not the slightest influence of any kind. In many respects the condition of a dependent Greek city resembled that of an English Colony. The two agree in most of those points which effectually distinguish both from the member of a Federation. Both, unlike the Confederate City or Canton, are strictly dependencies of a greater power. The Compari- Colony, like the Athenian ally, is independent internally, but its son with relations towards other nations are determined for it by a hae power over which neither the Colony nor its citizens have any sort of control.2 But there is one all-important difference between the British Colony and the Athenian Ally. The dis- qualifications of the colonist are purely local; he is a British subject equally with the inhabitants of Britain; he can come and live in England, and may become, no less than the native Englishman, elector, representative, or even Minister. The disqualifications of the Athenian ally were personal; the Chian or Mitylenean was not an Athenian, but a foreigner; if he transferred his residence to Athens, he lost his influence in his own city, while he acquired none in the city in which he dwelled. Partly because he personally remains an Englishman, partly because the instinct of perfect independence is not now so keenly felt as it was in old Greece, the colonist commonly acquiesces in the dependent position of his Colony. It is felt that dependence is more than counterbalanced by perfect internal freedom combined with the gratuitous protection of the mother- country. As long as the mother-country abstains from practical oppression, as long as the Colony does not become so strong as to make dependence palpably incongruous, an English Colony has really no temptation to separate. But, in a dependent Greek city, the citizens were personally in an inferior position to the citizens of the ruling state, while the city itself was deprived of a

1 See Tocqueville, Démocratie en Amérique, i. 254. 2 See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 155 et seqq.

11 DEPENDENCIES COMPARED WITH ENGLISH COLONIES 21

power to which the political instinct of the Greek mind held that it had an inherent right. The sway of Athens did not necessarily involve either actual oppression! or any loss of purely local freedom ; it was the loss of all share in Sovereignty in the highest sense which the Greek city deplored when it was reduced to a condition of dependent alliance.

It follows therefore that a system like the Athenian Alliance or Empire always remained a system of detached units. A areek city either remained independent, retaining its full sovereign rights, or else it became more or less dependent upon some stronger city. There was no means by which it was No means possible to fuse any large number of cities, like the members of Incor- of the Athenian Alliance, into a single body with equal rights poration common to all. A Federal Union easily effects this end, but it the system effects it only by depriving each city of the most precious attri- οἵ mee butes of separate sovereignty. A Constitutional Monarchy, by ities, means of the representative system, also easily effects it, though of course at a still greater sacrifice of local independence. Even under a despotism, there is not the slightest need for placing the inhabitants of a conquered, ceded, or inherited province in any worse position than the inhabitants of the original kingdom. But a Greek city had no choice but either absolute independence or a position of decided inferiority to some other city. It is clear that a city-commonwealth can incorporate only within very narrow limits. In such a commonwealth the city itself is every- thing in a way into which the inhabitants of large kingdoms can hardly enter. And the representative system, by which all the inhabitants of a large country are enabled to have a share in the government, is not likely to occur to men’s minds in such a state of things. Every citizen in a Democracy, every citizen of the ruling order in an Aristocracy, deems it his inalienable right to discharge his political functions in his own person. Conse- quently incorporation cannot be carried out over an extent of

1 That there were isolated cases of oppression on the part of individual Athenian commanders, like Pachés, there is no doubt. But there was certainly no habitual oppression on the part of the Athenian government. This has been forcibly brought out by Mr. Grote (vi. 47, aud elsewhere). See also North British Review, May 1856, p. 169. Cf. Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 102.

I have drawn my picture of a Greek dependent city from the most favoured of the Athenian allies. But the condition of different allies of Athens differed much ; and the position of a dependency of Sparta or Thebes in the next generation was far inferior to that of the least favoured subject of Athens.

Incorpo- ration carried as far as pos- sible by Athens,

in the case of the old Attic Cities.

Impossible in the case of the later Athenian Empire.

22 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT onap.

territory so large as to prevent the whole ruling body from habitually assembling in the city. Athens indeed, in a remote and unchronicled age, actually carried incorporation as far as a city-commonwealth could carry it. There is no record of the causes and circumstances of the change, but there is no reason- able doubt that the smaller towns of Attica, Eleusis, Marathon, and the rest, were once independent states! which were after- wards incorporated with Athens, not as subjects of the ruling commonwealth, but as municipal towns whose inhabitants possessed the common Athenian franchise equally with the inhabitants of the capital.2 But then Attica was not so large a territory as to hinder all its free inhabitants from frequently meeting together in a capital whose position was admirably central. All Attica therefore was really incorporated with Athens. Athens became the only City, in the highest sense, in all Attica, and all the free inhabitants of Attica became her citizens. But this incorporation, which geographical position rendered possible in the case of old Attic towns, could never have been extended to all the members of the later Athenian Empire. If the jealousy of the Sovereign People could have stooped to communicate its franchise to subjects, or even to allies, it was utterly impossible that the rights of Athenian citizens could have been exercised by the inhabitants of Rhodes or of Byzantium. Even a Federal Union, except one which admitted the representative principle, could hardly have bound together such distant members; to unite them into a single commonwealth of the ancient type was physically impossible.

1 See North British Review, May 1856, p. 150.

* There can be no doubt that this incorporation was the main cause of the great power and importance of Athens. As such, it is one of the great events in the history of the world. No other Greek city possessed so large an immediate territory, or so great a number of free and equal citizens, The territory of Sparta was much larger ; but then Sparta held the Lakonian towns as subjects ; their inhabitants had no voice in general politics ; whatever freedom they had was merely that of municipalities under a despotism, Thebes called herself the head of a Beeotian League, but the sinaller Boeotian towns, as we shall see when we reach that part of her history, looked on her as a Tyrant rather than a President. A Beeotian town was practically a subject dependency of Thebes, but throughout Attica, a territory hardly smaller than Bootia, the smaller towns were free muni- cipalities, and their inhabitants were citizens of Athens. This was a wonderful advantage, precluding all fear of internal treason or discontent,

There is a dialogue in Xenophdn, comparing Beotia and Athens at length, in which the Athenians are always set against the Boeotians as a whole, not against

the Thebans only. οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει μὲν οὐδὲν μείους εἰσὶν ᾿Αθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν ; οἷδα γὰρ, épn.—Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 2.

II INCORPORATION OF DEPENDENCIES 23

So in later times, wherever the system of city-commonwealvths existed, we find subject cities and districts following naturally

in the wake of other cities, which bear rule over them. We find Depen- the system of the Athenian Empire followed, even in cases ‘encies of where no geographical obstacle prevented the imitation of the metiieeval earlier Athenian system of incorporation. Venice, Genoa, modern Florence, held sway over other cities and districts, sometimes Italian near neighbours, sometimes dependencies beyond the sea. In” ” both cases the subject countries often retained large municipal privileges, but in neither case did the Sovereign City ever dream

of conferring on their inhabitants any share in its own more exalted rights. So in the old state of things in Switzerland, and of both the League as a whole and many of the several Cantons, ®w!s democratic Uri no less than oligarchic Bern, assumed the Cantons. character of despotic sovereigns over subject districts, which

they too often governed yet more purely in the interest of the sovereign state than had been done by Athens or Venice. In

short among city-commonwealths, where the Federal principle is

not admitted, absolute political independence or absolute political subjection are the only alternatives. Once only in the history

of the world has incorporation on a large scale been tried in the

case of a city-commonwealth. And in that one case the experi-

ment undoubtedly failed. The geographical position of Rome allowed an extension of the Roman franchise far wider than was possible with the franchise of Athens or of any other Greek Effects of city. From the narrow limits of the old Ayer Romanus the tion ot freedom of the Roman city was gradually spread over the whole Rome. of Italy, and, when it had long ceased to confer any real political

rights, its name was further extended to the inhabitants of the

whole civilized world. Within certain bounds, this liberal extension of the franchise made Rome the greatest and mightiest

of all cities. But the same system, carried beyond those bounds,

led directly to the destruction of Roman freed,» Federation

was not tried ; it would have been inconsistent with the dignity

of the Sovereign City. Representation was unheard of ; so the hundreds and thousands of citizens of the allicd states were gradually admitted to a personal vote in the Roman Assembly.

The result naturally was that the Assembly became at last a frantic and ungovernable mob, utterly incapable of peaceful deliberation. When called on to discharge any political func-

tions, to pass a law or to elect a magistrate, it commonly

Town- autonomy in medie-

val Europe.

24 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT onap.

eee ee

appealed at once to violence, murder, perhaps to open civil war. From such a state of things even the despotism of the Caesars was felt to be a relief. The Athenian, Venetian, or Bernese system was much as if the local Livery of London were invested with the supreme power over the whole United Kingdom, leav- ing to the other towns and counties full municipal, but only municipal, independence. The Roman system was as if the Livery of London were invested with the supreme power, every elector in the United Kingdom being at the same time invested with the freedom of the City.

Greece then was the true home of the system of independent city-commonwealths, the land where the system reached its fullest and its most brilliant developement, the land where its good and its evil results may be most fairly balanced against each other. In ancient Italy the system hardly attained to full perfection ; it was modified by a far stronger tendency than in Greece to unite many cities by a Federal tie, and also by the steady and increasing power of the one City of Rome. In modern, and even in medieval, Europe Town-autonomy has always had but a comparatively feeble life. Many common- wealths of Italy, Germany, and the old Burgundian Kingdon,’ have attained to fame, wealth, and power; but, even in the most brilliant days of medieval Italy, town-autonomy was the exception and not the rule. Most European states, great and small, have always been monarchies. Such city-commonwealths as have existed have always had a far greater tendency than in Greece, sometimes to join themselves into Confederacies, some- times to degenerate from great Cities into petty Principalities.* And, in truth, the perfect city-autonomy of old Greece could not exist in medieval Europe. The still abiding life of the Roman

1 See National Review, April 1859, p. 337.

21 must remark, once for all, that medixval history cannot be properly understood unless it be fully understood that the Kingdom of Burgundy, the region between the Saone, the Alps, and the Mediterranean, is historically no part of France. It has been gradually acquired by the Kings and “ Emperors ” of Paris, by a series of stealthy robberies (r¢unions), reaching from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth. Part of the country still retains its freedom as the Western Cantons of Switzerland. Lyons, Besancon, Marseilles, were anciently Free Cities of the Empire; they have been swallowed up, while Geneva and Bern have as yet escaped ; that is the only difference.

3 Most of the points touched on in this paragraph I have worked out more at large in the Oxford Essays for 1857, Ancient Greece and Medieval Italy, p. 156 et seqq.

Ul TOWN-AUTONOMY IN MEDIAVAL EUROPE 25

Empire forbade it. Tho parts of Europe where the cities Indepen- attained to the greatest splendour lay within the bounds of one dence of or other of the monarchies which retained the style and imperial ὌΝ pretensions of old Rome. Cherson! and the Campanian Re- by the publics were dependencies of the Byzantine Emperor ; so was Claims of Venice, in name at least, long after she had attained to practical perore ; independence. The other cities which possessed republican constitutions, in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Provence, and

the Netherlands,” all lay within the limits of the Empire of the

West. However carefully the Imperial power might be limited

in practice, no commonwealth absolutely denied its existence in theory. The city then was not absolutely independent ; it had

an earthly superior, entitled always to honorary respect, often to

some measure of practical obedience. A Greek city owned no

king but Zeus ; a German or Italian city had at least a nominal

king in Cesar.2 The title of “Free Imperial City,” borne as a

badge of honour by many a proud medieval commonwealth, would have sounded like a contradiction in terms in the ears of

an Athenian. Venice alone, through. her peculiar position and

her peculiar policy, obtained complete independence in name as

well as fact. The island city retained her nominal allegiance to

the Emperor of the East till she became strong enough to dispense with all recognition of the successor either of Con- stantine or of Charles. But even Florence and Genoa in the

days of their might would ‘hardly have denied that some vague

and shadowy superiority over them belonged of right to the chosen King of Germany and Italy, the crowned and anointed Emperor of the Romans. From all these causes, the independ-

ence of city-commonwealths, even in medieval, and still more in modern, Europe, must be looked on as merely a secondary element, existing only in an imperfect shape. It is to old Greece that we must ever look for its one great and splendid manifestation.

1 For the deeply-interesting history of Cherson, literally the Last of the Greek Republics, see Finlay, Byzantine Empire, i. 415 [History of Greece, ii. 350] et 5844.

* Strictly speaking, the cities in the County of Flanders should be excepted, as Flanders, or its greatest portion, was a fief of the Crown of France. But the history of Flanders can hardly be separated from that of the neighbouring and kindred provinces which were all fiefs of the Empire. Provence, of course, was not French till late in the fifteenth century.

3 The Emperor of course was supreme, in theory at least, everywhere. But the independence of a town was often much more practically modified by the neighbourhood of some local Duke, Count, or Bishop.

General view of the system of Inde- pendent Cities.

Varieties in internal Canstitu- tions.

26 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT cuHap.

Let us now strive to picture to ourselves the condition of a country whose great political doctrine is that of the perfect independence of each separate city. Such a land is crowded with towns, each of them acknowledging no superior upon earth and exercising all the rights of sovereignty as fully as the mightiest empires. Within limits, it may be, less than those of an English county, among a people one in blood, language, manners, and religion, you may pass, in a short day’s journey, through several independent states, each of which makes war and peace at its pleasure, and whose relations to its neighbours are regulated only by the public Law of Nations. From any lofty peak you may look down on several capitals ata glance, and see the territory of several sovereign commonwealths lying before you asin a map. Within this narrow compass there may be perfect examples of every varying shade of political constitu- tion! In one city pure Democracy may reign; magistrates may be chosen, laws may be enacted, treaties may be ratified, by an Assembly in which every free citizen has an equal voice. In another, an hour or two from its gates, all power may be in the hands of a narrow Oligarchy, who bind themselves by vath to be evil-minded to the People? In a third, at no greater distance, we may even find that name of fear, the Tyrant—the ruler whose power rests on no hereditary right, on no popular choice, but who dwells entrenched in his citadel, lording it over unwilling subjects by the spears of foreign mercenaries. Thus, within this narrow compass, we may see every form of govern- ment in its extremest shape, and we may see them too in all those intermediate forms by which each shades off imperceptibly into the others. We may see Democracies in which an acknow- ledged sovereignty of the People is found not to be inconsistent

1 (This is well brought out by Piitter in regard to the Germany of his day, Hist. Entw. der heutigen Staatsverf. des teutschen Reichs, ii. 162. ‘‘ Kurz was irgend einem, der mehrere unabhingige Staaten in Kuropa bereiset, deren Verschiedenheit in Verfassung, Gesetzen und anderen Ejinrichtungen begreiflich machen kann, das wird einen Reisenden in ‘Teutschland bald eben so deutlich, und oft noch viel auffallender belehren, dass es ganz verschiedene Staaten sind, wo er oft, nicht halbe Tagereisen braucht, um bald republicanische, bald monarchische, bald eingeschrinkte, bald beynahe despotische, bald erbliche, bald auf Wahlfreyheit beruhende Regierungsformen wahrzunehmen, um mit jedem neuen Gebiete wieder ganz andere Cesetze, ganz andere Miinzen, andere Posten, andere Soldaten zu finden.”

2 Arist. Pol. v. [viii] 9, 11. Nov μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις [ὀλιγαρχίαις] ὀμνύουσι “Kal τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὃ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.᾽"

Π GENERAL ASPECT OF CITY-COMMONWEALTHS 27

with the practical ascendancy of a high-born and wealthy class, the leaders of the People but not their masters. We may see Aristocracies, where the ruling order is not a band of sworn oppressors, but a race of hereditary chiefs, submitted to, if not with cordial love, at least with traditional respect. We may aven see Tyrannies, where the Tyrant would scarcely, in modern language, deserve the name, where he is sometimes hardly to be distinguished from a popular chief, sometimes hardly to be distinguished from a hereditary King.’ And _ besides every variety of internal government, we may also see, within this same narrow compass, every possible variety of political relation between city and city. For, though every city claims inde- pendent sovereignty as its right, it may well be that every city is not strong enough practically to maintain that right. One city may stand absolutely alone, neither ruling over others, nor Varieties ruled by others, nor yet entering into habitual alliance with any Ἢ externa other power.? Others, though not connected by anything which | eranions: can be called a Federal tic, may yet be attached to each other by ancient affection ; they may be accustomed to have friends and enemies in common, and they may, without resigning any portion of their independent sovereignty, habitually follow the political lead of some mightier and more venerable city. Others may have sunk from independent into dependent alliance ; their internal laws and government may be their own, but their fleets and armies may be at the absolute control of another state.‘

1 Tn the Islands and in the colonies Tyranny seems to have been less carefully distinguished from lawful Kingship than in continental Greece. Pindar freely applies the name βασιλεύς to the Sicilian Tyrants, but it may be doubted whether Herodotos, when speaking in his own person, ever distinctly applies the name to any Tyrant. This has been pointed ont by a writer in the National Review 1862, p. 300.

The Tyrannies, both in continental Greece and in the colonies, must be care- fully distinguished from the few cases of lawful Kingship which lingered on in a few outlying places, Salamis in Cyprus for instance, long after its general abolition.

2 See the policy of Korkyra as set forth in Thucydidéy, i, 32, 37.

8 This was the condition of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta during the great Peloponnesian War. Lacedamén took the habitual lead, but matters of common interest were debated by the voices of the whole Confederacy, and each city was free to act, or not to act, as itthought good. Sce Thuc. i. 125; v. 30; Grote, vi. 105. It is instructive to see how, after the temporary conclusions following the Peace of Nikias (B.c. 421), the different states gradually fell back into their old places and relations, Cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 8.

4 This was the condition of Chios, Mityléné, and the other allies of Athens which never exchanged contributions of men for contributions of money. See Grote, vi. 2.

Different relation between the City and its Territory.

28 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ~— cHAP.

@

Or they may even be without any fleet or army of their own ; they may pay tribute to some imperial city, which engages in return to defend them against all aggressors! Or some unhappy cities may have fallen lower still; dependent alliance may have sunk into absolute subjection. Law and life and property may all be at the absolute command of a foreign governor, for whom even the domestic Tyrant would be a good exchange. And his yoke may be embittered rather than alleviated, when his power is supported by the intrigues of degenerate citizens who find their private advantage in the degradation of their native city.” Again, as there may be every conccivable variety of relation between city and city, so we may also find, within the same narrow compass, every conceivable variety of relation between the city itself and its surrounding territory. In one district, as we have seen in the case of Attica, every free inhabitant, that is every man who is neither a slave nor a foreigner,® enjoys the full

franchise of the City, votes in its Assemblies, and is eligible to

its honours. In another, the rural inhabitants may be per- sonally free, protected by the laws in all their private rights, but shut out from the political franchise, subjects in short, rather than citizens, of the sovereign commonwealth.4 In the third, the City, the abode of free warrior-nobles, may be surrounded by lands tilled for them by serfs, Lakonian Helots or Thessalian Penests, whose highest privilege is to be the slaves of the Commonwealth, and not the slaves of any individual master. But, in all these cases alike, the City is the only recognized political existence. Each city is either sovereign or deems itself wronged by being shorn of sovereignty. At a few miles from the gates of one independent city we may find another, speaking the same tongue, worshipping the same gods, sharing in the same national festivals, but living under different municipal laws, different political constitutions, with a different coinage, different

1 This was the condition of the great mass of the Athenian allies.

2 This was the condition of the extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta after the great victory of Aigospotamos (B.c. 405). On the harmosts and dekarchies, see Grote, ix. 271 et seqq.; Isok. Panath. 58.

4 It must be of course borne in mind that the children of a foreigner, though born in the land, still remained foreigners, This seems strange to us as applied to the question of nationality, but it is simply the rule of burghership as it was carried out in many an old English borough.

4 This is essentially the condition of the Lakonian περίοἰϊκο. They had towns, but all notion of their separate political being was so utterly lost, that their inhabitants had more in common with ἃ rural population,

II ADVANTAGES OF SMALL COMMONWEALTHS 29

weights and measures, different names, it may be, for the very months of the year, levying duties at its frontiers, making war, making peace, sending forth its Ambassadors under the pro- tection of the Law of Nations, and investing the bands which wage its border warfare with all the rights of the armies and the commanders of belligerent empires. :

Now what is the comparative gain and loss of such a political system as this? There are great and obvious advantages, balanced by great and obvious drawbacks. Let us first look Compara- αὖ the bright side of a system to which the nation on which [108 gain the world must ever look as its first teacher owed the most ane syste brilliant pages of that history which still remains the text-book of all political knowledge.

First of all, it is clear that, in a system of city-commonwealths, Advan- the individual citizen is educated, worked up, improved, to the oe of highest possible pitch. Every citizen in the Democracy, every common- citizen of the ruling order in the Aristocracy, is himself states- wealths. man, judge, and warrior. English readers are apt to blame such a government as the Athenian Democracy for placing power in hands unfit to use it. The truer way of putting the case would be to say that the Athenian Democracy made a greater number of citizens fit to use power than could be made fit by any other system. No mistake can be greater than to suppose Political that the popular Assembly at Athens was a mob such as gathers Fdtteation at some English elections, or such as the Assembly of the Roman jnaiviaual Tribes undoubtedly became in its later days. It was not an Citizen. indiscriminate gathering together of every male human being to be found in the streets of Athens. Citizenship was some- thing definite ; if it was a right, it was also a privilege. The citizen of Athens was in truth placcd in something of an aristocratic position; he looked down upon the vulgar herd of slaves, freedmen, and unqualified residents, much as his own plebeian fathers had been looked down upon by the old Eupatrids in the days before Kleisthenés and Solén.t The Athenian Assembly was an assembly of citizens, of ordinary citizens

1 This quasi-aristocratic position of the citizen necessarily follows trom the nature of a civic franchise. The freedom of the city could be acquired only by inheritance or by special grant. But in a great commercial and imperial city like Athens a large unqualified population naturally arose, among whom the

citizens held a sort of aristocratic rank. Such an unqualified population may exist either in an Oligarchy or in a Democracy, and their position is legally the

90 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT οσηάρ.

without sifting or selection ; but it was an assembly of citizens among whom the political average stood higher than it ever did in any other state. Our own House of Commons, though

same in either case. The difference between Oligarchy and Democracy is a difference within the citizen class. In a Democracy civil and political rights are coextensive ; in an Oligarchy political rights are confined to a portion only of those who enjoy civil rights.

The really weak point of Greek Democracy is one which T have not mentioned in the text, because I wish to make my remarks as far as possible applicable to city-commonwealths in general, whether aristocratic or democratic. Each gives the same political education to those who exercise political rights ; the difference is that in the Democracy this education is extended to all the citizens, in the Aristocracy it is confined to a part of them. The real special weakness of pure Democracy is that it almost seems to require slavery as a necessary condition of its existence. It is hard to conceive that a large body of men, like the qualified citizens of Athens, can ever give so large a portion of their time as the Athenians did to the business of ruling and judging (ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν), without the existence of an inferior class to relieve them from at least the lowest and most menial duties of their several callings. Slavery therefore is commonly taken for granted by Greek political thinkers. In Aristotle’s ideal city (Pol. vii. 10, 13) the earth is to be tilled either by slaves or by barbarian περίοικοι. In an Aristocracy no such constant demands are made on the time of the great mass of the citizens ; in an Aristocracy therefore slavery is not theoretically necessary. It might therefore be argued that Democracy, as requiring part of the population to be in absolute bondage, was really less favourable to freedom than to Aristocracy. In the Aristocracy, it might be said, though the political rights of the ordinary citizen were narrower, it was still possible that every human being might be personally free. But the experience of Grecian history docs not bear out such an inference. Slavery was no special sin of Democracy ; it was an imstitution common to the whole ancient world, quite irrespective of particular forms of government. And in fact, the tone of feeling, the general sentiment of freedom and equality, engendered by a democratic constitution, actually benefited those who were without the pale of citizenship or even of personal freedom. It must doubtless have been deeply galling to a wealthy μέτοικος, whose ancestors had per- haps lived at Athens for several generations, to see the meanest hereditary burgher preferred to him on all occasions. It must have been more galling than it was in a city like Coriuth, where strangers and citizens were alike subject to the ruling order. But Democracy really benefited both the slave and the stranger. The slave was far better off in democratic Athens than in aristocratic Sparta or Chios. (On the Chian slaves, see Thuc. viii. 40.) The author of the strange libel on the Athenian Commonwealth attributed to Xenophén makes it a sign of the bad government of Athens that an Athenian could not venture to beat a stranger (μέτοικος) or another man’s slave! (Xen. de Rep. Ath. i. 10.) This accusation speaks volumes as to the condition of slaves and strangers in aristocratic cities. {With the μέτοικοι at Athens, cf. the Natifs at Geneva; Miiller, Hist. de la Conféderation Suisse (Continuation), xv. 275 sqq. ]

In modern times the experiment of a perfectly pure Democracy, one, that is, in which every citizen has a direct vote on all questions, has been confined to a few rural Cautons, where the demands on the citizen’s time are immeasurably smaller than they must be in a great city. The question of slavery therefore has not arisen. American slavery is, of course, a wholly different matter.

On the general subject of ancient citizenship, see Arnold, Thuc. vol. iii. p. xv. (Preface. )

II POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE CITIZENS 31

a select body, does not necessarily consist of the, 658 -wi

men among the British people. Many of its mémbers will Compari-

always be mere average citizens, neither better nor worse 398 with

than many among their constituents. A town sends a wealthy tne une: ish House

and popular trader, an average specimen of his class. A county of Com-

sends a wealthy and popular country gentleman, an average ™S-

specimen of his class. Very likely several of those who vote

for them are much deeper political thinkers than themselves.

But the average member so elected, if he really be up to the

average and not below it, will derive unspeakable benefit from

his political education in the House itself. He cannot fail to

learn much from the mere habit of exercising power in an

assembly at once free and orderly, and from the opportunity

of hearing the speeches and following the guidance of those

who are really fitted to be the leaders of men. ‘This sort of

advantage, this good political education, which the English

constitution gives to some hundreds of average Englishmen,

the Athenian constitution gave to some thousands of average

Athenians. Doubtless an assembly of thousands was_ less

orderly than an assembly of hundreds ; but it must never be

thought that the Athenian Ekklésia was a mere unruly crowd,

ignorant of all order and impatient of all restraint. The mode

of proceeding was regulated by fixed rules just as much as the

proceedings of our Parliaments. As far as we know the history

of Athenian debates, breaches of order were rare, and scenes of

actual violence—common enough in the Roman Forum—vwere

absolutely unknown. It was surely no slight gain to bring so

many human beings into a position habitually to hear—and

that not as mere spectators, but as men with an interest and

a voice in the matter—the arguments for and against a proposal

brought forward by Themistoklés and Aristeidés, by Periklés

and Thucydidés, by Kleédn and Nikias, by Démosthenés and

Phékién.t It is the habitual practice of so doing which is the

true gain. Popular assemblies which are brought together

only at rare intervals are incapable of wise political action,

almost incapable of free and regular debate. The Parliament Contrast

of Florence, for instance, was a mere tumultuous mob, which wien te Parlia- 1 Tocqueville, Dém. en Am. ii. 241, ‘‘C’est en participant ἃ la législation ment. que l’Américain apprend a connaitre les lois; c’est en gouvernant qu'il s’instruit

des formes du gouvernement.” How much more truly could this be said of the Athenian.

Compari- son of the Athenian citizen and the English member.

Connexion of Athe- nian his- tory with

the subject state of things to which they were applied.

of Fede- ralism.

32 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT σῃάρ,

seldom did anything except vote away its own liberties. Such a political franchise could give no political education whatever. But the Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the history of mankind has ever been found to equal.?

The ordinary Athenian citizen then must really be compared, not with the English ten-pound householder, but with the English Member of Parliament in the rank-and-file of his party. In some respects indeed the political education of the Athenian was higher than any which a private member in our Parliament can derive from his parhamentary position. The comparison is instructive in itself, and it is more closely connected with my immediate subject than might at first sight appear. When I come to the political history of the Achaian League, I shall have to compare the working of popular government, as applied to a large Confederation of cities, with its working as applied, on the one hand, to a single city like Athens, and, on the other, to a large country, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy. I shall then show how the principles of the Achaian constitution, no less democratic in theory than the Athenian constitution, were modified in practice by the requirements of the wholly different Athens, in short, is the typical City and the typical Democracy. A clear view of the Athenian constitution is absolutely necessary in order to understand, as we go on, the modifications which later Greek Federalism introduced into the old ideal of the democratic city. I therefore do not scruple, with this ulterior purpose, to enlarge somewhat more fully on Athenian political life than would be of

1 One of the few faults in M. de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is his failure to appreciate the Greek republics. Such words as the following sound strange indeed to one who knows what Athens really was. ‘Quand je conipare les républiques greeque et romaine a ces républiques d’Amérique ; [65 bibliotheques manuscrites des premitres et leur populace grossi¢re aux mille journanx qui sillonnent les secondes et au peuple cclairé qui les habite,” ete. (ii, 227). Fancy the people who heard and appreciated A’schylus, Periklés, aud Aristophanés, called a “ populace grossi¢re,” because they had no newspapers to enlighten them! And this by a writer who, in his own walk, ranks deservedly among the profoundest of political philosophers.

It is some comfort that Lord Macaulay, at all events, could have set him right. See the well-known and most brilliant passage on the working of the Athenian System in his Essay on Boswell’s Life of Johuson.

I ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 33

itself necessary in a comparison between the system of separate city-commonwealths and the system of larger states. The Athenian citizen, the Achaian citizen, the English Member of Parliament, resemble each other in being members of popular bodies each invested with the most important powers in their respective countries. But the functions of the three are not exactly the same, nor is the political education received by the three exactly of the same kind. The Athenian had the highest political education of all, because he had the highest responsibility of all. The comparison between Athens and Achaia I will put off to another Chapter; I will now rather try to show what the Athenian political education really was by comparing the powers and responsibilities of the ordinary Athenian citizen with those of an ordinary Member of our own House of Commons. There can be no doubt that an Athenian citizen who habitu- ally and conscientiously discharged his political duties was called on for ἃ more independent exercise of judgement, for a more careful weighing of opposing arguments, than is_ practically required of the English private member. ‘The functions of the Greater Athenian Assembly were in a few respects more limited, but, 7esponsi- on the whole, they were much more extensive than those of the ard English House of Commons. The Assembly was more directly Athenian a governing body. Démos was, in truth, King, Minister, and citizen Parliament, all in one. In our own system the written Law ΠΝ Οὗ the ) ; y W English entrusts the choice of Ministers, the declaration of war, the Member. negociation of peace, in general the government of the country as distinguished from its legislation, to the hereditary Sovereign. But the conventional Constitution adds that all these powers Position shall be exercised by the advice of Ministers who, as chosen by οἱ the " . . . ele nglish the Sovereign out of the party which has the majority in the winistry. House, may be said to be indirectly chosen by the House itself. These Ministers, ἃ body unknown to the written Law, but the most important element in the unwritten Constitution, exercise royal power during the pleasure of the House.? As long as they

1 Matters of Legislation, which we think so pre-eminently the business of a popular Assembly, were at Athens by no means wholly in the hands of the Ekklésia. Its powers were a good deal narrowed by the institution of the Nomo- thetes (see Grote, v. 500). On the other hand, the Assembly exercised exactly those functions of electing to offices, and declaring war and peace, any direct share in which we carefully refuse to the House of Commons,

2 With us a body which has no existence in the eye of the Law exercises the chief power in the name of the Sovereign and during the pleasure of the House

D

Received duties of the private Member.

Different duties

of the Athenian Citizen.

3-4 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cHap.

retain the confidence of the House, they take the management of things into their own hands! The House asks questions; it calls for papers; it approves or censures after the fact; but its vote is not directly taken beforehand on questions of peace, war, alliance, or other matters of administration. It leaves such matters to the Ministers as long as it trusts them; if it ceases to trust them, it takes measures which practically amount to their deposi- tion. No Minister remains in office after a direct vote of censure, or even after the rejection of a Government motion which he deems of any importance. He may indeed dissolve Parliament ; that is, he appcals to the country. But if the new Parliament confirm the hostile vote of the old one, he has then no escape ; he is hopelessly driven to resignation. No Minister receives instructions from the House as to the policy which he is to carry out; least of all, when he rises in his place in Parliament to advo- cate one policy, is he bidden by the House to go to his office and take the requisite administrative steps for carrying out another policy. Hence, under our present parliamentary system, the average member is in truth seldom called on to exercise a per- fectly independent judgement on particular questions of import- ance. He exercises his judgement once for all, when ke decides whether he will support or oppose the Ministry ; by that decision his subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted ; it is enough for our present purpose that it is the political morality commonly received. Matters were widely different in the Athenian Assembly. Every citizen who sat there exercised much higher functions than those of an English private member. He sat there as a member of a body which was directly, and not indirectly, sovereign. [lis own share of that corporate sover- eignty it was his duty to discharge according to his own personal

of Commons. We shall presently have to contrast this with the Achaian and American system by which a magistrate, chosen for a fixed time, exercises nearly the same powers in his own person, Athens differs from all these by what may be called vesting the royal authority in the House of Commons itself.

1 The gradual change of political language and political habits is curious. The Sovereign no longer presides at a Cabinet Council, because the practical function of the Ministers is no longer to advise the Sovereign, but to act for themselves, subject to responsibility to Parliament. Therefore it has of late become usual to apply the name of ‘‘Government”’ to the body which used tc be content with the humbler title of ‘ Ministry” or ‘‘ Administration.” Its

members are felt, subject to their parliamentary responsibility, to be the real rulers,

II COMPARISON BETWEEN ATHENS AND ENGLAND 35

convictions. Athens had no King, no President, no Premier ; The As- she had curtailed the once kingly powers of her Archons till sem>ly ἃ they were of no more political importance than Aldermen or ; ont as Police Magistrates. She had no Cabinet, no Council of Ministers, well as a no Council of State! The Assembly was, in modern political Patla- language, not only a Parliament but a Government. There was’ indeed a Senate, but that Senate was not a distinct or external Function: body : it was a Committee of the Assembly, appointed to put οἱ me matters in regular order for the Assembly to discuss. There” ’ were Magistrates, high in dignity and authority —the ten Generals, on whom, far more than on the pageant Archons,

rested the real honours and burthens of office. But those of the Magistrates were chosen hy the Assembly itsclf for a definite Gener. time ; it was from the Assembly itsclf that they received those instructions which, in all modern states, whether despotic, con- stitutional, or republican, would issue from the ‘“ Government.”

There was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call Nothing “ Office” and “ Opposition.” Periklés, Nikias, Phokion, appeared @nalogons | . . to “ Office in the Assembly, as Generals of the Republic, to propose what ang «op. measures they thought fit for the good of the state. Their pro- position.” posals, as coming at once from official men and from eloquent

and honourable citizens, were doubtless always listened to with respect. But the acceptance of these proposals was by no means

a matter of course; their rejection did not involve immediate resignation, nor did it even imply the rejection of their proposcrs

at the next yearly choice of Magistrates. The Assembled People

was sovereign ; as sovereign, it listened to its various counsellors

and reserved the decision to itself. Periklés, Nikias, and Phokién,

were listened to; but Thucydidés,? Kleén, and Démosthenés were

listened to also, and their amendments, or their substantive pro-

posals, had as fair a chance of being carried as those of the Generals of the commonwealth. A preference given to the pro-

posal of another citizen involved no sort of censure on the official

1 T cannot but think that Mr. Grote, to whom, more than to any other man, we are indebted for true views of the Athenian Democracy, has been sometimes led astray by his own English parliamentary experience. He clearly looks on Nikias and other official men as coming nearer to the English idea of a ‘ Govern- ment,” and Kle6n and other demagogues as coming nearer to the English idea of a “Leader of Opposition,’ than the forms of the Athenian commonwealth allowed. TI have tried to set this forth at some length in an article in the North British Review, May, 1856, p. 157.

2 I mean of course Thucydidés son of Melésias, the rival of Perikl¢s ; quite a different person from Thucydidés the historian.

B.C. 415.

Direct Di- plomatic action of the As- sembly,

BG. 343.

Effect

of these powers on individual citizens,

36 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT σπλρ.

man who was thus placed in a minority; it in no way affected his political position, or implicd any diminished confidence on the part of the People. The Sovercign Assembly listened patiently to the arguments of Nikias against the Sicilian expe- dition, and then sent him, with unusual marks of confidence, to command the expedition against which he had argued. It was the Assembly which, by its direct vote, decided questions of peace and war; it was the Assembly which gave its instructions to the Ambassadors of Athens; and it was the Assembly which listened, in broad daylight and under the canopy of heaven, to the proposals which were made by the Ambassadors of other powers. In modern times, even a republican state has some President, Secretary, or other official person, to whom diplomatic communications are immediately addressed. The consent of a Senate may be necded for every important act, but there 1s some officer or other who is the immediate and responsible actor.! We shall see a very close approach to this system when we come to look at Greek Democracy as modified in the Federal constitution of Achaia. But in the pure Democracy of Athens there is no approach to anything of the kind. When King Philip has to communicate with the hostile republic, he does not commission a Minister to address a Minister; he writes in his own name to the Senate and People of Athens.* The royal letter is read, first in the Senate before hundreds, and then in the Assembly before thousands, of hearers, each of whom may, if he can gain the ear of the House, take a part in the debate on its contents. So, when the reading and the debate are over, it is by the sovereign vote of those thousands of hearers that the policy of the commonwealth is finally and directly decided. It is evident that the member of an Assembly invested with such powers as these had the very highest form of political education opened to him. If he did his daily duty, he formed an opinion

1 By the American Constitution the assent of the Senate is necded for the treaties entered into by the President, and the power of declaring war is vested in Congress, But all diplomatic business up to these points is carried on after the forms usual with the Governments of other states. Despatches are not addressed to Congress, nor even to the President, but to a Secretary of State, whose office is not mentioned in the Constitution. According to Athenian prac- tice, the letters of Earl Russell on the affair of the Trent would have been addressed, not to Mr. Seward, but to the House of Congress, and the liberation of the Southern Commissioners would have needed a vote of those bodies,

2 See the Speech of Démosthenés (or rather of Hégésippos) about Halonnésos (Oratores Attici, vol. iv. p. 82).

1 ATHENS THE HIGHEST TYPE OF CITY-COMMONWEALTH 37

of his own upon every question of the day, and that not blindly or rashly, but after hearing all that could be said on either side by the greatest of orators and statesmen. Of course he might blindly follow in the wake of some favourite leader—so might a Venetian Senator, so might an English Peer—but so to do was a clear forsaking of duty. The average Athenian citizen could not shelter himself under those constitutional theories by which, in the case of the average English member, blind party voting is looked upon as a piece of political duty, and an independent judgement is almost considered as a crime.

The great advantage then of the system of small city- commonwealths, the system of which the Athenian Demo- cracy was the greatest and most illustrious example, was that it gave the members of the ruling body (whether the whole people or only a part of the people) such a political education as no other political system can give. Nowhere will the average of political knowledge, and indecd of general intelli- gence! of every kind, be so high as in a commonwealth of this sort. Doubtless to take Athens as the type is to look at the system in its most favourable aspect. The Athenian people Athens the seem to have had natural gifts beyond all other people, and the highest circumstances of their republic brought each citizen into daily (Yh, contact with greater political affairs than could have been the system. case with the citizens of an average Greek commonwealth. At Rome, again, the vast numbers of the Assembly and the com- paratively narrow range of its functions must have effectually hindered the Comitia from ever becoming such a school of politics as the Athenian Pnyx. The Roman Tribes elected Magistrates, passed Laws, and declared war; but they did not exercise that constant supervision over affairs which belonged to the Athenian Démos. The ordinary powers, in short, of a Government, as distinguished from a Parliament, were exercised by the Senate and not by the Tribes. It was not every city-commonwealth which could give its citizens such opportunities of improvement

1 General intelligence, not of course general knowledge, which must always depend upon the particular age and country in which the commonwealth is placed. The average Englishman knows far more than the average Athenian knew, because the aggregate of knowledge in the world is incomparably greater than what it was then. But the average Athenian probably knew far more in proportion to the aggregate of knowledge in his own day ; most certainly he had a general quickness, a power of appreciation and judgement, for which we should look in vain in the average Englishman.

Oppor-

tunity for the deve- lopement of genius.

Intensity of patriot- ism in Small States,

38 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cmap.

as were enjoyed by the citizens of Athens. But, in estimating the tendencies of any political system, they must be estimated by their most perfect manifestations both for good and for evil. And undoubtedly even commonwealths which gavo their citizens far less political education than was to be had at Athens must have given them far more than is to be had in any modern kingdom or republic. We idolize what is called the press,! as the great organ of modern cultivation ; but, after all, for a man to read his newspaper is by no means so elevating a process as it is to listen with his own ears to a great statesman and to give his independent vote for or against his motion. And great statesmen morcover grow far thicker on the ground in common- wealths of this kind than they do in great kingdoms. Many a man who has a high natural capacity for statesmanship is, in a large state, necessarily confined to the narrow range of private or local affairs. Such a man may, under a system of small commonwealths, take his place in the Sovereign Assembly of his own city and at once stand forth among the leaders of men. In a word, it can hardly be doubted that the system of small commonwealths raises the individual citizen to a pitch utterly unknown elsewhere. The average citizen is placed on a far higher level, and the citizen who is above the average has far more favourable opportunities for the display of his special powers.

This elevation of the character of the individual citizen is the main advantage of the system of small states. It is their one great gain, and it is an unmixed gain. It does not indeed decide the question in favour of small Commonwealths as against Federations or great Monarchies. These last have their advan- tages which may well be held to outweigh even this advantage ; but it clearly is unmixed gain as far as it goes. Less absolutely unmixed is another result of the system, which is closely connected with both its good and its bad features. A system of small commonwealths raises in each citizen a fervour and intensity of patriotism to which the natives of larger states are quite unaccustomed.? It is impossible, even in a fairly homogeneous country, to feel the same warmth of affection for a large region

1 It is worth notice that the “press” in common language always means newspapers and not books.

2 On the intensity of patriotism in small commonwealths, see Macaulay, Hist. Eng. i. 350 et seqq.

II INTENSE PATRIOTISM IN SMALL STATES 39

we -----ἰ -τ ---

as for a single city or for a small district. An Englishman is patriotic ; a Dane, as a countryman of a smaller state, is more patriotic still; but neither England nor Denmark can awaken

the same glow of patriotic zeal as the great name of Athens.! A man loves his birthplace, he loves his dwelling-place, he has a loyal respect for the seat of his country’s government. But with

the great mass of the subjects of a large kingdom these three feelings will severally attach to three different places. With an Athenian or a Florentine they all attached to the city of Athens

or of Florence. In a smaller state, like Megara or Imola, the local patriotism might be yet more intense still, for the Athenian citizen might really he a native and resident, not of Athens, but

of Marathén or Eleusis. But the inhabitant of the rustic Démos

was still an Athenian ; if his birthplace and dwelling-place were

not within the city walls, they could hardly be far out of sight

of the spear-head of Athéné on the Akropolis. Jn any case the Identifica City was far more to him than the capital of a modern state can tien of all ever be to the great bulk of its inhabitants. To adorn a capital with the at the expense of a.large kingdom is one of the most unjust City. freaks of modern centralization; but in adorning the city of Athens every Athenian was simply adorning his own hearth and home. Walls, temples, theatres, all were his own; there was

no spot where he was a stranger, none which he viewed or trod

by the sufferance of another. The single city will ever kindle a

far more fervid feeling of patriotism than can be felt towards a vast region, large parts of which must always be practically strange. And this intensity of local patriotism is closely connected with all that is noblest and all that is basest in the history of city-commonwealths. Where the single city is all in all, no self-devotion is too great which her welfare demands, no deed of wrong is too black which is likely to promote her interests. The unselfish heroism of Leénidas and Decius sprang from the very same source as the massacre of Mélos and the destruction of Carthage.

For that there is a weak and a bad side to this system of Bad side separate city-commonwealths is as obvious as that there is a great of the and noble one. First of all, the greatness of such commonwealths ae ° is seldom so enduring as that of larger states. A democratic city, common- above all, if it would preserve at once freedom at home and a Wwealths. high position abroad, has need of a certain high-strung fervour

1 Thue. vii. 64 τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν.

Greatness of small states less permanent than that of greater ones,

B.c. 508- 405.

Common fallacy as to the weakness of small statcs,

40 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT © cual

of patriotism which is not likely to endure through many genera tions. This Mr. Grote has remarked in the case of Athens when he compares the feeble resistance offered by the contempor aries of Démosthenés to the growing power of Macedonia wit! the vigour displayed by their fathers in the Persian and Pelopor nesian wars.! A state again whose political franchise depend wholly on the hereditary burghership of a single city cannot s easily strengthen itself by fresh blood from other quarters, a can be done by a great nation. A conquest destroys a city; i not uncommonly regenerates a nation. Of all city-commonwealth none ever had so long a day of greatness as Rome. One mai cause doubtless was because the Roman People was less of purely civic body than any other city-commonwealth, and becaus no other city-commonwealth was ever so liberal of its franchisc Rome thus grew from a city into an empire; other cities, aristc cratic and democratic alike, have often seen their day of greatnes succeeded by a long and dishonoured old age. Nothing coul well be more miserable than the latter days of democratic Athen and of oligarchic Venice. During the period of Grecian histor: with which we shall chiefly have to deal, the once prow Democracy of Athens sinks into the most contemptible state i Greece. And surely the dregs of a close body like the Venetia patriciate afford the very lowest spectacle which political histor can produce.

Here then lies the real cause of the inherent weakness o these small commonwealths. Nothing can be so glorious as th life of one of them while it does live. The one century o Athenian greatness, from the expulsion of the Tyrants to th defeat of Aigospotamos, is worth millenniums of the life of Egyp or Assyria. But it is a greatness almost too glorious to last ; 1 carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. This kind o weakness, at all events this want of permanency, is inherent 1] the system itself. But another kind of weakness, with whicl the ancient commonwealths are often reproached by superficia observers, is not inherent, or rather it has no existence at all Men who look only at the surface are tempted to despise Athen. and Achaia, because of the supposed insignificance of what ar< called ‘‘ petty states” in modern Europe. There are men who when they look at the colossal size of despotic France or Russia are led to despise the free Confederation of Switzerland and the

1 Grote, iv. 240.

II SUPPOSED WEAKNESS OF SMALL STATES 41

free Monarchy of Norway. How utterly contemptible then must commonwealths have been, beside which even Switzerland and Norway would seem empires of vast extent. Such a view as this involves the fallacy of being wholly physical and forgetting all the higher parts of man’s nature. France and Muscovy have indeed incomparably greater physical strength than Switzerland or Norway, but the Swiss or the Norwegian isa being of a higher political order than the Frenchman or the Muscovite. And this view also involves another fallacy. It goes on a mistaken analogy between small states, when they are surrounded by greater ones of equal material civilization, and small states, when small states constituted the whole of the civilized world. There is a certain sense in which the interests of Switzerland are smaller than the interests of France, but there was no possible sense in which the interests of Athens were smaller than the interests of Persia. The small states of modern Europe exist by the suffer- ance, by the mutual jealousy, possibly to some extent by the right feeling, of their greater neighbours.1 But the small commonwealths of old Greece were actually stronger than the contemporary empires; they were less than those empires only in the sense in which Great Britain is less than China. The few free cities now left in Europe are mere exceptions and anomalies ; they could not resist a determined attack on the part of one even of the smaller monarchies. Cracow could have been wiped out of the map of Europe at a less expenditure of force than the combined energies of three of the Great Powers. If Germany and Europe chose to look on, Denmark could Moubtless annex Hamburg, and Bavaria annex Frankfort. So it must ever be when Free Cities are merely exceptions among surrounding Kingdoms, when every Kingdom maintains a standing army, when a city can be laid in ashes in a day, and when the reduc- tion of the strongest fortress has become simply a question of time. But when we discuss the merits of a system of Free Cities, we do not suppose those Free Cities to be mere exceptions to a

1 Just at this moment Federal Government in general has acquired a certain amount of popular discredit from some of the acts of the power to which a momentary caprice has specially attached the name. It therefore cannot be out of place to point out the admirable union of dignity and modesty, the unswerving assertion of right combined with ,the absence of all unseemly bravado, which has distinguished all the acts of the Swiss Federal Government during the recent aggressions of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, both in the annexation of Savoy and in the more recent violation of Swiss territory in the Dappenthal. (February, 1862. )

Different position of smal] states

where they are merely exceptions,

A.D. 1846,

and where they are the general rule.

Free cities in the Middle Ages,

Constant warfare among Free Cities.

Force of antipathy between neighbour- ing towns.

42 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — crap,

general state of things, mere relics of a political system which has passed away ; we suppose a state of things like that of old Greece, in which the independence of every city is the universal, or at least the predominant, rule of the civilized world. And even in much later times, in those centuries of the middle ages when Free Cities, though not predominant, were still numerous, a city surrounded by strong walls and defended by valiant citizens might successfully resist the resources of a great empire. Feudal levies could not be kept to constant service, and, before the invention of gunpowder, the art of attacking fortified places lagged far behind the art of defending them. A single city nowadays is weak as compared with a small kingdom, just as a small kingdom is weak as compared with a great kingdom. The fact that no state can resist a power which is physically stronger than itself proves nothing as to the merits of particular forms of government. Aristocratic Rhodes, democratic Athens, federal Achaia, and kingly Macedonia were all alike, as their several turns came round, swallowed up by the universal power of Rome.

But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate Free Cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. This is the constant statc of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes which, in a great monarchy or a Federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neigh- bouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with tenfold force, in the case of independent city-commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to indi- vidual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay; but a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities. The German historian of Frederick Barbarossa speaks with horror of the hate which raged between the several Italian

II CONSTANT WARFARE AMONG SMALL STATES 43

towns, far surpassing any feeling of national dislike between Italians and Germans.! In old Greece the amount of hatred between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically upon their distance from one another. Athens and Sparta are commonly rivals, often enemies. But their enmity is not in- consistent with something of international respect and courtesy. When Athens was at last overcome, Sparta at once rejected the 8.0. 404. proposal to raze to the earth a city which, even when con- quered, she still acknowledged as her yoke-fellow.2. That pro- posal came from Thebes, between whom and Athens there reigned an enmity which took the form of settled deadly hostility.- The greatest work that orator or diplomatist ever achieved * was when Démosthenés induced the two cities to 8.0. 389. lay aside their differences, and to join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader. But Examples even Athenian hatred towards Thebes was gentle compared with ™ Steet the torrents of wrath which were poured forth upon unhappy ~~ ae Megara.° So too in Beeotia itself; just as Frederick entrusted the destruction of Milan, not to his own Germans, but to Milan’s a.p. 1162. enemies of Lodi and Cremona,® so Alexander left the fate of Thebes to the decision of his own Greek allies, and the ven- 5.0. 335. geance, not of Macedonia, but of Plataia and Orchomenos, soon swept away the tyrant city from the earth.’ A system of Free Cities therefore involves a state of warfare, and that of warfare carried on with all the bitterness of almost personal hostility. The more fervid the patriotism, the more intense the national life and vigour, the more constant and the more unrelenting will be the conflicts in which a city-commonwealth is sure to find itself engaged with its neighbours.

The same causes tend also to produce a greater degree of cruelty in warfare, and a greater severity in the recognized law of war, than is found in struggles between great nations

1 See Radevic of Freising, iii. 89. Cf. National Review, No. XXIII. (January, 1861, p. 52.) 4 Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19, 20.

3 Circumstances led Athens and Thebes to receive help from one another in the very crisis of their several revolutions (b,c. 408 and 382); but when these exceptional causes had passed by, the old enmity returned. It never was stronger than during the later campaigns of Epameinéndas and during the Sacred War. 4 See Arnold’s Rome, vol. ii. p. 331.

5 This comes out strongly in those scenes in the Acharnians of Aristophanés, in which the Beeotian and the Megarian are severally introduced.

8 Otto Morena, ap. Muratori, vi. 1108. Sire Raul, ib. 1187.

7 Arrian, i. 8. 8; 9. 9.

Compari- son be- tween citizen soldiers and pro- fessional soldiers.

A.D. 1631.

A.D. 1576.

B.C. 424, A.D. 1176.

44 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — cnap.

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in civilized ages. An army of citizen soldiers is a very different thing from an army of professional soldiers. Undoubtedly the citizen soldier never sinks to the lowest level of the professional soldier. He never attains that pitch of fiendishness which is reached when the professional soldier degenerates into the mercenary, and when the mercenary degenerates into the brigand. Old Greece was full of wars, of cruel and bloody wars, but she never knew the horrors with which France,