ilSTORT OF
ITHE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA I899-I902
rOMPimO BY THE DIRECTION mmS MAJESTYS GOVERNM^T VOfclV
HISTORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
1899-1902
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
1899-1902
WRITTEN BY DIRECTION OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
VOLUME IV
b>iv- Trec^©r»ck I^laUrK^ and Captain MAURICE HAROLD GRANT
(Devonshire Regiment)
LONDON I ^
HUEST AND BLACKETT LIMITED
1910 All right* reserved
AI3f
PREFACE.
This Volume comprises the account of the War in South Africa from the assumption of the command-in-chief by General Lord Kitchener, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., to the termination of hostilities. It might, there- fore, be considered as dealing with a distinct phase of the campaign, even if the peculiar nature of the operations did not of themselves distinguish it from what had gone before. From December, 1900, to May, 1902, was waged incessantly guerrilla warfare of the purest type and on the most extensive scale between an army of 195,400 men on the one side and of 30,000 to 50,000 men on the other. The contest was remarkable in many respects, but in none, perhaps, more than in its duration. When it is considered that at the moment at which this narration opens the Boer forces were already beaten, inasmuch as their cause was irretrievably lost, their long -sustained effort to ward off the end requires some military explanation. It is to be found in the fact that in their expiring struggle they reverted to weapons which were peculiarly their own and precisely those in which their opponents were least practised. Casting off the trammels of formal warfare, and disintegrating into a thousand bands, they compelled the British Army to conform, and agitated the whole vast theatre of war with an infinite complexity of movement which never for a moment desisted, nor for more than a moment was marked by any distinguishable trend.
To trace in detail the components of this universal stir has been the author's task. It was necessary to do so minutely. An official historian owes a duty from which a general writer is exempt ; his work would be valueless to military students if it could not be referred to for information concerning the minutiae of the campaign, the lesser as well as the greater tactics, the work of units, and even of individual officers and men. Moreover, a campaign such as that recorded in the following pages especially calls for dissection, because it was mainly composed of a myriad of events, each so small, yet contributing to so vast a sum, that it was often impossible to determine which was
vi THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
greater than another, or wliich was worthy or unworthy of mention. The elimination of every minor operation would, in fact, have resulted in almost total silence on a whole campaign of small affairs which together composed one of the greatest feats of the British Empire and Army. As much as possible, therefore, has been briefly recorded ; to record it all was beyond the power of man.
Of one deficiency in the scheme of the Volume the author is well aware, namely, the rarity of any periodical " purview " or general glance over the theatre of war. This has not been neglected because it was forgotten, but because it seemed alike valueless and impossible. Rarely was the campaign marked by any permanent development of the situation ; never, until the end, by one that affected it all. If the enemy appeared few and dispirited on one day, they were numerous and aggressive on the next ; the clearance of one area did but embroil its neighbour ; defeats and victories of columns and commandos followed one another with a regularity in which the gradual attrition of the weaker side was scarcely to be perceived. In short, it could never be said precisely how matters stood at any given moment ; those who attempted to do so from the seat of war were sadly at fault. Now, as then, only the size of the campaign can be truly stated, for shape it had none.
For the assistance of the reader it may be remarked that the work has been so designed that those desirous of following the operations in any particular province of South Africa may do so by omitting the intervening chapters which deal with other parts.
In cases where a number of officers of the same name were in the field, the initials are repeated as often as is necessary to avoid confusion.
A mass of technical material for which there was no place in the text has been incorporated in Appendices.
In conclusion, the author wishes to record his indebtedness to two ofi&cers, namely. Captain J. Bowers (Army Service Corps) and Captain L. Oppenheim (2nd Dragoon Guards, Queen's Bays), who took charge of, and extracted the essentials of the enormous and intricate mass of material from which this Volume has been written. He can say no more, and no less, than that without their services the work could not have been completed.
M. H. Grant.
CONTENTS.
VOLUME IV.
CHAI*. PAGE
I. — Events in the Western Transvaal. December,
1900 I
II. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. December
1ST, 1900 — January 30TH, 1901 ... 23 III. — Events in the Orange River Colony. December,
1900 — January, 1901 45
IV. — Events in Cape Colony. December, 1900 —
February 28th, 1901 60
V. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Con- tinued from Chapter III.) February — June,
1901 93
VI. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. (Continued
from Chapter II.) January — March, 1901 . iii VII. — Events in the Western Transvaal. (Continued
from Chapter I.) January — April, 1901 . 128
VIII. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal and Natal.
{Continued from Chapter VI.) April — May, 1901 139 IX. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter V.) April — June, 1901. . . 156 X. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
IV.) March — April, 1901 .... 172 XI. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter VII.) May — August, 1901 . i8i
viii THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
CHAP. PACK
XII. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. (Continued
from Chapter VIII.) June — September, 1901 . 198 XIII. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
X.) June — September, 1901 .... 224 XIV. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter IX.) July — August, 1901 . . 245 XV. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
XIII.) September — October, 1901 . . 270
XVI. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XI.) September — November, 1901 291 XVII. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. {Continued from Chapter XII.) The Action of Baken- laagte, October 30TH, 1901 .... 304 XVIII. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XIV.) August — November, 1901 316 XIX. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued from Chapter XVI.) November, 1901 — January,
1902 339
XX. — Events in the North- West and West of Cape
Colony. April — December, 1901 . . . 349 XXI. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal, {Continued from Chapter XVII.) November, 190 i —
January, 1902 371
XXII. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued from Chapter XVIII.) December, 1901 —
February, 1902 382
XXIII. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XIX.) January — March, 1902 . 406 XXIV. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XXII.) February, 1902 . . 423 XXV. — Events in the Northern Transvaal. April,
1901 — May. 1902 ...... 435
CONTENTS. ix
CHAI'. I'AGK
XXVI. — Events in Cape Colony. {Continued from Chapter
XX.) January — May, 1902 .... 453 XXVII. — Events in the Orange River Colony. {Continued
from Chapter XXIV.) March — May, 1902 475
XXVIII. — Events in the Western Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XXIII.) March — May, 1902 . 491 XXIX. — Events in the Eastern Transvaal. {Continued
from Chapter XXI.) February — May, 1902 . 512 XXX. — The Conclusion of Peace 523
ILLUSTRATIONS.
WiTKOPPiEs — Views of, from the North and West
Facing page 104
APPENDICES.
»0. PAGE
1. SuMMARV OF Supplies sent by the Natal District for
General French's Force, Garrisons, etc., February — March, 1901 567
2. The Evolution of the Blockhouse System in South
Africa 568
3. Letter from General C. R. De Wet to General J. C.
Smuts, appointing him Successor to Kritzinger and GIVING Instructions as to the Conduct of the Campaign in Cape Colony, February 8th, 1902 . . 577
4. Orders by Lieut. -General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton,
K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Columns operating in Western Transvaal, May 6th, 1902 .... 581
5. Notes on the Supply System in South Africa,
1901— 2 . 584
6. Notes on the Transport System in South Africa,
1901 — 2 598
7. Notes on the Royal Army Medical Department
IN South Africa, 1901 — 2 602
8. Notes on the Army Ordnance Department in South
Africa 617
9. Notes on the Army Post Office Corps in South Africa 625
10. Notes on the Military Railway System in South
Africa 629
11. Notes on the Army Remount Department . . . 650 T2. Notes on the Refugee Concentration Camps in South
Africa, 1901 — 2 659
xii THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
NO. PAGE
13. Strength of the Garrison in South Africa on August
1ST, 1899, AND Reinforcements, etc., from Home and Colonies during the War up to May 31ST, 1902 . 671
14. Drafts, etc., despatched to South Africa during the
War, 1899 — 1902 675
15. Statement showing : —
(a.) Comparative Recruiting Figures of the Army and Militia prior to and during the War in South Africa 678
(b.) Recruiting Figures during the War of THE Imperial Yeomanry, Volunteers, South African Constabulary, etc. . . . . 679 i6. Casualties, Wastage, etc., in the Army in South
Africa during the War, up to May 31ST, 1902 . . 680
17. Statement of Casualties, by Corps, during the War
IN South Africa, 1899 — 1902 681
18. Expenditure incurred on Army Votes in consequence
of the War in South Africa 698
19. A List of Recipients of the Victoria Cross during the
War in South Africa, 1899 — 1902 .... 700
20. Statement of Boer Prisoners of War, showing how
disposed of . ....... 704
Monthly Comparative Statement for 1901 — 2,
Casualties in the Boer Forces .... 705
Summary, showing Decrease of Boer Forces . . 705
LIST OF MAPS AND SKETCHES. VOLUME IV.
No. 56. Eastern Transvaal.
No. 57. The Action of Bakenlaagte. October 30th. 1901.
No. 58. South Africa, showing lines of Blockhouses, Stationary Garrisons
and Posts, May, 1902. No. 59. Western Transvaal. No. 60. General Sir Ian Hamilton's " Drive " in the Western
Transvaal, May 6th — nth, 1902. No. 61. Plan of Railway Line. Illustrating System of Blockhouses, etc.,
generally adopted. No. 62. Plan of Road — Machadodorp and Lydenburg. Illustrating
System of Blockhouses, etc., generally adopted. No. 63. Cape Colony. No. 64. Orange River Colony.
MAPS TO VOLUME IV.
The general remarks on maps prefacing Volume I. are applicable also to the maps in this Volume. Maps Nos. 56, 59 and 64 have been compiled chiefly from the four-miles- to-one-inch sheets issued by the Topographical Section of the War Office previous to the war, and these again were prepared from the Government Farm Surveys of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Where the ground is not covered by that series, Jeppe's Map of the Transvaal has been used.
No. 57 is an enlargement made from some reconnaissance mapping done since the war.
Nos. 58 and 63 are compiled from ordinary published maps of South Africa revised in parts from special sketches made by officers.
No. 60 is from Jeppe's Map of the Transvaal.
Nos. 61 and 62 are from special sketches.
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
CHAPTER I.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL, DECEMBER, IQOO.*
At the moment of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' departure from the theatre of war, and of the assumption of the chief command by General Lord Kitchener, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., the Western Transvaal seemed very little disturbed except General by rumour. Of the combined Boer descent upon Cape the West. Colony nothing had materialised except De Wet's single- handed incursion between the Orange and Caledon rivers, where that daring leader was daily becoming more deeply involved in one of the most dangerous predicaments of his career, f Botha himself was not to be seen ; his foremost troops were supposed to have fallen back into the Pilands Berg. Liebenberg, near Ventersdorp, and De la Rey, known to be hovering between the Harts river and Wolmaranstad, seemed to be cut off alike from De Wet by distance, and from their Chief to the north by Lord Methuen's garrisons at Lichtenburg, Otto's Hoop, Zeerust, by Cunningham's at Rustenburg, by Douglas', Barton's, Hart's and Clements' along the Klerksdorp — Pretoria railway, and by the various columns which certain of these Generals despatched from both flanks to and fro across the Zwart Ruggens between Otto's Hoop and the Magaliesberg mountains. At the end of November, 1900, the western approaches to that range were being patrolled by Broadwood, whose nominal coad-
* See map No. 59. t See Volume HI., pages 494 and 495.
VOL. IV. I
2 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
jut or, Clements, was tied up in Krugersdorp ; Hart was operating in the Gatsrand. All these were under general command of Lieut. -General French, who had been placed in charge of the entire Johannesburg district,* which extended westward to Klerksdorp and southward to the Vaal river.
Yet though there was no sign of any considerable concentra- tion of hostile forces, there were several troublesome parties in the country beyond the Magaliesberg to the west of Rusten- burg. During November they had been kept moving by Broad- wood, and he was in constant touch with them as he fell back for orders behind Olifants Nek in the first week in December. Situation in On December ist the reported arrival of De la Key himself at the Magahes- yiakhoek in the midst of these bands gave their presence a fresh significance, and Clements was ordered northward from Krugersdorp to join Broad wood in clearing the neighbourhood, f Clements had already arranged to do this some days earlier ; but the constant depletion of his command whilst in Krugersdorp — some of his men and guns being lent to Hart in the Gatsrand, some sent to Potchefstroom, some chained to garrison duty in Krugersdorp during Hart's absence, and at the fortified com- munication post at Rietfontein, whilst Broadwood himself had possession of half of one of Clements' battalions — all this had so weakened Clements that he considered himself practically immobile, and on November 27th had informed Broadwood that any joint action must be postponed for the present. The Commander-in-Chief's orders of December ist found him in no better position ; nevertheless, they were peremptory, and on December 3rd Clements marched northward as far as Dwarsvlei with about 1,500 men and ten guns, J Broadwood arriving at
♦ See Volume III., Chapter XXI.
t Telegram No. K. 33, from Lord Kitchener to General Clements, December ist, 1900.
* Composition — ^Two hundred and forty-two men 2nd M.I., 211 men Kitchener's Horse, 199 men Imperial Yeomanry, P. battery R.H.A. (four guns), 8th battery R.F.A. (four guns), a 4.7-in. gun and a Vickers-Maxim, 38th company R.E. (twenty-four men), 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (560 men), 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (279 men).
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 3
Oorzaak, on the north side of OUfants Nek some thirty miles away, on the same date. On that very day, and almost mid- way between the two, the enemy struck a blow more unex- pected from its direction than its weight, though it was heavy enough.
At Rustenburg, it will be remembered, Cunningham had been stationed since the re-occupation of that town in October. He had some 2,000 officers and men in the place, too few to com- bine the guardianship of a large dep6t with field operations, especially at a post which might have to be evacuated at any time, yet numerous enough to require frequent convoys to keep them supplied. These convoys had been wont to travel along the Rustenburg — Pretoria road. It was so long since the enemy had been seen in this quarter that the track had come to be considered " as safe as Piccadilly."* To and fro throughout November the baggage trains had passed regularly without molestation, with escorts growing gradually weaker and vigilance relaxing ; yet the passage was long and difficult, unguarded westward of Commando Nek, and open to sudden forays from either side. Noting these things, and being in need of supplies himself, De la Rey kept watch upon the road from the southern side of the mountains, determined to seize the first opportunity for a coup. In the last week in November a convoy of more than 260 wagons, having discharged its load at Rustenburg, pro- ceeded eastward to refill. The journey was made in peace, and on December 2nd, the road being reported as safe as usual, the wagons once more headed westward for the return march. De la Rey saw his chance. Broadwood was still beyond the western arm of the mountains, kept there by the presence of the aforementioned patrols ; Clements lay inactive on garrison duty in Krugersdorp. Stealing into the gap between, De la Rey dashed across the range by Breedts Nek, and on the morning of the 3rd was in hiding with 800 men near Buffelspoort, flanking the track of the advancing convoy. This was marching in two equal divisions, the leading half escorted by twenty men of the
* Description by an officer. VOL. IV. I*
4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Victorian Mounted Rifles, two companies 2nd West Yorkshire regiment, twenty-one men ist King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, two guns 75th battery R.F.A., the whole under com- mand of Major J. G. Wolrige-Gordon (ist Argyll and Suther- land Highlanders). The rear portion, accompanied by twenty men of the Victorian Mounted Rifles and two companies Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was under Captain A. Patten (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders). The whole train covered some eight miles of road, so that with an escort of the strength and composition detailed it was practically defenceless through- out its length, whether the troops were kept concentrated at Loss of a one point or distributed in many. At 3 a.m. on December 3rd Declsrd.iooo. *^® convoy left its halting-place of the night before, near Wol- huter's Kop, and proceeded along the lower of the two tracks leading to Rustenburg, the more northerly and safer road having been rendered impracticable by a fortnight's fall of rain. Two hours later the foremost wagons were abreast of Buffelspoort, and here the scouts reported the presence of a hostile party close ahead. This was at once a surprise and a confirmation. The road had indeed been reported clear on all sides by every British authority, but a native headman, coming in to the bivouac at Wolhuter's Kop, had warned Wolrige-Gordon of De la Rey's passage of the Magaliesberg, adding, however, the misleading information that the Boer General had gone away to the north- ward, and had not returned. Immediately after the first dis- covery— too quickly to allow of the wagons being parked for defence — a hot fire-attack was delivered from the south of the road ; many of the draught oxen were shot, the native drivers and conductors fled, and the head of the convoy fell into instant disorder. In the few moments at his disposal the commander of the escort made prompt preparations for defence. On both sides of the track stood kopjes some 700 yards apart, that to the south of small dimensions, but 500 feet higher than the northern hill, which was longer and divided by a depression. Seizing the former with half a company of the West Yorkshire, Wolrige-Gordon posted half a company of the same battalion on the western end of the northern kopje, and the guns and the
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 5
handful of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry on the nek to the east, sending back at the same time to warn the second half of' the convoy, which was now some six miles in rear. It hap- pened that at this moment the leading half of the convoy was itself divided into two parts by the intervention of a spruit. In front of the second part of the train marched another company of the West Yorkshire, which was immediately pushed forward into the bed of the spruit, whilst the wagons were parked behind it. But the company itself was first in difficulties. Dense bush, which there was no time to clear, blinded the banks of the stream ; the enemy, crawling through the thickets, closed around in force, and, firing suddenly from point-blank range, shot down sixteen of the soldiers and made prisoners of the rest when their ammunition was exhausted. Before this Wolrige-Gordon, seeing the predicament of his rearguard, had signalled to Patten to bring up his men to the rescue from the rear division of the convoy. Patten, who had laagered his section of wagons at the first alarm, complied ; but on approaching the spruit under heavy fire he became aware that the Boers were turning his own flanks to get at his now unguarded wagons, and he pru- dently fell back to protect them, leaving the company in the spruit bed to its inevitable fate. Meanwhile the troops at the head of the convoy were being hard pressed. The dispositions, of necessity hurriedly made, were all in favour of the enemy. The higher hill on the south of the road, the key of the other, was held by but thirty-five non-commissioned officers and men ; they had no officer with them, and being directly between the main kopje and the enemy, who attacked from the south, had to bear the full brunt with no possibility of support by fire from their comrades behind, whose guns and rifles their posi- tion effectually masked. Nor was any assistance, except re- plenishment of ammunition, sent to them ; and at 3.30 p.m., after having lost but four killed and wounded, they surrendered to the enemy. This placed the main defences almost at the mercy of the captured crest. From it the Boers looked down into the hastily built sangars, and, firing fiercely into them, they began an enveloping movement which it was impossible
6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
to check. Towards 6 p.m., when the kopje was practically sur- rounded, the Boers rushed in to carry it, directing their greatest efforts against the artillery, which with its paltry escort and bushy surroundings seemed a certain prey. Then arose a combat which General De la Key himself, than whom there was not in the whole theatre of war a keener critic of close fighting, watched with admiration. Encircled by the enemy, the rapidly diminish- ing infantry shot back as fast as their nfegazines could be emptied and re-charged. The guns — finely commanded by Captain H. J. Farrell, R.A., an intrepid officer, who when many of his men were down armed the rest with rifles taken from the slain and laid the field-pieces himself — were run trail to trail, and with depressed muzzles shattered the front of the charge at only forty yards' distance with case shot and shrapnel fuzed to zero. The infantry around the guns showed equal valour. Of the twenty-one men of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who formed the escort, eleven fell ; but of the soldiers of this regiment it was to be known that so long as any remained aHve guns were safe in their keeping. The survivors rifled the pouches of the dead for cartridges with which to avenge them. But not only here did the troops fight with resolution ; over all the kopje the loss of half the defenders found the rest still resist- ing to the utmost, and when darkness fell the Boers had ex- hausted their spirit, if not their strength, for they were six to one. About 7.30 p.m. they ceased firing and fell back amongst the wagons on the encumbered road. There their booty was heavy enough to make amends for the failure to conquer the British detachment on the ridges above. One hundred and twenty-six wagons of supplies, much needed, especially by Broad wood, and 1,862 oxen were driven off or destroyed ; losses to the number- of 118* had been inflicted on the escort. Tactically, the results were that the Rustenburg communications were effectually severed, and Cunningham at that place and Broadwood at Olifants Nek were cut off alike from Pretoria and from Clements at Krugersdorp. But De la Rey, knowing how more prompt his
* Casualties— Killed, eighteen; wounded, forty-six ; prisoners, fifty-four.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. ;
opponents were to avenge than avoid a disaster, had no inten- tion of being caught with his practically beaten men between converging forces. Already troops were on the march from Rustenburg, more might be coming out of Pretoria, whilst Broad- wood, though he had not yet stirred, was certain to be on the scene shortly. Moreover, De la Rey had plans afoot which rendered him particularly anxious not to hazard his force. He therefore drew off, and a relieving detachment from Rustenburg* which at i a.m. on December 4th reinforced Wolrige-Gordon on the kopje, had nothing to do but to conduct the surviving troops and wagons to their destination, which was reached on the 7th. Broadwood had come up soon after the Rustenburg troops ; but no sooner had he arrived than he received insistent warning from Rustenburg that the Boers were now making for Ohfants Nek, with the intention of attacking that key to the western Magaliesberg. Accordingly Broadwood hurried back to Oorzaak, only to be met there on the 6th by a message from Clements, ordering him eastward to begin the pre-arranged co- operation. Clements by this time was upon the Magaliesberg Clements above Scheerpoort, and hearing only on the 5th of the capture MaJjaUesberg. of the convoy, he proposed marching westward along the moun- tain crests towards the scene of the disaster, and to meet Broad- wood. Once more Broadwood set out eastward, and on the 7th at Kromrivier, to the south of Buffelspoort, gained touch with Clements, who had advanced along the Berg to Doornhoek, in- tending to take the joint forces on towards Olifants Nek in search of the destroyers of the convoy. But Clements had now become aware of the real nature of those marauders. Not now had he to deal with the usual gangs of freebooters such as had formerly infested the Magaliesberg ; he was in the presence of a strong and aggressive force, led by one of the most able Generals of the federal armies. To search out and attack so formidable an opponent in unfavourable country with his own diminished and
* Strength — Detachment Victorian Mounted Rifles, two companies West Yorkshire regiment, and two guns, under Lieut. -Col. W. Fry, West Yorkshire regiment. This detachment had left Rustenburg at 3 p.m. on December 3rd.
8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
almost immobile column seemed to him the height of impru- dence. In any case he required reprovisioning, and concen- trating his troops at Nooitgedacht on December 8th, he sent a convoy to Rietfontein for the rations, and renewed his requests both to French and to Headquarters that the rest of his proper troops might be freed from their garrison duties in Krugers- dorp and despatched to reinforce him. French, not knowing where to find other guards for the important centre, refused, and so at first did Headquarters ; but in the meantime Hart returned to Krugersdorp from his expedition, and on the nth and 12th Clements, who was now stationary at Nooitgedacht, was told that his men had been ordered to proceed to him on the 13th. At this moment rumour, the will-of-the-wisp of troops in the field, spirited Broadwood from him just as he had at last got him to his side. First, Broadwood had on December nth moved across to Elandskraal, consequent on a report that Commando Nek was in danger of a raid from the north. Here he was still in close touch with Clements ; but he had halted for only a few hours when another alarm from the exactly opposite direction called him to horse again, Rustenburg once more warning him that Olifants Nek was about to be attacked from the west. Back to the Nek for the third time hurried the cavalry leader, nor could he well refrain, since to keep open the Rustenburg road was the chief of his duties in the Magalies- berg. Yet dire events were to hang largely on his departure, and what can be said of the system which allowed a brigade of cavalry to be thus abstracted from its column and led about a mountain range by the messages of friends and feintings of hostile patrols ? At this time, indeed, the whole military machinery in the Magaliesberg was out of gear, largely owing to a somewhat confused delimitation of areas of command. Clements, whilst at Krugersdorp, had been under French ; but that General's jurisdiction did not extend to the Magaliesberg, so that Broadwood had been always in a different sphere of command from his colleague, until Clements, having reached Nooitgedacht, became himself beyond the orders of an officer who yet retained command over the considerable portion of
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 9
his force which remained behind ; finally, as has been seen, Clements was unable to keep Broadwood near him for more than a few hours together. Thus doubly weakened, Clements' ^ column lay in the mountains during the second week of December, its continued isolation carefully noted by the scouts of a Boer commander whose manoeuvring had done much to produce it. For De la Key had now, with a skill worthy of all admiration, played the opening moves of a game as well conceived as any which had been undertaken by the federal tacticians, a game, moreover, which was to be for heavy stakes. Ever since the dchdcle at Komati Poort a cloud had hung over the Boer arms, casting a shadow all the darker because, though the disintegra- tion of Botha's commandos had its origin in the fine encounter at Bergendal, its final stages had lacked the glamour of severe fighting. Exhaustion and bewilderment had done more than The Boer combat to scatter the Boer forces, and an army which breaks up thus is harder to mend than one shattered by defeat in a pitched battle. Botha, sheltering unmolested in Pietersburg, had worked hard to piece together his dissevered armament ; and so well did he succeed that by the end of November he was ready with a scheme, which if it could not save the campaign, or even set it back greatly in favour of his side, would at least revive in his commandos the spirit of offence which was fast rotting. That it could do more than this the Commandant-General could scarcely hope, for he, almost alone amongst his compatriots, had an eye to measure the disaster which had overtaken his country. His plan was to fall upon the Johannesburg — Krugersdorp line, and to capture if possible one or both of these places, the first the mainspring of his enemy's existence in South Africa, the other the Mecca of his countrymen, where stood the monument sacred to all burghers slain by British and Zulus from 1836 to the triumph at Majuba Mountain forty-five years later. To approach this line was tactically easy by way of the Magaliesberg and the Witwatersrand, but all depended upon the strength of the British forces at those defensible ranges. All depended, too, upon the quality of the leadership, and Botha, looking about for men to conduct the enterprise, found one at his side and
10 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
another mthin easy call. At Pietersburg was General Beyers, an officer who had had need of all his great strength of character to overcome the unpopularity caused by his somewhat brusque supercession of the aged and beloved Grobelaar, the former commandant in those parts. The other was General De la Key, a leader who in his sombre intensity of purpose, his courage, and his high sense of honour, bore witness to the Huguenot blood which preserved in him a personality somewhat foreign and aloof from his compatriots. These two would undertake the operation. At the beginning of December the situation in the Magaliesberg was as favourable as it was ever likely to be. Paget, with his efficient scouting service, had been removed to the eastward too far to be able to keep watch on the road. The garrison at Rustenburg was practically immobile ; at Krugersdorp there was no sign of movement, except in the oppo- site direction. The only free troops in the Magaliesberg were those of Broadwood. Him it was very desirable to lure aside, and, as has been seen, De la Rey found little difficulty in doing so at will by demonstrating at the western arm of the Magalies- berg. So surely as he showed troops there was Broadwood called to the spot, a victim to the tactics which had placed a mountain range in the keeping of a brigade of cavalry. De la Rey had first tested his power in this manner on December 3rd, when, having drawn Broadwood away to Ohfants Nek, he had captured the convoy a few miles behind his back at Buffelspoort. He had then retired through Breedts Nek, which was unguarded by British troops, to Boschfontein, to await the coming of Beyers from the north, only falling back a little way to Zeekoehoek when Clements and Broadwood effected their brief and fruitless union at Kromrivier and Doomhoek.
On December 6th Beyers marched from Warm Bath with some 1,600 men of the Krugersdorp, Zoutpansberg and Water- berg commandos. Moving slowly at first — he was only at Boer Hamanskraal on the nth — a night march of sixty miles carried
in Uie"^*'°" him with a rush across the Rustenburg road and into touch with M^;aiiesb€rg. De la Rey. Plans were quickly made for an attack on Clements.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. il
That General had now lain for a week in the same camp at Nooitgedacht below the Magaliesberg ; every detail of his posi- tion was known, and they all seemed to favour an attack. Broadwood was away to the west ; the reinforcements from Knigersdorp had not yet started ; nothing was to be feared from Rustenburg, where the small garrison was shut up in strong entrenchments as became an isolated post with the enemy in strength in the field.
Clements, in truth, had done httle to discount the many dis- advantages under which he laboured. Of Beyers' approach, indeed, he knew nothing; but he was aware of De la Rey's presence at Zeekoehoek, and recent events were sufficient in- dication that the Boer was not there for sport. So little did Clements divine the true situation that, weak and isolated as he was, on the very day of Beyers' junction with De la Rey he telegraphed to Headquarters that his presence at Nooitgedacht prevented " any combination of Boers in south joining those in valley north of Magaliesberg."
This, had it been true, were enough and good reason for his long pause at Nooitgedacht ; but the General's supposition rested on no foundation. At Nooitgedacht he blocked no passage through the MagaHesberg ; the nearest, Breedts Nek, he knew to be at that very moment in the hands of a strong force of the enemy,* apparently ignored by the British, though it had been and was shortly to be again a gateway of the greatest value to De la Rey. At Nooitgedacht, in short, Clements hampered the movements of no one but himself, for he lay under the MagaUes- berg where they rose most sheer. His tactical position was as dangerous as his strategical. Where, at Nooitgedacht, a steep ravine indented the Magaliesberg, he had pitched his camp Clements' close against the mountain side, holding the crests of the cliffs ^*th°" high overhead with a line of piquets, whose chief duty was to Magaliesberg. maintain communication with Broadwood. These were found by four companies of the 2nd Northumberland FusiUers, which were disposed, two on the height east of the ravine, and two on
* Major-General Clements' report, evening of December I2th.
12 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
that to the west, which was more lofty than the other. The left front, where the crest receded and fell abruptly southward, was watched by a post of Legge's mounted infantry, whose camp lay close behind them on the western buttress of the ravine. South of this, on an isolated knoll called Green Hill, were forty men of Kitchener's Horse, their post protecting the camp from the south-west. Some kopjes which rose separately from the flat ground below the range, to the east and south-east of the camp, were held by men of the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light In- fantry. The defects of such an arrangement from the point of view of defence were many. The piquets on the mountain could neither be reinforced nor withdrawn quickly. So steeply fell the ground behind them that the ravine constituted the only line of approach or retreat, and the use even of this narrow and difficult way depended on the integrity of the heights on both sides. Should either fall, not only would the troops on that opposite be cut off, but the camp itself and the artillery within it would lie at the mercy of plunging rifle fire, from which escape would be difficult, for the only line of retreat ran across the flat and exposed ground skirting the foot of the heights. But there were even more serious internal faults in the position. Solid rock, crowning the mountain top, rendered entrenching impossible ; the ground in front of the crest either continued to rise gently or fell in rounded shoulders which hid the neighbouring hollows. The piquets, in short, could neither see nor shoot for any great distance, so that the only lines of observation and resistance were of little avail for either purpose. Finally, the eastern half of the piquets, invisible from the camp below, could only signal to Headquarters through the western section ; and both portions, though divided by the nature of the ground, were under a single commander. Against this not very formidable disposition De la Key and Beyers planned a triple attack, to be carried out by Beyers himself across the mountains against the piqueted British front ; by Commandant Badenhorst, from De la Key's contingent, against the camp itself, from under the foot of the range from the west ; by De la Key's main body from the south-west, whence he would threaten the line of retreat. A reconnaissance on the
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 13
previous day had pointed to the mountain tops being but
weakly held ; for the piquets, though they had detected the
investigation, had refrained from firing according to rule, though
on this occasion, perhaps, a smart fusilade might have inspired
a groundless respect for the strength of a front, the position of
which was already known to the enemy. At midnight on
December 12th Beyers ordered his men to saddle their almost
exhausted horses, and led them out towards the northern slopes
of the Magaliesberg. His plan of attack was simple and tactic- The Boer
ally perfect. The British piquets lay in a shallow line, their atfackupon
main body hundreds of feet below the cliff behind ; their left Clements.
flank, the key to the whole, in the air. This flank he intended to
roll up with the Waterbergers, whilst the Krugersdorpers engaged
the right, and the Zoutpansberg men, advancing up a central
depression which led up to the head of the rift between the
two portions of the position, would endeavour to cut the hostile
line in two. He himself accompanied the Waterbergers, both
because their task was the crux of his tactics, and because much
depended on making connection with Badenhorst on the lower
ground on the same flank. Guides from De la Key's force,
who knew the ground more intimately than the northerners,
accompanied each division. Before dawn on the 13th the
three commandos began to climb the slopes. The first blow
at the British, however, was not to come from them. At 3.40
a.m., Badenhorst, betrayed into too great haste by his easy
line of advance below the mountains, fell hotly but single-handed
upon the mounted infantry post to the west and south of
the piquet line. For a time he carried all before him. The The action at
mounted infantry, reinforced by a company which Legge D^.'?3^th^*^ *'
despatched to the front at the first shots, stood firmly with '900.
the bayonet against the determined rush of the Pretoria and
Krokodil River burghers ; but Badenhorst had nearly 400 men,
some of the posts were soon annihilated, and through the gaps
thus formed the enemy darted in until the whole spur was
practically in their hands. Their hold was as brief as the
fight for it had been. In a few minutes Legge was upon them
with every man from the mounted infantry camp ; and though
14 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
he himself fell in the forefront almost at once, his men, well handled by Colonel G. A. Cookson, and aided by two guns of P. battery R.H.A., under Lieut.-Colonel Sir Godfrey Thomas, and a Vickers-Maxim which was brought across at full speed from the main camp by General Clements in person, fairly wrested the ridge back from the Boers by hard fighting, and re-occupied it themselves, heavy losses occurring on both sides. Baden- horst was flung back westward ; not a shot had supported him from the crest ; he had struck too soon, and his opponent's impression that this had been but an ordinary attack on out- posts seemed to be confirmed. Badenhorst, however, had been premature by so few moments that his discomfiture points again the old moral how with the utmost care and calculation perfect co-operation by separated units in a night attack is practically impossible except by chance. Scarcely had the echo of his rifles died away when distant shots were heard coming from the extreme left of the Une of infantry piquets on the summit of the Magaliesberg. There the four companies of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, under Captain C. Yatman, were not only fully prepared for but expectant of an attack. Whilst standing to arms before dawn they had heard the firing during Badenhorst's abortive attempt ; the Boer reconnaissance of the day before, the movement of lights all night about their front, had given certain warning that a hostile body wis near, and every man was vigilant. The many precautions taken did not, unfortunately, include either a demand for reinforce- ments or the supply of a reserve of cartridges, of which there was only the normal field supply in the pouch of each soldier. An attempt to communicate with Broadwood, a matter of vital importance, was foiled by the haziness of the dawn. There was to be little opportunity to repeat it. At 4.25 a.m., quiet being restored in the camps below, the officer in command was about to dismiss his spare men from parade, when the enemy suddenly appeared in front of the extreme left of the piquet line, and advancing swiftly, speedily enveloped it, shooting rapidly the while. The troops fought well, but they were outnumbered and outflanked from the first. Group by group from the left
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 15
they were overwhelmed, the Boers steadily gaining both ground and prisoners as they worked eastward along the ridge towards the head of the rift behind the centre of the hne of piquets. For half an hour or more there was severe fighting along this, the left, section of the Northumberland Fusiliers ; but during all that time Yatman, though the rapidly swelling firing was plainly audible to him, knew nothing of the fate befalUng the key of the position, for being on the eastern and lower half of the ridge, much of the ground to his left was invisible. At the first outbreak of shooting his own attention had been at- tracted by a strong body of the enemy who came in sight for a moment upon a patch of green grass some 1,700 yards to his front. These were fired on by his men so long as they were visible ; but, riding forward, they were soon lost to view in the dead ground nearer the position, and for a time the two eastern companies had nothing to do but listen to the unaccountable uproar drawing momentarily nearer to their left flank. Whilst they stood, the Boers on their own front were making rapid and silent headway. They too heard with anxiety the heavy firing to the west, for all depended on success in that quarter. As, still unseen, they approached the crest they were given cheering evidence that matters had gone well on the right. Away from the back of the Waterbergers' position marched a band of a hundred British prisoners. A few moments later, about 6 a.m., Yatman's two companies found themselves under a warm fire from front and right and left fronts, and worse, soon from left and left rear, for the Waterbergers, having swept away the British left, had worked eastward along the ridge as far as the dividing rift, from the edge of which they commanded the remaining defenders in flank and reverse. Yatman's position was doubly lost ; for even without this turning of his flank, the frontal attack which he had now to meet was many times heavier than his men could bear. The Boers, safe in their superior numbers, disdained all cover and advanced like veteran infantry, adopting as their formation that enclosing horn which at the price of many a devastated laager they had learned from the Zulu impis. The Northumberland Fusiliers faced in all
i6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
directions and strove desperately to keep off the swarm of rifle- men ; but they had no cover from such a ring of bullets, and soon were without bullets themselves, for their furious firing all but emptied their pouches. At 6.45 a.m. came the in- evitable end ; when only some score out of the original 150 soldiers remained effective, the officer in command ordered the white flag to be hoisted to save the lives of the rest. About that time Clements returned to camp, from which he had been absent since Badenhorst's attack on the western piquets. He had heard the shooting on the Magaliesberg, and riding towards the front to investigate the cause, had himself come under fire ; but it was not until, puzzled, he sought information in camp that he learned that the summit was in the hands of the Boers. Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. C. Lambton, the commanding officer of the Northumberland Fusiliers, who had been left in charge of camp, had earlier inkling of the situation. Reinforcements and ammunition mules which he had sent to close the lower end of the ravine had instead gone to the top; but had been un- able to reach the piquets. The Fife and Devon Yeomanry lost half their numbers as they attempted to emerge from the head of the kloof, whilst a half company of the King's Own York- shire Light Infantry, who climbed the precipice by a goat track in single file, were shot down man by man until their officer withdrew the survivors. Then a last signal message had come down from the mountain to the effect that the enemy was within 300 yards of the piquets, which were cut off. In a few moments the worst fears were confirmed by a warm plunging fire from the crest beginning to beat at medium range upon the defenceless camp. Now in one instant every vice of his position came home to Clements. With the loss of his piquets his lines of observation and resistance had disappeared together. He had lost all chance of communicating with Broadwood ; he had lost one half of his force, and it seemed as though nothing could save the other half from as summary a fate, so totally exposed was it to an unanswerable fire from high overhead. But Clements' skill was only awakened by a situation which would have confused or appalled a weaker soldier. The camp, which
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 17
was becoming mixed under the searching fire, was quickly brought to order by his cool and rapid commands. Leaving the guns to bombard the crest of the Magaliesberg, he ordered the transport, hospitals, etc., to make for a hill, called Yeomanry Hill, to the south-east, where he intended to gather his troops and make a stand. The artillery in the main camp at this moment con- sisted of the 8th battery R.F.A. (four guns), under Major H. Chance, and a 4.7-in. gun Eastern Division R.G.A., under Major N. B. Inglefield. The four guns of the R.H.A. were with the mounted infantry on the other side of the ravine, two being in the camp there, and two in the piquet Une, where they had gone to assist in the repulse of Badenhorst. All were completely exposed, and the gunners and teams suffered heavily ; but, covered by a united fire, Clements gradually evacuated his camps in spite of inconceivable difficulties caused by the de- struction and terror amongst his draught animals and the flight of most of the native drivers. Nearly two hours elapsed before the wagons could be got to move, and during that time nothing but the admirable practice of the guns kept the enemy from pouring down the mountain side. The danger of the situation reached its cUmax when it became the turn of the artillery to retire. Referring first to P. battery R.H.A. , on the west side of the ravine, Lieut. -Colonel Sir G. Thomas, seeing the stir of retreat in the main camp, and finding that the enemy was gradually closing upon his two guns in the piquet line, sent them back by a circuitous track which he had fortunately discovered and investigated during the week's halt at Nooitgedacht. This track was somewhat protected ; for on the knoll which marked the south-western extremity of the destroyed piquet Une, Kitchener's Horse were still holding on, though the advance of De la Rey from the south-west was threatening to make their position untenable. Both guns, after coming into action again on an intermediate position, retired in safety on the main body. After their departure Sir G. Thomas hurried back to the other two guns in the mounted infantry camp close behind. He found the officer whom he had left in charge wounded ; one gun was being vigorously fought by a sergeant, the other stood silent
VOL. IV. 2
i8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
and deserted, all its gunners out of action, its last round ex pended. The teams of neither piece were to be seen, for they were sheltering in two separated kraals in rear ; but when found they were brought up into a clump of scrub as near to the guns as the hot lire permitted. Then, by dint of crawling on the ground, Sir G. Thomas and a few volunteers contrived to make fast the ends of eighty-foot ropes to the trails, the pieces were hauled into the bush, and were driven off under the very eyes of the enemy. A little later the whole battery came into action again from near Yeomanry Hill. At the main camp, the 8th battery R.F.A., which had been firing heavily from a knoll close behind the tents of Clements' Headquarters, fell back with little difficulty by the direct route to Yeomanry Hill. There remained only the 4.7-in., and the fate of this ponderous cannon seemed certain. It stood on rising ground towards the north of the camp, in an emplacement which had at first been surrounded by scrub and brushwood. To gain a field of fire this, however, had been cleared away on all sides except the northerly, where it still grew so high and dense as to screen the weapon from view of the crest of the Magaliesberg. To this fortunate circumstance, which emphasised once more how little the mountains had been con- sidered the true front of the position, the 4.7-in. owed its rescue. The Boers were beginning to come down from the hills, from which a fierce fire continued ; the troops had departed, and but for his detachment and escort Inglefield was almost alone. His team of bullocks, which he had inspanned at the first alarm, had stampeded, and their drivers were not to be seen. To extricate so large and heavy a target seemed a forlorn hope ; but after half an hour's search Inglefield collected nine bullocks, seven less than the proper team. To drive these up to the em- placement was impossible, so hot was the fire. The gun had to be dragged to them, and after one failure the five tons of metal began to move over the rough ground. The stirring of the weapon from the bushes betrayed to the Boers how great a prize was slipping from their grasp. Every rifle was levelled at the spot, and two of the detachment were wounded. But the gun, now travelling fast downhill, rolled on beyond reach; more
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 19
bullocks were found and yoked in, and soon Inglefield, from Yeomanry Hill, was bursting shell over the very spot whence he had so narrowly escaped, for he had barely got clear when the whole camp was in the hands of the Boers.
Scarcely had Clements concentrated the remnants of his force, some 350 rifles in all, upon Yeomanry Hill, when fresh misfortune befell him. De la Key's advance from the south- west had been unexpectedly tardy, largely owing to the firm stand of Kitchener's Horse on Green Hill ; but now he too began to draw near, and opening fire with his artillery, made as if to surround Yeomanry Hill. His two guns were quickly silenced ; but not before they had almost completed the ruin of the column, for the shells, falling amongst the already terrified transport animals, sent the whole baggage-train careering in panic towards Rietfontein to the south. Bands of Boers had already been seen in that direction, others were coming in from east and west ; the wagons were rushing straight into the arms of the enemy. Clements had always been famous as a horse- man ; his skill in the saddle was now to stand him and his troops in good stead. Galloping with a few others at full sp)eed after the receding mob, he succeeded in heading and turning them back, a feat the difficulty of which only veteran stockriders can appreciate. So narrow was the margin of safety that his own aide-de-camp, who accompanied him, rode into the enemy in the course of the chase, and was taken prisoner. This disaster averted, Clements had now to face the multitude of dangers by which he was confronted, nay surrounded, for by this time the Boers were on all sides of Yeomanry Hill. Shortly before the stampede of the transport he had received a message from the Intelligence Department warning him of Beyers' march from Warm Bath with 2,000 men. The information, coming cir- cuitously from Rustenburg through Paget far to the east, was late indeed ; half his infantry were already prisoners to that very Boer leader ; but it was not without value, for it con- firmed Clements in the knowledge of the great superiority of the forces which had fallen upon him. He had previously de- termined to entrench and fight to the last at Yeomanry Hill ;
VOL. IV. 2*
20
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Clements retreats.
but having lost nearly 640 men,* the warning of the numbers surrounding him rendered this too desperate a resource, and he now watched narrowly for a chance of withdrawing. For a brief moment such a chance was given. Wearied by their night's marching and the long fighting of the morning, which had cost them about one hundred men, the Boers paused in their advance. To the indignation of their officers, they hngered in the de- serted British camps, looting freely, and little encouraged to advance by the shells from the batteries on Yeomanry Hill. Their bands on flank and rear were not yet formidable. Clements saw his opportunity and that it must be seized instantly or not at all. At 2.30 p.m. he gave the order to retire, and setting out three quarters of an hour later, the column marched almost un- molested, and with fine discipline, through the night, arriving at Rietfontein at 4.30 a.m. on December 14th. Clements' action at Nooitgedacht will long be remembered, but rather for his triumph over almost incalculable misfortunes than for the errors which led to them. The disaster, indeed, ought never to have been incurred ; but having occurred, it should by the laws of tactics and topography have been final, so deeply had the troops been compromised. That it was not fatal was due to the presence of a commander able to collect a broken force and lead it out from the very midst of ten times its numbers, f
At Rietfontein Clements found reinforcements enough. During December 14th his own men, released at last from Krugersdorp, marched in, nearly a thousand strong, comprising
• Summary of Casualties, December 13TH, 1900.
|
Ranks. |
Killed. |
Wounded. |
Prisoners and Missing. |
Total. |
Remarks. |
|
Officers Other ranks ... |
9 65 |
*7 ti79 |
13 355 |
29 609 |
»i died of wounds. ti3 died of wounds. |
|
Totals . . . |
74 |
186 |
368 |
638 |
t For gallantry at this action Sergeant D. Farmer, ist battalion Cameron High- landers, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL. 21
the ist Border regiment, 200 mounted infantry, and two guns of the 8th battery R.F.A. Here, too, he was joined by Brigadier- General E. A. H. Alderson with 800 mounted men and J. bat- tery R.H.A. Nevertheless a critical moment had arrived, not so much for Clements as for the whole balance of the campaign in this area. The Magaliesberg were now in the hands of the Results of the enemy, for Broadwood and Rustenburg were for the moment NSgedacht. negligible quantities, and even in extreme danger. And these mountains were the key to the Western Transvaal, indeed to the whole theatre of war, so closely did they command the most vital parts of the country. The briefest pause might confirm the Boers in possession of the range, and Lord Kitchener saw that no time was to be lost in wresting it back. Appointing French to command the whole zone, he directed him to use all the troops for the clearance of the district, at the same time bringing a brigade of cavalry across from Heidelberg to the Krugersdorp line, and summoning Paget westward towards Hamanskraal. Within three days of the repulse at Nooitgedacht the columns took the offensive to regain the lost advantage.
December i6th, Dingaan's Day, ♦found French busily gather- ing troops into the town in which the Boers had vowed to celebrate the festival. But the place was in little danger ; once more the enemy showed his incapacity to follow up a stroke or maintain a brisk offensive. The collaboration of Beyers and De la Rey failed just when it might have been fruit- ful, and Nooitgedacht, the first of their united efforts, was also their last. French at Krugersdorp and Clements at Riet- fontein concentrated their units with little hindrance, and on the 19th joined forces at Thorndale in the Hekpoort valley. The enemy was there in strength ; but Nooitgedacht seemed to have exhausted his courage as well as his energy ; a very brief encounter sufficed to sen4 2,000 Boers " in a panic-stricken rout "f northward, through Breedts Nek, losing some fifty as
* An annual festival of the Boer States, commemorative of the defeat of the Zulus under Dingaan by Pretorius on Sunday, December i6th, 1838.
t Lieut. -General French's telegram, December 20th, 1900.
22
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
they ran. These were De la Rey's men, and leaving Clements to deal with them, French sent Gordon westward down the French clears Hckpoort Valley, driving Beyers before him towards Broadwood, suuation. ^^^^ ^^^ been summoned southward to co-operate. Having thus effectually cut up the Boer combination, French returned to Krugersdorp, and thence to Johannesburg, where he organised a force for the complete clearance of the disturbed sub-district. The immediate danger to be met was a descent upon Potchef- stroom by Beyers, who appeared to be circling southward on finding himself pursued by Gordon and headed by Broadwood. To keep him off the Potchefstroom — Johannesburg railway French decided to estabUsh a centre at Ventersdorp, which was easily occupied on December 28th.
By the last day of December French had drawn a line of columns from Ohfants Nek through Ventersdorp to Klerks- dorp, thus denying to the enemy all the vital tract to the east- ward, whilst Clements and Alderson in the Magaliesberg acted as a similar guard against incursion from the north. Thus, the stir in this region abated, the year closed less anxiously than had seemed probable, for undoubtedly the Boer arms had for a few hours pointed near to the heart of the British occupation of the country.
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in foregoing chapter.
|
« |
bow |
||||
|
§* |
.ss •a-5 |
CO a 9 |
|||
|
COLUMN. |
•0 V a 1 |
1 a |
9 cS .9 ' |
0 a 1 |
|
|
December, 1900. |
|||||
|
Maj.-Gen. R. A. P. Cle- |
|||||
|
ments |
6S2 |
863 |
10 |
2 |
|
|
Brig.-Gen. R. G.Broadwood |
444 |
344 |
7 |
2 |
|
|
Brig.-Gen. E. A. H. Aider- |
|||||
|
son |
800 |
~ |
4 |
23
CHAPTER II.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL.* DECEMBER 1ST, I9OO — JANUARY 3OTH, IQOI.
Following on Paget's engagement at Rhenoster Kop,t the situation on
month of December witnessed much, if somewhat unproductive ^y raih?^.
activity along the eastern Une. On the ist Payne's, and on
the 3rd Carleton's and Macbean's columns returned to their
bases at Middelburg and Belfast, having neither inflicted nor
suffered any but trifling losses. The outgoings included an
expedition by Barker from Balmoral on the 3rd, and another
under W. P. Campbell (ist K. R. Rifles) on the 7th, the latter
being designed generally for co-operation with Paget, and
specifically to close the Waterval Drift (Wilge river) to any
Boers who might fall southward away from Paget's force. A
week had, however, elapsed since Viljoen's retirement, and in
any case that leader's command had withdrawn in good order,
not south, but north to the Botha's Berg. Campbell, therefore,
met but few opponents ; and after communicating with Paget
on the loth — only then to be apprised of the direction of the
enemy's retreat — he returned to Middelburg on the 12th, Paget
remaining entrenched about Rhenoster Kop. Troops, indeed,
could ill be spared from a line of communication, which, even
in their presence, appeared almost at the mercy of the enemy.
On the 5th, 6th, 8th, J 20th, 24th and 26th,§ attacks were made
* See map No. 56.
t See Volume III., page 450.
t Casualties — Two men killed and five wounded, one officer and thirteen men taken prisoners. Near Barberton.
§ British casualties — One man killed, one officer and four men wounded. Boer casualties — One killed, seven woimded. At Pan.
24 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
on trains, rail or fortified posts, causing occasional loss of each. The series culminated on the 29th in a memorable onslaught.
Towards the end of December, General B. Viljoen removed his laager from the Botha's Berg to Windhoek in the Sten- kamps Berg. Since leaving Rhenoster Kop his command had been nearly doubled by the addition of the Lydenburg and Middelburg commandos ; and Viljoen, eager to use his strength, ooked for the weakest hnk in the chains of British posts which traversed the district. Nor was his choice easy : there were many posts ; none escaped the scrutiny of his scouts, and few were numerically formidable, though all were sufficiently en- trenched to demand an assault to bring them down. But in Viljoen the too elastic tactics of his countrymen were braced by a soldierly confidence in the timely use of weight of men as well as of lead ; and of all the federal leaders none would have made better use than he of the steel which was missing from the equipment of his burghers. And so much more powerful is leadership than training with natural soldiers like the burghers, that, as will more than once be seen, the very presence of such a man at the head of commandos sufficed to convert them from evasive guerillas into daring and determined regiments, not afraid of close combat, though without the only proper weapon for such work. Viljoen's men, too, were in high feather from other causes. The affair at Rhenoster Kop, whether victory or rebuff, mattered little compared with cheering events outside, which, now some months old, must have worked far in their favour. In November Viljoen had received information, the egregious source of which, as is usual with good news in the field, was disregarded in the delight of the message. At a conference held at Paris, so ran the telegram, England had begged in vain of the Powers six months in which to attempt to finish the war. The German Consul at Pretoria had received instructions from BerUn to remain accredited, not to the British, but the Republican Government. As for France, she was ready to land troops in England at any moment. The Czar of Russia had received the Boer delegates at St. Petersburg as represen- tatives of a friendly State. The Belgian monarchy was pre-
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 25
paring to do the same. In America the hoped-for election of Mr. Bryan to the Presidency wais assured. Internally the cause of Britain was in even greater straits. Australia, India, Canada and Cape Colony were clamouring for the return of their con- tingents. Two thousand five hundred loyalist troops in Cape Colony had already broken with the army, had been disbanded and their arms burnt.* Such documents, the excreta of warfare, would not be worth recording, were they not in this case actual weapons of war in the hands of the leaders of an immured and gullible people. In the field all armies credit fair prophecies as blindly as men in the desert press on for cascades suspended in the far-off air. None were even more prone to feed on myths, or were more lavishly fed, than the Boers ; and it is as difficult to measure the stimulant thus derived as to determine its morality. With his burghers in this spirit Viljoen cast about to do damage, and he soon selected Helvetia for his first blow.
This post — originally dropped, it will be remembered, by Sir R. Buller in September, as the first link of his communications with Lydenburg — was held by a mixed force of 344 officers and men with a 4.7-in. gun, under Major S. L. Cotton (King's Liverpool regiment). It consisted of four separate kopjes aligned east and west, of which the outside two, called respect- ively King's Kopje and Gun Hill, were somewhat distant from those in the centre, i.e.. South Hill and Middle Hill. All were defended by closed works and by barbed wire entangle- ments. In front (north) of the centre kopjes a camp was pitched for the troops of the detachment not on outpost duty. The nearest adjacent posts were at Zwartkoppies, some three miles to the north-east, at Machadodorp, the same distance to the south, and at Waterval Boven, four miles to the south-east. Well situated and defended, and adequately garrisoned, the place seemed strong enough for all contingencies ; appearing especially inaccessible to the enemy on its eastern and southern sides, since these were practically surrounded by neighbouring
* Telegram from Superintendent of Telegraphs, Ermelo, to General Viljoen, November 2nd, 1900, embodying the report of a German doctor recently released from the British lines.
26 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
garrisons. The configuration and garrison of the post were well known to Viljoen, and since it was probably most alert towards the north and west he decided to assail it from the south and east.
Leaving Windhoek on the night of December 28th with some 580 men, he marched through Dullstroom and across the Crocodile, upon the left bank of which he paused to arrange the attack. Against a place so ringed in by friendly camps as Helvetia, Viljoen had to provide as much for the safety of his command as its success. But the very audacity of his plan of attack relieved him of the necessity of detaching largely in order The attack on to fend off reinforcements from adjacent garrisons. Insinuating DeJ^db, ^s whole force between Helvetia and its neighbours, he ordered 1900. two field-cornetcies (120 men) to attack Zwartkoppies simul-
taneously with his own descent on Helvetia, whilst the main body (350 men), encircling the eastern extremity of the line of kopjes, would both deliver the assault and keep off any assistance coming from Water val Boven. A third body of about 100 men, chiefly composed of State artillerists, serving as mounted riflemen since the loss of their guns, would act at once as a reserve and as scouts towards Machadodorp and Belfast. Viljoen fixed 3.30 a.m., December 29th, as the hour of attack.
A thick fog descending about 2 a.m. aided the main body to take up its positions undetected, but the eastern detachment lost its way, and failed to find Zwartkoppies. Nevertheless, at the appointed time, Viljoen, who had been apprised of this mischance, gave the word, and his men, discharging a burst of musketry, ran in upon the kopjes. Gun Hill, the nearest, fell at once ; and with it the 4.7-in. gun upon it and its twenty-one attendant artillerymen passed into the hands of the enemy. This, the first blow, was tactically and morally the worst for the defence ; for Gun Hill commanded the other knolls, whilst the officer in command of Middle and South Hills, deprived of judg- ment by a severe wound in the head, thought nothing worth saving when the gun was lost, and ordered a surrender. Thus, only the isolated King's Kopje remained, and there the defenders, a half company (sixty-five men) of the Liverpool regiment,
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 27
under Lieutenant F. A. Wilkinson, knowing nothing of the capture of the cannon, resisted so stoutly that no effort of the enemy could reduce them. The value of this handful's tenacity appeared when at daybreak the Boers proceeded to remove their trophy and the prisoners, who numbered 235, from Gun Hill. This they began to do by way of the track running westward close below Helvetia Kopjes, and away from Zwartkoppies, which was now thoroughly alert and had brought two guns into action. But the undiminished shooting of Wilkinson's detachment effectually denied the route, and the captors of the gun, com- pelled to make a detour to the northward, came under the shrapnel from Zwartkoppies, which not only did execution, but forced them to abandon the only wagon-load of 4.7 pro- jectiles, and another containing the rifles of the prisoners of war.* Viljoen then made off with his cortege towards DuU- stroom, soon releasing the prisoners, but retaining the gun, which was now nothing but an unwieldy trophy, for the loss of its store of ammimition had rendered it useless.
The news of the surrender of Helvetia sent a thrill through the British army such as had not stirred it since the sombre affair at Nicholson's Nek ; but its effect proved actually detri- mental to the enemy. There is no better touchstone of the quality of troops who have been long in the field than their attitude after disaster, an indication by no means trustworthy with fresh and inexperienced soldiers. Over the theatre of war were scattered a multitude of posts similar to Helvetia, and Uable momentarily to a like trial ; and in them there served no officer or soldier who did not look again to his defences, his vigilance, and his resolution, and promise himself that such a test would not find him so easy a victim.
If on the other Une of communication in the Eastern Trans- vaal— i.e., the railway from Johannesburg through Standerton into Natal — no event had transpired of such importance as that at Helvetia, the troops thereon were incessantly employed
• Casualties — Killed, eleven men ; wounded, one officer and twenty-eight men ;
prisoners, four officers and 231 men.
28 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
throughout December, and any departure from the fortified line entailed fighting or skirmishing with hostile bands. But though from Heidelberg down to Zandspruit there was scarcely a patrol or an outpost which did not exchange shots with the enemy, the absence of any notable Boer leader in these parts enabled much to be done in the way of clearance of crops and supplies from the country-sides adjacent to the railway, Especi- Events on the ally was this the case in the northern district, where the Boers, Nat^"^^^"'^" though bolder and more numerous than in the south, were kept railway. on the move by the constant peregrinations of Lieut. -Colonel
A. E. W. Colville's mobile column of about 1,400 men of all arms, with eight guns, which was usually based on Greylingstad. Trains, the easiest prey of guerillas, were more than once inter- cepted, resulting on one occasion (December 9th, at Vlaklaagte) in the loss of 124 horses ; but not until the end of the month did the Boers seriously take the initiative. On December 24th a foraging party from Eden's Kop, near Heidelberg, was roughly handled by a band of 100 with a Vickers-Maxim, losing sixteen out of the 150 men of the 2nd Devonshire regiment who were engaged. Two days later Colville's column was itself heavily attacked twelve miles to the west of Greylingstad. Colville's constant depredations amongst the farm-borne stock and supplies, upon which the enemy depended for subsistence, had greatly exasperated the local commandos under Buys and Trichard. The clearance of Rietvlei, south of Vlakfontein, on December 24th, had already been more strongly opposed than usual*, and when, two days later, Colville, turning south- ward, undertook Roodewal, the Boers were ready with a trap, which they all but closed upon the column. Having cleared one farm, not without considerable opposition, Colville moved forward to another, leaving the baggage, guarded by 150 men of the Rifle Brigade under Captain C. E. Radclyffe, with a Vickers-Maxim, some distance in rear. As the column advanced, continually engaged in front, it was reported to Colville that a body of the enemy had worked around his flanks and was closing
* Casualties — Killed, one man ; wounded, two men.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 29
in upon the baggage. He therefore ordered a retirement, which was begun at about 1.15 p.m., the Boers following too closely for much speed to be made. Before the column could come within reach, the blow which it was hurrying to avert, fell. Surrounding the transport, the enemy opened a furious fire upon the parked wagons, and were with difficulty kept off by the escort, until Radclyffe, having got the oxen inspanned, moved the train off towards the approaching column. The Boers pressed hard, the Vickers-Maxim narrowly escaped capture, and Radclyffe, as the only means of saving his charge, dehvered a dashing and successful counter-attack, with very inferior numbers, which gained him a covering position 800 yards in front of the wagons. Here he was reinforced by artillery and by a company of infantry which Colville had sent in mule- wagons from his own force. The baggage was thus enabled to draw off in safety, but at a cost to the rearguard of fifty-seven casualties, including Radclyffe himself, wounded. The majority of the losses arose from the annihilation of a detached half company, which was surrounded and decimated, and forced to capitulate after firing the last cartridge. Altogether, the day's losses amounted to eighty-one*, out of a total of ninety sustained by the column during the whole month of December.
Meanwhile the troops of the Natal command had been kept Signs and uneasy by sporadic fighting, not, indeed, within the colony itself invasion of but in the south-east angle of the Transvaal, which marched Na^ai. with the frontier. Persistent rumours of a hostile concentration on a large scale for the invasion of Natal were afoot, and seemed to be warranted by the numbers and aggressions of the enemy, who appeared to be aiming at bases for an important movement in these parts. Thus, Wakkerstroom, Utrecht and Vryheid were centres around which revolved continually bands which were evidently anxious to test the strength of the defences. A half-hearted and easily repelled inquiry at the Vryheid outposts on December ist was followed by a sharp skirmish outside
* Casualties — Killed, eleven men ; wounded, ihree officers, forty-seven men ; prisoners, twenty men.
30 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Utrecht on the next day,* and that by a brief but warm bom- bardment of the Wakkerstroom lines on the 6th, when in one hour two Boer guns sent a hundred shells against the entrench- Attackon ments. Then on the nth Vryheid, despite these warnings, was D^^oth— surprised by night and all but lost. The defences there were nth, 1900. as singular from their strength as their configuration. North of the village rose a high, steep hill, named Lancaster Hill, upon the flat top of which was pitched the camp of the half battahon 2nd Royal Lancaster regiment who defended it. The rim of the summit, which was roughly square, was armed at the four comers with natural bastions formed by projections of the almost precipitous faces, and upon the north-westerly and south- easterly of these, 12-pr. guns were strongly emplaced, the infantry lining the others and the " curtains " between. Five hundred feet below the sheer western side of Lancaster Hill an oval fiat, called Mounted Infantrj^ Plateau, projected like the low forecastle of a turret ship, and on this were the camp and outposts of a company of the 5th division mounted infantry, from which one small advanced post, under an officer, was thrown out upon the Utrecht road, 2,200 yards to the north of the mounted infantry encampment, and another midway between this and the north gun on Lancaster Hill. Sentries were numerous and well posted, their supports strongly entrenched. The distance of the mounted infantry camp from the infantry supports, the isolation of the weak posts at night, the presence of tents so close to the piquets, and the fact that both the officers and visiting non-commissioned officers slept in them, the exposed position of the horse Unes, were nevertheless defects which were soon to be all discovered in turn.
At 2 a.m. on the morning of December nth, the Boers gathered around Vryheid in numbers over a thousand strong. The detached post to the northward fell into their hands at once, not a warning sound reaching the camp behind. They then moved on against the plateau, rushed the line of sentries from
* British casualties — Killed, two men ; wounded, one officer and four men ; missing, three men. Boer casualties — Killed, six men ; wounded, ten men ; prisoner, one man.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 31
end to end, and breaking into the lines, stampeded all the horses, and used the very rows of saddles on the ground as cover from which to pour a fire which threw the whole mounted infantry camp into confusion. The troops made every effort to recover possession. Time after time knots of men, hastily rallied by the officers, charged, and engaging the enemy hand to hand with bayonets and clubbed rifles, drove them out temporarily. But the attackers were in overpowering strength, and the mounted infantrymen had either to fall back or to be demohshed. The Boers then closed around Lancaster Hill, collecting thickest below the gun emplacements on its opposite sides. There the garrison was ready, and denied any further advance with a girdle of musketry. An attempt to rush the northern gun at 3.30 a.m. was trapped within fifty yards of the crest by a barbed wire entanglement ; the southern gun, its muzzle depressed to the utmost, defended itself by sweeping the steep hillside. At 4 a.m. Lieut. -Colonel J. M. Gawne (2nd Royal Lancaster regiment), the officer in command and District Commissioner at Vryheid, led a half company up from the village, where he was in residence, towards the scene of the fighting. High up the track he came upon a knot of mounted infantry, whom two young officers had collected and posted to keep the enemy from descending into Vryheid. The reinforcement, hotly assailed at close range, could get no further, Gawne himself being mortally wounded as he attempted to cUmb higher ; but its presence here still further safeguarded the town. Thus the attack was everywhere held in check, and the Boers, relinquishing all further attempts at assault, settled down under cover to an aimed musketry, which lasted without intermission throughout the day. At 7.30 p.m., when Lancaster Hill had shown itself the master, and retire- ment was covered by dusk, they made off. The day's fighting had cost the garrison fifty-eight officers and men, and nearly all the horses.
Lieut. -General H. J. T. Hildyard lost no time in despatching troops to the eastward. Colonel C. J. Blomfield (commanding at Dundee) taking a column of all arms across De Jager's Drift on the I2th, in co-operation with a mounted force under Lieut.-
32 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Colonel H. De la P. Gough, which hurried out from Nqutu. Though the actual attackers of Vryheid had vanished north- ward, Blomfield and Gough on the 14th encountered on the Schurwe Berg, to the west of that place, a strong body which they all but succeeded in catching between them, the enemy losing heavily as he galloi)ed for safety under a searching shrapnel from the 69th battery R.F.A.* On the same day, a small column, under Major-General J. Talbot Coke, marched to Wakkerstroom. On the i6th Blomfield, warned at Vryheid that Utrecht was threatened, reconnoitred vigorously in that direction, driving the enemy over the Kambula Mountain with no loss to himself, and securing stock which brought his total captures during the two days' fighting up to nearly 10,000 head. Thereafter, nothing noteworthy occurred until December 26th, when reiterated reports of an attempt to be made on Utrecht were justified to the full.
Never in the whole coui-se of the campaign had a British force been fore-armed with more ample information of an im- pending attack. There was not only a fantastic epistle from a Russian officer, who on the 24th wrote demanding supplies from the District Commissioner under menace of a descent which was actually to be made at the time threatened, but the Boers themselves seemed to have thrown to the winds their accustomed secrecy, for there were reports of speeches by their leaders promising them Utrecht in compensation for Vryheid, There was so much prophecy, indeed, that it rendered the possi- bility of an actual attack almost incredible in a campaign where it had become an axiom that the expected did not happen. Attack on Nevertheless, it was duly deUvered, and the commander at Dec^^^zSth— Utrecht, profiting by his unusual good fortune, had made all 26th, 1900. ready to receive it. The force available consisted of six com- panies of infantry drawn from the ist and 2nd York and Lancaster, the 2nd Royal Lancaster, and 2nd Middlesex regi- ments, of which two companies lay in the town, one on a hill to the east, and three, with a 12-pr. gun, two Maxims, and sixty
♦ Casualties — Two killed, four missing.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 33
mounted infantrymen, on another hill to the northward, the whole under command of Major A. J. Chapman (Royal Dublin Fusiliers). To deceive the many eyes which he knew were directed on his defences, that officer practised an artifice which can never fail to mystify the most wary of adversaries. Posting his men towards evening, but in full light, as if in their defences for the night, he would transfer them as soon as it was dark to completely different positions, so that hostile scouts and spies were alike baffled to report their true situations. Remembering Vryheid, Chapman furthermore emptied his tents and manned his trenches by night, giving the troops rest in the daytime ; he also removed his horses from their lines into a sheltered donga.
Against this well-prepared post the Boers advanced on Christmas night, and at 2 a.m. attacked it on every side. On the side of the town a band, shouting a battle cry of " Utrecht ! Utrecht ! " poured a violent fusilade against the untenanted camp and its entrenchments. Encouraged by the silence, they then rushed through both, only to be disconcerted first by the deserted state of the defences, and next by an unmistakable summons to halt from the rifles of the inner line. Here, then, a heavy interchange of lead began to stream from and to the town, the inhabitants of which, by a pre-arranged plan, had at once sought safety in the church. Meanwhile, a determined onslaught was being made upon the hill to the west. This was a kopje so broken and precipitous that it could be defended only in parts where there was room for half a dozen men to entrench, and the hill was dotted with such posts. The fore- most, which lay under a low cliff, was surrounded and captured early, the Boers, who had wrapped sheepskins round their feet to deaden the sound, climbing to the verge of the overhanging cliff, whence they shot straight down upon the soldiers. But the other posts, warned by the firing, were not to be caught ; and though the enemy approached within fifteen yards of the rifles — in one case cutting through a barbed-wire entanglement in their ardour to close — and though, when repulsed, they more than once came on again, the knots of British, standing firm and
VOL. IV. 3
34 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
shooting steadily, lost not another foot of ground, and heavily punished their assailants. Before daybreak the Boers were in retreat on every side, carrying with them many dead and wounded, amongst them the before-mentioned Russian, mortally struck as he headed an attack on one of the groups of infantry. The British losses numbered but seven, of whom four were prisoners ; few, indeed, and little indicative of the closeness of the fighting until it is remembered how little dangerous is a night attack when the advantage of surprise has been lost, and there is no steel to make it good. An attack on the hill to the north at the same time as that on the east hill came to nothing^ owing, so said the enemy, to the cowardice of the commanders detailed to lead it.
These successes, though they by no means cleared the dis- tricts, ensured for Natal almost complete repose for a month, during which the interest of the eastern campaign again shifted to the Delagoa Bay railway.
The anxiety of the Commander-in-Chief to unlock at least a portion of the army of troops on that expensive line of com- munication for more active service in the open field found expression in earnest soHcitations to the commanders to reduce their permanent posts and increase the strength of their mobile columns. But if no channel of supply absorbed more men per mile, none was more continually harried, and in the first week in January, 1901, an unmistakable hint was given that in the presence of an enemy who could put even strong posts, strongly entrenched, in jeopardy, weak columns in the open were scarcely Botha to be thought of. On the 3rd and 4th of January, 1901,
rffD^fag^ Commandant-General Louis Botha rode up from Ermelo with Bay line. His 1,200 men Under Generals C. Botha and T. Smuts. Leaving the '^*"^' commandos on the Upper Komati, between Carolina and Bel-
fast, Botha himself with his subordinates crossed the line east of Middelburg by night, and on the 5th summoned all his officers to receive his orders at Hoedspruit, a farm on the western slopes of the Botha's Berg. Amongst others, General Ben Viljoen repaired to the spot, receiving there the congratulations of his chief on his recent feat at Helvetia. Botha had in mind no less
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 35
a plan than a wholesale demolition of the British eastern line of communications by means of simultaneous night onslaughts on its central section from both sides, by Viljoen from the north, and by C. Botha and Smuts from the south. As the points of attack he selected Machadodorp, Dalmanutha, Belfast, Wonder- fontein and Pan, with the smaller posts linking these garrisons. Such a scheme possessed radical defects which by no means escaped the criticism of Botha's Ueutenants. With an available strength of under 3,000 men it contemplated an operation on a front of forty miles, and that by divided forces at night, when the advantage of darkness would be more than counterbalanced by the difficulties of timing and intercommunication. Neverthe- less, the conception commended itself by its very boldness to the majority of the Boer leaders, and it was resolved to carry it out to the letter.
The night of January 7th exhibited every circumstance of General attack vileness which is prejudicial to defence. It was intensely p'^y^fiJ^^''^"* dark ; a fine cold rain fell persistently, and a piercing easterly !»"• 7th— 8th, gale, which deadened the ears of sentries, did nothing to '^'* dissipate the driving mist which blinded their eyes. With everything in their favour the various Boer detachments gathered, and at midnight each hurled itself upon its appointed victim. But the lesson of Helvetia — a lesson which Botha him- self had feared might prove a marplot* — had not been wasted. As at Utrecht, commanders of garrisons had long turned night into day for their men ; the trenches were bivouacs guarded on every side by mazes of barbed wire and often by chained watch dogs ; the soldiers who slept fully armed therein had been taught to anticipate a night attack as a certainty. Nor were they entirely without specific warning. A native, coming into Nooitgedachtf at dusk, had foretold a visitation that night, and the word had been passed along the posts, which, however, were now habitually prepared without it, and indeed gave little
• General B. Viljoen, " The Anglo-Boer War," page 309.
t This place, which lies close to Pan upon the line midway Ijctween Belfast and Middelburg, is not to be confused with another of the same name situated midway between Machadodorp and Nelspruit, i.e., some fifty miles to the eastward.
VOL. IV. 3*
36 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
credence to intelligence from such sources, so often disproved. Thus each post, suddenly struck, was ready at once with a counter-blow, and all along the line arose bouts of fighting, so close, so well contested, and so disconnected, that they must be recounted, however briefly, in detail, and for convenience from east to west.
Attack on Machadodorp, the headquarters of Reeves's section of the
°^^' line, was attacked simultaneously by Viljoen's Lydenburgers from the north, and on the other side by the Ermelo men, under Smuts. The garrison consisted of the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, with guns and cavalry, disposed on three heights, Rocky Hill, Natal Hill, and Signal Hill, all of which were separately engaged by the enemy and stoutly defended. On the first-named especially was there a remarkable combat in which ninety-three men of the FusiUers and six artillerymen withstood and iinally repulsed the onset of nearly seven times as many burghers. Natal Hill and Signal Hill, though closely beset, were in Uttle danger from smaller commandos, and by 3 a.m. on the 8th the whole attack, decisively defeated, was withdrawn.
Attack on Dalmanutha, to the westward, was attacked at the same time,
Dalmanulha. , ' , , ' , . . ,
but at first from the south only. This garrison, the easternmost of Smith-Dorrien's section, was held by two companies (161 men) of the 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment, and a troop of the 19th Hussars, with a 12-pr. gun. The defences on the north side of the railway consisted of a redoubt, surrounded by smaller works, and an entrenched piquet on the hne itself, the ground on the southern side of which fell sharply. The southern side, the weakest and most accessible, was selected by the enemy, who, collecting below the slope, charged suddenly up the hill, shooting from the saddle as they galloped, rode over the sentries and groups, and had lined the railway before they were checked by the fire of the entrenched piquet only thirty yards away on the other side. So hot was their reception here that the attack faltered in spite of the efforts of the Boer leaders, who shouted encouragement to their men. At i a.m. the burghers ceased firing altogether, hoping thus to silence the unendurable fusilade from the British trench. Meanwhile another party, working
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 37
round to the north, fell upon the redoubt and the gun-pit, their attack being accompanied by so overwhelming a recrudescence of fire from the railway that the entrenchments began to crumble, and the piquet seemed likely to be overpowered. The Boers, however, knew nothing of the effect they were producing and, being in worse case themselves, soon fell back. At 2.15 a.m. Dalmanutha was free, the losses numbering but four in killed and wounded, and a few prisoners, who were shortly -afterwards released.
Belfast, the key of the hne, and Smith-Dorrien's Head- Attack on quarters, had a far more severe trial. Here were over 1,300 ** ' infantry of the ist Royal Irish regiment, 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry, ist Gordon Highlanders, ist Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, together with 230 men of the 5th Lancers, 180 mounted infantry, the 84th battery R.F.A., and two 5-in. guns. But this was all too small for the ground to be defended, which, extend- ing over a perimeter of fifteen miles, cut up the force into detach- ments nowhere strong enough to be safe against such attacks as those which were launched against them by Botha in person. Every post, was, however, strongly entrenched, and so thickly belted round with wire that it seemed as if they must be im- pregnable from that cause alone. The system of defence, which was divided by the railway into northern and southern sections, was as follows : Monument Hill, to the north-east of Belfast, and about one and a half miles from it, was crowned by a fort containing a company of the Royal Irish regiment, which found piquets in subsidiary works in front. Another company, not on outpost duty and under canvas in rear, brought the numbers on the hill to ninety-three officers and men. Outside the north- east .corner of Belfast the Shropshire Light Infantry, less one company on duty in the town, garrisoned a fort, which, like that on Monument Hill, was piqueted by troops in smaller works. A drift, due north of Belfast and midway between the two above- mentioned heights, was held by mounted infantry ; and this completed the northern section. South of the railway a semi- circular hne of defences was in the keeping of the Gordon High- landers, who maintained it by means of the two main works
38 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
on either flank, connected by circular fortalices of stone, the main body of the battaUon lying encamped behind the centre, in support. Belfast was thus well watched on every side, but as there were neither troops nor ground for an inner line, its de- fences possessed the weakness common to all in which the Unes of observation and resistance are compelled to be the same, namely, the liability to be ruptured by the mere surprise of an outpost. The first and heaviest stroke fell upon Monument Hill. Nowhere were the fog and drizzle thicker than here, so dense, indeed, that not only did the sentries fail to detect the approach of an enemy, but the Boers themselves, about 500 Johannesburgers and Boksburgers under MuUer, saw nothing until they were through the outlying posts, which, in consequence, fell into their hands. They then broke through the entanglement, especially at one point where it was weak owing to a failure of the stock of wire, and rushed upon the fort calling upon the garrison to surrender. The soldiers, unable to stop them with their rifles, answered with defiant shouts as they met them at the parapet, and a fierce meUe ensued in which bayonets and butts of rifles were freely used, some even fighting with their fists, whilst others wrestled upon the ground. Everywhere the garrison, hopelessly outnumbered, resisted desperately, their commander, Captain F. L. Fosbery, animating all by his example until he was slain. Amongst so much valour as was displayed there is room here to mention none but the most conspicuous, and that was shown by Private J. Barry (No. 3733). Seeing the regimental Maxim gun sur- rounded by the enemy, this brave soldier burst into the group and proceeded to smash the lock in order to render the trophy useless ; and this, in spite of threats, he persisted in doing, until one of the Boers, less chivalrous than the rest, shot him dead.* For half an hour the struggle continued before the garrison, having lost thirty-eight of its number, was overpowered. Together with the fort, two officers and fifty-one rank and file, belonging chiefly to the second company on the hill, were taken
• For Private Barry's gallant act a Victoria Cross (posthumous) was awarded.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 39
by the enemy, who lost thirty-four in the assault, and dared not wait for light on the scene of their triumph, which was re-occupied by the British at dawn.
Simultaneously with the above a combat, only less disastrous because on a smaller scale, was in progress at the Colliery to the westward. Here, as usual, the outl5^ng post fell a victim, but not until it had covered itself with glory by its resistance. In the small work in front of the Shropshire fort were nineteen men under a subaltern, who were suddenly set upon by a band more than ten times their number, chiefly composed of Viljoen's State artillerymen, led by Coetzee. For an hour this handful held their own, shooting down some two dozen of their assailants before they themselves succumbed, having lost their officer and thirteen men killed and wounded. The main work behind was then threatened, but the tenacity of the annihilated post had taken the sting from the attack, and the Boers were easily driven back. A demonstration against the mounted infantry at the drift between Monument and Colliery Hills led to heavy inter- change of firing, but was pressed no further.
The attacks on the north of Belfast had been in progress some time before Botha's men made their descent upon the southern section ; and the Gordon Highlanders, warned by the distant uproar, had reinforced their outposts and were lying in readiness for what might befall. At. 1.15 a.m. matters opened by an onslaught by 400 Boers upon the extreme right, or south- west work, which was occupied at first by twenty-five men and two officers, who were soon assisted by the approach of two companies from the supports. Severe fighting followed here. The Boers, carrying stones, built up sangars within forty yards of the parapet, and actually inside the wire entanglements, which, as at other places, had failed to keep out their determined rush. But the Highlanders kept them at bay, and at the end of two hours the Boers fled beaten, leaving their dead behind. From this spot, however, the attack of the Ermelo and CaroHna men had developed rapidly all along the arc, and there was no entrenched group but had to fight its hardest to avoid destruction. Only one, a post of ten men under a corporal, somewhat exposed
40
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Attack on
Wonderfon-
tein.
Attack on Wildfontein.
Attack on Nooitgedacht.
near the eastern flank, after losing six of its number and firing nearly 200 rounds per man, was eventually demolished by the invasion of 200 Boers. So much for the defence of Belfast, which cost the garrison 134 casualties.
Next in order of place, though not of time — for it was one of the first to be attacked — came Wonderfontein, where separated trenches of strong profile, guarded by a continuous and complex zigzag of barbed wire, sheltered the 150 men of the 2nd Royal Berkshire regiment who formed the garrison. Here the enemy were unfortunate from the outset, themselves giving warning by a preUminary reconnaissance which was discovered by the sentries, whilst sounds of fighting from other parts had already brought the defence to arms when at midnight the Middelburgers and men of Germiston opened upon the piquets to west and north of the enclosure. The post on the railway was most heavily engaged, some 200 burghers emptying their rifles against it, striking the officer and seven of the eleven men who lay therein. But here for once the formidable wire did its work, and after attempts to get in at different spots, which lasted two and a half hours, the enemy fell back, their retirement being hastened by shrapnel from two 12-pr. guns which had been mounted on armoured trucks upon the line.
At Wildfontein, too, the soldiers had been called to the loop- holes by the firing on either side. Here some 100 men of the Royal Berkshire were entrenched within an oval enclosure, having the railway as its longer axis ; a detached triangular work sheltered a detachment of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers on the south of the line. The latter was first attacked, but the firing soon spread, until both southern and western forces were fully engaged. Matters, however, went no further, and when the enemy departed at 2.30 a.m. the British detachment had suffered but three casualties.
Nooitgedacht, warned as related, was as admirably entrenched as every other post held by the Royal Berkshire, a regiment which since the days of McCracken's Hill* had been notable
See Volume I., Chapter XXIV.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 41
for its skill in field fortification. One hundred and fifty men of that battalion, a detachment of the 5th Lancers and a section of the 66th battery R.F.A. held the place, which was a square formed of rifle pits on three faces, and on the fourth — the southern — of loopholed farm buildings of brick and masonry. It was against this side that the Boers, creeping up two bifurcating ditches, advanced in two parties. So doing — a faint moon giving some intermittent Ught — their heads were discerned by the sentries, who aroused their comrades. A trap was then set for the would-be surprisers. A sudden volley at close range staggered the advance and checked it once and for all, shrapnel from the field guns joined in with effect, and Nooitgedacht remained intact with but two casualties.
Finally Pan, kept by a company of the Royal Berkshire, with Attack on two field guns, had to withstand an attack from the east, a ^^"* bridge guard on the railway in that direction retiring just in time to avoid capture. Secure in their strong and well-designed trenches, which formed a parallelogram about the station, the garrison easily held its own, with the loss of one man, against an attempt less determined than at other places, and at 1.30 a.m. its vicinity was clear enough for the bridge to be re-occupied.
Such was the memorable attack on the eastern line of com- munication on January 7th ; and if it seem to have been dwelt upon with overmuch detail, yet too much that was creditable to the arms of both sides has been unwillingly omitted.*
Throughout the rest of the month of January, the flame, which for one night had been concentrated, spread and broke out at every spot along the eastern line which afforded it momentary fuel. On the 8th, 12th, 14th, 23rd, 25th and 29th skirmishes occurred near the line ; a convoy of wagons and sheep was captured near Bronkhorstspruit Station on the 13th ; on the 9th one train was wrecked, on the 17th three trains ; the line being severed on several other days, on one occasion (23rd) cutting off the Commander-in-Chief from Middelburg, whither he was proceeding for an interview with Lyttelton. On the
* For full casualty list see end of chapter.
42 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
night of the i6th, Rocky Hill at Machadodorp was twice attacked, whilst Helvetia had to repulse attempts on the nights of both the 19th and 21st. In short the line was harried with a persistency which seemed to point to more than a desire to cause annoyance. Botha, indeed, had long been occupied with preparations from which he anxiously wished to divert attention. To that end had been inflicted every damage which the British had suffered on the Hne and in the field since Viljoen's affair at Rhenoster Kop. His proceedings were, however, well known to the British Intelligence Department, Every report disclosed a powerful concentration of commandos about Bethel and Ermelo, and all that was at first uncertain was its purpose. By the time that became clear. Lord Kitchener had already de- vised measures to avert what might have proved a grave crisis. To both the Transvaal and Free State generalissimos, as with the majority of their brothers in arms, the south still glowed with the memories of early successes. Along the Tugela, on the heights of Cape Colony, and the Modder, the campaign had once seemed so nearly won that it might perhaps still be saved Botha's fresh there. Botha and C. De Wet had determined, therefore, to turn again that way from the disastrous north, and had planned a simultaneous re-invasion of Ca-pe Colony and Natal, the former to be carried out by De Wet, Hertzog, the Free State judge, and Kritzinger, of Zastron, whilst Botha reserved for his own hands to grasp at the well-remembered mountains and valleys across the Buffalo. Some talk there was also of a ship to be met by Hertzog at Lamberts Bay, laden with munitions of war and mercenaries from the Europe which almost every burgher, except the Commandant-General himself,* still believed to hold his interests first in its heart. This scheme had already partially broken down by the failure of the very leader whose success had been most confidently expected. A month earlier De Wet, hemmed in by the flooded waters of the Caledon and Orange rivers, and pursued by a pack of columns, had so
* "It is useless for us to entertain the thought of intervention, and we shall have to fight the matter out ourselves." — Letter to General C. De Wet, January 15th, 1901.
EVENTS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL. 43
narrowly escaped destruction* that he was no longer to be counted on as a factor m Botha's strategy. But Hertzog and Kritzinger had fared better. They were at this moment in the heart of Cape Colony, re-opening everywhere the deepest sore in the British cause. f Such success could only be partial, but a vigorous offensive in the east might yet confirm it, and Botha persisted in his plan. Slowly — for communication was more difficult than of yore — he gathered together some 4,000 men at the places mentioned, employing part of them on January 7th in the raid upon the Une which, costly failure as it had proved, might yet, he hoped, have served as a useful bUnd to his and De Wet's proceedings in the opposite direction.
But now, with every railway in British hands, the theatre of war had resolved itself into a series of fortified angles within one or the other of which every Boer force still in the field was compelled to operate. Thus Botha, marching southward from Ermelo, would find himself entering the narrowing tract shut in on the one side by the Swazi and Zulu borders, and on the other by the railway posts until they gave place to the forts and garrisoned drifts which screened and defended the Buffalo. Into this corner Lord Kitchener prepared to hunt him with a pack of columns to be directed by Lieut. -General French ; but whilst they made ready he first, on January 25th, despatched Smith-Dorrien to Carolina with about 4,000 men of all arms and fourteen guns to try the ground. This column had to fight all the way out and back, and when it returned to Wonderfontein on the 30th had suffered fifty-five casualties at the hands of 2,000 Boers who were left close to CaroUna. Smith-Dorrien then awaited on the line the approach of the great expedition in which he was to play a part, and which French had already set in motion two days earlier.
On the Heidelberg — Standerton section of the Une nothing of importance had occurred during January. Only Colville in the course of his usual patrolUng encountered near Vlaklaagte on the i6th another combination of some 900 Boers who attacked his
* See Volume III., pages 494 to 496. f See Chapter IV.
44
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
baggage and drove in the rearguard, only to be handsomely beaten by a bayonet charge, followed by a pursuing fire, de- livered by six companies of the ist Rifle Brigade which formed his main body. The enemy lost fifty men, and Colville but sixteen. At the end of the month he was as before in the neighbourhood of Greylingstad.
Casualties — Railway Line of Communication — East of Pretoria- Night Attack by Boers, January 7th, 1901.
|
Killed. |
Wounded. |
Captured or |
Total. |
|||||
|
Missing. |
||||||||
|
Action. |
||||||||
|
t^ |
1- in |
r. |
h a |
C |
u in |
iS |
Si |
|
|
w |
*> ^ |
V |
v^ |
V |
<u^ |
4> |
||
|
1 0 |
•s s oc2 |
u 0 |
5§ |
0 |
0(2 |
0 |
•s g |
|
|
Machadodorp |
I |
I |
_ |
II |
_ |
I |
12 |
|
|
Dalmanutha |
— |
I |
— |
J |
— |
— |
— |
4 |
|
Belfast |
I |
16 |
3 |
2 |
70 |
6 |
134 |
|
|
Wonderfontein |
— |
3 |
I |
7 |
|
I |
10 |
|
|
Wildfontein |
— |
I |
|
2 |
__ |
_ |
— |
3 |
|
Nooitgedacht |
— |
I |
I |
— |
— |
I |
I |
|
|
Pan |
~ |
~ |
I 73 |
~ |
I |
|||
|
Totals |
2 |
22 |
S |
2 |
70 |
9 |
165 |
The Boer casualties numbered approximately 100, of which some thirty were killed. Commandant-General Botha returned his losses as twenty-one killed, sixty-one wounded, and two missing, but this was somewhat under the mark.
45
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.* DECEMBER, IQOO — JANUARY, IQOI.
After his abortive attempt to enter Cape Colony in December,
1900, t De Wet turned northward hoping to find a retired spot
about Hammonia where he could prepare for another effort.
His reputation and his force were alike little weakened ; his De Wet turns
numbers, indeed, were actually increased by bands which joined orange°rTver!*
him upon the left bank of the Caledon, and he was soon at the
head of some 5,000 burghers. Only his horseflesh had suffered
greatly in the forced marches up and down the miry river
banks : his passage 6i the Caledon alone had cost him 500
animals ; more dropped out at every mile, and deprived of
horses, De Wet, Uke every Boer, was like an engine without
steam. But he had small immediate prospect of the respite
he so greatly desired. His fortunate escape from a circle of
floods had but delivered him into the midst of another of British
troops and forts. On December nth, when his commandos
gained Helvetia, J Major-General C. E. Knox was so close behind
that the Boer rearguard was actually engaged with the three
columns of Lieut. -Colonels J. S. S. Barker, W. H. Williams and
W, L. White (the latter replacing Lieut. -Colonel E. B. Herbert).
Further back, in the Rouxville district, was Colonel C. J. Long
* See map No. 64.
t See Volume III., pages 494 to 496.
X Not to be confused with the place of the same name on the Delagoa Bay railway.
position.
46 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
with Lieut. -Colonels T. D. Pilcher and H. M. Grenfell advancing in front of Herbert in support at Aliwal North. Colonel Sir C. Parsons, who had reheved Major-General H. H. Settle at Eden- burg on the 5th, was on the left front at Reddersburg ; Colonel A. W. Thomeycroft and Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J. Byng, brought from Standerton and Volksrust respectively, were hning up from Israels Poort through Thabanchu and Springhaan Nek to the banks of the Caledon, thus shutting off the north- east, or right front. C. Knox first manoeuvred to drive the Boers upon Sir C. Parsons at Reddersburg ; but De Wet, kept well informed by his scouts, edged away to the north-east, and, pass- ing between the Caledon and Dewetsdorp, laagered at Daspoort, seven miles to the east of the latter on the night of December 13th. C. Knox and Sir C. Parsons were then only ten miles behind, with Pilcher, the foremost of Long's command, twenty- five miles in rear again. J^|s_<iangerous De Wet was now voluntarily entering a trap very similar to that from which, four months before,* he had escaped with his own small following, leaving the Orange Free State army fast in the toils of the Brandwater basin. He was perfectly aware of the situations of his various opponents, of the line of troops and blockhouses barring his front, the great topographical strength of their disposition, and of the exact distance of his pursuers. His haven was only to be gained by extreme good fortune or an expensive engagement, whilst failure, of which there was every chance, would mean total ruin, for half a day's march by C. Knox, in rear, would shut him up. Here, as elsewhere, indeed, De Wet, compelled to stake everything upon long odds, made it doubtful whether he did not shine brighter as an inspired gambler than as a serious leader of men. A greater than he had indeed set, at Somosierra for instance, the seal of genius upon feats of unbridled tactical licence based upon penetration as pro- found as it was instantaneous of his enemy's condition. But in tactics, as apart from policy. Napoleon never risked his all except once, when all was already lost ; whereas De Wet, now
* See Volume III., pages 292 to 306.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 47
become on his smaller scale, even more than Napoleon, the soul of his country's resistance, had to hazard on one throw the whole campaign. But he knew that his chances were better than they appeared, and neither he nor his adversaries failed to improve them. The line taken up on the night of December 1 2th by Byng and Thorneycroft ran, as stated, from Israels Poort to the banks of the Caledon river facing south. Thorney- croft, who was in command, assigned the right, from Israels Poort to the foot of Patchoana, to Byng, taking post himself on Patchoana, about the left centre. On either side of Tha- banchu his disposition followed the course of the existing block-houses, which, indeed, the columns had been sent by the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce. These defences had the double defect of lying too far apart, and of stopping short at an important point. For example, the pair called Springhaan Post and Intermediate Post, which had been designed to command Springhaan Nek, the best outlet towards Hammonia and the north, were no less than 4,000 yards apart. Another 2,700 yards separated the latter of these from its nearest neighbour, Springhaan Hut Post, the easternmost defence of the Nek, beyond which again a stretch of rideable ground extending to Patchoana Mountain was entirely unobstructed. Intervals like these over so wide a front the two commanders, who had less than 1,100 men between them, were unable to fill and at the same time preserve strength and mobility to strike from any part. It was absolutely necessary to retain the power of offensive ; for though Springhaan Nek was the main entry, it was neither the only passage, nor from its very prominence that most Ukely to be attempted. De Wet himself had avoided it to make ure of another, namely, the space between Hut Post and Patchoana, on his recent march southward to the Orange, and there was soon given another sign of the enemy's preference for this track.
Its importance had been by no means overlooked by Thorney- croft. Well aware of the weakness at this spot, he had already requested Byng, in whose section it lay, to make it good ; but Byng could find no troops for the duty. Immediately on
Nek.
48 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
his arrival on Patchoana, therefore, Thorneycroft pushed out a company of his own regiment midway into the space, where it entrenched itself, an orderly being sent to the officer at the Hut Post to acquaint him with the proceeding. Soon after this man had delivered his message, and while it was still dark, a strong body of horsemen appeared in the gap, coming not from the south but the north. They rode forward with such confidence that the garrison of Hut Post, believing them to be Thorneycroft's approaching company, refrained from shooting, thereby letting Prinsloo's Bethlehem commando, some 400 strong, pass through undamaged. Descending the Nek in safety, Prinsloo pursued his way southward and joined De Wet at Daspoort. On this being reported, Thorneycroft, though he could ill spare the men, at once entrenched another company in a series of detached posts across the space, leaving himself less than 300 mounted men available for offence. Neither he nor Byng could do more for the centre, for Tha- banchu on the one side and Patchoana on the other were them- selves by no means unlikely to be completely turned. Thus Springhaan Nek proper, except for the inadequate defences on its widely separated flanks, remained open ; and it was pecuUarly vulnerable because close in front of it a height called Ngoana towered some 700 feet higher than the general line of defence, forming both a secure gathering ground for a rush upon the Nek and an excellent point from which to reconnoitre the whole of the British dispositions. This mountain, the true outwork of the passage, was left unoccupied. De Wet, as he approached the gateway, had in fact determined to win t by his former route, which would carry him outside the defending blockhouses instead of between them. Prinsloo's undisputed passage promised well, and he trusted that the troops since arrived in this quarter were too few, and had had too little time to entrench to be able to oppose him seriously. He had more fear of those in the direction of Thabanchu, whom very little delay on his part in front of Springhaan would assuredly bring down upon him, when, even if he could master them at all, it must be at such expense of time that C. Knox
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 49
would inevitably come up on his rear and ruin him. To keep the defence extended, then, and to pierce it quickly were vital objects, and to this end he set in motion a train of masterly tactics.
In order to contain the western troops and hold them to De Wet's their position it was necessary, unless De Wet detached largely springhaan himself, to threaten them from a point which would arouse Nek. more apprehension than a merely frontal demonstration. De Wet determined, therefore, to send a small force to break through the weak centre, and to place it directly in rear of the Thabanchu section of the line. It was probable that the commander there, menaced from so unexpected a direction, would not venture to move a man to the assistance of any other quarter. For this service De Wet selected the last arrivals, the Bethlehem burghers, whose horses were fresher than his own exhausted animals, who, moreover, had but the morning before traversed in one direction the very ground over which his plans required them to return. Before light on December 14th, Prinsloo, marching well ahead of the main body, ap- proached the gap at a point between Hut Post and the most westerly of Thorneycroft's detached outposts. He was imme- diately detected and fired upon ; but keeping his men well together, and protected by the darkness, he charged through the narrow gap almost unharmed, indeed almost unseen, for the troops were under the impression that they had driven back the majority of the party, and so reported to Thorney croft when he sent a patrol to ascertain the cause of the firing. In a few seconds Prinsloo was safely on the other side, when he swung north-westward, and made for the reverse of. Byng's line of defence.
At sunrise Thorneycroft received a heliograph message from Wepener to the effect that De Wet and Steyn, with 4,000 men and three guns, were approaching him from the south. But he had little need of warning. Soon, from the top of Patchoana, the Boer army came full into view, marching from the direction of Dewetsdorp. Guns, transport and commandos were all plainly discernible, and warning was sent along the line to all
VOL. IV. 4
50 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the posts, all, that is, with the exception of Thabanchu itself, which was so thickly shrouded in mist that the heliograph was useless. As a consequence Byng, who from the first had had no very clear idea of the situation, remained throughout in partial ignorance of the significance of the ensuing events, though his uncertainty had but little effect upon the results, for he had not a man to spare.
De Wet now manoeuvred to discover his best crossing place. Still bent on that immediately to the east of Hut Post, at 5.30 a.m. he sent his scouts forward to prove it. But day- hght had rendered it impassable. The fire from the Post, and from Thorneycroft's western detachment covered all the space. The Boer scouts then probed further to the east, to- wards Patchoana ; but here matters were even worse, for still Thorneycroft's men lay in front, whilst from the slopes of Patchoana the artillery joined in denying the passage. Though baulked here, the reconnaissance gave De Wet the clue to the problem before him. His old route was closed ; but the dis- closure of the presence of the British main strength upon Patchoana rendered Springhaan Nek itself not only his sole hope, but no bad one. The wide separation of its defending forts was known to him ; it was unhkely that Thorneycroft's extension had been continued so far to the west, whilst Byng's must by this time be surely checked and contained by Prinsloo's appearance on his rear. Nevertheless, Thorneycroft was still nearer to the Nek than De Wet himself, and it was essential to pin him to his ground until the last moment. FaUing back, therefore, with half his force under the shelter of Ngoana, De Wet sent the other half, nearly 2,000 strong, to threaten the outer or eastern flank of Thorneycroft upon Patchoana, feigning an intention against the difficult but almost unguarded tract between Patchoana and the Leeuw river. Whilst this demonstration was in progress, De Wet edged the wing upon Ngoana under the mountain side towards a point opposite the entry of Springhaan Nek. Thorneycroft, to whom the above evolutions were plainly visible, was now in a greater quandary than if he had seen nothing at all. It was impossible to devise
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 51
the enemy's real intentions. He had, as stated, a striking force of less than 300 men left under his hand ; to strip Patchoana of these in order to reinforce Springhaan would be to expose his baggage, his left flank, and the ground beyond to a force six times the strength of his own. To withdraw the already entirely inadequate defences of the Nek would present the main passage as a free gift. It was impossible to summon Byng to the spot, even more so than Thorneycroft was aware.
Hidden in thick mist, Byng was at this moment preoccupied by reports of attacks from all sides, and practically isolated by the necessity of dealing with Prinsloo, who was well seconding the able tactics of his chief by his close attentions to the Thabanchu defences. Sending a Colt gun to Hut Post, and to Intermediate Post a section of Byng's mounted infantry which had joined him the night before, Thorneycroft therefore remained on Patchoana, watching keenly for the slightest disclosure of the real attack. He had not long to wait. At about 8 a.m. the commandos with De Wet, having wound around Ngoana, began The forcint,' to move rapidly upon Springhaan. As they advanced the ^^Spnnghaan body on the right inclined inwards, and refusing the front of Dec. 14th, Patchoana, swiftly closed in upon the others. Only one party '^°°* of 300 men under Commandant Haasbroek of Winburg re- mained behind, and, turning back at Ngoana, disappeared westward down the Khabanyana river. Instantly Thorneycroft, his doubts removed, issued from Patchoana with three companies of his regiment, two guns R.F.A. and a Vickers-Maxim, and galloped for Springhaan Nek, leaving but one company to guard the baggage on the mountain.
As he debouched, the enemy also broke into a gallop, and in two compact bodies rushed for the entry. The first, led by Vice-Chief-Commandant P. Fourie, burst through almost un- scathed by the hurried long-range fire from the badly placed flanking forts, before Thorneycroft came within reach. Having passed the fire zone, this party of Boers swung eastward and, facing round, took up a fire position which commanded not only the rear of the Nek, but also the flank of Thomeycroft's
VOL. IV. 4*
52 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
advance, an admirable piece of tactics which would have done much to ensure success had much been necessary. Flankers from this band soon engaged Thorneycroft's foremost troops, and, though they were driven back, the slight delay enabled the main Boer body to get through the more safely, because Thorneycroft found himself obliged to detach from his handful in order to cope with so dangerous a menace to his flank. With one united rush the second portion of De Wet's force, under Field-Cornet J. Hattingh, covered the space between the forts, the hurried and distant fire from which was again almost ineffectual. Just as all had passed Thorneycroft threw himself with his few remaining men athwart the gap, his guns shelling the receding horsemen with some effect. To pursue in force was out of the question, but a strong patrol which Thorneycroft sent out upon the line of retreat met with gratifying success. The capture of forty-two stragglers, a 15-pr. gun, a Vickers-Maxim (the former part of De Wet's booty at Dewetsdorp) and 60,000 rounds of ammunition, in some measure made amends for the loss of the main issue of the day.
De Wet's daring and lucky venture had not been made a moment too soon. By mid-day C. E. Knox, marching up on a broad front through Daspoort, W. H. Williams' column on the right, Barker's in the centre, W. L. White's on the left, had practically closed all retreat from Springhaan Nek. Haas- broek's band was actually caught at dusk by White near Victoria, and before it escaped in the darkness lost nearly forty burghers, the majority at the hands of " A " squadron 1 6th Lancers and a party of the Welsh Yeomanry, who, under Colonel W. Forbes, charged into the midst of the laager, taking twenty prisoners and killing and wounding as many more. At nightfall C. Knox halted on either side of Ngoana. Pursuit of On the next day, December 15th, Thorneycroft, having col-
lected his men, went in pursuit of De Wet, who had disappeared in the direction of Walspruit. On clearing this farm in the forenoon the Boer rearguard was seen falling back across Brands Drift on the Linyana Spruit, and Thorneycroft's advance parties
De Wet.
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 53
pushed on to gain touch. But they found De Wet posted too strongly to be interfered with on the heights commanding the Spruit from New Holstein down to Hoepel, with a party thrown in advance of his right flank on the mountain at Lokoala. Thomeycroft could do no more than remain in observation at Maseru Farm. About i p.m. the Boers ostentatiously withdrew their piquets along the whole front, and despatched their convoy down the Linyana towards Zamenkomst. Thomeycroft, suspect- ing that a trap was being set for his greatly outnumbered force, prudently stood fast on Maseru. His caution was soon amply justi- fied. A pause of half an hour exhausted the patience of the enemy, who, seeing that the column was not to be inveigled, suddenly emerged, nearly 3,000 strong, from behind New Holstein, and followed their baggage northward. Still a considerable body remained concealed, and the outlying force on Lokoala was actually reinforced. But early on the i6th Thomeycroft detected both parties, and remained stationary, whilst Barker joined him at Maseru, White moved up towards his left flank, and Pilcher, who had caught up with C. E. Knox the day before, took post upon his right. This alignment was complete on December 17th, and a united movement in pursuit of De Wet was on the point of being made, when orders were received which broke up Knox's combination in the Thabanchu district. Thomeycroft, W. H. Williams, Byng and Sir C. Parsons were now to hasten to Bloemfontein to entrain for Cape Colony, where Hertzog and Kritzinger, more fortunate than their chief, were rapidly penetrating British territory by west and east.* Only Pilcher, W. L. White and Barker remained with Knox, and with these the chase of De Wet was resumed.
A three days' advance by Clocolan, Mequatlings Nek, Evening Star and Conoviam confirmed the north-easterly direction of the Boers' retreat. All three columns were con- stantly in touch with one portion or another of De Wet's widely extended rearguard, which on the 25th appeared to be cover- ing a position lying between Gouverneur's Kop and Ficksburg.
• See Chapter IV.
54 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
In the last-named town much activity was apparent, and Knox sent Pilcher and Barker upon the place by way of the Caledon, whilst White moved on Hammonia. This advance into the heart of the most tangled district of the Orange River Colony promised to lead to serious fighting. But De Wet was more intent on husbanding his resources for his main strategy, a renewed invasion of Cape Colony, than on giving battle. De Wet He knew well that so long as he kept his large force together
forces.^" '^ neither men nor horses would have rest from pursuit. Moreover, he was being rapidly driven into a district every town of which, Lindley, Senekal, Reitz, Frankfort, Bethlehem, was held by the troops of Sir L. Rundle, based on Harrismith, portions of whose division, under Lieut. -Colonel C. P. Crewe and Major-General J. E. Boyes, were already moving on his flank with convoys for Lindley from Winburg and Senekal. At this point, there- fore, De Wet broke up his army, dispersing it, part under Assistant-Head-Commandant P. Botha, part under Vice-Chief- Commandant P. Fourie, part under Commandant Davel, to which last he also entrusted the guardianship of President Steyn. Davel's party made towards Reitz. De Wet himself, with a small guard, rode for the Heilbron district, intending there to collect, with General P. Froneman's assistance, transport and ammunition for his next attempt on Cape Colony. Thus the British columns, though unaware of the cause, found their task at once lightened and confused. Ficksburg, in spite of its strong defences, was at once yielded, whereupon Pilcher hastened to the assistance of W. L. White, whose single column at Hammonia had as much as it could manage with a considerable hostile body. On December 28th White and Pilcher advanced to Rietvlei ; Barker, having destroyed the flour mills in Ficks- burg, moved to Commando Nek. Next day all three turned northward upon Rexford, on the Senekal — Bethlehem road, White and Pilcher in front. Barker following to Rietvlei. The columns were now in close touch with Fourie's detachment, which was pushed through Rexford, and kept in a north-easterly direction by a movement by White on Tweepoort, and Pilcher on Luipaardsfontein, Barker halting at Rexford. This band
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 55
then seemed to disappear ; but on December 30th another, that of P. Botha, was discovered in the other direction upon Kaffir Kop, a strong position on the northern spurs of the Witte Bergen. C. E. Knox manoeuvred to surround the Kop by despatching White around the north by Lindley, Barker towards the south, whilst Pilcher moved directly against the position. The appearance of a strong line of battle on the morning of the 31st heralded an engagement, and for four hours the three columns skirmished with clouds of riflemen, who were especially thick opposite Barker on the left. But a threat of closer quarters and the practice of the howitzers speedily cleared the mountains, and the commando vanished towards the north. White then marched to Lindley, Pilcher back to Tweepoort, and Barker camped close to Kaffir Kop.
On January ist, 1901, all three concentrated at Lindley, and on the 3rd White and Barker led the advance eastward upon Reitz. Arrived at Plesier in the afternoon, the two columns were joined by Crewe, who had been sent from Boyes' command at Winburg with 500 men of the Colonial division. (At this time both Winburg and Senekal were garrisoned by troops from Boyes' column.) Crewe arrived in the presence of disaster. It happened that some 150 men of an irregular corps from White's force, entitled the Commander-in-Chiefs Bodyguard, had been sent to reconnoitre in front of Plesier towards the head of Liebenbergs Vlei. At Kromspruit this party, which regardless of rules and experience was in close formation and without even ground-scouts, fell suddenly in with P. Botha's vastly superior force, which had not been seen since its evacuation of Kaffir Kop, three days before. In a moment the patrol was completely surrounded. A desperate but hopeless combat ensued, which was maintained until forty officers and men, including the commanding and three other officers, had been killed and wounded. The remainder then surrendered, were immediately disarmed, but as quickly released, White dashing up to the rescue a few moments later.
Once more P. Botha's and every other formed body dis- appeared, and C. E. Knox, tvirning from Reitz, cast vainly north-
56 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
ward in search of something to strike at. He began to suspect that the enemy had doubled and was now behind him. Accord- ingly on January 5th he concentrated his columns at Gelderland, north-west of Reitz, preparatory to a movement southward, that is, by the way he had just come. On the 6th he was at Winbult, close by his former halting-place at Plesier. Here he lost Barker's and White's columns which were ordered to Kroonstad for reconstruction and subsequent service under Bruce Hamilton, who was coming from Hoopstad to organise a force for operations against De Wet. Knox pursued his way uneventfully with Crewe and Pilcher to Senekal (January loth) where he found Boyes, come from Winburg, together with a column of 500 horsemen, chiefly Bethune's mounted infantry, under Colonel S. C. H. Monro, which had been railed from Dundee, in Natal, to relieve Lindley at the end of December. Monro had reached Lindley on January 2nd, and two days later had joined Boyes. On January 6th, when marching to- gether on Senekal, both had been heavily attacked in flank and rear by the ubiquitous P. Botha at Rietpan, where there was some difficulty in saving the guns, one of which was disabled, the other deprived of its horses. In the skilfully conducted rearguard action the columns lost fifteen, the Boers twenty casualties. Throughout the march such large hostile bodies were discovered in the Lindley district that, on his arrival at Senekal, Boyes was able to report the main body of the Boers in that quarter. Nevertheless, a council of war between the five com- manders resulted in the decision that, in accordance with orders received from the Commander-in-Chief, Boyes should return to his proper sphere, Harrismith, and Monro into Lindley, to evacuate the perilously placed garrison of that town. C. E. Knox himself, completely at a loss amid conflicting reports and an invisible foe, marched on to Winburg, which he entered on January 12th.
Monro lost no time in undertaking his dangerous mission. For such a task as probably awaited him, his force, composed of only 400 mounted men, 100 regular and 200 militia infantry, with three guns, was totally inadequate, just such a body,
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 57
indeed, as De Wet loved to discover isolated upon the veld. Fortunately the Free State leader was intent on other schemes, and Monro pushed on almost unnoticed, en- countering only a weak Boer force on January nth at Bronsfontein, midway to his object. On the 13th he entered Lindley unopposed, cleared the place of its garrison and stores, and safely gained the railway at America Siding on the 23rd.
Boyes had more trouble on his march to rejoin Rundle at Harrismith. He moved by Honingfontein and Wilansspruit, in the angle of the Senekal — Lindley and Senekal — Bethlehem roads, a route which, for a time at least, afforded some support to Monro. On the last-named of these two roads a commando was discovered, which moved parallel with Boyes as far as Rexford, and when he turned south-easterly for Bethlehem, placed itself upon his left front about Onverdacht, disputing his further advance on January 13th from a strong double position. For nine hours Boyes fought for his passage, much Actional hindered by the enveloping nature of the enemy's dispositions, j^n^^jfh)**' and by a 15-pr. gun which was accurately served against his 1901- troops. The key of the advance was a prominent hill some 5,000 yards in the direction of Bethlehem. Although this was un- occupied by the enemy, approach to it was difficult, because of the danger of being surrounded on the way ; for the Boer rifle- men lapped partly around the left rear, only awaiting an oppor- tunity to close in. Boyes, keeping off the left attack with his guns and infantry, collected his mounted men, under Lieut. - Colonel R. B. Firman, on his right, which was protected by the Zand river at Wilansspruit, and at 3 p.m. ordered them to go forward and attempt to seize the commanding hill in front. Firman moved out boldly, and approaching the height, saw that he could do even better than secure it, for his line of advance led him with good cover actually around the enemy's left flank. He therefore circled rapidly to his left, and furiously charged the flank of the Boer first line, which instantly dissolved. In ten minutes the whole situation had been reversed. Boyes then pushed forward allhis strength and carried both positions,
58 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the enemy's second line not awaiting his attack. He was no more opposed on the west of Bethlehem, which he entered on the 15th. Thence he moved to and emptied Reitz. Orders were then received from Rundle to join hands with Major- General B. B. D. Campbell at Elands River Bridge, and this, with constant skirmishing by the way, was carried out on January 23rd. Boyes' column arrived in a deplorable con- dition. Not only the incessant marching with columns more mobile than itself, than which nothing is more exhausting to any unit, had worn its efficiency to the last thread. A form of low fever had infected the ranks and claimed many victims. Both the commanding officer and his brigade-major were seriously ill. Out of the two battaUons which composed the column 170 had already come in sick to the base. One of these regiments, which Rundle had sent out 700 strong, returned with only some 300 men able to stand on parade, and of these nearly half were reported by the medical officer as unfit for active service. The other battalion was little less debiUtated. All were in rags, the majority bootless. De Wet turns On the very day on which Boyes and Monro reached their ^iony°'^^^ respective destinations, De Wet, having completed his pre- parations, joined his reunited commandos on the Doornberg, and prepared to lead them once more southward to the invasion of Cape Colony. Lord Kitchener had kept in remarkably close touch with his obscure manoeuvres of the previous three weeks ; in closer touch, indeed, than his subordinates on the spot, whom a less elaborate intelhgence service and the constant encounter- ing with bodies of unknown strength served to bewilder beyond all hope of distinguishing the Boer main body. No sooner was De Wet on the march when Bruce Hamilton, at Kroonstad, and C. E. Knox, who had worked his way round to Leeuw Kop again, were ordered to converge upon his rendezvous and cut him off from the south. Then followed the events next to be described in connection with De Wet's second inroad into Cape Colony.*
• See Chapter IV. pages 75 to 78,
EVENTS IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY. 59
Approximate Strength States of Columns referred to in
foregoing chapter.
|
t |
.£ S |
i |
|||
|
X |
na'Z |
3 |
|||
|
c s |
b |
.2 5 |
0 |
||
|
Column. |
c c |
<n u |
1 |
||
|
5 |
2 <j 0|5 |
:s |
|||
|
December, i<^po^/anuary, 1901. |
|||||
|
Lieut. -Colonel J. S. S. Barker |
750 |
90 |
4 |
2 |
] Major - General |
|
„ W. H. Williams |
340 |
3 |
6 |
C. E. Knox in |
|
|
„ W. L. White |
830 |
138 |
I |
command. |
|
|
„ „ T. D. Pilcher „ H. M. Grenfell „ E. B. Herbert |
1,070 450 386 |
82 no |
2 |
Col. C. J. Long in command. |
|
|
Colonel A. W. Thorneycroft |
500 |
150 |
— |
||
|
Lieut. -Colonel the Hon. J. H. G. Byng ... |
380 |
— |
|||
|
Colonel Sir C, Parsons |
500 |
— |
3 |
||
|
Lieut. -Colonel C P. Crewe |
640 |
— |
2 |
] Lieut. - General |
|
|
Major-General T- E. Boyes (later Harley) |
3'8 |
1,361 |
3 |
Sir L. Rundle |
|
|
„ B. B. D. Campbell |
34a |
1.393 |
2 |
J in command. |
|
|
Lieut. -Colonel S C. H. Monro |
320 |
480 |
2 |
— |
|
|
Major-General Bruce Hamilton |
830 |
752 |
8 |
3 |
6o
CHAPTER IV.
EVENTS TN CAPE COLONY.* DECEMBER, I9OO — FEBRUARY 28tH, I9OI.
To a commander in the field a more constant anxiety than an open foe is a wavering ally. Such a confederate must be alter- nately tnisted and suspected ; though he may at any moment assume the offensive, he must be given no cause of offence ; his territory is sacred, yet must be watched like that of a hostile State ; the very grasp of his right hand must be received witli Attitude of caution, in case his left conceal a dagger. When, in addition. Cape Colony, g^ doubtful a friend dwells upon the chief hnes of communica- tion, the danger and difficulty of dealing with him become doubled ; for, even should he himself be too weak or timorous to strike, he may have a welcome for enemies bolder than him- self, who \\'ill ask no more than admittance within his borders. Such was the position of a large portion of Cape Colony through- out the war in South Africa.f The reasons why long years of prosperitv under British rule had failed to win the loyalty of many sections of this great province have been already given ; the first outbreaks of disaffection and their suppression have been described. J Let it suffice to say that when, after the paltry rebellions of the spring of 1900, Sir Charles Warren ceased his punitive expeditions in July, none who knew the colony, none, indeed, who knew war, were deceived into the belief that
* See map No. 63.
f Roughly, the parts about Colesberg, Philipstown, Hanover, Burghersdorp, Albert, Steynsburg, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Prieska, Kenhardt, Griqualand West, Hay, Herbert and Barkly West.
J Volume ni., Chapter I.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 6i
the immense communications of the western theatre of war stood at last upon a firm foundation. The fear of a wide- spread rebellion had, indeed, become more remote. The enthu- siasm of the disloyal farmers for the Republican cause had now been diagnosed. In the majority of cases it was likely to indulge itself very little further than the giving of supplies and informa- tion to the favoured side, and withholding them from the other, valuable, nay indispensable, military aids to guerilla bands, but in no way symptomatic of a universal conflagration. More- over, the merciful measures taken by the British Government after the first rebellion had considerably dulled the edge even of that enthusiasm. Martial law has never been more leniently administered than it was upon the armed rebels of the early part of 1900, who found not only their lives, but their liberties, possessions, and even their business, preserved for them after a mere pretence at arraignment. But disaffection, in spite of all opiates, is a light sleeper ; if it slumbered throughout the summer of 1900, the Boer leaders had good hopes that it only awaited the time and the call to awake. Neither were long delayed ; nor could the moment for the summons have been better chosen. The early days of 1901 found Cape Colony thinly and unscientifically occupied by British troops, and stir- ring uneasily from its lethargy. In November, 1900, so-called " congresses," in reaUty meetings of conspirators, engineered by agents of the Boer Government, had been held at various centres of unrest, notably Graaff Reinet and Worcester, with no more interference by the British authorities than had been exer- cised with the target practice of notorious rebels in the previous year. It was a moment when something of a St. Martin's summer was beginning to revive the waning Republican cause ; when their forces all over the theatre of war were being strengthened by the reappearance of hundreds of burghers, who were driven, or rode voluntarily, back from their sworn neutrality into the ranks of the commandos. The British armies, on the other hand, were in the act of depriving themselves of most of the first contingents of Colonials, whose presence had bestowed the very qualities which the regular troops most lacked and the campaign
62 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
most demanded. It has been seen how, despite these advan- tages, the Boers' initial strategy in the contemplated double scheme of invasion went to pieces amidst the waters of the Orange and Caledon.* But this did not save Cape Colony. Two of De Wet's officers, less closely watched than their famous leader, contrived to evade both the floods and C. E. Knox's columns ; and soon the disturbance of the whole colony, down to its very seaboard, was to point the lesson how that the least De Wet's Considered factors of an enemy's combination may, in certain advanced circumstances, prove the most troublesome of all. On December
parties invade
Cape Colony. 15th and i6th, Commandants P. H. Kritzinger and Judge Hertzog dashed across the Orange river, the former between Bethulie and Odendaal Stroom, the latter by Sand Drift, oppo- site Philippolis. To have foreseen this sally on the part of one at least of the invaders should have required no great gift of prophecy. For the past fortnight Lieut. -Colonel H. M. Grenfell, in the Rouxville district, and Sir H. MacDonald, recon- noitring across the Orange from Aliwal North, had been in close observation of Kritzinger, and their reports gave no uncertain indication of his designs. It was known on December 8th that the Free Stater was seeking information about the drifts over the Orange, that the whole Zastron district was covered with his parties busy collecting fresh horses. Continually, too, he edged southward, and on the 14th was at Wolve Kop, within a march of the main drift at Odendaal Stroom. Still no hint of his intentions was gathered ; his refusal to be headed northward, and his long delay about Rouxville, were attributed only to the presence of C. E. Knox at Smithfield, whilst the recent repulse of De Wet rendered inconceivable a single-handed foray south- ward by his weakest lieutenant. Kritzinger's appearance south of the Orange, then, caused as much surprise as though he had ridden secretly 500 miles to effect it, instead of from one bank of the river to the other. Not only the audacity of these unsupported invaders showed their supreme and signifi- cant confidence in the sympathy of the British province. Their
* See Volume III., Chapter XX.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 63
forces were small ; Kritzinger had but 700 men, Hertzog some 1,200, nearly all of them oath-breakers.* They carried with them no wheeled vehicles of any kind ; artillery would be of as httle service as transport to leaders who intended to rely for success on avoiding engagements, and for provender on the innumerable friendly farms, with the names of which the sleepn less agents of the Boer cause had furnished them. So dispro- portionate, in short, seemed these expeditions to the task of serious invasion that the British Headquarters were scarcely to be blamed if they regarded them as merely marauding bands. Though they were, in fact, httle more than this, the inroad of the two Free Staters was a serious diversion, partly because it was evidently designed for the purpose of collecting horses and supphes from the rich districts within the British borders for the use of a larger force which was to follow, but still more because of its constant incentive to that large section of the people which, though it had proved aUke its stupidity, timidity and egotism, was Repubhcan to the core. However damp the powder in the barrel, the entry of sparks even so feeble as the armed bands of Kritzinger and Hertzog might provoke an explosion at any moment.
The passage of the Orange placed the two Boer forces at once in rear of the only formed body of troops in Cape Colony. This was part of a brigade of Guards under Major-General Inigo Jones, which was disposed on either side of Norval's Pont, along the Orange river. There was no second hne, nor any- where else a force in being either of foot or horse ; only the mihtia and irregular levies under Major-General Sir H. Mac- Donald, who commanded at Aliwal North, and of Lieut. -General Sir F. Forestier-Walker at Cape Town were distributed in small guards along the hnes of communication. There, however, they were invaluable. The possession of the railways, always ol the first importance, becomes practically the sole means of coping with an adversary of superior mobihty. Already the British commanders had learned how to wage guerilla warfare on the
• De Wet to Botha, dated from Stnilhfie d, December loth, 1900.
64 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Importance of rails. Throughout the complicated operations which followed, the skilful employment of the railways was so constant a feature of their tactics that it ^^dll not always be especially remarked upon. For a general scheme of defence this would have been simple enough. The tracks were seldom in the enemy's hands. Their general direction towards the southern ports, through the parallel moimtain ranges and desert plains which guarded them like lines of fortifications and glacis, rendered easy the conveyance of troops from the remotest garrisons in South Africa into strong positions covering the most valuable por- tions of the colony. Against a regular enemy the province could quickly have been rendered impregnable. Armies could have lain in the Roggeveld, the Sneeuw Bergen and the Storm Berg, covering Cape Town, Port Ehzabeth and East London as securely as Lisbon was covered from Torres Vedras. But here was an enemy of a different type, one who operated from no base and towards no objective, whose victories lay in escapes, and in the length of time during which he could remain im- trapped ; who could never be said to advance or retire, but merely to move, now this way, now that, his tactics rendered imfathomable either by utter lack or rapid change of purpose. Against such an opponent cross railroads are the chief need, and these were infrequent in the eastern part of the colony, and altogether absent in the west. In the east, from Hopetown to Cape Town, there existed but one cross communication with the Norval's Pont — Port Ehzabeth line ; from that, and the Port Alfred hne which joined it at Middleburg, to the Ahwal North — East London railway, but one. With what infinite resource these meagre facihties were managed will only be understood when it is told how seldom the great spaces between the hues of railway were free from the presence of roving bands, and how seldom these were unattended by columns which had been hurried into contact by train. In the west the value of the main and only line lay chiefly in its power to provide for the protection of the capital by placing troops in possession of the encircUng ranges from either side. For the offensive within the vast equilateral triangle, whose sides, each 300 miles long,
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 65
were the Atlantic seaboard, the Orange river and the railway itself, the absence of branch Unes rendered it useful only as a moveable base.
A strong hold upon the railway system of an extensive theatre of war goes so far to nullify the weakness or faulty disposition of troops in any part, that the Director of Railways and his pro- tecting troops are the real props and executive of strategy. Within a week of the violation of the frontier of Cape Colony, no less than sixteen bodies of troops were within the border and organised for the field. To Hanover Road from the Roux- ville district, where they had been left by Major-General C. E. Knox after his operations against De Wet, came the commands of Lieut. -Colonels H. M. Grenfell, G. F. Gorringe and E. B. Herbert ; from other parts of the Orange River Colony the columns of Colonel Sir C. Parsons, Lieut.-Colonels A. W. Thomey- croft, R. K. Parke, the Hon. J. H. G. Byng, E. C. Bethune and W. H. WilUams and H. de B. de Lisle to Naauwpoort ; from the Transvaal, Lieut. -Colonel W. Lowe with the 7th Dragoon Guards and Brabant's Horse ; Kimberley provided a force of Yeomanry, whilst Inigo Jones immediately formed three mobile columns under Major H. G. D. Shute atColesberg, Lieut.-Colonels E. M. S. Crabbe at Petrusville, and the Hon. A. H. Henniker at De Aar. All these were placed under the general command of Major- General Sir H. H. Settle, who had been called up from Cape Town to Naauwpoort on December i8th. His first task was to delimitate the commands. Taking himself the western area, with Headquarters at De Aar, he assigned to Inigo Jones the central, with Headquarters at Naauwpoort, to Sir H. Macdonald the eastern. Headquarters at Burghersdorp. In endeavouring to obtain a grasp of the enemy's plan of campaign a strange diffi- culty beset him. The closer his touch with Kritzinger and Hertzog — and he was at once in touch — the more imcertain be- came their motives. On December i8th Shute found Hertzog south of Petrusville ; next day Grenfell touched Kritzinger near Venterstad. On the 19th Hertzog passed through Philipstown, Tactics of the and three days later entered Britstown, whilst Kritzinger, though '"^* "^' he loitered below Venterstad, still pointed southward on Ste5ms-
VOL. IV. q
66 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
burg. Thus there seemed an inclination of the Boer leaders to separate rather than combine, tactics so unusual that it was some time before the British commanders, accustomed as they were to the occurrence of the unexpected in Boer warfare, could reahse that bodies so weak had ventured to invade a vast hostile territory on divergent hues and unsupported. When, however, the full significance of such a movement was suspected, it increased the necessity of taking prompt measures against the marauders. Their single-handed persistence and daring left little room for doubt that De Wet himself was soon to form the body to his far-thrown wings. To manoeuvre to gain time and a bloodless penetration of Cape Colony became at once the main object of Kritzinger and Hertzog ; to destroy them before they could be Unked by the redoubtable Commander-in- Chief of the Free State, before, in short, the disconnected forays were transformed into a real invasion, was Settle's insistent problem. Now, therefore, his campaign resolved itself into two distinct operations — the chase of Hertzog in the west, of Krit- zinger in the east. By the arrangement of commands above referred to, the piu-suit of Hertzog came within his own province, of Kritzinger within that of Inigo Jones and Sir H. MacDonald, and the fortimes of each must be briefly followed.
It would be an endless task to describe in detail the efforts to find and engage in a vast terrain bands whom a single hollow could conceal, who rode fast, and who were bent on nothing so much as avoiding battle. Space denies all but an indication of the toil involved, the constant scouting, marching, and entraining, the never-ceasing contest of wits on the part of the leaders on both sides, of endurance on the part of their men. Kritzinger On December 26th Kritzinger, shadowed by Grenfell (in com- heads south- maud of Goniuge and Herbert), by Colonel A. A. Garstin, who had come from Kimberley to command Lowe, W. H. Williams, Byng and Shute, suddenly headed for Stormberg, was turned back at Henning from crossing the Stormberg — Rosmead rail- way, and sidhng first north-westward between the Zuur Berg and Kikvorsch Berg towards Colesberg, and then southward past Arundel, attacked Sherborne and Bangor on December 30th.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 67
He then went on south, making presumably for the historic centre of Boerdom in Cape Colony, Graafi Reinet. Next day he was not to be seen, and the five columns concentrated at Middleburg and Rosmead to search for him.
At Britstown Hertzog threatened the very centre of the western system of supply, the great depot at De Aar, and instant efforts were made to chase him thence. On December 23rd Sir H. Settle arrived at De Aar, and on the same day de Pursuit of Lisle, Thomeycroft and Parke marched westward. Hertzog, " °^' however, had passed through Britstown, which was occupied by Thomeycroft on the 25th, and was now reported at Stryden- burg. Accordingly the columns, moving on a broad front, swung northward, the left on the Ongers river, on the banks of which de Lisle ran into the enemy near Houwater on the 26th. A sharp skirmish resulted in the Boers slipping away towards Prieska ; but the encounter proved a valuable reconnaissance, for it revealed both the strength and composition of Hertzog's force, which was discovered to consist of six commandos, 1,200 strong in all, xmder Hertzog, Brand, Wessels, Pretorius, Theunissen and Nieuhoudt. On this day and the next Sir C. Parsons and Bethime appeared on the scene, the former detrain- ing at Victoria West, the latter at De Aar. Both had been intended to march northward, but on the 28th Hertzog, doubhng de Lisle's left flank, struck suddenly southward, arousing fears both for Carnarvon and Victoria West. Bethune was accord- ingly railed to the latter place. Sir C. Parsons hastened by forced marches to the former, whilst de Lisle, Thomeycroft and Parke clung closely to Hertzog through Vosburg and Brandewjms Kuil. On December 30th the commandos were within seven miles of Carnarvon, and Bethune from Victoria West prepared to turn them back into the arms of the pursuing columns.
In this he was unsuccessful ; but his movements had the effect of diverting the enemy's advance from south to west, Hert«^ turns and the occupation of Fraserburg and Camarvon by Sir H. ^^^^^" • Settle's troops cut all communication between Hertzog and his confederates in the eastem part of the colony. The western and southern counties were still open, however, and these, the
VOL. IV. c*
68 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
richest agricultural districts in all South Africa, were Hertzog's real object. There he could subsist in plenty for an indefinite period, requisitioning with small risk of refusal amongst prosperous farms well stocked with horses, grain and every kind of provender, and inhabited many by open, many by secret sympathisers. At present this hunting groimd could hardly be denied to the marauders, and only on his possession of the railways could Sir H. Settle base his hopes of barring Hertzog from the approaches to the capital, and the raiding of the southern seaboard counties, which would turn a mere incursion into a veritable invasion.
Thus the New Year of 1901 saw the virus of rebellion nmning deeply into the receptive veins of the colony. The Boer plan of campaign was now more obvious than the means of confoimding it. Experience had taught that to come to Difficulties of tcrms with bands like those of Kritzinger or Hertzog by fair ™F*'gn- chasing was a remote hope. They possessed mobility such as their opponents could never attain. Provided with two or three horses apiece they could always keep ahead of pursuit ; made acquainted by the reports of their spies with every granary and pasture, they were sure of supplies ; whilst so great was their elasticity that their usual habit was to march and forage at full speed over a front of fifteen or twenty miles, concentrating at a given point at the end of the morning or afternoon stage to receive fresh orders. The only way to deal with such an enemy is to press him hard, and at the same time to throw troops across his path. These tactics must absorb a large number of men, all, indeed, that were available in Cape Colony ; and it was now more than a suspicion that Krit- zinger and Hertzog were purposely drawing the British troops aside to east and west in order to leave a clear course down the centre of the colony for the expected rush of De Wet. The problem, in short, was of a complexity only to be fully under- stood when it is remembered on what dangerous ground it had to be worked out ; ground beneath which rebellion smouldered hke an imprisoned flame, ground upon which rested not only the stability of the armies manceuvring in the Orange River
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 69
Colony and the Transvaal, but the whole British ascendency in South Africa. The loss of Cape Colony, even temporarily, or even a serious struggle within its frontiers, might transform the whole campaign. Therefore, Cape Town itself stirred uneasily on the news of the inroad of these insignificant bands ; the men-of-war lying in its harbours prepared for a possible part in a campaign which had recently seemed to be dwindhng far in the interior of the sub-continent towards the Tropic of Capricorn, Loyalty, which never slumbers on a bed so uneasy as Cape Colony, sprang to arms in every county. Within three weeks 10,000 officers and men were enrolled, and despatched in detachments to hold the towns and villages which stood in the path of the commandos. And as for the regular troops, they threw themselves once more into the weary task of running down an enemy swifter than themselves, who promised infinite toil before he could be caught, and little honour in the catching. On January ist Sir H. Settle confessed his inabihty to con- fine the raiders to the north by moving his Headquarters down to Beaufort West, Next day Thomeycroft and de Lisle, having by great exertions followed Hertzog to Spioen Berg, east of WilUston, were obhged to leave him to seek supphes at the railway. Thus disencumbered, Hertzog turned due southward once more, and de Lisle and Thomeycroft were thrown hur- riedly into Fraserburg ; Sir C. Parsons, few of whose men had mounts, was ordered to follow. It was less likely, however, that Hertzog should trouble to surmount the difficult mountain ranges which intervened between him and Cape Town, than that he should turn them where they sank towards the western seaboard by ClanwiUiam and Piquetberg. This, indeed, if done earher, would have been a master-stroke, and it was not yet too late for the Boer to attempt it if he were really in earnest. Sir H, Settle, therefore, appreciating the fortunate trend of his Sir h. Settle communications, requested Sir F. W. Forestier-Walker at Cape (w Town, Town to send a garrison for ClanwiUiam by sea, whilst, in order to shut off the south, he railed portions of his own troops to Matjesfontein, whence he extended them westward, Bethune through Sutherland, and Henniker along the passes of the
yq THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Roggeveld mountains, the natural outpost line of Cape Town. This last was a delicate manoeuvre, the result of which hung in the balance of moments, until Henniker, by an admirable forced march from the line had made all safe at the passes. Now, therefore, was presented the singular spectacle of one set of forces hurrying southward by train, another northward upon the ocean, converging towards the critical spot at a speed beyond the utmost capacity of their opponents. But Hertzog was as quick to perceive as Sir H. Settle to utilise the dangers of the narrowing angle. He continued to sidle westward, and on January 7th de Lisle was ordered to entrain for the south at Beaufort West, and to move on Clanwilliam by Piquetberg, which was held by a levy under Major H. J. Du Cane, R.A. As Hertzog's westerly movement became more pronounced, Bethune was railed southward to Touws River to follow de Lisle ; Lowe and Parke came down to Prince Albert Road ; Thomeycroft, still followed by Sir C. Parsons, from Fraserburg to Sutherland ; whilst at Matjesfontein, which Sir H. Settle now made his Headquarters, a mounted corps, called Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, was being raised under Colonel Colenbrander for the operations in the west. Henniker, with Du Cane on his left at Piquetberg, remained in the Roggeveld. By January 21st Hertzog found himself cut off from south and east by an ad- vancing semi-circle traced from Sutherland through Ceres, Tul- bagh, Piquetberg and Clanwilliam to the open sea itself, where H.M.S. Syhille, the true left flank of the British forces, was steaming up to Lamberts Bay. Hertzog immediately drew in his horns. Foraying amongst the farmsteads of Prieska, Ken- hardt and Calvinia, he had let slip the moment when he might even have outrun the railway, which had now placed an im- penetrable fence of colunms in his way. He checked his advance on the Doom river, and Sir H. Settle, whose chief anxiety up to now had been to save the colony from being overrun, saw that the tide had reached its height, and immediately assumed the offensive.
On January 30th de Lisle and Colenbrander, supported by Bethune, were ordered to cross the Doom river and march on
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 71
Van Rhyns Dorp and Calvinia, which were occupied on February 6th. They found their advance unexpectedly easy. Hertzog, Hertzog fails making no pretence at resistance, fell back rapidly through Willis- ton, and thence past Carnarvon, which de Lisle reached on the i6th. But the Boer leader retired, not in alarm, but in hope ; his task in the west was completed, and he was now hastening to take his part in events of which his own incursion had been but the foreshadow. As he marched the chase grew weaker ; the same causes which drew him northward with equal urgency calling off his pursuers. More dangerous game than Hertzog was now afoot.
Meanwhile, it will be remembered that by the end of Decem- ber Kritzinger had penetrated the eastern part of the colony as far as Middleburg. On January ist, 1901, when Colonel D. Haig arrived to take command of the four British columns, Kritzinger was moving southward on New Bethesda, and orders were issued for Lowe and Grenfell to be railed to Graaff Reinet to forestall him by operating northward. Shute's colunm accompanied them to garrison this, the kernel of Boer influence in the colony, and from this time forth the place was kept quiet, if not loyal, by that officer's administration. Kritzinger, how- ever, who was now marching fast, was first in the town, and on the 4th Haig disposed his forces so as to enclose him, Byng on the east in front of the Cradock border, Grenfell on the south between New Bethesda and Graaff Reinet, Lowe on the west, whilst W. H. Williams remained to hold the passes of the Sneeuw Bergen on each side of the lofty Compass Berg. This pressure Pursuit of was too much for Kritzinger, who on January 6th, finding him- '^"''•"s^''- self checked in all directions but the west, turned that way as Hertzog had done on the other side of the colony, and for greater safety divided his forces into two parts, one of which imder Commandant Scheepers moved on Richmond, the other, under his own leadership, on Murraysburg. Haig at once followed in pursuit, much hampered by the want of reliable information, always the chief difficulty of a commander in chase of separated forces. On the 13th Kritzinger and Scheepers reunited ten miles west of Murraysburg, only to move southward singly once
72 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
more, the one by the Willowmore road, the other by that lead- ing to Aberdeen. Haig then sent Lowe round by rail to Prince Albert Road, and attempted to throw Byng and W. H. Williams between the Boer columns, Grenfell falling out to refit at Beaufort West. But the enemy was travelUng too rapidly to be caught ; on the i8th, Haig, reaching Willowmore, found the commandos still to the south of him, and with nothing between them and the coast. Mossel Bay, Knysna and all the coast townships were in a ferment, the first-named especially, for it was now an important supply dep6t for Haig's columns. The place had neither defenders, defences, nor transport until Captain W. L. Grant, R.N., arriving in H.M.S. Doris, by great energy succeeded in organising not only fencible forces, but a complete system of supply and communication with Haig. The subsequent appear- ance of H.M.S. Widgeon, which scouted beyond Plettenberg Bay, still further reassured the coast dwellers, who had given themselves up for lost.
On January 19th Lowe, from Prince Albert, was at Klaar- stroom, watching, but by no means safeguarding, the approaches to Cape Town, whilst the Free Staters, again separating, sprayed outwards over the seaboard counties, Kritzinger towards Kritzinger Oudtshoom, Scheepers towards Uniondale. Haig, now for the first time favoured by the configuration of the ground, soon had them in difficulties. Blocking the Oudtshoom — Klaarstroom end of the OHfants River valley with the columns of Lowe and Grenfell, who had now rejoined, he despatched W. H. Wilhams to Uniondale, whilst he himself with Byng drove down the Olifants from the direction of Willowmore. Wilhams, entering Uniondale early on January 21st, all but put a summary end to Scheepers, whom he surprised at breakfast with his commando at the village inn. The Boers escaped, however, with the loss of four of their number. Haig's dispositions now had the effect of herding the enemy amongst the Kammenassie mountains, where, on January 24th, Haig proceeded to surround them by means of Lowe and Grenfell on the west, Williams from the north, B5mg from the east, a fifth column — a new organisation of 500 Colonial Defence forces imder Colonel G. F. Gorringe —
near ihe coast.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 73
approaching from Steytlerville to co-operate. For two days Kritzinger lurked in the mountains, uncertain how to escape, for Haig's troops appeared to occupy every outlet. On January 26th he made a dash for the west by Dysseldorp, but running into Grenfell, who had artfully changed the stations of his piquets after dark, he retired precipitately. An attempt to emerge in the opposite direction near Avontuur was similarly foiled by Major H. E. Gogarty, who had come on from Willowmore with a party of details, the Boers losing five killed and several wounded. But Kritzinger, seeing that he must break out or be lost, renewed his attempt at the same spot before dawn on the 28th, and favoured by the darkness slipped by Avontuur and made for Haarlem, closely pursued by Gogarty, and threatened in front by Gorringe, who was approaching from the east over the diffi- cult mountain ranges between Uniondale and Steytlerville. Kritzinger's commandos lost nine men in the resulting skir- mishes, and broke up into small bands, which, scattering north- ward, fled into the Baviaans Kloof mountains, a stronghold of gorges and precipices.
Meanwhile Scheepers, instead of following his chief east- ward, had left him to attempt a break-back through Zuur- berg Poort towards Willowmore. The Groote Zwarte Bergen passages were here held by Parke's Yeomanry, whom Haig had especially cautioned to guard a certain footpath by which the enemy might escape. Scheepers' first attempt was frustrated, and he fell back in a somewhat perilous plight. He then heard that a party of Yeomanry was marching to block the footpath in question, which hitherto had been left unguarded. Knowing that his sole hope of safety rested on keeping this outlet open, he advanced towards the approaching troops with the intention of fighting. The Yeomanry, fifty in number, marching care- lessly without the proper scouts and flankers, were completely surprised, and after a brief resistance captured ; whereupon Scheepers, dashing for the footpath, got clear north of the Groote Zwarte Bergen. Now the Boer leaders, abandoning all idea of concerted action, made haste northward by widely different ^"'^l"p',
J J turned back
routes, Scheepers heading towards Beaufort West, Kritzinger in northward.
74 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
the direction of Aberdeen. Grenfell, clinging closely to Scheepers, harried him through Amos Poort, and on February 9th was in front of him at Letjesbosch, on the railway. Grenfell was then ordered into Beaufort West for more urgent operations elsewhere, and Scheepers had a temporary respite. Kritzinger, hunted by Lowe, and raced by W. H. Williams on the railway, made for Swanepoerls Poort, where a vain attempt was made to entrap him, thence over the railway near Klipplaat (February' 7th), and north-west, as if pointing on Murraysburg. On February loth he was at Been Kraal, amongst the headstreams of the Kariega river. Once more Haig reshuffled his cards, rail- ing Byng up from Willowmore to Aberdeen Road for Camdeboo, Gorringe from Uitenhage to Beaufort West for Murraysburg, Lowe to Graaff Reinet to forward supplies, whilst W. H. Williams was sent to beat up the Kariega River valley from its lower end. Byng's appearance at Camdeboo on the nth had the effect of deflecting Kritzinger north-eastward through Bassons Hoek to near Murraysburg, whence, given no rest, he circled towards Graaf! Reinet. On the i6th Byng pushed him hard, whilst Lowe coming from Graaff Reinet by way of Zuurpoort placed himself in front of the commandos. Thereupon Kritzinger, swinging rapidly westward and northward, hurried across the Sneeuw Bergen directly to Dassiefontein, south-east of Rich- mond. There on February 17th he found the pressure unex- pectedly eased by the withdrawal of three of the pursuing columns. The same urgent summons as had relieved Scheepers of Grenfell, and Hertzog of the attentions of de Lisle, Thomey- croft and all the columns in the west, now called Haig with Lowe, Byng and Williams to other parts of the colony. What that summons was Hertzog by this time knew, and Kritzinger News of De and Schccpcrs could surely guess. De Wet had crossed the Orange river ; he had been already a week within the colony, and the time had come for the consummation of the campaign in front of which the three Free State Commandants had scouted long and anxiously from the frontier down to the seaboards of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans,
To the Boers, Transvaalers as well as Free Staters, great
Wet
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 75
events waited on the inroad of De Wet. Two months earlier Kritzinger had written that the Cape farmers were only waiting for the event to rise en masse* Assistant-Commandant-General J. C. Smuts, when on the eve of his temporary trimnphs at Modderfontein and against Cminingham in the Gatsrand,t promised to come with General Beyers and 2,000 men to aid an enterprise of which the fruits were to be a " general revolution and declaration of Independence of Cape Colony . . . the beginning, not only of the real independence of the Republics, but also the dehverance of the whole of South Africa and the union of our people into a great nation from Table Bay to the Equator. "J But his hopes would have soared, less high had he known that the Free State Chief had already lost his most trusted weapon, that of surprise. De Wet had indeed been less adroit than usual in retaining it. Lord Kitchener had suspected and fully prepared for his design from its earUest initiation in the interior of the Orange River Colony. The proba- bility of an effort to wipe out the memory of the rebuff from the Caledon had always been recognised. The unrest in the Smithfield and Rouxville districts, and the bold perseverance of Kritzinger and Hertzog in Cape Colony tended to confirm the cloud of rumours which invariably arose whenever the invasion of British soil was in the air.
On January 22nd the Commander-in-Chief was warned that De Wet was on his way to join his commandos, the majority of which had been on furlough, at the Doomberg, north-east of Winburg. Next day the Free State leader, accompanied by President Steyn, crossed the railway near Holfontein Siding, and was traced on his way to the Doomberg, whereupon Major- General Bruce Hamilton at Kroonstad and Major-General C. E. Knox at Leeuw Kop were ordered to concentrate and engage him before he could organise his forces and set out for the south. The two British commanders arranged to attack the Doom-
* Kritzinger to De Wet, December 22nd, 1900.
t See Chapter VII.
X Smuts to De Wet, January 20th and February loth, 1901.
76 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Pursuit of De berg on the 28th ; but De Wet, who was watching as keenly the o^ge^ as he was watched, sHpped between the converging columns River Colony, on the night of the 27th, crossed the Winburg branch hne, and moved southward at full speed with more than 2,000 men under Commandants Froneman, Fourie and Haasbroek, two 15-pr. gims and a Vickers-Maxim. C. E. Knox, who was nearer than Bruce Hamilton, followed in pursuit at once with a twin command composed of forces imder Lieut.-Colonels T. D. Pilcher (Bedford- shire regiment) and C. P. Crewe (Border Horse), whilst Bruce Hamilton hurried into Winburg and Smaldeel, hoping to be able to throw his troops by train between the Boers and the Orange river. De Wet was travelling at a great pace ; but he was driving before him large flocks and herds, the food supplies for his intended campaign, and lingering to let these gain an offing, he allowed Knox to come up with his rearguard on the Tabaksberg, forty miles north of Thabanchu, on January 29th. Action on the The position was immensely strong, and Knox, sending Pilcher Jan. 29th, ' against the front, and Crewe with only 600 rifles and three *9oi- field guns around the Boer right flank, no less than ten miles
distant to the eastward, found his divided forces, which would have been fully employed even if acting together, almost over-matched. Pilcher, attacking doggedly, made ground with difficulty all day against a delaying action, which was dangerous from the accuracy of the shrapnel burst by De Wet's artillery- men. By the evening, with a loss of fifteen killed and wounded, including two officers, he had sent the Boer rearguard after its main body, and occupied its ground. Crewe, isolated to the eastward, fared more hardly. His appearance on the flank endangered the enemy's line of retreat, but he was too weak to push his advantage, and could barely withstand the resistance which his threatening position brought against him. Indeed, only the fine conduct of his troops, especially of the Kaffrarian Rifles, preserved him from destruction, for he was outnumbered by three to one, and it was vital to De Wet to disable him. In a fierce attack made in the afternoon the Boers got so nearly home that they actually surrounded and captured in his fines a Vickers-Maxim gun which had jammed. Crewe was then
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 77
practically surrounded; but seizing commanding ground in the
very midst of the enemy he concealed his transport below it,
and entrenched himself successfully, beating of? another heavy
attack deUvered during the night. Altogether his casualties
numbered thirty-five, making fifty in both columns. The
enemy lost about the same number, but they had Crewe's gun,
and had kept their southward road open. On January 30th
De Wet, outpacing Knox and forestalling Bruce Hamilton,
reached Israels Poort, whence, hearing of no body of British
troops between himself and the frontier of Cape Colony, he raced
on southward and disappeared. Lord Kitchener now saw that
direct pursuit was fruitless, and that De Wet could only be
headed upon the same swift steed that had outstripped Krit-
zinger and Hertzog, the railway. Ordering well-nigh every body Preparations
of troops in Cape Colony to the strategic points, and simimoning De wet's
the columns of Paget and Plumer from far-distant Balmoral and ij^^ision of
Brugspruit, he called in Bruce Hamilton and C. E. Knox to ° °"^"
Bloemfontein, to entrain for BethuUe. He further withdrew all
the township garrisons in the Smithfield and Rouxville districts,
and transferred the forces which had been acting in those districts
under Lieut.-Colonels E. B. Herbert and J. W. Hughes-Hallett
from the right bank of the Orange to the left. Finally at Naauw-
poort he concentrated a new mobile force, composed of the ist
(King's) Dragoon Guards and two battalions (900 men) M.I.,
just landed from England, the Prince of Wales' Light Horse,
3rd Dragoon Guards and G. battery R.H.A. The cavalry
and horse artillery were formed into a brigade under Lieut.-
Colonel E. C. Bethune ; two battalions of mounted infantry
with four field guns into a fresh column imder Colonel T. E.
Hickman (Worcestershire regiment). These and all other troops
in Cape Colony were then placed under Lieut. -General the Hon.
N. G. Lyttelton, who left the Pretoria — Komati Poort line of
communications to take charge of the defence of Cape Colony
against the oncoming Free State forces.
Whilst all these measures were being prepared against him, De Wet, with singular lack of penetration or information, ac- quired confidence instead of suspicion from the sudden cessation
78 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of the pressure on his rear, and delayed his march upon the Orange. Not until February 4th were his scouts in observation of the river, which they found so strongly guarded on both sides of Norval's Pont that a passage there was out of the question. Thereupon De Wet, crossing the railway at Pompey Siding, struck westward, and was lost to sight at the very moment when close touch would have been most valuable. He cleverly obscured his intentions as well as his movements. Even when it was discovered that he was pointing directly upon Sand Drift, the passage by which Hertzog had entered the colony six weeks previously, the continued presence of strong commandos under Fourie, whom De Wet had purposely detached in the Rouxville district, rendered it by no means impossible that the real invasion was to be from that side, and the westward march nothing but a blind. Awaiting the resolution of these alternatives, and with insufficient troops for both, Lyttelton held his forces in readi- ness for either until, on February 8th, on which day Fourie followed his chief, Bruce Hamilton, reconnoitring north-eastward from the line of the Slik Spruit, found the coimtry clear. To the west, then, the crossing would probably be made. On February 9th C. E. Knox was ordered from Bethuhe to Philip- polis, Bruce Hamilton to follow from the Slik Spruit, and the troops in the colony were directed towards Sand Drift.
On the nth Knox was at Philippolis, Bruce Hamilton at Priors Siding ; Plumer, passing through Colesberg, by a forced march reached Onverwacht, on the Seacow river. But these move- ments, admirably designed to shut in Sand Drift from both banks of the river, were two days too late. De Wet had thoroughly De Wet confused his opponents. On February loth whilst Army Head-
Orange river quarters were telegraphing to Lyttelton that they still believed Feb. loth, that the crossing place would be between Bethulie and Aliwal, ^^'' the Free State leader took all his forces across the Orange by
Sand Drift. On the 12th Pilcher, from C. E. Knox's column, traversed the flooded drift far behind him, followed by Bruce Hamilton who, after crossing, turned from the direct pursuit of De Wet to hasten for an intercepting position to the south of him. Then Plumer, coming down the Seacow with Cradock
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 79
and Jeffreys in extended line, encountered the heads of the invading commandos at Hamelfontein. This was a critical meet- ing, for all De Wet's hopes of penetrating into the interior of Cape Colony depended on his being neither delayed nor deflected at this moment. Plumer's problem, on the other side, was of the utmost nicety. To keep the invaders from the vitals of the colony he must not only turn them, but turn them westward. The enemy's left, in short, was the strategical flank, and Plumer, though he fully recognised this was fortunately served by subordinates able to anticipate his orders before they could be conveyed across the field. It happened that the enemy was first struck into by a reconnoitring squadron of the Imperial Light Horse, commanded by Captain G. T. M. Bridges, R.A. Had this party bungled in its tactics infinite harm might have resulted ; but the situation was as clear to Bridges as to his chief. He instantly sprang towards the proper flank and, establishing him- self in a defensive position, successfully clung to De Wet and warned him away from the east imtil Jeffreys' column, coming up, finally barred the south and east, and bent the hostile line of advance in the required direction. After a sharp skirmish, in De Wet is which six of Plumer's men were wounded, the Boers drew off ^j. ^"^ towards Phihpstown, whence another part of the Boer vanguard was beaten off by the small garrison, opportunely supported by Henniker's Coldstream Guards, after eleven hours' fighting.
De Wet now began to have misgivings. The preparedness of his adversaries, and their swift recovery from the false scent about Bethulie took him by surprise. He had intended to have penetrated the colony in three separate divisions, but forced marches had much diminished both his strength and mobility ; he was already short of 600 men, many of the remainder went afoot ; there were hostile columns both before and behind him. He had been compelled already to abandon his southerly incursion ; but his enforced deflection might yet turn to his ad- vantage, for Hertzog was pressing to join him with 1,500 fresh horses, the fruits of his forays amongst the stud farms of the west. On February 13th he swung back to the Hondeblafs river, and laagered at De Put, north of Philipstown. Here late in the after-
^ THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
noon he was unearthed by Plumer, who, drawing in his wings at Venter's Valley, had followed the trail closely from Hamel- fontein. Hastily mounting, the enemy retreated westward to Wolve Kuil, Pliuner, who was beset by a great thunderstorm, being compelled to call a halt at Leeuw Berg, after a march of thirty-four miles. The rain continued to fall ; all that night and the next both sides halted knee-deep in water. On the 14th the Boers, anxious to give their convoy time to get away over the quaggy roads which led around the northern end of the Bas Berg, stood firmly on the strong position at Wolve Kuil. Plumer lost no time in attacking, and once more one of his officers, this time Cradock, on his own ini- tiative anticipated his wishes by faUing instantly and with vigour upon the Boer left, thus holding them up still to the westward. Contained in front by the King's Dragoon Guards and Imperial Light Horse, and turned by the 3rd Imperial Bushmen and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, after consider- able resistance, which cost Plumer fourteen casualties, the Boers followed their transport around the Bas Berg, pursuit being shortly foiled by another storm which laid the tracks two feet deep in mud. Meanwhile C. E. Knox, hampered by the same causes, had not yet reached Philipstown, Pilcher, who led his advance, being still six miles short of that place, which was entered on the 15th. Then Knox, learning how closely Plumer was pressing the commandos, judged that they would soon double southward, Bruce Hamilton had already made De Aar, and Knox took his own troops towards Hout Kraal, where an armoured train and a small column composed of a company of the 3rd Grenadier Guards, two guns and 150 mounted troops under Colonel E. Crabbe had already arrived, expecting to be joined by another vmder Henniker, which was on the march from Philipstown. These bodies had been hastily formed at De Aar by Sir H. Settle for the express purpose of clinging to De Wet until the regular columns should arrive. At 4.30 a.m. on the 15th, before either Knox or Henniker appeared on the scene, Crabbe discovered the Boers in the act of crossing the railway four miles north of Hout Kraal. De Wet had destroyed
I
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 8i
the track on either side of the crossing, and the armoured train, which promptly steamed towards the spot, could only shell the rear portion of the convoy, whilst Crabbe was too weak to do more than follow in observation. About noon he was joined by Plumer, whose march in pursuit of the commandos would have been rendered intolerable by the morasses had not these ex- hausting obstacles held so many derelict Boer wagons as to cheer his men with evidence that the enemy's case was worse than their own. More than twenty wagons, for the most part laden with flour and ammunition, lay embedded in the mud, to be joined soon by as many of Plumer's. The night's scurry from Wolve Kuil and Plumer had indeed reduced the Boers to an abject plight. It confirmed the suspicion which had already arisen in the minds of the majority of the burghers, that their trusted leader's sole triumph in Cape Colony was to be that over the floods of the Orange river, a victory which that un- certain stream might yet avenge. They were now without re- De Wet in serve ammunition or the certainty of supply ; horses and men were faihng as rapidly as their adversaries were increasing around them. General Fourie, who had remained behind to attempt to extricate the wagons before they fell into Plumer's hands, had disappeared. At this moment their adventure threw off the last rags of the disguise which "had begun to drop from it from the day of their entering the colony. Nor was there now any burgher so bUnd as to mistake this headlong flight for the hurry of invasion. Later on the 15th Henniker joined forces at Hout Kraal, after skirmishing his way through from Philips- town with a few casualties. Next day the chase was resumed. The enemy had pointed on Strydenburg, and Plumer, most of whose supphes were still fast in the bogs of the Bas Berg, pressed on that way to Brits Kraal, followed by Crabbe and Henniker as far as Pienaars Pan, whilst C. E. Knox pushed his leading troops through Hout Kraal to Rhenoster Vlakte. On the 17th De Wet fled northward, intending to strike for Prieska by one of the lower drifts of the Brak river.
Whilst resting his weary forces at Gous Pan he was once more marked down by Plumer's efficient Intelligence Staff,
VOL. IV. 6
82 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
conducted by Captain B. Williams, R.E., who, fastening on the spoor, and guided more than all by the receipts for commandeered horses and provender which De Wet thoughtlessly left behind him at every farm, never lost touch with the enemy during 300 miles of tortuous riding. A threat of attack sent the commandos on again, to be hunted as far as Geluks Poort, where their breaking up into various bands seemed to indicate a dissolution. But at this moment Plumer was compelled to caU a halt. He was absolutely destitute of supphes ; neither man nor horse had fed that day, the latter were almost immoveable from fatigue. He had nm himself to a standstill at the very brush of his exhausted quarry. However, a few carts came up during the night, and Crabbe and Henniker, who closed up from the rear, shared what scanty rations they had with Plumer's starving troops, who thought themselves fortunate at receiving one biscuit apiece, with five pounds of grain for their horses, after a succession of forced marches as severe and under con- ditions as trying as it is possible to conceive. On February i8th the three columns pushed on, tracking the commandos by a trail of foimdered horses through Elsjes Vlakte and Gras Vlakte to Krans Pan. There at 4 p.m. the troops once more came in sight of the game, just as their own force was spent and that of De Wet's men renewed by the brief rest which was the re- ward of their short but irreducible lead. De Wet, too, had made good a measure of his losses in horseflesh by vigorous requisitions, and this advantage he retained throughout by depleting the stables and paddocks close in front of his pursuers. Next day (February 19th) Plumer employed his last fragment of strength in struggling on to Zout Pan. Halting there, he col- lected the remaining crumbs of his supplies, and picking from the three columns imder his command the best mounted men, he despatched them, 230 in number under Major Vialls (3rd regiment AustraUan Bushmen), towards the banks of the Brak to endeavour after all to deny the passage to De Wet, or at least to keep him in sight. Vialls started at 9.30 a.m. and bivouacked in the evening at Vrouw Pan, having reported to Plumer at i p.m. that the Boers were
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 83
now heading south-west, that is, up the course of the Brak. To intercept this fresh direction seemed impossible, which indeed it was for Plimier. But C. E. Knox, accurately forecasting on the i8th De Wet's dash towards Prieska, and knowing that the Brak ran high, had thrown his own troops wide on Plumer's left flank in the hopes of placing them between De Wet and the river, which a few hours' fine weather would convert from a barrier to an outlet of escape. Three messengers whom he sent to Plumer, who was at that moment lying well-nigh exhausted at Krans Pan, were captured by the enemy's scouts ; but Knox, though completely out of touch with his colleague, persisted in his movement, was at Springbok Vlakte on the 19th, and next day at Khp Drift on the Brak river, thus denying to De Wet all but the lower and heavier waters of the Brak. Knox even contrived to send a strong patrol under Pilcher across the raging stream to demon- strate upon the other bank towards Karabee. On the 20th Plumer, bankrupt of every form of supply, was forced to fall back on Elsjes Vlakte, bitterly regretting that — so he thought — he must yield the drifts of the Brak to a quarry who had so barely outstayed him. But Knox's tactics fully counterpoised the enforced abandonment of the direct pursuit. On the day of his appearance at Klip Drift De Wet arrived on the banks of the Brak some ten miles above its confluence with the Orange, and sought eagerly for a practicable drift. But the Brak was a torrent, "its great waves roaring like a tempestuous sea,"* DeWet foiled and it would have been less foolhardy to brave the troops of '^^ ^^^ ^^^^ Knox, whose approach was now reported, than the whirlpools of the swollen river. De Wet, however, had hopes of en- countering neither. One way of escape still remained, if indeed that could be called escape which exchanged one peril for anothe r, a way so hazardous that De Wet, before he threw the dice, thought proper to submit the chances to Mr. Steyn. This was to double back eastward, past the right flanks of Vialls at Vrouw Pan and Plumer at Elsjes Vlakte, and to dash for the Orange river
» "Three Years War," by C. R. De Wet, 1902. VOL. IV. 6*
river.
84 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
below Hopetovvn, trusting that the main stream might have fallen. The plan teemed with dangers. To be discovered meant to be hemmed in between two rivers at present impassable ; and even if undetected the Orange might remain in flood, when nothing but a miracle could deliver him. The first throw fell well. Taking advantage of a night of intense darkness, De Wet led his burghers, many of them dismounted, down a broad de- De Wet pression which sheltered him from Vialls' outposts, and striking
w^rd.^^^^' north-eastward was abreast of Plumer by dawn on February 2ist. By this time Vialls had discovered the evasion, and Plumer, receiving his report, hastily threw Crabbe and Henniker in the direction of the Leeuw Berg. C. E. Knox, it should be mentioned, had also anticipated this last shift of De Wet, and had done his best to close the gap between Plumer and the railway by ordering the Kimberley column, which was marching westward from Hope town, under Major Paris, to halt between that place and Geluks Poort. Then Knox himself, learning the news, began to move north-eastward towards Zout Pan, whilst Bruce Hamilton, who was at this moment driving another band of Boers from Beer Vlei towards Knox, deflected his columns instead towards Strydenburg. De Wet was thus shut into the great loop of the Orange, where it receives the Vaal, by a semi- circle of troops curving from the confluence of the Brak river through Bhnk Kop to Hopetown, whilst Plumer, Crabbe and Henniker, who were hurrying up by different routes to Welgevon- den, were close upon him. Still closer, though De Wet did not know it, was a party of Queensland Imperial Bushmen, whom Vialls had despatched from the Brak to keep contact with the commandos. These men, in spite of the difficulty of subsistence — for they carried no supplies and were directly in the wake of an enemy who left the farms bare — never lost the trail from beginning to end of the chase, and their feat was only robbed of its full value by the difficulty of transmitting news to Plumer. For De Wet all depended on the mood of the Orange river. The frontier stream proved to be in league with the waters of the Brak against their common violator. The Orange, although faUing, was still impassable. De Wet turned upstream, trying
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 85
every yard foi' a practicable crossing, only to find each drift a Finds the cataract. At the entry of the Vaal river the ferry punts, which J^^^bie ordinarily were moored there, were found to be destroyed. The report that a boat had been discovered some miles higher up sent the despairing commandos cantering in that direction ; and though the boat proved to be a mere wherry it was joyfully hailed as a means of escape from the dreaded colony. By the evening of February 21st 200 burghers had been trans- ported over the river by this means, a few more in their eager- ness crossing by swimming. The rest bivouacked at nightfall on the left bank, awaiting daylight to enable them to follow their envied comrades. But dawn brought news of Plumer's near approach, and De Wet hurried on to De Kalk, where he off-saddled and halted to draw breath. Here Plumer, who had marched in the dark from Welgevonden, discovered him about 10 a.m. and rushing upon him with all the force his wearied troops could muster, threw him in utter confusion past Kameel Drift, Slyp Steen and Dooters Kraal, the Boers scatter- ing in all directions. At Slyp Steen Plumer was informed about 3.30 p.m. that De Wet's guns were close ahead, with beaten animals. The troop-horses were all but exhausted, but a mixed party of his own and Henniker's men, consisting of the King's Dragoon Guards, Victorian Imperial Bushmen, and Imperial Light Horse, pushed on, led by Colonel Mostyn Owen and Henniker's staff officer. Captain R. J. Marker (Coldstream Guards). After a three hours' chase, which foundered most of Capture of the horses, the two pieces of artillery, a 15-pr. and a Vickers- ?,ns^** Maxim, were sighted on the road at Disselfontein, surrounded by burghers who, thinking that they had outrun pursuit, were preparing to bivouac. Every Boer immediately galloped in panic from the less than half a dozen troopers with Marker who had been able to urge their horses to the spot. By night- fall, when Plumer ordered a halt at Disselfontein, besides the guns and two ammimition carts, 102 burghers were prisoners, an unlooked-for celebration of the anniversary, the forty-seventh, of the foundation of their native State. Meanwhile, little more fortunate, De Wet and the rest struggled on upstream, hoping,
86 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
but scarcely expecting, to be able to double by the west of Hope- town and strike across the railway below the town towards Petrusville. But De Wet's rapid countermarch from the Brak river had actually saved him, by bringing the pursuit closer on his heels. When it had become certain that De Wet, foiled at the Pont, at Mark's Drift and every other drift within the angle of the Vaal confluence, was pushing south-east up the left bank of the Orange, it became of the first importance to inter- cept as well as press him. Pursuit alone, the hotter it was made, could but tend to drive him the faster out of the imprisoning angle towards an outlet only partially filled by Paris at Geluks Poort. Plumer, of course, could not abandon the direct pursuit. It was his incessant harrying alone which had turned De Wet's retreat into a rout. At any moment he might run the Boer down, and he knew too well the danger of relaxing even for an hour the pressure on so elusive a quarry. It was for the commanders in rear to provide the " stops," and one of these was prompt to recognise the emergency. Henniker, marching northward from Verlaten Dam upon Welgevonden, had perceived the advantage to be gained by a change of direction ; but though permission to turn eastward was given as soon as asked, it came too late. De Wet indeed had escaped but narrowly at De Kalk and Dissel- fontein ; but he asked no more ; he could at least run as fast as his pursuers could follow. As he approached Hopetown he learned that Paris' column extended between that place and Middelplaats. The discovery little dashed his rising hopes of safety. Paris' column was small, and alone. A rapid night ride would carry him around its flank with less risk than that which had led him past Plumer' s associated columns at Wel- gevonden. De Wet's chief anxiety was for his dismounted men, of whom he was now hampered by many. These it was impossible to take with him on a march so fast and far as that which lay before him. He therefore detached this unhappy band under Commandant Haasbroek, and bade them strike by a short cross road for the banks of the Orange, where they must trust to fate for a crossing. Then with the rest he rode all night clear around Paris, passing outside, that is, to the
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 87
westward of him, until, having got well to the south of Hope- DeWet town, he turned sharply eastward and broke across the railway Hopetown. above Kraankuil at 11,30 on the morning of February 24th.
Meanwhile Bruce Hamilton, by hard marching, had reached Strydenburg. At De Aar he had received orders from the Com- mander-in-Chief to block the west and south ; and moving up the Ongers river about Houwater he had been in touch since February 21st with a strong commando, evidently not that of De Wet, which he had chased northward through Beer Vlei, until, as described, the movements both of his own quarry and of De Wet himself turned him towards Strydenburg. Bruce Hamilton soon discovered that he was on the heels of no less Reappearance a personage than Hertzog, then hurrying from the raided western ° ertzog. counties to join his chief. On the evening of the 23rd Hertzog was still in front of Hamilton, travelling north-eastward with the evident intention of effecting a junction with De Wet above Hopetown ; but, turned, as De Wet had been, by the troops at Middelplaats, he swimg eastward instead, and darted in two bands for the railway. Bruce Hamilton, who was in Stryden- burg early on the 24th, thus found the pursuit of both the Free State leaders temporarily in his hands alone. For the moment Plumer and C. E. Knox, both beyond Hopetown, were out of the chase. Only Paris, turning rapidly southward from his now useless Middelplaats — Hopetown line, was following the stragglers of De Wet's broken bands north of the Elands Berg. Lyttelton had already, on the 23rd, ordered Thomeycroft, who had been left in a watching position further down the line, to entrain at De Aar for the north, to attempt to intercept De Wet wherever he should strike the line. With the rest of his troops he made after Hertzog's divided commando, which he was unable to prevent from crossing the railway at Paauwpan and Potfontein. Thomeycroft went very near to better fortune. At 10.30 a.m., an hour before De Wet began to cross above him, his trains arrived at Kraankuil ; but the station was so congested with transport trains that Thomeycroft did well to get his coliuim on the march by 2 p.m., when he hurried after De Wet to Bak- oven Pan. Next day, Febmary 25th, he pressed on the trail
88 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
towards Zoutpans Drift, to leam that De Wet had turned from that impracticable passage towards Petrusville. Thomeycroft heard also of Hertzog's approach from across the railway, in strength reported as 1,500 men. Whilst he continued the pur- suit up the Orange, Plumer and C. E. Knox marched into Hope- town, Crabbe and Henniker into Kraankuil, and a newly arrived column, under Hickman from Hout Kraal, to Philipstown. Of these Knox alone received some compensation for the enormous and apparently wasted exertions of the past ten days. News having been brought to him that Haasbroek's horseless unfortunates were engaged in stealing across the Orange by means of a small boat below Hopetown, Knox despatched thither the Scottish Yeomanry. Although the majority of the fugitives had crossed when the troops arrived, they secured thirty- seven burghers, killed ten, and were only prevented from doing greater damage by the jamming of the Maxim gun.
Meanwhile, the commandos flying with De Wet were under- going every vicissitude of hope and fear. The cheering effect of the successful passage of the railway was brief enough. The
The Orange Orange was still inexorable ; it ran even higher than before ;
abie.""^'*^" Zoutpans Drift was impassable ; Bosjesman's Drift, Vissers Drift, Lemoenfontein Drift, by Petrusville, were the same, and Thomeycroft chased the fugitives furiously through that town. A still greater danger than the direct pursuit was the column of Hickman, which was coming up on the flank from Philipstown ; but from this the Boers were deUvered by an error of tactics on the part of their opponents. Hickman had rightly intended to march straight on Sand Drift, where he might well have anticipated the commandos. Instead, he received an order to go to Petrusville, which would bring him in touch with Crabbe and Henniker, but must inevitably place him behind instead of before De Wet. As he reached De Put Hickman discovered the Free Staters hurrying out of Petrusville across his front eight miles ahead. He immediately dashed for the mouth of the Hondeblafs river ; but he was too late ; the enemy was already to the south of him. Meanwhile, Crabbe and Henniker reached Kalkfontein, Thomeycroft halting outside Petrusville.
EVENTS IN CAPE COLONY. 89
Lyttelton now rested upon the railway, the last expectation of heading De Wet, and he ordered Plrnner to entrain for Coles- berg, where Byng, from Haig's command, was about to detrain whilst W. H. Wilhams and Lowe, from the same force, had • been railed to Hanover Road, with orders to advance on Philips- town. With the Boers every hope centred on Sand Drift and many a prayer went up that the gateway which had ushered the commandos in to the conquest of Cape Colony should now let the remnants of them out to save themselves from destruction. But here, too, the water covered man and horse, and the two burghers who tested the crossing for the rest aU but lost their lives. As De Wet, his hopes nearly extinguished, turned once Union of De more upstream, he was joined at last by Hertzog and Brand with ^^^ »"d all their burghers; with them came Fourie. last seen below the ""''"^• Bas Berg. Such a union, effected in the very midst of encircling columns, and in the course of a disastrous flight, constituted a tactical feat as wonderful as it was now useless. Hertzog's reward for his bold entry into the zone of peril could only be to share the confusion and perhaps the capture of his general On February 27th the British cordon began to tighten round both, though the converging movements were much retarded m the case of some of the columns by delays in the railway arrangements, of others by the length of the marches and the severe storms which ruined the marching. The neglect to post signallers on Coles Kop, whose lofty summit became visible to every column in turn, further militated against speedy com- munication and transmission of orders and information On this day Hickman was in closest touch with the enemy whom he might have shut in had the line of the Seacow been held in time. On the 28th Byng was about De Eerste Poort, intending to throw his right to the Orange at Twyfel Poort, his left towards Karee Kml, where Lowe and Williams would link him with Hickman at Venters Valley. On Hickman's left at Riet Valley was Thomeycroft, coming down to close the Hartzen Berg from Kattegat, Crabbe and Henniker at Elands Kloof beyond completing the circle to the river. Plumer was hastening up from Colesberg ; Paris, who since the 24th had been on the trail
90 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
of a wandering party in the direction of Britstown, was ap- proaching Venter's Valley from Kraankuil. These movements, improvised by consultation between the various commanders during the morning of the 28th, were in progress when they were suddenly interrupted, about 2 p.m., by the news that De Wet had already crossed the Seacow river opposite Goede Hoep, and was two hours on his south-eastward way. Byng, who was at that time about Weltevreden, immediately threw his flankers out to Bastards Nek — Rietfontein Ridge, following with his main body to Ortlepp's Request, marching forty-five miles during the day in the endeavour to get to the Orange at Colesberg Bridge before De Wet. But his efforts were in vain. A long night march had carried De Wet across the front of the columns, and on to the bank of the Orange at LeHefontein, close to