£/e/
Section
|
A N r |
■if |
|
npartial Enqufey |
■.T,i,i00' |
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Into the EXISTENCE and |
NATURE OF GOD:
Being a Modest Essay towards a
more Intelligible Account of the
DIVINE PERFECTIONS.
With Remarks on feveral A U T H O R S
both ANCIENT and MODERN; and
Particularly on fome Paflages in Dr. Clarke's
DEMONSTRATION OF THE
BEING AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.
In TWO BOOKS.
With an APPENDIX concerning the Nature of SPACE andDURATION.
The Third Edition.
With confiderable Additions and Improvements, made partly
witii Regard to fome Objedions of the Reverend
Mr. JACKSON.
. . -
By Samuel Collider.
Sapiejitiam fibi adimuut, qui fine iilh Judicio Inventa Majorum probarit. Sed hcc eos faliir, quod 'Majorum nomine audits^ non putant fieri poJJ'e ut ant ipf. plus fapianty, quia Minores vocantur^ aut illi defipueritity quia Majores no77iinanUu\
Laftantius Lib. 2. Divinarum Inft. Cap. 8,
LONDON: Printed for R. Robinson, at the Golden Lyon in St. Paul's Ckurch-Tard. Mdccx.xxv.
THE
PREFACE.
H E general good Recep- tion which this Eflay has met v/ith from Men of Learning and Impartiality, has orivcn Occalion to ano- ther Edition ; in which Care has been taken to make feveral Additions and Im- provements. ........
What I have further to fay "By way of Preface, fhall be comprized in few Words.
If the main Principles contained in this Enquiry are either felf-evident, or elfe fully demonflrated ; if the Hypo- thefes propofed for obviating Objcdlions are agreeable to Reafon, and not difa- A 2 agreeable
i:he P R E F A C E. greeable to Scripture ; if by proceeding upon thofe Principles and Hypothefes, not only the great Truths of Religiou have been eftablifhed, but a Difcovery has been made of the Grand Source of Error, which has for many Ages lain hid, like the Head of the Nile^ and o- verwhelmed the Chriftian World with Difputes and Contentions (as fome are inclined to think) I have fufficiently gain'd my End.
But if this fhould not be the Cafe, yet 'tis hoped this Eflay may ftill be of Ufe, by giving Occafion to fome abler Perfon to undertake the fame moft difficult and important Enquiry with Succefs.
In the mean time, I enjoy the Satis- faction of having, (in the midfl: of Dif- couragements) contributed my lincereft Endeavours towards promoting the Caufe of Religion in general, without being bigoted to the particular Intereft of any Sed or Party whatever.
S, COLLIBER.
THE
'mmM
THE
CONTENTS
OftheFirft BOOK.
CHAP. I.
HE Agreeahlenefs^ natural fenden- cy\ and tiniverfal Concern of this En- quiry. Some Account of the At- tempts "which ha'ue heen formerly madc^ ^tth the Reafons of any ill Succefs they may have had. A Vie^ of the Methods ufed by the Indians, Chaldeans, Perfians, Phoenicians, Ethiopians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Jews and Chriftians.
CHAP. ir.
Miftales both of ]c\vs ^;;^ Chriftians, chicfy derived fro?n the Greek Philofophy. Its Fa- ruty and Uncertainty, 'the feilimony ^Cicero. Theprefent Age not free fro?n its ill Influences, two Extre?Hes of "which the Learned of the prefent Age appear to be general^ guilty, the Univerfality of the Idea of a God, no neceffary Proof of its being innate, the Probability of its being derived from tradition.
A3 CHAP.
r-
The CONTENTS.
C H A P, III.
tradition not to he entirely depended on ^ ^hen a Thing is capable of immediate Proof from Reafon. The two Fundamental Principles of all our other Knowledge. A Demonliration of the Exifience of the Divine Beings from the Conft deration of our own Evidence. Of the 'Nature of Ablblute Neceflity, and its Con- neBion with All poflibl^e Perfections.
c h'^a p.^' iv.
An Enquiry into the general Idea ofVer^ fe£bion. PerfeBion is Relative and Deter^ minate,
CHAP. V.
A Proof of the Unity of God, derived from the Nature of an ahfolute Necejftty of Ext' Hence,
C H A P. VI.
A Lift of our particular Ideas of the <y^- preme or Divine PerfeBions, in fuch Order as they feem mofi naturally deducible from the general Jdea.
■}'^^ CHAP. VII.
AnlExplanation and particular Proof of the Truth of thofe Ideas. Self-adivity pro- ved from the Conjf deration of Motion. An eternal EfeB impojftble. Gravity fto necejfary Property of Matter. IntelligencCj or Self- conlcioufnefs, another Property or Power of
the
The CONTENT S.
the ahfohtely necejfary Being. Its Proof. Liberty, or Self-determining Power, a third Property of that Being. Its Proof The Na- ture ^' Guilt, or Obligation to Punifhment. /// fwhat RefpeBs Humane Liberty differs from the Di'vine or mofi perfeB Liberty. Of the Connexion of the moral Attributes of God 'with the natural. An Enquiry into the Opi- nion of particular eternal Decrees, and its un- avoidable Confequences, Of Eternal Truths,
CHAP. VIII.
Of Spirituality, Conftancy, or Immutabi- lity, Happinefs.
CHAP. IX
Cy Omnipotence, or perfect effe£l:ive Power. Its proper ABion tmoo-fold^ v/z. Creation and Suftentation. Cic^ition from Nothing a Poffibi- lity. ObjeBions anfwered. Suftentation a ne- cejfary Confequence of fuch Creation. Omnipo- tence proved from the Nature of Creation and Suftentation. The proper Notion of Annihila- tion. Of Perfect Wifdom. Its Nature and particular Proof (yOmnilcience. How it is to be conceived as effential to the Divine Being.
CHAP. X.
CyGoodnefs or Benevolence. Its Notion.
Whence derived. The Certainty of a proper
Creation and Suftentation. The Idea of Om-
niprefence derived from the Suppofttion of Crc-
A 4 ation
the CONTENTS.
ftt'fon and Suflentation. RefleBtons on the Fundamental Principles (9/'Spinofa*s Syjtem.
CHAP. XI.
Of the Divine Government. Its Idea 'whence derived. It includes both the orderly Dijpofition and Regulation of the fever al Parts ef the World, ihe Method of dealing ijoith Atheifls in demonfiratingthe Wifdom of God in the Creation, The prefent Confiitution of the World ahfolutely unaccountable by the Prin- ciples of Ripicmus, Proved infeven Infiances. ObjeBions anfwered. Tuoo Sorts of SubjeBs of the Divine Regulation ; the former governed by InftinB^ the latter by Laws. Brutes not guided by an internal intelleBual Principle^ nor mere Machines. InJtinBs 'what. Govern- tnent by Laws two-fold^ viz. of Particulars and Comfnunities, T'he Foundation^ Rule^ In^ (irument and Reality of this Government. T'he two necefj'ary Salifications of its Sub^ jeBs. I'he immutable Reafon ^ Juftice, and of Rewards and Punfhments in the Exercife of it. The Necef/lty of our being obliged by the bidtates of Reafon as Laws of the Creator. Twelve Propofitions, explaining and vindica- ting the Methods of the Divine Government of Particulars asfuch. Of the Nature of moral Good and Evil: Of Ho line fs and ijufiice ; of Repentance^ fiCc. Six Propofttions relating to the Divine Government of Communities.
CHAP.
The CONTENTS.
CHAP. XII.
Of Providence. Its Notion. How dlftin- gmjh'd from the Notions of Creation, Suften^ tatton, and Government. Opinions of Ph'tlo- fophers concerning a Providence. Its Certain- ty and Univerfality. jHs of Providence with regard to Particulars, of little Weight 'with Men of irreligious Principles. 'The Reafon. Eight remarkable Infiances of a general Pro- vidence.
The Contents of the Second Book.
PART the Firft.
THE general Deftgn of the following Dif- courfe. The moft likely Method of fuc- ceeding in itpropofed. A Divifton of the Jrea- tife. The Weaknefs of certain pretended De- monftrations of the Exiftence of God dete^ed. Notional Truth and Real Truth diftinguijh'd. Of the Perfe^ion of the Divine Idea in our Minds.
PART the Second.
CHAP. I.
AfL'ort Hi [lory of the /FordlnHnitc, and its Synonyma, as applfd to the Deity,
CHAP.
The CONTENT S.
CHAP. IL
■>;>f/? Enquiry into the Opinion of an A'bfokte or Pofitive Inlinity. Various Notions of Infi-^ nity. A Search into the Scripture Proofs of an abfolute Infinity, fen Arguments from Rea- fonpropofed and conftdered.
CHAP. III.
Of the Ufefulnefs of the Opinion of an Ahfo- lute or Pofitive Infinity.
CHAP. IV.
Of the Confequences of that Opinion. Va- nini'j Defer iption ofQod.
PART the Third.
't'wo ufual Methods of conceiving Eternity. fheir Incomj'eniencies. A Medium propofed. Ohje^ions anfwefd.
The At p e n d i x.
A N
( II )
A N
Impartial Enquiry
INTO THE
Exiftence and Nature of G O 2),
BOOK the FIRST.
CHAP. I.
H E human Mind is never fo agree- ably employ'd, as when it tries its Strength in Enquiries of this Sort: When it takes a View of the whole Frame of Nature, and difcovers the mighty Spring which fet it In Motion : When it pierces into the inmoft Subftance of Things to that invifible Cement which unites them : When it traces them back to their Original, and from the Nature of the Effefls infers the Perfedlion of the Caufe ; and when from a nearer Acquaintance with the Perfedion of the Firft Caufe, it proceeds to form Rules for its own Condu(5t,
in
1 2 An ImpartUl Enquiry into the
in order to a more exaft Conformity to fo noble a Pattern.
Some Thoufands of Years have been already fpent in thefe Enquiries, and confiderable Difcoveries have been made both from Scripture and Reafon ; fuffici- ent at leaft for the Condud of Life, and perhaps e- nough to have fatisfied any Age lefs curious and phi- lofophlcal than our own. But it has been our Fortune to vifit the World, at a Time wherein as we have feen the Range and Compafs of human Knowledge fo nice- ly adjufted and determined,* fo we fee daily Attempts towards the extending it to'its iitmoft Limits. The Event, it is to be hop'd, may at laft be^ that the great Truths of Religion will be tix'd on their proper and natural Principles, and fetin fo clear a Light, that by a nearer Agreement in Opinion, human Nature may appear with more Uniformity, and Piety may be thought as hecelTary to complete the Charafter o'f a Man of Senfe, as Libertinifm and Immorality have been.
'Tis, I think, the Right and Duty of every ca- pable Perfon .to improve and employ his Faculties, and to take his own Meafures in the Search of Truth, There muft be a Judgment of Dlfcretion with refe- rcince to the Scriptures, and a Liberty of Reafoning in all other Cafes ; provided they be exercifed with Mo- defly, from a fmcere Defire to difcover and embrace the Truth, and with entire Submiflion to better In- formation.
I conceive, that whoever will undertake an Enqui- ry of this Nature, can't begin it better, than with an impartial Search into fuch Miflakes and Mifmanage- ments as may have caus'd the ill Succefs of for- mer Enquiries. Several of thefe we may be capable of detecting in the prefent Cafe : Which we fhall briefly mention •, not with Defign to expofe the Fail- ings and Weaknefles of others, bvit purely to form "iiich Cautions as may be of Ufe to ourfelves.
The
* See Mr. Locke of Hum. Und. Book 4. Chap. 3.
Nature ^w^ Exiftence of GOT>. 13
The Occafions of any ill Succcfs that hath attended former Enquiries, we Ihall find to have been cither more general and common to all or moft ot the prer ceeding Ages and Nations, or more particular and peculiar to fome.
The more general will appear to have been, I. Intercjl and Dcfi^}/. Thefe were efpecially thp Imperfeftions of the Priefts. The firft Lawgivers, or Founders of Civil Government among the Pagans, finding how difficult it was to infufe the Sentiments of Religion and Civility into the ftupid unthinking Vul- gar by Argument and Pcrfuafion, did it moil elTec- tually by a Pretence of divine Enthufiafms and Re- velations. By this Method they wifely ferv'd them- fclves of the Principle of Fear, which is ever the Itrongeft and mod vigorous Spring of Action, and which we ufually find to be moft predominant in thofewho lie Icaftopen to the Methods of Convi6lion. Hius Zavwlxis wrought the rude unpolifh'd Scythians into a Belief that he received the Laws and Precepts of his Religion in a Den, where he faid he conversM with the Gods. Niana, the Founder .of Religion and Civility among the Romans, is faid to have con- ceal'd himfelf in a Wood, pretending to receive In- llrudtions from the Goddefs Jigeria. And Mango Copac, the Introducer of the Peruvian Superftition, is reported to have feign'd himfelf to have been fent on his Errand by his Parent the Sun.
To carry on the Defign fo fuccefsfully begun, we find that a certain Order of Men was every where inftituted, whofe peculiar F,mployment it was to in- ftrud the People in the Duties of Religion. And to give the greater Reputation and Authority to the Priefthood, we find that Princes themfelves thought it no Difparagement to unite the Mitre with the Crown, nnd at once to rule and teach their Subjecfts. Thus among the ancient Egyptians, the Kings were always inverted with the High-Prieilhoo.d, and entrufted
with
14 An Impartial Enquiry into the
with the Myfteries of their Religion as well as Go- vernment. The like is reported of Numa among the Roinans.
But though the Defign of thofe primitive Law- givers was good, yet fince their Models of Reli- gion were not fufficiently founded on Reafon, but politickly fet together in fuch Manner as was mofl agreeable to the Humour and Relilli of the People to whom they were prefcrib'd, and moft fubfervient to the prefent Intent of the Inftituror ; they, in time, prov'd the Occalions of great Inconveniencies. For the Pretence of Revelation became an effeftual Bar to future Improvements : The Priefts fearing left the Alteration of any Particular fhould tempt the People to fufped: the whole, and call in queftion the preten- ded Revelation on which 'twas founded. And the Priefthood, which at firft was fo noble and ufeful an Inftitution, degenerating by Degrees into a Trade, and being taken up by moft with no other View or Defign but that of Gain, the Priefts foon found it their Intereft to difcourage all fuch Speculations as tended to breed a Diflike of that Superftition which yielded them fuch great fecular Emoluments.
In fome Countries indeed we read, that the Priefts were Philofophers too. But tho' we may believe that they themfelves, by the Exercife of Reafon, difcover'd the Vanity of divers of thofe Methods of Religion that had been imposed on the People ; yet they induftri- oufly conceal'd their Sentiments as Myfteries not to be imparted to the Vulgar, whofe Ignorance was the chief Support of that profitable Devotion which In- tereft taught them to cherifti and improve. At leaft, they were not perhaps inclinable to be at the Expence of much Pains in Matters of Speculation, while they obferv'd the People might be treated at a far cheaper Rate with trifling Ceremonies and religious Pageantry. This is certain, that we find 'em, in the general, to have been fo far from inftruding the People either in
better
Nature and Exiftencc of G OT). 15 better Principles or Methods of WorAiip, that they rather added to the Impofture, by irequenc Inven- tions of new and more gainful Fopperies.
2. Another confidcrable Obftruftion to the Incrcafc and Improvement of Divine Knowledge inthe tormer Ages of the World, was Fnde or Vmiiy. This feems toliave been the epidemical Dileafe of the Philofo- ■phers. We may trace its Symptoms as well among the flovenly Cyjiicks of Greece^ or the favage Gyimio-
jhpbijh of Ethiopia, as among the politer Magi ot Per- fta, or Bracb??ia?]soi' India. This divided them into innumerable Facftions, and often caufed their Philo- fophy to degenerate into big Words and infignificant Sophiftry; while almoft every Man had a more paf- Oonate Concern for the Reputation of his Sed, than for the Intereft of Truth. A remarkable Inftance of this philofophical Pride is to be met with in the Life oi Apollonius Tyancrus j who travelling into India to converfe with the Brachmans, was told by them, that he might propofe what Queftions he pleafed, fince he was come to Men who knew all Things. And for ought appears, by their magical Jugglings, and a few quibbling Replies to his Quellions, they at laft fo far impos'don that Philofopher, as to work him in- to a Belief of this their pretended Omnifcience. And certainly, when Men once arrive either at fuch a Pitch of Diftraflion as to imagine themfelves ignorant ot nothing, or at fuch a Degree of Folly as to believe it concerning others, we need not be furpriz'd if either the former Sort lay afide all Endeavours after further Improvement, or die latter negled all other Methods, and depend entirely on the oracular Dictates of luch Pretenders.
3. Another Hindrance- to this Sort of Knowledge, was Ignoran!: Zeal. This was the general Unhappi- nefs of the Populace, and was a Tool which their Priefts very well knew how to ufe to their own Ad- vantage. Thus when Socrates had divulg'd fome No- tions
1 6 An Impartial Enquiry into the
tions tending to mar their Trade, they faird not to fet the People againft him, and never ceas*d till that great Man fell a Sacrifice to their Refentments. This, and divers other Inftances of the like Nature, could not but be a very great Mifchief, either by en- tirely difcouraging Enquiries of this Sort, or at leail by obliging Men to diflemble and difguife their Sen- timents.
Thefe appear to have been the general Caufes of the little Progrefs of Divine Knowledge in the former Ages of the World. The more particular are to be deriv'd from the peculiar Genius and Conflitutions of the feveral Nations and Sefls which have diftinguiOi'd themfelves in this Sort of Philofophy. Thefe were the Eajlern Pagans^ the Greeks, the Romans, the Jews, and the Chrijlians.
I . The Eaftern Pagans, fuch were the Indians, Chaldeans, Perfians, Pb^nicians, Elhiopians, and E- gjptians. Thefe appear to have been, in the general, of a light, defultory Wit, impatient of Thought, conceited of their Knowledge, fcorning to borrow from others, and backward to communicate of their own. Their Divine Learning was preferv'd, or ra- ther imprifon'd, by certain particular Orders or So- cieties : Among the Indians by the Bracbmans, a- mong the Chaldeans and Perfians by the Zabii and Magi, among the Ethiopians by the Gymnofophifts, and among the Egyptians by their ArfepedonaptcB or Priefts. It confifled of certain Cabala''?, or Rhapfo- dies of Traditional Opinions, neither clearly exprefs'd, nor, perhaps, well underftood. Thefe they appear to have taken upon Trufb, convinc'd by no other Argument fo much as by the Reputation and Autho- rity of their Brahma, Zoroajler, Hermes, and the o- ther Introducers of their refpeflive Superftitions. The Dictates of thefe they efleem'd as facred and unim- proveable •, and thought they acquitted themfelves fufficiently well, by barely tranfmitting them fafe to
their
Exigence and Nature of G 0T>, 17
their Pofterities. Their Reputation for Wifdom in Divine Matters feems to have been owing chiefly to their magical Tricks and myftick Ceremonies and Hieroglyphicks : It being the general Weaknefs of Men moil to admire what they leaft comprehend.
2. The Greeks. Thefe learn'd the Rudiments of their divine Philofophy from the Egyptians. Orphe- us, who firll imported the Egyptian Myfteries into Greece^ began that Commerce, which was carried on and improv'd by many of the fucceeding Poets and Philofophers •, infomuch that it foon became a com- mon Praftice to travel into other Countries to traf- fick for Notions, and to pick up ftraggling Tradi- tions, which when they came home they drefs'd with a Grecian Air, and vended for their own. Yet thefe were generally the bell of their, Philofophers. For fuch who kept at home, and fpun their Opinions out of their own Brains, (though divers of them Men of great Wit and Induftry) were, for the molt Part, too much troubled with the Itch of Innovation, and the Ambition of feeming confiderable, by fetting themfelves at the Head of new Se(5ls. Hence fprung perpetual Brawls *, and a confus'd Medley of Opi- nions, till their Philofophy ftheir Morality except- ed) either vanifh'd in Scepcicifm, or to a great De- gree degenerated into the moll ridiculous Sophiilry.
3. The Romans. Thefe were at firil a rude un- polilh'd People, more addi^led to Arms than Arts. 'Twas a confiderable Time before they would admit the Greek Philofophy -, partly out of Pride, as fcor- ning to be taught by Interiors -, partly out of Poli- cy, as fearing left it fliould foften and debafe their Spirits. But afterwards, we find they feldom con- quer'd a Country, but they were very careful to in- troduce its Gods into the Pantheon, and its Arts and Sciences into their Academies. The firll of the Grecian Arts that got Atlmifllon at Rome, and made
B Way
* Vid. Luciani TImon.
1 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the
Way for the reft to follow, was Rhetorick. Though nothing feem*d better quahfied to abtain a Welcome among thofe rough Mortals than the Art of Perfua- fton itfelf, yet its Succefs was not fo much the Effe<5b of its own Force, as of another Caufe. Rome was at that time become an Enemy to the Name, as well as to the Power of Kings, and had moulded itfelf into the Form of a Common-wealth. The fupreme Power refided in the People, and fuch as could beft make their Court to them, ftood the faireft Candi- dates on all Eledtions to Places of Honour and Pro- fit. This made all who afpir*d to Commands in the Common-wealth, very fond of that Art which gain- ed them fo great Influence on the People, and taught them to govern their Superiors. Wherefore, we need not wonder that Rhetorick loft nothing, but ra- ther improv'd by being tranfplanted to Rome, where no Culture was wanting to render it more flourifhing than in its native Soil. But as for Philofophyy the Cafe was different. The Philofophers had wrangled themfelves out of much of that Reputation they had formerly gain'd. They found but few Dionyfmffes, or Alexanders, even in Greece. Befides, the Bent ot the Roman Genius was entirely turn'd upon A6lion. A People bred amidft the Noife of Arms, could find but little Convenience for Contemplation. And even afterwards, when Philofophy began to be more faftiionable at Rome, we find but few that made it their Bufinefs. The Generality confider*d it chiefly as an agreeable Amufement in their Retreats from the Service of the Publick ; content to ftrike in with Ibme or other of the Grecian Sedls, without at- tempting either to fet up for themfelves, or to im- prove on the ancient Stock.
4. The Jews. Their Theology appears to have been entirely founded on Divine Revelation. They reafon- ed but little upon it for a long. Time, having lefs
Temptation
Exigence and Nature of GOT>. 19 Temptation than other Nations, as enjoying that Sa- tisfiidtion by a long Series of Miracles and Predidions, which as efteftually convinced them of the Truth of their Revelation, as the immediate Teftimony of Reafon could have done. Yet when Miracles and Predidlions became lefs frequent, towards the Decli- nation of the JewiJJj State, we find they began to philofophife after the Manner of their Neighbours, cfpecially after their Conqueft by Autiochus Epipba- nes, who erefted an Academy at Jerufakm to in- ftru(ft them in the Pythagorean^ Platonkk^ and Epi- curean Philofophy. Thence fprung divers St&.s, and Variety of abfurd Opinions, which, in a great Degree continu'd, notwithftanding the fevere Pro- hibition of the Greek Philofophy by x.\\t Maccabees. In general, they appear to have been no great Ma- ilers in the Art of Reafoning j both their ancient and modern Philofophy being little elfe but a Medley of ridiculous Apophthegms, and extravagant Conceits concerning their Law and their Traditions, which they prefer before it.
5. The Chrijlians. Thefe reafoned but little at firft, chiefly from the fame Caufe with the ancient Jeivs^ viz. on account of the frequent Miracles, which were more confirming to themfclves, and con- vi(5tive to their Adverfaries than Arguments. When they began to difpute with the Heathens, they ufu- ally fought them with their own Weapons, and con- futed them from their own Principles : For the moft celebrated Fathers of the primitive Church were bred in Plato's School. Yet though the Platonick Philo- fophy did fome Service againft their Adverfaries, it at laft turnM to the great Prejudice of themfclves ; for fome of its Principles not well fuiting with di- vers ofthe Do(flrines of their Religion, produced endlefs Difputes, which not a little diftratSted their Thoughts, and prevented the Improvement of real Knowledge. In Time Plato's Philofophy grew out B 2 of
20 An Impartial Enquiry into the
of Reputation, and Arijlotle (firft introduced by Boetius) began to be ador'd. Then Learning was nothing elfe but an Infight into his Opinions, and that was always reputed Truth which he afferted. Soon after the Papal Hierarchy was eftabhfhed, chiefly by Means of the Ignorance and well-manag'd Superftition of the conquering Barbarians. Then Learning, fuch as it was, was confined to the Con- vents, and no Sin fo zealoufly reprov'd and punifli- ed in the People as the Sin of knowing too 7?iuch. Men of Parts were every where lifted to fupport a pretended Infallibility, and Reafon was brib'd to vote in Favour of its two greateft Adverfaries, Igno- rance and implicit Credulity. At laft, the Refor- 77iation commenc'd ; Ignorance and Credulity grew out of Reputation, and a generous Senfe of Liberty began to revive. But the curious and inquifitive Part of Mankind, too timorous at firft in the Ufc of the Liberty they had gain'd, inftead of taking their own Meafures in the Search of Truth, were careful only to reftore the ancient Learning, and condemn'd themfelves to dig in the Rubbifh of An- tiquity. By" this Means they gave a Refurreftion to an Infinity of Opinions, which perhaps had bet- ter lain buried as before -, and *tis but of late that People have made an impartial Ufe of their Reafon, and introduc'd a fort of Free Philofophy^ which yields a better Profpedl of Succefs than ever.
CHAP. II.
BY what has been obferved, it appears, that the ill Succefs, both of Jews and Chrijiians, in En- quiries of this Nature, was chiefly owing to their too great Affeftation of fome of the Grecian Sefts j of whofe Methods, though we could have given no Account from Hiftory, yet we might have found
fuf-
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 21
fufficient to have producM in us no great Opinion of their Difcoveries by the Idea Cicero gives us of their, divine Philoibphy in his Book !)<? Natura Dsorum.
'Tis the general Obfervation of that learned Ro- man^ that nothing can be imagined fo filly and ri- diculous which has not found a Patron among thofe Philofophers. And though they managed fome of their Proofs of the Exiftenceof a God with fufficient Evidence, yet when they came to treat of his Na- ture, he affurcs us he found them fo abfurd and va- rious, that he thought it a fruitlefs Labour to reckon up their Opinions. For, it feems, they were many of them fo fond of Variety, that they had too little Regard for Truth or Probability ; and were fo care- ful to difagree from each other, that they fometimes negledbed to be confiftent with themfelves. Which Humour of Novelty and Contradidlion has no lefs difcover'd itfelf on other Occafions, but efpecially in their Difputes concerning the material Principle of the Univerfe, and concerning the fummum Bonum, or fupreme Good.
How malignant an Influence thofe Diflentions have had on an Age, which is ft ill too generally in- clin'd to limit the utmoft Extent of Science by the Opinions of the Ancients, is evident. Multitudes are tempted to doubt of, and not a few to disbelieve what appears to have been fo little underftood by thofe mighty Pretenders. And even fuch who pro- fefs a confirm'd and fettled Perfuafion of the Exif- tenceof a God, are yet, for the moft Part, difpo- fed to lay afide all Enquiries into the Perfecftions of his Nature, as Things entirely above their Sphere and Capacity.
Yet, left the Underftandings of Men fliould ap- pear with lefs Variety than in former Ages, we have another Sett of Gentlemen devoted to the Cartefian Metaphyftcks, who would perfuade us, that the Deity. is the plaineft and moft evident Thijig i;i Nature. B 3 That
/
22 An Impartial Enquiry into the That every Man brings into the World an innate Idea of a God, or a Confutation of Atheifm, as it. were, engraven on his own Mind. And that if we have not from thence a fufficiently clear and di- ftind Knowledge of our Maker, 'tis not for Want of Light and Perfpicuity in the Objecft, but through a wilful Bljndnefs, and the moft culpable Inadver- tency in ourfelves.
As for the Gentlemen of the former Perfuafion, it would, I conceive, be to little Purpofe to go a- bout to convince them of the Poflibility of a fa- tisfaflory Knowledge of the Deity by Arguments, unlefs we could make the Experiment, and convince them by the Succefs of the following Eflay.
And as for the latter Sort, I perfuade my ielf, it would be alike impertinent, in this Place, to fpend Time in arguing againft their pretended innate Idea, when the whole fucceeding Difcourfe will, 'tis hoped, be the bed Confutation of it. For if it can be made appear, that God has given us the Ability of ncquiring a fgfficient Knowledge of Himfelf in the Way of Reafoning, it will, 'tis conceiv'd, be abun- dantly clear,how unneceffary it is to fuppofe any fuch Epicurean Prolepfis, or Anticipation of the Ufe of Reafon, as is imply'd by the Opinion of an innate Idea. For as the late excellent Mr. Locke obfer- ved, ^twere impertinent to imagine the Ideas of Co- lours to be innate in any Being to whom God has given Sight,
Nor ought it to be objefled, that becaufe fo mar ny make fo little Ufe of their Faculties, therefore we muft have Recourfe to an innate Idea, if we prcr tend to account for the Univerfality of the Belief of a God. For admitting the Idea of a Divine Being to be as univerfal as they fuppofe, how fhall we be affur'd, that this fuppos'd Univerfality is not ow- ing to Tradition ? As this Negative is impofTible to be prov'd, fo, on the contrary, it feemsno difficult
Matter
Exiflcncc ayid Nature of GO D. 25 Matter to make appear from the Teftimony of for- mer Ages, that there has acftually been an ancient immemorial Tradition of the Formation of the World by a beneficent, wife, and moil powerful Being : Which Tradition alone was fufficient to dif- fufe the Principles of Religion as univerfally as the pretended innate Idea is conceived to have done.
CHAP. III.
THOUGH the Authority of Tradition, if it appears to have been perpetual and uninter- rupted, will ever have its due Weight with all con- fidering Men, yet when a Thing is capable of other Proof, nothing is fo grateflil and convidlive as the immediate Teftimony of Reafon. Wherefore, tho* by the Means of Education-and Example, we have received a general traditional Notion of the Exiftence and Perfections of the Deity, and of the Precepts and Obligations of Religion, yet 'tis very fit, that: in a Matter of fo great Concern, we fhould make ufe of fuch Afliftance as Reafon is capable of yield- ing us. This is what I (hall now attempt to do.
Tho* fome too nice * Metaphyficians have of late been teaching us to doubt of the very fundamental Principles of all Certainty, yet I perfuade my felf, none that is not dispos'd to trifle, will expedt great- er Evidence of any thing, than what immediately arifes from the Internal Confcioufnefs which we have of our own Exiftence, and the concurrent Tejlimony of our external Senfes.
Now the Exiftence of a God, or mofi -perfeul Be- ings is a moft diredl and natural Confequence of that Confcioufnefs which we have of our own Ex- iftence.
This may appear from the following Reficcflions. B 4 As
* Des Cartes and his Followers.
2$ An Impartial Enquiry Into the
As we have infallible Evidence that we ourfelves are, Ip frpm thence we may have no lefs AfTurance that fomething has ever been. For fuppofing that there once was nothing at all exifting, we may be as fure that neither we, nor any other Being, could &t all have been, as either that Nothing could not produce Something, or that Something could not produce itfelf.
'Twas therefore never doubted by any fober Rea- foner, that fome Being eternally was. The only Queftion has been concerning the Nature of an E- ternal Being •, which to difcovcr will be the chief Pefign of the enfuing Enquiry.
Now, in the firft Place 'tis evident, that an eter- nal Being was a neceffary Being. The Reafon is, becaufe it was without Beginning. For 'tis as cer- tain, that a Being which was without Beginning vas neceffary, as that there never was any Poffibili- ty of its not having been.
In the next Place, 'tjs clear not only that an ori- ginal eternal Being was neceffary, or fuch as could not but have.been -, but likewife that it was an ahr (olutely neceffary Being, which by Confequence muff ever continue to be.
By an ahfolutely necejjary Beings I underftand fuch a Being as ever contain'd a neceffary Reafon of its own Exiftence in it? very Nature, without the ]ea|t Dependence either on the free Eledion of its own Will, or on tjie Caufality of any other Being.
That there could be no other Being on whofe Caufality fuch an eternal or neceffary Being could depend, is felf-evident. And that the free Elecftioi;! pt its own Will could be no Reafon of its neceffary Exiftence, is no lefs manifeft, Confequently, the Reafon of its neceffary Exiftence muft have been ei- ther included in its very Nature, or elfe there mu(t have been no Reafon of it at all .; which is abfurd. But to include a neceffiyy Reafon of its Exiftence in
its
Exigence ^w^ Nature of GOD. 25
its very Nature, without the leaft Dependence ei- ther on its own free Will, or on the Caufalicy of any other Being, is (as we before obfcrv'd) to be abfokitely neccilary.
'Tis therefore clear, both that there is an eternal independent Being, and that fuch a Being cannot but be abiblutely neceffary. Our next Attempt muft be to gain a more particular Knowledge of fuch a Being. To which End, it is conceiv'd, we need only to confider the Nature and Import of an ahfolute Necejjity of Exijlence.
In the general, it muft, I think, be confefs'd, that there is fomething in the very Idea of an abfo- luce Necefllty ofExiftence which ftrikes a confiderate Mind, and difpofes it to believe that the Reafon of fuch Necefllty muft be fomewhat very wonderful : Therefore the moft natural, as well as the moft pro- bable Method of acquiring a more particular Know- ledge of an abfolutely neceflary Being, is to make fome Enquiry into that Reafon of neceflliry Exif- ■tence, which we obferv*d it to include and pofTefs : To which End I fliall proceed by Steps.
Firfiy 'Tis, I conceive, demonftrable, that the Reafon Of an abfolute Necefllty of Exiftence, can import no Icfs than All a5lual Perfe^iion ; or that there is no Kind or Degree of Perfe(flion which is not included in the Nature of an abfolute- ly neccfliliry Being. For though we fliould fuppofe divers abfolutely necefl^hry Beings, yet it would be abfurd to imagine any one of them fhould neceflfarily poflfefs either more or greater Perfedion than ano- ther •, they being equally neceflTary or independent In Exiftence, and therefore not necefiarily unequal in any Refpedl. And if not necefllirily unequal, they could not but be neceflTarily equal. For the Inequali- ty, if any, muft have been abfolutely neceflTary. But it we fuppofe but One abfolutely neceflFary or inde- pendent Being, 'twill he yet more evident, that
That
26 An Impartial Enquiry into the That Being muft poflefs all adtual Perfedion, whe- ther we conceive it (with the Atheift) to be the only Being, or (with the Theiil) to be the Author of all other Beings. For that the Only Being muft poflefs all aftual Perfedion, is no lefs than felf-evi- dent ; and that the Author of all other Beings can himfelf want nothing of that Perfedlion which he has communicated to his EfFeds, is undeniable.
Again, 'tis, I conceive, equally certain, that the Reafon of an abfolute Neceffity of Exlftence can import no lefs than all poffihle Perfe5lion ; and by Confequence, that no imaginable Acceflion of any Sort could have render'd an abfolutely neceflfary Be- ing more perfect than it actually is.
My Argument is this.
Nothing exifts with an abfolute or independent Neceffity, but fuch a Being whofe Nature abfolute- ly excludes the very Pofiibility of ceafing to be.
But no Nature can abfolutely exclude the very Poflibility of ceafing to be, unlefs it abfolutely ex- cludes all pofllble Imperfedion, The Reafon is, be- caufe where- ever -any Imperfedion is, there it can be no abfolute Impoflibility (or Contradidlion) for any other (even the utmolt) Imperfeftion to be ; and confequently there may be a Poflibility of ceaflng to be ; which is the utmoft: Imperfedion.
Therefore, fince the very Nature of an abfolutely neceflfary Being abfolutely excludes the Poflibility of ceafing to be, it can be for no other Reafon, than becaufe it abfolutely excludes all pofllble Imper- fedlion.
But that Being whofe Nature abfolutely excludes all pofllble Imperfedlion, cannot but poflefs or in- clude all pofllble Perfedion. The Reafon, is, be- caufe the Want or Abfence of any pofllble Perfedion is an Imperfedion.
Thus, in Oppofition to the Aflfertors of the Eter- nity of Matter or Body, it may be firmly demonftra-
tcd
Exiftciicc and Nature of GOD. 27
ted to be and to have been eternally an abfolutc Impof- fibility or Contradidion, that an original eternal Beino- fliould be other than mod perted:, (which Matter, we are lure, is not) from the abfolutc In- confiilence that there is between the abfolutc Ne- cefllty of its Exiftence, and the kail pofTible Imper- fedion.
CHAP. IV.
BEING advanced thus far, we may, with the grcateft Aflurance, affirm that there is a God, j. e. an elernaly independent ^ ahfolutely necejjary^ and moji perfect Be'mg. Of this, I think, there can be no doubt, whatever Doubt there may be with Re- ference to fome particular Notions of his Perfec- tion.
In order to a more particular Difcovery of the Nature of a Being, which we are aflured poffefles the highell pofTible Perfeftion, it will be neceflary care- fully to confider the general Idea of Perfe5iion. For this, though perhaps not ufually confider*d as it de- ferves, is the Standard whereby we are to form our particular Ideas of the Nature of an eternal inde- pendent Being in the enfuing Enquiry.
The Word Perfecf, was firft ufed with Reference to artificial Things, as fignifying that which was finilh'd, or fully fuiced to the End lor which it was dcfign'd by the Artift. But afterwards, we find it v.'as adopted by the Philofophers, and ufed in more than one Senfe in their Reafonings on Natural and Metaphyfical Subjedls.
In the general, that is faid by Philofophers to be perfcd:, which contains whatever is included in the Idea which they have of its Nature. They con- (Ltive a Thing to be thus perfed, fometimes in an
ahfolutCy
2$ An Impartial Enquiry into the "
chfolute, fometimes in a relative Senfe. In the abfo- lute Senfe, that only, fay they, is perfe^, whofe Nature comprehends an abfolutely infinite Number of Kinds and Degrees of Perfeftion. And in this Senfe an eternal independent Nature is ufually faid to be perfedl. In the relative Senfe, any Being is denominated 'perfe5i^ which wants nothing of that which belongs to its particular Nature.
But whether there is in reality any fuch Thing as an ahfolute Perfe^ion in the Senfe before explain'd, may well deferve our Enquiry.
That an eternal independent Nature cannot but have ever been moft abfolute, or exclufive of any proper Caufe, is, it is confefs*d, no lefs than felf- evident. By Confequence, the Perfedlion which is neceflary to fuch a Nature, muft be allow'd to be moft abfolute in the fame Senfe. Yet it is hum- bly conceiv'd, this doth not hinder but that the utmoft pofTible Perfeftion may not be abfolute in the other Senfe ; or that it may not confift in an ab- folutely infinite Number of Kinds and Degrees, but in an immutable'determinate Relation to all capable Objefts. To afTert that it confifts in an abfolutely infinite Number of Kinds and Degrees, is, I con- ceive, to obfcure its Idea by unneccfTary and inex- plicable DifHculries ; for as much as the Idea of the utmoft pofTible Perfeftion cannot pofTibly be fbrm*d with an abfolute Infinity of Number, but may very well be form'd without it.
This will eafily appear from the Nature of Num- ler.
If any Number (or Arithmetical Quantity) is ab- folutely or infinitely great, it can be for no other Reafon, than becaufe 'tis abfolutely (or in its very Nature) incapable of Increafe, without an abfolute Contradidlion. But the very Nature of all Quan- tity infers, on the contrary, a Neceffity of Increafe, on the Suppofition of the kaft Addition. For all
Quan-
Exiftencc and '^t^x.mt of GOT). 29
Quantities fbeingofthc fame general Nature) muft feverally bear a Proportion to each other. For Ex- ample, That can be no Unit which, by the Addi- tion of one Unit, will not become two. And by Parity of Reafon, that is no Million which, by the Addition but of a fingle Unit, will not increafe to the Greatnefs of a Million and an Unit. For if it be but a Million after the Addition of the Unit, 'tis plain, it muft before that Addition, have been lefs than a Million by an Unit. The like may be faid of all Quantity. But of this more at large hereafter.
Thefe Refledions, which are felf-evident, (or as plain as that three and two make five) are entirely deftrudlive of the Suppofition of an abfolute Per- fedlion confifting in an ahfolutely infifiite Number of Kinds and Degrees. Whereas, on the contrary, nothing can be more eafy and intelligible than the Notion of Perfedion in the relative and determinate Senfe. For in this Senfe,Perfed:ion is plainly the fame with Sufficiency. According to which Notion of it, 'tis evident, that as among Inferior Beings, that on- ly can be faid to be perfedt in its Kind, which pof- fefles whatever is ncceflary to qualify it for attaining its particular End •, fo only fuch a Being can poffefs the utmoft poflible Perfedfion as is all-fufficient, or naturally and independently qualified for all fit and fuitable Ends.
To explain this general Conclufion by particular Inftances. The Perfeftion of effeflive Power may very well confift in its bearing an immutable Rela- tion of Proportionatenefs to all fit and capable Ob- je<fls of fuch Power in general, or in its being inde- pendently fufficient to effect or produce whatever is fit, and implies not a Contradidtion : For to fuch Power, though we fliould imagine farther Degrees to be addible, yet fince they would be in vain, or to no Purpofe, they could not render it more per-
fed
^o An Impartial Enquiry into the feft by their Acceffion. The like may be faid of IVifdom, Knowledge^ or any other Powers or Pro- perties ; the Eftimate of whofe Perfeftion is, it is conceiv'd, no otherwife to be made than with re- lation to their Objects either aftual or polTible. *
And as the Perfedlion of Properties or Attributes is to be underftood to confift in a Relation of Pro- portionatenefs to all fuitable and capable Objedts, fo the Perfedlion of Suhfiance, (however we may con- ceive it) mull, it feems, confift in a like Relation to its Properties. And thus, that muft be the moft perfedt Subftance which is the neceflary Subject of the moft excellent and perfed Properties.
CHAP. V.
THE Necefllty with which an original eternal Being exifts, is, it feems^ the Source of all the Knowledge we are diredly capable of acquiring of its Nature. Therefore, fince the Difcovery of one Property of that Necefllty {viz. its Jbfolutenefs) has already led us to the Knowledge of the Su- preme Perfedion or All-fufficiency of fuch a Being, it may not be amifs, before we proceed to a parti- cular Confideration of that Perfedion, to enquire what other Property of original Necefllty is dif- coverable by us.
When we reflect on the Necefllty with which fomething ever exifted, we find, that next to its Ahfolutenefs^ or Independence, nothing is more ob- vious to our Thoughts than its Unity,
That the mention'd Necefllty of an original Be- ing was One as well as Abfolute, is certain, becaufe the internal Reafon of it was uniform^ and there- fore not neceflary to more than one Being.
To * See Mr. Locke in the Beg. of his Chap, of Infimti-
^ Exiftcnce and Nature ofGO^. 31
To make this appear we need only to refled, that though Something ever exifted without a Caufe, yet Nothing could exill without a Reafon of its Exiftence ; and likewife that the Reafon of the Exiftence and abfolute Neceflity of an eternal un- caus'd Being was ever included in its own Nature : Which Reafon of abfolutely neceflary Exiftence, we have proved to be the utmoft poflible Per- fedlion.
Now, that Perfecftion, which is the internal Rea- fon of abfolutely neceflary Exiftence, is, and ever was uniform, and capable of exifting in one and the fame Being, and that therefore it could not be the abfolutely neceflary Reafon of the Exiftence of more than one Being as its Subjedl, is certain. For there is no Inconfiftence or Contrariety in Perfediion. Perfedion is only of Good -, of Evil there is no Perfedlion -, for Evil confifts in De- fe6t. Therefore an Oromafdes and Arimanius (which fome have imagined to be two eternal Beings, wha were the neceflTary Principles of Good and Evil^ can hare no Place in the Nature of Things.
It cannot indeed be denied, that the general No- tion of Perfedion includes Variety of Ideas, fuch as Ji'lfiom, Power, i^c. But then, this Variety, we may be aflur*d, is uniform and confiftent, and confequently could be no abfolutely neceflary Rea- fon of the Exiftence of more than one eternal Be- ing. Therefore to deify an Apollo, and an Hercules, or to make diftindl Deities of Wifdom and Power, was to attempt to divide that Supreme Perfedion, which was ever One and Undivided.
The Sum of the Argument is this :
Every Thing that exifts muft have a Reafon (if not a Caufe) of its Exiftence.
The Reafon of the Exiftence of an eternal, ab- folutely neceflary Being, is contained in its very Na- ture,
3 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the
ture, and is (as was proved) no lefs than the utiiioft
pojftble Perfebion.
Perfeftion is uniform, i, e. all poflible Perfedions agree in one common uniform Nature, or they agree in the general Nature and Notion o^Goodnefs ; which admits of no Inconfillence or Contrariety.
Since all poflible Perfedions agree in one common Nature, which admits of no Inconfiftence or Con- trariety, they could not neceflarily require more than one original Subject ; (or which is the fame) they could not be an abfolutely neceflary Reafon of the Exiftence of more than one eternal abfolute- ly neceflary Being.
Therefore to fuppofe more than one eternal ab- folutely neceflfary Beings is to fuppofe abfolute Ne- ceflity of Exiftence, without an abfolutely neceflary Reafon of it : Which is no lefs an Abfurdity, than it would be to fuppofe an Efi^eft without a Caufe.
The.Refult of the whole is, that there is but one eternal abfolute Necefllty included in and founded on the utmoft Perfeftion, and by Confequence but one eternal abfolutely neceflfary Being, who is the Subjed in which alone all poflible Perfedions and Degrees of Perfection are united, and from which all communicated Perfection flows.
CHAP. VI.
BY difcovering the Supreme Perfediion of the one eternal independent Being in the general, we have laid a firm Foundation for fome more par- ticular Knowledge of that Super-eminent Nature. For fince eternal abfolute Necefllty, being founded on Perfection, could not but admit of all the Va^ riety included in the Nature of Perfedion ; as we cannot but afcribe to the eternal, and moft perfedfc Being, whatever Excellencies we are acquainted
with.
Exiftence and Nature of C O T>. 53
with, fo we are obliged to believe it niay poirefs many others of which we have no Ideas. For cer- tainly we need not imagine either our Natures of our Acquaintance with the World to be fuch, as to render our Ideas the adequate Meafures of the Su- preme Perfecftion. Theutmoflwe are able to do, is to confider what Ideas compofe the general Notion we have of Perfedlion, and in what Manner they arc to be conceiv'd with reference to that Being which we ' are aflured poflefles the utmoft poflible Perfec- tion.
But before we proceed to produce a Scheme of thfc particular Ideas which make up our general No. tion of Perfedlion, it muft be obferv*d, that Per- fedion or Sufficiency may be confider'd, either with reference to the Being to which it belongs, or with refpedt to other Beings : Which will occafion a twofold Diftribution of our Ideas of the Supreme or Divine Per fed: ion.
I. Our Ideas of the Divine Perfedion with refe- rence to the Deity Himfelf, for his Self-fufficiency) are of two Sorts, viz. either Primary or Secondary. Of the former Sort are,
1. Self-aofivily, or Vital Power.
2. Intelligence, or Self-Confcioufnefs.
3. Liberty, or a free felf-determining Power with regard to what is term'd External Adion ; in which it is the leading or firft moving Principle.
Thefe two laft Ideas reprefent Powers which muft be conceiv'd as founded on the vital Power or Sclf- adivity.
'Tis, I confefs, the ufual Opinion, that the Di- vine EfFedive Power, in its flill Latitude, is nothing elfe but a Power of Willing ; or that to will and to effe£l are, with regard to the Deity , the very fame. But with all due Submiflion, 'tis conceiv'd, that the Power of Willing, as it regards what is call'd Ex- ternal Adion, includes an Ability not only of chu-
C fing
54 ^n hnpartial Enquiry tnt<y the fing a particular A61, but likewife of determining ibme other Power tq the Execution of it. And though we may, in .certain Gafes, have no other Idea of the Manner of ading diftinft from that of pure Willing or Chufmg, yet Mpdefty will reach us to beiic,ve there may be more and more per- feift Manners of Ading than we ('who derive all our* Jdeas of Power from i.mperfed Agents) are acquain- teci •^ith. ; ^And fp.much the rather, fmce our Ide^ of a rnere Power of Willing or Chufmg is too nar- row to reprefent the Divine Effeftive Power ; and confequently the Ufe of the; Word Will, fo as to fig- m£y either that Povv^er or its Adion, rather obfcures than explains the Matter. For to, us 'ti$ inconceivr Jiple.how a pure A(5t of the WilJ^ q^n immediately .produce or effedt any thing. And accordingly Va- nini reckons it among the Abfurdities, which he f^ys necelTarily attend the Belief of a God, ; that we muft, as ufilal, affert his Will and effedUve. Power to.be th^ i^rae; but to proceed. •
, .^,'^|i'jrQm thefe three; primary Ideas of the Divine Per- fcftion confider-'d with r^ard to the Deity himfelf, refult three others, which may be term'd Secon^ary^
1 . Spirituality. Which is a complex Idea, inclu- ding the three primary ones. , ,!, ..
2. Confiancy^ or immutability» An Idea reful- ting from that of Spirituality confider*d as Perfect.
3. Happinefi. An Idea neceffarily refulting frorq the two lail mentioned, and conilituting, together with them> our Idea of the moft perfect Being con- fider'd as he is in Himfelf.
II. The Divine Berfe^io?i or Sufficiency with re- gard to other Beings^ may likewife be confider'd in a twofold Relp^d^ ; with relation to Beings either merely pojjihle or a^^ually exijlent. In the former Refpe<5l it yields us three other Ideas, viz.
-x^ ty.i . ' ' -^ .
Exiftcnce and Nature of GO^. 35
1. Omnipotence or Almighty Power. An Icieareo fulcing chiefly from that ot Self-a5livity.
2. fVifdom. Which Idea we derive fro'm the Con- fideration of the Divine Intelligence.
3. Omnifcience, or Perfect Knowledge. An Idea form'd chiefly by the Confideration oi the Divine Liberty.
All thefe Ideas reprefent fuch Perfeflions as are ufually term'd natural., as oppofcd to moral.
Correfpondently to thefe three Ideas of the Divine Sufficiency with regard to other Beings confiderM as merely pofllble, there are three others which we derive from our confidering it with regard to othet Beings as adlually exifl:ent, viz.
1. Goodnefs 01 Benevolence. An Idea chiefly re- fulting from the Confideration of the free Effects of Omnipotence in the Creation and Sujientation of the Univerfe.
2. Government. An Idea derived from our View both of the beautiful Order of the inanimate Parts of the World, and of the regular Frame and Ma- nagement of the Irrational and Intelligent : Which are particularly confider'd as the Effeds of Divine fVifdom. To this Idea are reducible thofc of Holinefss Mercy^ Jujlice^ and Veracity j as being Ideas deri- ved from the Confideration of the Exercife of the Divine Wifdom in governing the World.
3. Providence, ftridtly fo call'd. Which Idea we owe moll immediately to the Exercife of Omnifcience. I i;iy mofl: immediately ; for the Wifdom and Pow- er of the Eternal Being will appear to be likewife mofl: brightly difplay'd in all his A(5ls of Provi- dence.
i.. Thefe three laft: Ideas, with whatever Ideas they
may include, denote no particular Perfedions of the I Divine Nature, but are Notions form'd in our I Minds by the Confideration of the Exercife of the
Divine Pcrfe(^ions with regard to the Creatures.
i:. C 2 And
$6 An Impartial Enquiry into the
And thefe are the Idsas which reprefent fuch Attri- butes as are ufually called moral ones. , From thefe three Ideas it is that we derive our Idea of the Divine Omniprefence i tho* moft immediately from the firft, viz. that of the Divine Goodnefs in creating and fuilaining the World.
CHAP. VII.
HAVING thus taken a View of our Ideas of the Supreme or Divine Perfection in fuch Order as they feem moft naturally either to be com- prehended in or to be deduced from the general Idea of Perfe6lion, we may now proceed to confide r .thcrti diftinCtly, and to the general Demonftration may add the Proofs of each in particular : Which will likewife be fo many additional Proofs of rheEx- iftence of a God.
I. The fir ft Idea included in our general Notion of Perfection, we obferv d to be Self-a^ivity. Now, that the Eternal Being is vitally and independently aftive, appears not only from the general Notion or Idea of his Perfection, but had we form*d no fuch general Idea, would have been abundantly evi- dent from the Motion we obferve in the World.
If we believe our Senfes, we cannot doubt of the Reality of Motion. But 'tis undeniable that the Motion we are fenfible of, muft have been either ab- folutely uncam*dy or if caus*d, it muft have been the Effe^ either of eternal Matter, or elfe of fome eter- nal immaterial felf-a6tive Principle.
If abfolutely uncaus*d^ it muft have been an eter- nal natural Property either of All Matter, or at leaft of fome p.irticular Portion or Portions of Matter.
If it was the Effe5f of Eternal Matter^ it muft have been either Temporal (or' with Beginning,) or Eternal for without Beginning.) If Temporal^ it
muft
ExrUcnce and Nature of GOD. 37
muft have been begun by the A6lion of fome free or indetermin'd elective Principle, eflential either to the whole Mafs of Matter, or at jeaft to fome par- ticular Portion or Portions of it. If Eternal^ it mull: have proceeded either from fome Aclion of Matter bent towards fome particular Point or Points, or elfe from fome Ad ion that was indifferent to every Side. All thefe Hypothefes will be comprehended and explained under the following Proportions.
I. The Motion we -perceive in the JVorld ivas not ahfolutely uncaused, or an eternal natural Property either of all Matter^ or of any of its Parts.
By Matter^ or Body, I underftand the Subftance of which all the Parts of the vifible Univerfj confiil:. Thefe we know to be made up of a Multitude of folid, moveable, and divifible Particles, having fas well as the greater Parts) an Aptitude to communi- cate Motion by Impulfe. But whether any other Properties belong either to the Ivhole Mafs of Mat- ter, or to any of its Parts, is difputed.
As for Motion^ 'tis a fimple Idea, and therefore neither needs nor admits Explanation.
That Motion was not abfolutely uncaus'd, or an eternal natural Property of All Matter, may appear from the following Reflexions.
Ftrfly It has been already prov*d, that a Being that was eternal and abfolutely uncaus'd, muft have been abfolutely neceflary, or of fuch a Nature as render'd it an abfolute Contradi(flion for it to ceafe to be. Now 'tis clear, that this both was and is t-qually true of whatever is pofitive and natural to fuch a Being j for as much as it cannot but be with the very finie Neceflity as is the Being to which it belongs. If then both the Motion of Matter and its Diredion were natural to it and abfolutely uncaus'd, it clearly follows that they ever had and ever will have an abfolutely neceflil\ry Connedion with Matter. Whereas on the contrary, though it
C 3 fl:iOuld
3 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the
ihould be admicted that not a Pa rticle in the Uni« verfe is abfolutely at Reft, yet *tis certain that Mat- ter and Motion, and Motion and its particular Di- re6lion, have no fuch neceffary or effential Connec- tion with each other, as will be Ihewn under the third Propofition.
Again, if Motion was abfolutely uncaus'd, or an eternal abfolutely necefifary natural Property of All Matter, it follows that it was neceffary to every Particle of Matter in the fame Degree without any Variety. For fince there is nothing in Nature capable of inferring any Variety in original Necef- fity, but only Perteftion, on which it was founded, and which likewife infers its Unity, 'tis clear that all the Particles of Matter, and their Properties, iffup- pos'd to have been uncaus'd,andto haveexifted by a NeceffiLy not founded on Perfeftion, (which Neceffity muft have been not only One but abfolutely Simple) muft be afferted to hav^ been without the leaft Variety.
But if Motion was neceffary to every Particle of Matter in the fame Degree without the leaft Variety, 'tis clear that-every Particle muft have moved alike. Both comparative Reft and Increafe of Velocity muft have been equally impoffible, A eonftant U- niformity muft have difplay*d itfelf throughout uni- verfal Nature ; and there could have been no Dif- ference between the Motion of a Mote or Duft in the Sun beams and that of a Whirlwind.
And then as for the latter Part of this Propofi- tion, viz. 'That Motion was no eternal natural Pro^* perty of any -particular Part or Parts of Matter ; 'tis' no lefs manifeft. For fmce original Neceffity, whe- ther conceiv*d as founded on Perfedion or not, muft, as we juft now obferv'd, be fuppos-d to have . been ever one^ it follows,»that if the Parts and Pro- perties of Matter exifted by one and the fame Ne- ceffity, ^tis abfurd to imagine any of thoie Parts to have neceffarily poflefs*d a Property which another
Paft
Exiflcnce and Nature of GOD. 39 Part as neceflariJy wanted. For this is to conceive the one eternal NeccfTity to have been different, even while it is fuppofed to have been the fame.
2. Motion was not a temporal Effe5l produced by eternal Matter by virtue of any free eleitive Prin- ciple effential either to the whole Mafs of Matter^ or to any of its Parts.
That fuch a free Principle of Adion fif any fuch^ mull have been effential to all Matter, or an abfo- lutely neceffary Property of the whole Mafs, is ma- nifcft from the Principles already eftablifli'd. For the one abfolute eternal Neceffity (however con- ceiv'd) could admit of no Difference of Properties in different Parts of Matter. This, by the Way, dejftroys the Suppofition of an eternal material Soul of the World.
But though fome Atheiflical Materialifls have thought fit to beftow the Property of Intelligence either on the whole Mafs of Matter (as did Spinoza^) or on every diftindt Particle of it (as Mr. Hobbes feems to have done, j yet none ever afferted either the Whole or any Partofit, to polTefs an effential Liberty or Freedom of A6l:ion •, without which there could have been no Produiftion or Beginning of Motion. And indeed, as we juft now obferv'd^ had they been inclined to afcribe Freedom of Ac- tion but to any one Part of Matter, they would have been obliged to afcribe the fame Freedom to all : Which had they done, they could not have fail'd of a Confutation from every Man's Exp^ rience,
3. Motion IV as not an eternal _Effeff cf Matter hy virtue of any AStion bent towards fome paf-tic'ular Poini or Points:
That an eternal or neceffiry Action (if the Cau(e of Motion) could not but be inoHlbly bent to- wards one particular Point, is clear. For (ince cHe' Power from which th6 A-^ion. is fa p^ofcd ' to hive
C 4 ccer-
jfo An Impartial Enquiry into the eternally or neceffarily proceeded, could not but ad as well as exift with one and the fame immu- tabje NecefTity, it follows that |ts Ad ion could ad- .mit of no Difference or Change of Diredions. fhis abfolutely deftroys the Chance o^ Epicurus,
And though any Man fhould fuppofe the imagi- nary eternal Matter to have been intelligent •, yet this coijld have made no Difference. For if both the Action and its Diredion were necefTary or im- mutable, they could not but abfolutely exclude a felf-determining Power (or a Power of differently di- reding the AdtionJ from their Subjed: ; without which, Intelligence could effed nothing.
But I conceive 'tis fufficiently demonftrable, that - there could be no fuch thing as a proper eternal Ef- fed of any Caufe. For fince whatever was eternal, \yas neceffiry ; and fmce the NecefTity with which an original eternal Being edified was perfedly onp and uniform, it follows that it could not admit of fuch an eternal or necefTary Diftindion as that of Caufe and Effed. For whatever uniform Diftinc- tion or Variety, was included In the Nature of Per- fedion, this we may be affured was not ; both be- caufe Liberty is a Perfedion, and to be an Effed, or to be elTentially dependent, is a great Imperfec- tion.
Notwithftanding this, fome (virho had no Notion of the Perfedion of the original Being) have not fail'd to make Motion an eternal Effed of a fup- pos?d eternal Adion of Matter immutably bent to defcend, but with Variety of Inclinations or Direcr tions. Such Adion was ih^ Gravitation oHht Epcu- ream : Which we fhall briefly confider.
*Tis well known to have been the Opinion of E- picurus, and other ancient and modern Material ifls, that every Atom or Particle of Matter neceffarily or immutably pofTefTes a certain . determinate Gra- vity or Weight independent of any other Being ;
which
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 41
which Gravity, by its A6lion of Gravitation, they fappofed to have been the eternal or necelTary Caufe ot Motion •, though at the hmt time they abfurdly imagin'd Chance to have been, as it were, the Direc- tor of Motion.
Concerning thefe Philofophcrs, we may, in the firft place, obferve, that whatever Order they fup- pos'd between Gravitation and Motion as Caufe and Etieit, they yet conceiv'd them to have been both neceflary. Confequently, the Arguments produced under the firft of thefe Proportions, againft the Ne- celTity of Motion, are of equal Force here. But becaufe the Epicurean Hypothefis has formerly met with fome Entertainment in the World, I fhall give it a few Thoughts, and fhall proceed to fhew, in ]he firft Place, that there is no fuch Principle as Gravity immutably and independently inherent in Matter or Bodies.
'Tis, I take it, paft all Doubt, not only that the Gravitation of Bodies fituate without the Surface of the Earth, decreafes with refpcd: to the Center \n Proportion to the Increafe of their Diftance from the Surface^ but likewife that, on the contrary, the Gravitation of Bodies placed within the Surface^ decreafes, in the fame Refpeft, according to the J)ecreafe of their Diftance from the Center. From which, and divers other Obfervations, it is allow'd to be fjfficjently clear.
Firjl^ That there is a mutual Gravitation, or Tendency, not only of all the Parts of the Earth, but of the neareft Heavenly Bodies i and by Con- fequence, as far as our Obfervation reaches, of all the Parts of Matter towards each other.
Secondly, That the Gravitation of Bodies is eirher more or lefs in an exadt Proportion to their own real Quantity, and to the Qa.^ntiry and Diftance of the Bodies toward which they tend.
42 An Impartial Enquiry into the
How different this Gravitation is from that ne- ceflary Tendency to defcend, which Epicurus beftow'd on each of his Atoms, is evident.
According to thefe Principles, *tis eafy to con- ceive, that, contrary to the vulgar Opinion, fup- pofmg a Paffage through the Diameter of the Earth, a Stone or other ponderous Body defcen- ding, would lofe of its Velocity, or Swiftnefs, in Proportion to its nearer Approach to the Center. And thus moving ftill (lower, according to the De- creafe of its Gravitation towards the Center, it would at laft remain without any further predominant Ten- dency towards any particular Point j as being fur- rounded by an equal Quantity of Matter on all Sides. The like would happen to any lefler Body moving into the middle Space between two or more fuch Bodies as our Earth, confifting of equal Quan- tities of Matter ; or into the Space between two or more fuch Bodies of unequal Quantities, fixed at a proportionable Inequality of Diftance.
But if the Gravitation and Motion of Bodies be fo variable through Variety of Situations, this is enough to demonftrate them not to have been eternal or neceffary Effeds of any Principle inde- pendently inherent in every Atom or Particle of Matter (for as much as fuch a Principle could not admit of Variety of Directions, but mull have adted uniformly or alike in all Situations) but to be Ef- fects entirely dependent on fome other Caufe. . But admitting (according to the Epicurean Hy- pothefis) that Gravity was a neceflary independent Property of every Atom ; yet it may be affirmed impoflible it fhould have been the Caufe of that Va- riety of Motions which we experience in Nature. For 'tis demonftrable that the Principle and Laws of Gravitation (whatever they may be) fince they muft be allow'd, if eternal, to be uniform and invariable, could never have been fubje(5t to Chance^ fo as to •»c^. i have
Exiftcnce and Nature of GO D. 4^
have become the Caufe of various and contrary Mo- tions •, fuch as may be obferv'd in the prefent Sy- ftem of Things. For Inftance, the projedile Mo- tions of divers of the great Bodies of the Univerfe, tending to defcribe Circles or Ellipfes, and the Cen- tral Motions of their feveral Parts, tending always to Streight Lines.
4. Motion was not an eternal Effe5i of Matter f re- duced by virtue of any A5lion that was indifferent to every Side.
That fuch an indifferently determinable eternal' Adlion cannot with Reafon be fuppofed, even tho* Matter fhould be fuppofed to be intelligent, is clear from the Uniformity or Invariablenefs of eternal or neceffary Adion, already proved.
But fuppofmg fuch an eternal Aflion of Matter as was and is indilterent to every Side, ("and fuppofing the Agent (with the Epicurean Atheift) to have been unintelligent) how could this have been the Caufe of the Motion we experience in the World ?
If we take a View of the Heavenly Bodies, we ftiall fee with what an exaft and conftant Regularity they perform their refpciflive Revolutions. Even the Motions of Comets^ which, till of late, have feem'd the Extravagancies and Enormities of Na- ture, do now appear to be regular and reducible to fuch an Ellipfis whofe Sides approach very near a Parabola. And the feemingly confusM Pofitions of the Planets may be fufficiently accounted for from the different Widenefs of their Orbits ; in defcribing which they all revolve the fame Way with the greateft Exaftnefs. But among thefe, the Moon, the moft expofed to our View, is particularly re- markable ; whofe Revolutions about the Earth and ' her own Axis are fo nicely adjufted, that they are both performed in the fame Compafs of Time. By which admirable Harmony of the two Motions, ic happens that ibe alv/ays prefents die lame Sid>i to
our
44- ^n Impartial Enquiry into the our Eyes, while one Motion continually turns her from the Earth, and the other towards it, in the fame Proportion.
And fhould we confine our Obfervation to the Earth which we inhabit, befides the feveral Motions of the entire Globe (which are no lefs exadl and re- gular) we may obferve its feveral Parts, as if ani- mated by one common Soul, conftantly and uni- formly tending towards one common Center. But f jch Conftancy and fuch Uniformicy are as abfjlutely irreconcileable to the Opinion of a Principle of Motion which is unintelligent, and yet indifferent to every Side, as the former Inllances of Variety and Contrariety (under the laft Propofition) are to that of a Prin- ciple of Motion invariably determin'd to one Side.
Vi^ after all, any Man fhould objeft, that per- haps Motion was neither abfolutely uncaus*d, nor yet the Effe6t of any adfive Principle eflential to Matter, but a mere Pajfion communicated from one Part of Matter to another in an eternal Circula- tion, as Hohhes and Spinoza imagin*d, this is certain- ly the moll unreafonable Suppofition of any.
To prove this Aflertion, we Ihall not need to re- peat what we obferv'd when we Ihew'd the Impof- fibility of the Eternity of Motion. 'Twill be fuf- ficient to add this one Obfervation, viz. That in the Cafe of fuch an eternal Circulation, there is nei- ther any external Agent fuppos*d, which might be the proper Caufe of the Motion, nor any intrinfick Reafon of it in the Bodies moved ; but the Bodies are conceiv'd, in a manner purely paflive, to trans- fer that Motion to each other, which none of them in particular either poiTefs'd with an abfolute Ne- celTicy in its own Nature, or derived from the Pow- er of any proper Agent whatfoever, But what is this but to fuppofe Motion to exift without either a proper Caufe, or fo much as a Reafon of its Exif- tence \ vvhich js abfurd to the laft Degree,
If
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 45
If then the Motion of Matter be abfolutely un* accountable by any of thefe Hypothefes, (which yet are all that the Enemies of Religion either have propofed or can propofe or imagine) *tis maniteft that Matter is no original felf adive Being, but that its Motion muft kave been begun by fome Principle eflentially diftinft, or by fome immaterial Agent^ who is neceflarily exiftent, and, as fuch, perfectly jelf- a^ive. Of the Notion of an immaterial Being, we Ihall treat particularly in the Appendix.
II. The next Conception contain'd in the general Idea of the eternal Being, confider*d as He is in Him- fclf, is Intelligence or Self-confcioufnefs.
This Idea, as llkewife the Idea of Zz^^r/^, or Free felf-determining Power, we are naturally led to by the Confideration of the Idea of Self-a5iivity. For Self-aftivity, or mere vital Power, could be no fuf- ficient Principle of beginning external Adtion with- out Self-confcioufnefs and Self-determination, i. e. without both Intelligence and Liberty.
By Intelligence, as natural to the eternal Being, and as importing no more than Self-confcioufnefs, is meant a perfe5i Perception or Knowledge of his own mojl perfe5l Nature.
That the eternal Being was naturally or neceflarily a perceptive or felf-confcious Being, will more fully appear from the following Reafoning.
If Motion had a Beginning (as has been already demonftrated) *tis evident that the original Caufc of Motion was a thinking perceptive Being j for as much as nothing could immediately qualify him to begin to ad: but a free felf-determining Principle included in his own Nature. For without fuch a felf-determining Principle, if originally in any Re- fpedl una(ftive, he would necefl!arily or eflentially have remained fo. But S'^^lf-determination, which is the Refult of fuch a felf-determining Principle, could not be without a preceding Perception both of
the
4<5 An Impartial Enquiry into the
the Power of Ading, and of the Difference of Ads ; fince *cis certain, that no Being can be faid freely (or without Neceffitation) to determine a Power which it knows nothing of, to an Ad: of which it has no Perception. But Perception necef- farily \m^\i<z& Intelligence ov Self-confcioujhefs.
III. Another Conception included in the general Idea of the Eternal Being in Himfelf confidcr'd, is Liberty : 'By which is meant a perfe^ Freedom of external AElion^ or of fuch Adion as regards other Beings.
In the general Notion of Liberty is comprehended a Power both of choofing and determining, exempt from all external irrefiftible Force, and internal in- vincible Defeds.
Our Idea of the Divine Liberty in particular we are direded to form (as was hinted before) by the Gonf. deration of the two preceding Ideas of the Divine Perfedion. For as the Idea of perfed Self- adivity excludes the Influence of all imaginable Force and Defeds, fo that of a perfed Intelligence not only Hicludes a Power'of Perceiving, but infers likewife a Power of Choofing and Determining accordingly : Without which neither Self-adivity nor Intelligence Gould be a fufficient Principle of Adion.
Thus, the Arguments by which we proved the Self-adivity and Intelligence of the Eternal Being, are no lefs fufficient Proofs of his Liberty : Which will faveus the Pains of adding any thing here upon this Head.;';5I yviltjx/iiia 7^r;;!nif[:
But becaufe the Idea of Liberty admits of fomc accidental Variety, according to the Diverfity of its Subjeds and their ftveral States ; and becaufe *tis no fmall Difficulty to determine how far its Notion may agree to particular Agents and Ads ; we ffiali here-attempt an Explanation : And in fo doing we ihal], as on other Occafions, with 'all Submiffion, take our own Meafures, without following any
Track
Exiftcnce and Nature of G 0T>. 47 Track but that which we conceive is made by the Footfleps of Truth.
That we may the better apprehend the Nature of fuch Liberty as is agreeable to the mod perfe<fl of Beings, it cannot be amifs, firfl, to form a No- tion of fuch as may agree to our felves, as far as it regards external Action. To which End it will perhaps be neceffary to diftinguilli the fcveral Adts of our Minds with reference to Liberty of external Adion, in their natural Order.
Firjt then, We perceive an Objed:, whether it be Thing or Adtion. Then we judge of its Agrce- ablenefs or Difagreeablenefs, Fitnefs or Unfitneis, Thefe are Ads of Underftanding.
Then we either approve (or acquiefce in) our Judgment of it (i;/z. by an interveening Delibera- tion) or elfe difapprove it. Thefe are mix*d Ads of the Underftanding and Will.
In the next place, we either Chufe or Reflife, i, e, we either fmgle out the Objed in order to Pradice, orelfe we rejedit. And lajUy, we either determine our Pradice with reference to the Objed, according to this Choice, or elfe we refolve to remain unadive : \yhich are all pure Ads of the Will. * Hence it appears, that tho* every Free Ad in- cludes Choice, yet what we here call Choice, is that particular Ad only whereby we fmgle out the Ob- jed for Pradice.
By not well diftinguifhing thefe feveral Ads of the Mind, we are apt to bewilder our felves in our Enquiries into human Liberty ; more efpecially by our confidering the Approbation and the Choice of the Objed, as alfo the Choice of the Objed, and the Determination of the Pradice accordingly, as infcparable.
Thefe Things being premifed, we fliall endea- v,eur an Account of Human Liberty in the follow- ing Propofitions j by which not only ics Reality,
../.-i but
4* • An Impartial Enquiry into the
but its Diftindion from that of the Deity, will,
'tis conceiv'd, fufficiently appear.
1. 'Tis plain that no Being can he denominated a Tree Agents hut what is furnijh'd not only with a Power of Perceivings J^^S^f^g-) ^nd C hoofing, hut Ukewife of Determining its confequent A5ls (or Prac- tice) according to its Perception, Judgment, and Choice,
2. In order to the completing of Liberty or Freedom, 'tis neceffary that the Perception, Judgment, and Choice, as well as the confequent A^is, he exempt from the Immediate irrefjUble Influence of any External Force.
For though a Man can do whatever he wills or thoofes to do, yet is he not compleatly free, uniefs he be as free to will or choofe as he is to pradife.
3. ^ 'TIS further requiftte to the compleating of Liher^ ty, that the Perception, Judgment, Choice, and confe* qUent A^s, he exempt even from the Mediate, irrejijl- ■ible Influence of any fuch Force. For 'tis certain that' all thefe may be exempt from the immediate Influence of any Force,- and yet may, at the fame Inftant, be neceffitated. Thus, if a Perfon of a deprav'd Imagination chufes to leap into a River, miftaking it for a beautiful Meadow, none, 1 fuppofc, will fay he was compleatly free ; fmce 'tis clear his Perception and Judgment were under the remote Influence of an external Force, viz. of the original Caufe of his Diftemper. And thus, a Malefador, who has feveral Sorts of Death propos'd to his Choice, though his Choice be fo far free as not to be immediately fix'd to any one Sort, yet there is" ftill fuch an external Force, as effedtually, though remotely, determines both his Choice and Practice,
4. Hufnan Liberty can't yet be complete without a Freedom from the Invincible Byafs of all internal men- tal Defers. For though the Perception, Judgment, ' Choice, and confequent ACts, be exempt from the
mediate
Exi/lcnce and Nature of G O T). 49
n^ediatc as well as immediate irrcfiftible Influence of ;iiiy external Force, yet the Choice may be tar Irom being completely free. Thus a Perfon of a mean Capacity, in a Cafe of Difficulty, wherein tlvi apparent Good is clear and evident to Scnfe, but the real Good is the Objeft of Reafon only, and no o- tlierwife to be difcovered than by an accurate Search and laborious Dedudion ; though he be not fub- ii-ct to the Influence of any external Force, and cliough he deliberately choofe and determine his Ac- tion to the apparent Good, yet can't be fiid to have been completely free. For his Incapacity was as eftedual an Impediment as an external Force could have been.
5. The fevernl Degrees of Liberty already men* lioned, can*i yet render Ilmnan Liberty cbynpletey in our imperfe!^ State and Circumjlafices, without the Ac- cejjion of a Freedom of not A^ing as "well as cfAcfing^ ezrn after the clearejl Perception^ and the mojl delibe-
:c and unhyafs^d Choice. For wc find by Experi- c.ce, that notwithftanding all the Requifitcs of li- berty, already mentioned, an imperfeil Agent, like our felves, may be in fuch a State that he can't be reputed comp>letely free. Thus a Perfon fuddenly feiz'd with a Paify, and chufing to remain where he is, though his Stay be voluntary, and the Refvjlc of fuch a Perception, Choice, and Self-detefmina- tion, as no Force nor any Impediment influenc'd ; yet 'tis clearj that being Panilytick, he was not free to remove.
This makes it appear, that a Power o^ Aoling or not Aoiingj even after Choice, (by virtue of another intervening Choice) is that which is moft eflential to human Liberty in our prefent State, which we ihall prove to be a State of IVyal, and that our Liberty does not entirely confilt in a Spontaneity, or Volun' tarinefs, as fome imagin. For what is done volun- tarily (or with Choice) may yet be as neceflTary, as
D what
^o An Impartial Enquiry into the
what is done with the greateft Reludlance. The Choice may be irrefiftibly determin'd by an external Force, or efFedlually influenc'd by an internal Im- pediment. And fuppofmg it free, yet it can't alone denominate the Agent free •, whofe confequent Ac- tion may ftill be neceflitated or determin*d by fome external Agent. Nor can a free Choice, join'd with a Liberty of Determining and Executing that only which happens to be in our Power, when the contrary was naturally as much in our Power, de- nominate us free ; for if fo, the Paralytick we late- ly mention'd might as well be reputed free, as a Per- fon who has the Ufe of his Limbs. There muft therefore be a felf-determining Power capable of Ac- ting or not Afting even after the cleareft Perception , and freeft Choice, with reference to Things within the Capacities of Human Nature i i. e. there mufl ftill be a Power of refufmg and chufing anew, capable of determining the Pradlice, either by exerting or not exerting an Ability to ad: according to that Re- , fufal or Choice. I
6. Though a -previous Deterjninat'ion and NeceJ/ity (as far as they extend) are ever inconfifient with Liber- ty^ yet they are not always inconfifient with P erf e5lion. The Reafon is, becaufe Liberty, or Indetermina- tion, is not, in every Cafe, a Perfedion ; and be- caufe Determination and Neceflity may fometimes proceed from Perfection. For Inftance, though in the Cafes aforementioned, viz. either of an imme- diate or mediate Influence from fomewhat extrinfical, or of internal Hindrance from Defeats, the Deter- mination and NecefTity refulting from thence are Proofs of the Imperfedlion of the Subjeft, yet there is another NecelTity in all intelligent Beings, pro- ceeding from none of thefe Caufes, but purely from the greater or lefTer Perfedtion of their Natures : And by Confequence, an abfolute Freedom from fuch Neceffity (was it pofTible) would be an Imper- fection.
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). si Mion. Thus, when I refleft upon whac pafiTcs in my own Mind, I can't but obferve a necelfary In- clination to my own proper Good or Benefit in the general (as the End ot all my Adions ;) and when I let my lei f to confider any Good or Evil in particu- lar, in order to obtain the one, or avoid the other, I find (it" my Capacity and Means of Information be fufScient) I can't but necefiarily judge of it as it is in Reality.
Thatfuch Neccllity as is included in thefe Inftances is no Imperfedion, but rather a great Perfedion, is, I think, too clear to be doubted. For 'tis the una- voidable Refult of the Exercifc of Realbn ; which is queftionlels a Perfeftion. And notwithftanding fuch NecelTity, yet the antecedent Power we are conlcious we have, in all ordinary Cafes, either of determining or not determining our I'houghts to the Confidera- tion of any particular Objed in order to Praftice, join'd with a fubfequent Power of deliberating, and fometimes varying our Judgment in Cafes not felf- evident, as well as of fufpending and varying our Approbation, Choice and Praftice, even after the cxacleft Deliberation and trueft Judgment, will fut- liciently prove, that our Aftions are under no uni- verfil tatal Determination, either from the Objeds that affe6t us, or from any other Caufe. I fay we are confcious of thefe Powers within ouf felves. For I think I may appeal to any confidering Mail, whe- ther he be not in all ordinary Cafes, fcnfible of an Ability of diu-ting his Thoughts upon any prticular Object, even antecedently to any Deliberation •, and then, whether after Deliberation about particulair Objedts, he can't reafTume his Deliberation, and fometimes vary his Judgment ; and whether, after the cleareft Judgment, and moll deliberate Choice of particular Things or Adions, he be not ftill confcious of a Power of fufpending his Pradice, of reuliuming the Confideration ot the Objeds when- D 2 ever
5 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the
ever he pleafes, or of immediately chufing and pralc-' tifing the contrary. But we have no clearer Proof, even of our Exiftence, than Confcioufnefs : And I conceive we need not exped greater Evidence of any Thing, than we have of our Exiftence. So that if we duly refiedl, we can't but find enough in our own Minds to convince us, that the proper Spring of Aftion is within our felves, and capable of exert- ing itfelf by its own native Force, though ufually excited and fometimes determined by Things with- out us.
From what has been obferv'd, it is manifeft, that our Notion of Human Liberty, in the prefent State, . is then only complete, when it includes a fufficient Perception and a Judgment determined only by the Nature and Circumftances of the Objeft, without the irrefiftible Influence either of external Force or . internal Defeds ; preceded by an indetermin'd Abi- I lity of confidering and deliberating, and follow'd by a like indeterminM Ability either of approving or not approving, chufing or not chufing, adting or not acting accordingly.
This Defcription of human Liberty refiefts fome ^ Light upon the Nature of Guilty or Obligation to J Punifhment, which hereby appears naturally to re- lult from the Abufe of Liberty, either in our neg- ledling the poflible and moft conducive Means in order to our Information, antecedently to our Judg- ment of any A6lion •, or elfe from a like Abufe of Liberty confequent to our Judgment, in approving, chufing, or pradlifmg that or a different Adion ei- ther rafhly or obftinately. For as for the pure Ad of Judging, fince 'tis neceffarily determin'd by the Objedl as it appears to us, 'tis clear we can't be culpable merely on that Account.
By this it likewife appears, that Human Liberty, in its full Latitude, is not the Attribute of any par- ticular Adt, Power or Faculty, but is the Property
of
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 53 of the Agent or Man, For though the Judgment, Approbation, Choice, and Determination to Ac- tion be exempt from the fatal Influence of any ex- ternal Force or internal Defecfl, yet if the Agent be not capable of Not approving. Not chufing and ex- ecuting even what is really bell, as well as of ap- proving, chufing and executing it, thefe mention'd Degrees of Liberty can be no fufficient Principle of Adion in our Imperfeft State and CircumlUnces, or as we are fubjedt to Laws as Trials of Obedience. , By the Confideration of fuch Liberty as is agree- able to ourfelves in our particular State and Capa- city, we fhall now be the better quality'd to form Ibme Conception of that which is fuitable to the Idea of the eternal Being. In order to which, I think we may lay it down for a Principle, That the Nature of Liberty in all capable Beings is the fame, allowing only for fuch accidental Diverfity as may pro- ceedfrom the different States and Perfe^ion of its Subt
Now to difcover wherein the Perfeflion and pe-r culiar State of the Eternal Being may have occafion- ed his Liberty to differ from that of our felves, and other imperfe(5l Agents, we may here recolleft what we before obferv'd when we difcours*d of Human Liberty, viz. That all Determination and NecefTity is not inconfiftent with Perfedlion, but that on the contrary, there is ever an immediate Determination both of the Agent to Good in general, and of the Judgment by the Nature and Circumftances of the Objeds when duly perceiv'd (under the Notion of Goodj in particular. To which we may add, what we likewife hinted before, viz. That the more con- flant and uniform the Determination evep of the confequent Adts is to that which is really better, f proceeding from an internal Principle of Perfec- tion, and not from any external Influence) the more
D 3 per-
54 An Impartial Enqmry into the
perfp(?t is the Agent's Liberty, as may hereafter appear.
AgFeeably to this, it will, 'tis conceiv*d, be ma- nifeft, that the Difference between the Liberty of the Eternal Being, and that of ourfelves and other ?mperfe6t Agents, muft chiefly confift in the Conr ftancy and Uniformity of the Determination, not only of his Judgment, but of all his confequent A(^ls, to what is really better. This is the un- doubted Refult of the Supreme Perfedlion of his Nature. For as where the Underftanding is never deceiv'd by falfe Colours and Appearances, there the Judgment can't but be always right •, fo where no irregular PafTions, nor any imaginable Impedi- ments intervene between the Judgment, Choice, and Execution, there all the confequent A6ls can't but jbe perpetually agreeable to the right Judgment.
The conllant uniform Determination of the Dei- ty with Reference to his confequent A<5tion, mufl be conceiv'd to difcover itfelf in two feveral Refpedts : Both in Refpeft to his Manner cf AEi'ing^ and to certain of his ABs.
Firjly It can't but difcover itfelf in his Manner of Aofing. For Inftance, the very Nature of the moft perfect of Beings can't but immutably determine him when he ads, to a6l wifely and regularly. When he inclines to external Adlion, (/. e. to A5lion which has a Reference to other Beings) he can no more fail to chufe thebeft End, and to employ the fittefl or mofl conducive Means, than he can to underftand them. For that there is a Fitnefs and Unfitnefs in the Natures or Circumltances of Things and Aftions, will be undeniably clear from whap fhall be obferved hereafter.
This piakes it appear how the Divine A6lion may, notwithflanding the moft perfecfl Liberty, proceed from a Principle as conftant and uniform as the fup- pos'd Stoical Fate it felf. And this, by Confe-
quence.
Exiflence and Nature of GO D. 55 quence, ihows the neceflfary Connexion of the mo- ral Attributes of the Deity (fuch as Juftice, Mercy, i£c.) with the natural ones (his Self-adtivity, Intel- ligence, Liberty, l£c,) in the prefent State of Things. For though thefe moral Attributes denote no par- ticular Perfeflions of the Divine 7Vrt/;/r^, but only fuch relative Ideas of our Minds as refult from the Confideration of the Divine Atl'wns with Reference to ourfelves and other Beings, as will be fhewn ; yet fince the natural Perfed:ions, which arc the Prin- (fiples of thofe Divine Ads, are immutable both in themfelves and in their Manner of Ading, we may infallibly conclude, that whenever the Deity inclines to ad, his Adionsmult conitantly come under thole Denominations.
*Tisto be confefs'd, that in an Agent fubjed to Laws, and in a State of Tryal, fuch conitant na- tural Determination to the bed Method of chufino- and pradifmg, would, as we hinted before, be in- confiftent with his State and Circumftances, For fince fuch a State fuppofes a Poflibility of the con- trary Ads, vix. of Obedience and Difobedience, 'tis clear that the Liberty which agrees to it muft, e- ven after the Perception of the Obligation and Judo-- ment of the Duty requir'd, ftill include an Indeter- mination with Reference to the confequent Ads. For without this, the Impofition of Laws as Trials of Obedience, would feem impertinent, and Re- wards and Punifliments could have no Place -, fince 'tis manifeft, that where-ever Rewards and Punifh- ments take Place, they muft be difpens'd on account of fomewhat which was originally in the Subjed's Power either to do or omit.
But though fuch an Indetermination, with Refe- rence to Ads confequent on the Judgment, be that whrch is clTential to the Liberty of an Agent fubjed to a Trial of Obedience to the Laws of a fuperior D 4 ^^<^in^?
5<5 An Impartial Enquiry into the Being, yet it is merely accidental to Liberty in gcr neral, and far from being in itfelf a Perledtion.
Agahiy The conftant uniform Determination of the Deity muft be conceiv'd to difcover itfelf not only with Refped to his Manner of Afling, but with reference to certain of his Jois. Thus for In- llance : Since the Deity could not but be ever con; fcious of the Perfections of his adorable Nature (his Omnipotence, Wifdom, ^c. ) confequently, he could not but know it was fitter thofe Perfections fhould be exercis'd, than that they fiiould eternally remain unemploy'd. Therefore, fince (as was obr ferv'd) his Choice cannot but follow his Perception of what is fitter, and his confequent Adts can- not but be ever agreeable to his Choice ; it plainly tbllo>ys that he could never be indetermin'd with Reference to external Adllon. Yet this could not hinder but that his external A<5tion, though pro- ceeding from fuch Determination, might ilill be ia the moft perfe6l Manner free : Inafmuch as it was no Determination from any external Force nor in- ternal Defedt, but the pure Refult of his own ef- fential Pertedion, and executed when and in fuch Or^er as it plcas'd him. For that the Eternal Be- ing might have created the World Millions of Ages fooner, ( i. e, might have caus'd it to have been of a vaftly longer Duration than ft adtually is) is unde- niable. And that he, who was abfolutely indepen- dent of the Creatures, might have obferv*d a yery different Order in fome Refpedls, and yet in fuffi- cient Confiftence with his great Defign, is not tq t>e doubted •, fince in many Cafes different Methods are equally fuitable and conducive ; ^nd different Species of Creatures niviy be in all Refpe6ts of equal Fitnefs and Capacity. So that, with Reference tq the Beginning, Order, and particular A(fts and Objeds of Cre;ition, the Deity was ('tis humbly copcejv'd) under no origirjal Determination j though
with
Exiilence tf«^ Nature <?/ GO Z). 57
with Relpe(^ to the A^l of Creation in general^ he appears to have been ever determin'd by his own eilential Perfeftion. But of this more will be faid aiion.
Befides, by fome previous Aft that was compleat- ly free, vye may conceive him fometimes to con- tra(ft a confequent immutable Determination to fome particular future A6t. For Example, in the Cafe of an abfolute Promife, tho* the Engagement may be completely free, yet the Performance, with all its natural Confequences, can't but become neceflary to tlie Deity. For that fuch Determination is very confiftent with the divine Liberty, is manileft : Since fo perfe(5tly wife a Being, who is fully acquainted with the Relations and Dependencies of Things, can't be conceiv'd to oblige himfelf to the Perfor- mance of any thing without a particular Regard to all its natural aud neceflary Confequences. Which makes it evident, that in fuch a Cafe, thefe are no lefs the Effedls of his Liberty, than the Engagemenc from whence they proceeded.
From whfit has been obferv'd, we may now be adiited to form fome Idea of the Divine Perfec- tion with Regard to Liberty^ by concluding, That though the mojl perfeB of Beings luas ever Free^ or un- der no eternal Determination to any particular external A^, {fince neither his 0:1: n Nature^ nor the Influence of any other Being appears to have occajioned Juch De^ termination \ ) yet his ejfential Perfeclion way well he Juppos'd to have ever determined hm to external Ac- tion in general^ and that in the fittefl and ffiofl Juit- able Manner : And not only fo^ but that ^ in the pre - fent Scene of Things, a previous Auf, to which he was in no Refpeol oblig'd or determin'd^ may be conceiv'd f<dmctimes to occafion a confequent Determination and Niceffity with reference to other particular AUs^ with- o^a Prejudice to his Liberty,
'Tis
5 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the
'Tis eafy to remark, that this Defcription of the divine Liberty cannot eafily be reconcile with a cer- tain current Opinion ; I mean that of 'particular eternal Decrees. 'Twill therefore be necelTary to give it a few Thoughts.
I perfuade my {t% *tis a Matter of no great Dif- ficulty to make it appear, that this Opinion has no folid Foundation in Scripture. For as to thofe Texts which are ufually produced to prove the E- ternity of certain particular Decrees, they'll perhaps appear to be infufficient. Thus, the Texts which fpeak of Ele^ion before the Foundation of the World, can be of little weight to fuch who think it no necef- fary Article of Faith to believe that this inferior World was the earlieft Work of the Eternal Omnipotent Being -, and who are convinc'd that either this or any other Part of the Univerfe, might have been of a much ancienter Date than it actually is, without being Eternal. And as for that other Text which is ufually produc'd, 2 ^i;«. i. 9, where Grace is faid to have been given -sre^ ;)^e^r<yj' etWia^, ante Tefnpora Seculoru?n, or before the Times of Ages (as Beza, renders it.) I fuppofe few will doubt, but that the natural Senfe of the Phrafe is that which our Englijh Tranflation afligns it, vit.. before the World began : The Times of Ages being properly no other than the Duration of this inferior World, which confifts of a SuccefTion of Ages and Generations. That this is the genuine Interpretation, may further appear by comparing Kom. xvi. 25. with Col. i. 26. In the former Text the Apoftle fpeakingof the My fie- ry of the Gofpel which was then revealed, informs us that it was hid x^^°'^ amioji, fro?n the Times of Ages, or ftnce the World began, as the Englifh renders it. Agreeably to which Interpretation, the fame Apoftle, in the latter Text, fpeaking of the fame reveal'd Myftery, calls it the Myftery which was kid from Ages and Generations^ i, e. from the Begin-
Exiftcncc and Nature of G O D. 59
n|ng of Ages and Generations •, or, which is the (ame, fiuce the fi'orld began. Which makes it mofi: evident, that this Prcx)t can import no more to the prefent Purpofe, than the other we coniider'd above. The hke may be faid of that Text, where Mention is made of the Eternal Purpofe of God, Ephef. iii. 1 1 . V\f'r>hm 'nfv A\uvuvy or the Purpofe of Ages, as it is in the Original, which may fignify either that ic hath endured ever fmce the World began, or that ic fhall endure as long as the World continues. And when the ApolUe fpeaksof the Blood i^ttt^nMi ctiwU of tbc Covenant of Ages, Heb. xiii. 20. we need nor, perhaps, underftand it in any other Senfe than the former Texts.
Nor are the Proofs of the Eternity of particular Pccrees borrowed from Reafon of greater Force, tho* of greater Subtilty \ which we fhall briefly con- fider.
Firfl, Some have attein^pted a Proof of the Eter- nity of particular Decrees, from the fuppos'd Ne- ccflity or Eternity of certain Truths. Which re- puted eternal Truths are of two Sorts. Some are laid to refer to the Effences of Things ; others to their Exijlence and Aftions. Of the former Sort are fuch as thefe in the Mathematicks, A Circle hath equal Diameters, Two and Three are equal to Five ; and in fliort, all Propofitions of any Kind, whofe Predicates are of the Elfence of their Subjeds. Of the latter Sort are all fuch Propofitions as relate to Things or Aflionsnot yet in Being; fuch as thefe. The Sun will esifl, Socrates will difpute. Which Propofitions, fince (as is ufually imagin*d) they ne- ver began to b^ rme, fome are aj)t to conclude, muft have dcriv'd an eternal Verity (or Truth J from certain particular eternal Decrees of God.
But Ftrjl, as for fuch reputed eternal Truths as concern the Effences of created Things, 'twill per- haps appear, that thefe were no diftind, neceflary
or
6o An Impartial Enquiry into the or eternal Truths, but only particular contingent Determinations of this one general eternal or necef- fary Truth, (in which they were but virtually in- cludedj viz. T^mt isuhich is the fame is not different y or, Nothing can he diverfe from itfelf. Which gene- ral Truth is the Bafis or Foundation of all Science, and has an immediate Conne<5lion with the Exijlence of the eternal or neceflarily-exiftent Being, without the leaft Dependence on his Decree. For it never was more neceffarily true that the Deity exifled, than it was that he could not be diverfe from Him- felf,
To prove this, we may firft obferve, that the Senfe of thefe Propofitions, A Circle hath equal Dia- meters, Two and Three are equal to five, and the like, is in itfelf identical ; and they can amount to no more than thefe, A Circle is nothing elfe but a Circle, Two and Three are not different from Two and Three. For fince a Figure with equal Diameters figni- jies the very fame with a Circle, and fi'^e is nothing different from Two and Three, 'tis manifeft, that in thefe and the like Propofitions, there's no real Dif- ference between the Extremes, and by Confequence no proper Relation of Equality between Subjedl and Property, as is ufually imagin'd, but a real and pro- per Identity. For though thefe and the like Pro- portions add to our Knowledge by a clearer Difco- very of the fame Idea, and are therefore very diffe- rent (with refpedt to us) from fuch other identical Propofitions wherein one and the fame Idea is af- firm'd of itfelf without Diftindion of Words, yet Cin themfelves confider'd) they are equally identical : Since the Idea fignify'd by the Predicate is the fame which is fignify'd by the Subje^ ; only with this Difference, that the Predicate expreffes it more clear- ly, or with fome Modification which was not pAf- irly exprefs'd by the Subjed. '
So
Exlftence and Nature of GOT). 6i So that this Argument amounts at laft to no more than this, viz. That becaufe in the general it ap- pears that every Being which at any Time exilts, has of Neceflity a peculiar Nature, or is neceflarily the fame with it felf, and diflindl from all others, therefore it was eternally and particularly decreed it fhould be fo.
But, 1 take it, 'tis a ridiculous Thing to imagine a particular eternal Decree was requifite, in order to beftow a neceflliry or eternal Truth on thefe im- portant Proportions, A Circle is a Circle^ and not a 'Triangle, Two and Three are Five, and not an Hun- dred, and the like. For whatever Neceflity belongs to thefe Truths, is plainly no other than what is included in that eternal univerfal Truth we men- tioned before : Which Truth (as we obferv'dj was not deriv'd from any Divine Decree, but had a ne- ceiTary immediate Connexion with the Divine Ex- iftence and Nature itfelf. And as for the particular Determinations or Applications of that eternal uni- verfil Truth by the divine Decrees and productive Power either to the EfTence or to the Exiftence of thofe or any other created Subjedls ; they were noc nccefl^ary, 'tis humbly conceiv*d, but merely con- tingent. For as nothing neceflarily exifted unpro- duc'd but the divine Nature, whofe Non-exiflence was a Contradidion in it felf; fo Nothing can with Reafon be affirmed to have been neceflarily decreed and produc'd, but fuch Beings whofe Non-pro- dudion was a Contradidion to the Divine Nature. But what particular Being or Sort of Beings dare we affirm to be of fuch a Nature, as that it was a Contradiction to the divine Nature not to have decreed and produc'd it, or ('which is the fame) that the Deity could not have been Himfelf, had he not created it ? 'Tis freely confefs'd, that all the Crea- tures of God are in themfelves good. But we know there are Degrees of Perfection among *em ; and
none
^2 An Impartial Enquiry into the
none can fay that any exifts with all the Perfedion that Omnipotence could bellow ; or, by Confe- quenee, that any (much lefs every) Creature was the beft or mod perfeft the Deity could produce. Which Reflexion yields us a fenfible Demonftration of the divine Indetermination to particular Adls. For had the Deity been under a natural Determination to the decreeing and producing of every Creature par- ticularly confidcr'd, it mnft have been under the Notion of the Beft or moft Perfect. But then there could have been feen no Creature inferior in Per- fedion to another, and an univerfal Equality muft have appeared throughout the Frame of Nature.
And then, as for fuch Propofitions as relate to the Exiftence and Adlons of Things not yet in Being, fuch as, The Sun will exiff^ Socrates will difpule, and the like ; they can't, in an ahfoliite Senfe, be affirm'd to have been neceffiirily or eternally true, without begging the Queftion in Debate, or fuppofing thofe very eternal Decrees they were defign'd to prove. For if there were no fuch particular eternal De- crees, 'tis certain thefe Propofitions mil ft, in an abfolute Senfe, have been eternally or neceffarily falfe ; in as much as the Exiftence and Adions of particular Creatures, if not eternally decreed,- muft ot themfelves have been no other than pure Contin- gencies. But the Truth of every affirmative Pro- pofition confiftis in the Conformity of the Predicate or Property with the Nature of the S\ibje(5]: or Thing of which it is affirm'd : Which Conformity could not be, if Neceffity was abfolutely affirm'd of a Thing or, Adion in itfelf contingent or inde- termin'd.
There is then Nothing in the Nauire of this latter Sort of Propofitions, which can oblige us to aflert ihey were eternally or neceflarily true in an abfolute Senfe^ or to allow that there was (as fome imagin) an abfolute eternal Certainty, of ail Events. But if
they
Exiftcnce <j«^ Nature ofGOT>. 63 they were true only in a Conditional Senfe^ 'tis ma- j^itefl: they were no otherwile true, than as the like Propofitions concerning any particular poflible Sub- jed may be affirmM to have been fo, though ic Ihould never exift. For Example, this Propofition, A Centaur Jhall exi^-i if it pleafe the Deity fo to decree^ was always as true as thefe, "The Sun ivill exiji, or Socrates will difpute^ if God fo pleafes. And it is equally clear, that this conditional Truth proves no particular eternal Decrees, though it proves an eter- nal free Agent, who always polTefs'd a Ibvereign Power of decreeing, creating, and influencing par- ticular Natures if and as he pleafed.
Upon the whole 'tis eafy to conclude, that the eternal ideal TVorld, in which fome Platonick Gen- tlemen have lately imagin'd themfelves to have made fuch mighty Difcoveries, and which is chiefly fup- ported by Eternal Ejfences and Futurities, is in a more proper Senfe than can be faid of the Earthy founded upon Nothing.
Another Argument in Favour of particular eternal Decrees, is borrowed from the Opinion of a parti- cular eternal Foreknowledge. This, it feems, waa the Method of the Platonijls, who appear to have been the firfl: Introducers of that Doctrine. For they imagining it to have been eflential to the Per- fc6tion of the Deity, eternally and particularly to foreknow all other Beings and all Events depending on their Exiftence, were probably thence difpofcd to receive the Opinion of particular eternal Decrees as the only fufficient Hypothefis to account for fuch Foreknowledge.
In Reply to this Argument, we Ihall here only propofe ic to be confider'd, whether it be not more agreeable to the Independence and Liberty of the eternal Being, to fuppofe his own mofl perfect Na- ture to have been the only neceflfary particular Ob- je6t of his Knowledge v or whether the Suppofition
of
64- An Impartial Enquiry into the of the eternal or abfolutely neceflfary Decrees Snd Foreknowledge of particular Creatul-es and all their AftionSj can be maintain*d, without aflerting not only all the particular Creatures, but all their Ac- tions, to be in their own Natures fuch as the Deity could not have Emitted to decree and foreknow^ without Prejudice to his Perfedion and Happinefs.
There is yet another Proof of eternal Decrees attempted from the Opinion of an Injlantaneous E- ternity^ and the Ahfolute Immutahility of the divine Adion founded thereon. But the Abfurdity of this pretended Pfobf is generally confefs'd, and will be difplay'd in the Chap, of Eternity, Book II.
We have the longer infifted on this Opinion of Particular Eternal Decrees, becaufe of the impure Confequences with which it appears to have defiled the Innocence of the Chriftian Religion -, which Confequences, as they depend on it, muft neceffa- rily fall with it. For if there were no eternal par- ticular Decrees of every Creature and Event, then as the abfolute Predefbination or Predetermination of all Perfons and Events from Eternity, muft be rejected ('and no fufficient Reafon will appear for aflerting fuch Predeftination of a later Date) fo that particular immediate determining Concurfe of God to the worft of Aflions, for rendring thofe Decrees efFed:ual, will appear to be an unnecefiary Doc- trine ; and thereby both the Juftice of God, and the Liberty and Accountablenefs of Creatures will obtain a fufficient Vindication. Without fuch a Vindica- tion, what-ever Arguments we may employ to convince Men of Atheiftick Principles, that it is a Thing very defirable there fhould be a God, will, I doubt, be of very little Effect. For certainly, it is not the Idea of a moft intelligent and wife Be- ing, freely determining himfelf to Adsof Goodnefs and Juftice, which frights fuch Perfons -, but much rather that of fuch a Being as thcfe Opinions repre-
fent
Exigence and N:\auc of G 0 'T). 6$
•fent the Deity to be : Opinions far lefs pious than tfie Opinion of the Stoicks, as obliging their Afler- tors (at leail iWiredtly and by Conkquence) to make the Beft of Bemgs the Author of the worlt Adtions and Events •, which to avoid, thofe Pagans rather chofe to lay the Blame, in fome Degree at Jeaft, on I know not what independent uncontroulable Deftiny.
CHAP. VIII.
OU R Secondary Notions of the Perfedion of God, confider'd with Reference to Himfelf, we have obferv'd to be,
I. Spirituality, Men have generally agreed to exprefs their Idea of the Beft and Nobleft of Beings by the Word Spirit : A Metaphor taken from the ^ir or fFind, than which, by Reafon of its Tenuity, perpetual Agitation, and wide Expanfion, Nothing feem'd more proper to reprefent that invifible Na- ture which pervades, a6tuates, and comprehends all Things. Which invifible Nature, though to No- thing fo fitly refembled as to the Air (which of all the Portions of Matter is the leaft perceiv*d by our Senfes) yet has been ufually conceiv'd as diftindl from the moft refined Matter, and as including the three Properties already demonftrated, of which Matter was generally fuppofed to be dcftitute ;
1. Self-J^ivity. Thus Thales, Pythagoras, Pla- to, and others, according to the Philofophy of the Eaftern Nations, afiferted Two Principles, the one Aa:ive and Spiritual, the other PafTive and Mate- rial.
2. Intelligence. Says Poftdonius in Stob. 5 QxU ifi nnZ^A voipaj*, God is an Intelligent Spirit. To fignity this, they were wont to give him the Titles of
• N?f and <fltff,«i.v, both which import Conjcioufnefs and ' Perception.
E 3. Liberty,
66 An Impartial Enquiry into the
3 . Liberty. Some of the Philofophers, I confefs, fuppos'd the Deity to be fubjed to the Influence of Fate. But the *iKvi of Orpheus, the *rM' oi I'hales, the TAK of Pythagoras and Plato, nd the "Atij^pov of Anaxagoras, (by which Terms they ufually fignify'd the material Principle of the Univerfe) are always defcrib'das void of Liberty or felf-determining Pow- er, which thefe Philofophers fuppos'd to be only, in the Nsf , or Mind, who both imprefs'd and regulated their Motions.
II. Another fecondary Notion of the Perfeclion of God, confider'd with Reference to Himfelf, is Cmfiancy or ImmiitaUlity : Which we conceive is to be affirm'd both of his Nature and A^fion.
1 . Of his Nature. The Spring of Inconftancy or Mutability, in this Refped, muft be either feme necefTary internal Principle of Corruption, or his own Will, or elfe fome external Caufe. But the firft of thefe is abfolutely inconfiftent with his per- fed: vital Selfadtivity, the fecond with his perfe6t Intelligence, and the third with the Perfedion of his Liberty.
2. Of his A5fions. In treating of the Divine Adions, we may, it is conceiv'd, lay it down as an infallible Principle, 'That we can be no farther ob- liged to ajfert their Immutability, than as it appears to have a necejfary Connection with the Immutability of the Divine Nature.
The Divine Adions may be confider'd, either as eflential, or as uneflential. The former, becaufe they flow immediately from the Divine Nature, can't but be immutable in the fame Senfe as the Nature itfelf. The latter, (which 'tis humbly conceiv'd, had no neceflary Connedion with the Divine Na- ture) are of two Sorts, viz. either his particular Decrees, or their Executions. By his Immutability or Conltancy with Reference- to both thefe, 'tis conceiv'd we are to underftand in che general, his
un-
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 67
unvariably decreeing Ends fuitable to his Nature, and his lleddy Purl'uit and infallible Attainment of thofe Ends : Both which evidently imply Pertec- tion, and refult from the ablbkite Invariablenefs or Immutability of his Nature. But as for his parti- cular Ads, and his Knowledge confequenc thereup- on, the Immutabihty of his Nature infers no fuch Invariablenefs with Regard to them, but i-ather the quite contrary j for as much as their Variety mull be conceiv'd immediately to proceed from the va- rious Exercife of his Liberty •, which (in all indiffe- rent Cafes) is the Refult of the immutable Perfec- tion of his Nature.
And as for the Adions of other Beings, and all Events depending on their Exiftence ; they are alike incapable of caufing any Change in the Di- vine Knowledge inconfiftent with the Perfection and Immutability of the Divine Nature. On the con- trary, 'tis manifeftly a Point of Perfedion to know Things as they really are \ which yet can't be with- out fome Variation in the Manner of Knowledge anfwerable to the Variation in the State of its Ob- jeds,
III. Another fecondary Notion of the* Divine Perfedion, confider'd with Reference to the Deity Himfelf, is Happinefs. Hiis Idea is the neceflary Refult of all our other Conceptions of the eternal and moft per fed Being abfolutely confider'd. For a Being which eflfentially and independently poflcfles a perfed Selfadivity, Intelligence, and Liberty, (to which three Ideas, all our Conceptions ot the Di- vine Internal Attributes appear to be reducible) join'd with a juft Refledion upon, and Valuation ot 'em, can't but be completely happy.
All real Happinefs arifes from a certain Compla- cence in the PolTefiion, Hope, or Expedation of fome Good : Which Complacence is ever propor- tionate either to the intrinfick Worth, or, at leaft,
E 2 to
6 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the
to the Eflimation of that Good in the Mind of its Subjed. From which, 'tis evident, that That only- can be a compleatly happy Being, which both pof- feffes a perfect and permanent Good, and whofe Opinion of it is ever agreeable to its real Worth.
As it hence appears that the Eternal Being can't | but be a perfectly happy Being .; fo it is no lefs ' clear, that Himfelf is the only Reafon of his Com- placence and Happinefs ; for as much as his own Nature alone comprehends whatever is good and va- luable. For fmce fas will be fnewn hereafter j what- ever elfe exifts, could have no other real Worth but what it deriv'd from the eternal and moft perfe£t Being •, 'tis manifeft that what-ever Good is found in any other Nature, can no otherwife pleafe him than as a Communication from Flimfelf : Which Pleafure can no more increafe his eflential Happinefs, than the Refledion of a Ray can add to the Lullre of the Sun.
The Eficureans Vftr^ fo far from imagining their Deities could receive any Acceflion to their Happi- nefs by concerning themfelves with Beings of an in- ferior Rank, that they thought it too mean an Em- ployment, and a Fatigue inconfiftent with that Re- pofe or Tranquillity, which they conceiv'd to be the chief Ingredient of Happinefs. Therefore, in pure Civility, they banifh'd 'em out of the World, pretending it yielded no Place worthy of their Refi- dence, and feated them in certain ultramundane Spa- ces, there to live in uninterrupted Pleafure, and neither to trouble themfelves nor others, by a too officious intermedling with human Affairs. Their Seats the Poet thus defcribes.
^as neque concutiunt Venti, neque Nuhila Nimbis Afpergunt^ neque Nix acri concreta 'Pruind Cana cadens violate femperqu-e-innuhilus JSiher Intent, et large diffufo Lu?mne ridet,
-And
Exiftence and Nature of GOT). 69
— — — And happy Scats, Which Storm or violent Tempefl never beats. Nor Snow invades, but with the pureft Air, And gaudy Light diffus'd, look gay and fair.
Creech.
Thus thofe Philofophers were us*d to conceive of their tiditious Deities •, if at leafh it be not a Difpa- ragement to that Honourable Charadler to call fuch Men Philofophers^ who, though we lliould in Cha- rity fuppofe them to have bcliev'd fuch Divine Be- ings, yet, like the Vulgar, fram'd them after their own Model. For though it muft be own'd, that they have rightly placed Happinefs in the 'Tranquil- lity of the Mind, yet in this they were deceiv'd, when they fuppos'd that fuch Tranquillity was abfolutely inconfiitent with Ad:ion in fuch a Being as the Deity. How mean and unphilofophical was it to imagine the moft perfed: Power lliould be fubjed to Fa^ tigue, or that the moft perfeft Underftanding fliould be perplex'd and difcompos'd by too much Appli- cation and Solicitude ! This was, in Eftecft, to min-. gle the two Extremes, and to level the nobleft with the bafeft of Beings : Thofe Natures being ever the leaft perfect which are the leaft capable of and pro^ penfe to Action.
From all this the general Conclufion is, that as nothing in any of the inferior Beings is capable of making any Addition to the Happinefs of the Deity (which can refultonly h-om the Confcioufnefs of his own eflential Perfections •,) fo his creating fuch Bcr ings, and caring for them when created, could be no Diminution of it.
E 3 CHAP.
7Q An Impartial Enquiry into the CHAP, IX.
E now proceed to confider our Ideas of the Divine Perfed:ion or Sufficiency with Re- ference to other Beings as merely pojfihle.
I. One of thefe we obferv'd to be Omnipotence, or Perfeft Efiedive Power. By this, 'tis conceiv'd, no more can be meant, than an Ahility to do or pro- duce whatever is confijient in it/elf , and agreeable to the Divine Nature. For to extend it farther, would be in EfFedl to afcribe to the Deity a Power of caufing a Thing both to be and not to be at once and in the fame Senfe f for all Contradidlions arc reducible to That) or, which is all one, a Power of producing afuhjiantial Nothing.
The proper Aftion of perfed effeflive Power, will appear to have a twofold Notion, viz. either of Creation or of Sufientation.
By Creation, is here meant the Production of a Thing that before was not. By Sujientation, we un- derftand the preferving or continuing a Thing in its| Exiftence or Being.
In order to prove that the true Idea of the Divine Sufficiency includes what we call Creative Power, we need not here demonflrate that there has adlually been a Creation. 'Twill be enough for our prefent Pur- pofe, to prove Creation a Poffibility. For if this can be fet in a clear Light, 'twill evidently appear, that creative Power can't but belong to the eternal and moft perfedl Being.
Neither is It neceflary, in order to a Proof of the Poffibility of a Creation, to undertake to explain the Manner of it, or to reduce its Idea to a Level with our Underftandlngs. 'Twill be fufficient to refcue it from the Charge of Contradiftlon and Ab- furdity. For I take it, 'tis uhiverfally agreed, that
per-
Exiftcnce and Nature of GO D. 71 perfedl Power may extend to any thing on this Side a Contradi(flion.
Though we want not Variety of Proofs of the Formation of the World (fuch as are derived from the Nature of Succeflion, the late Invention of Arts univerfally ufeful, the gradual Increafe of Mankind, and other Animals, ^c.) the Evidence of which was fufficientto oblige fuch Philofophers as preceded A- rijlotle, almoft univerfally to attribute the prefenc Frame of Things either to the Agency of a pow- erful and moft intelligent Being, or elfe to a cafual Hit or lucky Combination of the Parts of Matter ; yet it feems to have been their Opinion, that the Matter o^ y/h\c\\ it was form*d was eternal and inde- pendent. This their Perfwafion appears to have been grounded on the Obfervation of the prefent Courfe of Nature and Art ; according to which, whatever is producM is made out of pre-exiflenc Materials. From hence it was that they concluded it abfurd to imagin any thing fhould (as they wrong- ly exprefs'd it) either fpring out of Nothing, or be reduc'd to Nothing.
But *tis worth obferving, that many of the Phi- lofophers, who could not, in the Caufe of a Deity, raife their Speculations above the vulgar Level, were, when they came to reafon on the contrary Hypo- thecs, extravagant and fantaftick enough. Thofe very Gentlemen who were fo careful to avoid an Abfurdity (as they would fain have had it account- ed j on the Side of Religion, were not fo fcrupulous in the Defence of Atheifm. For rather than fup- pofe this noble Frame of the World to have been the Creature of a perfectly powerful and intelligent Caufe, they chofe to fiither it on Chance, and to turn the moft ferious Affiiir into a Game at Hazard, Rather than own their Relation to the greatt-ft and beft of Beings, they chofe to level themfelvcs with the Brutes, to imagine that, like Infedis, they were E 4 originally
72 An Impartial Enquiry into the
originally begotten by the Sun's Heat, and fprung from Pimples and Tumours of the Earth. They could eafily derive Liberty from NecefTity, Beauty from Deformity, Harmony from Difcord, by a piere Chance, or, which -is all one, without any determining Caufe at al], . But to create the minuteft Thing in Nature, muft, in their Opinion, pafs for ?,bfolutely impofiible. And why ? But becaufe they had never feen an Inftance of that Kind. They could fometimes indeed believe as Itrongly as other People ; but here they defired to be excufed, and could not think themfi^lves oblig'd to believe a Crea- tion, becaufe they were not admitted to be Witneffes of the Work ! They never had feen the Birth of the leaft Duft or Atom, how then could they imagine a Generation of the Univerfe * ! They could never obferve an Artificer to make any Piece of Work- manfhip without his Materials^ without his Injfru- ments •, how then could they conceive the vafl Body of the Sun, the innumerable Stars, the maffy Rocks and Mountains, to have been the Effedls of Art !
This Method of Reafoning is very like the Ar- guings of a Man bred in the dark, difputing againft the PolTibility of Sight. Should fuch a Perfon be told that there's a Place in the World, where, if he came, he fhould need only to open his Eyes, and be immediately and diftinftly fenfible of an almoft infi- nite Variety of Objedls, each vaflly bigger than him- felf, and many of 'em at very remote Diftances j would not fuch a Story as this appear to him as in- credible, as that of a Creation from Nothing ? Might he not, with equal Reafon, argue againft the Poffibility of fuch a Relation, from the very Prin- ciples thofe Philofophers made ufe of againft fuch a Creation ? As yet, might he fay, I have been fen- fible ot but very few Objects at once, and thofe fuch
* Ocellus and others contend, that there's no Produdion bu£ by Genpratjcn.
as
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 75
as 1 am aflur*d could not exceed the Dimenfions of my own Body, and whole Diftance was, for the moft Part, no greater than the Length of my Arm or Staff. And as for fuch others as I have per- ceiv'd at a remoter Diftance, they have been either fingle, or if more, extremely contus'd and indiftindf. What Magick muil there be in my Eyes, that fo little Members fliould be capable of conveying the diftindl Refemblanccs of fo great Variety of bulky Objedts at once ? If it be reply'd, That the Eyes don't perform this alone, but with the Help of a certain Inftrument call'd Light ; yet what Idea could fuch a Perfon have of Light different from that of his Staff? And what Inducement could fuch an Idea be to him to allow that to be pofTible, which by Arguments deriv'd from his own Experience, he had before reje<5ted as abfurd and incredible ?
But though fuch a Perfon, if he (with thofe Phi- lofophers) rcfolvc to admit nothing for Truth or Poffibility, but what is agreeable to his own Ex- perience of Things, and upon a Level with the pre- fent Ideas of his own Mind, muft remain under a NecelTity of disbelieving all the Reports he hears of Sight and Colours, and rejecting them as Impoftures, yet we, who have had the Ufe of our Eyes, fhall never, I fuppofe, be perfuaded, to come into his Opinion.
This ought to convince us, that there may be Pollibilities in the Nature of Things, of which we are as incapable of forming Ideas, as fuch a Perfon would be of forming the Idea of Sight. And why may not Creation be fuch a PofTibility ? Why may not He produce from Nothing, whofc EfTence and Adion depend on Nothing ? If we find ourfelves incapable of conceiving how a Thing which was not fnould begin to be, are we not alike incapable of comprehending how any thing (hould exilt without Beginning?
Wc
74 -^^ Impartial Enquiry into the
We need only take a View of ourfelves, to find Inftances of fuch Powers and Manners of Afting as are inconceivable to us. It can't be deny'd that we perceive, we confider and refled, we confute and demonflrate ; yet we may perhaps as well conceive the Creation of the Univerfe, as the Produdtion of a fingle Thought by the Mind. Our Feet pra(5life all the Steps of a Dance, our Fingers readily per- form their Parts at a Mufical Concert ; and yet I doubt, we are no better acquainted with the Power which imprefles and governs their Motions, than with that which regulates the Courfes of the Stars. But if we fo little underftand fuch Powers and Ac- tions of our own as do not come within the imme- 'diate Notice of our external Senfes, ought we to think it ftrange that we can't comprehend the Ac- tion of a Being fo much fuperior to ourfelves, and whofe Nature fo vaftly tranfcends the Capacity of our weak and imperfed Minds ?
We can't comprehend by what Sort of Power God moves Matter ; and need we admire we can form no Idea of the Power by which he created it ? Our Imaginations have no other Materials to work on, in forming an Idea of the original Power, but fuch as they derive from the Objeds we daily con- verfe with. But may not a Perfon who has an I6te- rifm in his Eyes, with as much Reafon contend, there's no other Colour but yellow, as we, who are fo little acquainted with the World, that there's no nobler Manner of Adling, than fuch as our narrow Experience informs us of ?
But fome will perhaps objed, that a Produdion from Nothing is not only inconceivable to us in our prefent Circumftances, but contradidory, or abfo- lutely inconceivable.
Before we reply 'twill be fit to premife, that it is a very wrong Notion of Creation, to imagine it to be the Produdion of a Thing from Noching, as from
a
Exiftcncc and Nature of G O 1). 7 5
a material Caufe or SuhjcB. Our Definition of it is no other than the Produ^ion of a Thing lohuh was not before.
This being confider'd, I would ask the Obje(5tors, wherein the Nature of a Contradiftion confifts ? Is it not in at once affirming and denying fomewhat of the fame Subjeft in the fame Manner ? But what is there like this in the Suppofition of fuch a Creation ? I confefs, if any Man could be found fo abfolutely ftupid and void of Underftanding, as to affirm that the Deity, in creating the World, had either pro- duc'd it out of Nothing as out of a pre-exiflent Sub- ject, or had causM it both to Be and not to Be, to be Something and Nothing at the fame Time, fuch a Notion of it might have fome Right to the Cha- rader of a Contradiction. But fince by Creation no more can be meant than the caufing to be what was not before, this is evidently no more a Contra- diction, than what we perceive to be done every Day •, I mean the Production of new Motions by the Mind. Which is likewife a Sort of Production from Nothing. *
But if the Notion of fuch Creation be no Contra- diction, then the A^ of Creation, how inconceiv- able foever the Manner of it may be to us, can't but be a Poffibility, or it mull ncceffarily come within the Compafs of that Power which we have already prov'd to be perfeCt. For 'tis impoffible a Power fhould be perfeCt, if there be any thing not implying a Contradiction, which it can't do.
The other Notion of the proper ACtion of fuch ef- fective Power as is included in the Perfection or Suf- ficiency of the~Eternal Being confider'd with Refe- rence to other Beings as poffible, is that of Su^en- tation, by which is meant the continuing a Thing in its Exigence. I take it to be undeniable, that the
* See more in Free Thoughts concernirg Souls, p. 134.
mero
76 An Impartial Enquiry into the mere caufing a Thing to Be, can't infer a Neceflity of its Continuance in Being. If the Creation of any thing fliould import a Neceflity of its future Continuance, that Neceflity mufl: either proceed from the Nature of the Creature, or elfe it mufl: flow from either the Nature or the Decree of the Crea- tor. Not from the Nature of the Creature. For then 'twould be impofilble even to that Power to an- nihilate it which at firft produc'd it. Nor from the Nature of the Creator. For no eflfential Perfedion of the eternal omnipotent Being can be imagin'd to infer the Neceflity of a Creature's Continuance to Eternity, but what mufl: be conceiv'd to have e- qually infer'd a Neceflity of its Production from Eternity. Nor, lajtly^ can it proceed merely from the Decree of the Creator. For the Decrees even of the Supreme Being can have no Eficd: unlefs put in Execution. But they can't be put in Execution without Power. And if not without Power, then the Exercife of that Power can be no lefs than what is meant by the Act of Sullentation.
From the Naturebf Sufl:entation,'tis eafy tocolle6l what mufl be the true Notion of Annihilation. For if a Creature can't be conceiv'd to have any natural Aptitude to continue rather than to ceafe to be, but mufl: be fuppos'd to fubflft entirely by a Dependence on the Power which originally produc'd it ; then there can be no Neceflity to imagine any pofltive Influx of Power to deftroy k. 'Tisfuflicient to fup- pofe a Sufpenfion of that Influence on which it de- pended.
The A6ts of Creation and Suftentation we terni'd the proper Aois of Omnipotence. For the Power which is capable of thefe, can't but be equally capable of all others on this Side a Contradiction : There be- ing no imaginable Degrees of Power between the producing or continuing a Subftance which was not,
and
Exlftcnce and Nature of GOT). 77 and the caufing a Thing both to Be and not to Be at once.
II. The next Conception of Sufficiency with Re- ference to pojfible Eileds, is that oi' Wifdo7n •, where- by is ("here) meant a perfc5l Ability to dijpofe and re- gulate in order to the mojl effectual Attainment of the beft Ends. In this Idea is not only included fimple IntelHgence, but whatever other Ideas have a Rela- tion to it •, fuch as Imagination, Memory, and Judg- ment. All which are hereby afferted to belong to the Deity i but in a Manner agreeable to his Pcr- fedion.
A Being capable of producing no other than a Chaos, or diforderly Heap of Rubbifh, without the Power of contriving or difpofiog it fo as might be conducive to fome valuable End, could have nojuft Claim to the Character of a fufficient Creator. Ef- fedtive Power, fingly confider'd, can fupply only the grofs Materials, and imprefs a rude unbiafs'd Motion. Therefore to conceive a Creator without Contrivance and Defign, is to fink his Character below that of an ordinary Artificer. Such a Be- ing could be no Way fuperior to one of Epicu- rus's infignificant Deities, and might e'en as well fit an idle Spectator of the Dancing Atoms, as be any farther concern'd in the Work.
Nor could Omnipotence, join'd with Contrivance and Defign, be enough to furnifli the Notion of a perfedt Creator, without the Suppofition of a Su- perintending and Regulating Power : Which there- fore makes the other Part of our Notion of Wifdom. Without fuch a Power, the Creator's Defigns would be fubjedl to the Hazard of a Defeat, and his Creatures might entirely tail of reaching their refpedive Ends ; which would be no Way recon- cilcable to the Idea of Sufficiency or Perfedion.
But the Divine Wifdom is not only deducible from the general Idea of Perfection or Sufficiency,
but
78 An Impartial Enquiry into the but may be demonftrated from the particular Per-' fedtions already difcover'd. For fince the Deity was ever a perfedly felf-confcious, free, and omni- potent Being (as was prov'd j he could not but ever fully comprehend not only his own particular Na- ture and Adion, but in the general, the Nature and Adion of whatever was producible. By Confe- quence, he could not but know whatever might at any time become either fit or unfit, agreeable or dif- agreeable, either to his own, or any other Nature or Adion ; and fo could not but poffefs a perfeft Abi- lity both to judge of and to propofe the befl End, and to chufe and employ the moft conducive Means upon all Occafions : Which is the complete Notion of Wifdom.
III. Another undoubted Perfedlion of the eternal Being with Refpedl to other Beings confider'd as pojfihle^ is that of Omnifcience. The Demonflration of this has been already produc'd in the Proof we juft now gave of the Divine Wifdom. For the Ideas of Wifdom and Knowledge, as elTential to the Deity, have a near Affinity to each other : Wif- dom being no other than his Knowledge confider'd with Reference to Pradlice. Therefore that which Ihall here be added concerning the Attribute of Om- nifcience, will refer only to the Notion, which it's humbly conceiv'd, we ought to form of it as natural to the Deity.
The general Perfedion or Sufficiency of the Di- vine Nature has taught us, that Omnifcience, as well as all its other particular Perfedtions, ought to be confider'd as natural or elTential to it. But the fame Sufficiency may inftruft us not to conceive any effential Perfedlion of the Deity with a proper De- pendence on other Beings. For that Being can't be fd f-fufficient, whofe ElTence is properly dependent on another.
It
Exigence and Nature of G OT). 79 It feems then to have been fo tar from an Imper- fcdlion in the eternal Being to have been Himfclf the only particular determinate Object of his eflen- tial Perception or Knowledge, that the contrary Suppofition would debafe his Idea, and prove inju- rious to his Perfedlion. The Evidence of this may be fcen even in our felves. If we find our felves im- proved or advantag'd by our Acquaintance with other Beings, this yields an infallible Proof of our natural Poverty and Infufficiency. 'Tis the Depen- dence and Imperfection of our Natures which give^ us an Inclination to feek our Happinefs beyond our felves : Whereas to the moft perfedt of Brings, the Confcioufnefs of his own efTential Properties could not but be an eternal Spring of Complacence and Satisfadiion. To think otherwife, would be, in ef- fed, to fuppofe the Fountain to be fed by its own Streams, or the Sun to be enlightened by its own Rays.
Thefe Reflexions feem to make it evident, that whoever will form a fuitable Idea of the elTential Omnifcience of the moft perfedl of Beings, ought to confider it without Regard to any particular future Obje(fts. For though fuch a Being as was naturally and perfeftly confcious of his own ellential Activity fthe immediate Source of all other Beings) could not but ever have a moft perfect Knowledge of the utmoft Extent of PoIFibility, yet this might very well be without any necefTary Determination to particular EtFefts. The Knowledge of God, be- ing perfect, was without Difpute eiTentially or ne- celfarily extended to every Poflibility. But the E- lediion or Choice of this or that Poflibilicy in order to its future Exiftcncc, was, it is conceiv'd, entire- ly the Refult of his Liberty and Sovereign Pleafure. For though the Supreme Perfection of his Nature could not but incline him to external A<ition in che general, Cas to what was more lit than a State of
In-
So An Impartial Enquiry into the Inadivity) yet that Perfedion can't, it's conceiv'd, have necefTarily determin'd him to any external A61 in particular, forafmuch as no particular A6t or Ob- jedl can be faid to have been abfolutely beft or fit- teft. But if fuch neceffary Determination could not proceed from his effential Perfedlion, it follows that it could have proceeded from no other Original but Imperfection and Dependence i which the Nature of the Eternal Being, we are aflur'd, could never ad- mit.
And though the particular Decrees of God, and i the Exiftence and Adions of the Creatures confe- quent thereupon, may be conceiv'd to infer a new Modification of the Divine Knowledge, yet this can import no Dependence ; for as much as it proceeded not originally from the Natures or Exiftence of the Creatures, but purely from the Liberty and Omni- potence of the great Creator Himfelf.
Much lefs could that Knowledge which the Deity ever had of the future Exiftence of Creatures in ge- neral, infer any Dependence on the Creatures ; fince it miift likewife be conceiv'd as entirely proceeding from his effential Perfe6tion, without the leaft Re- gard to, much lefs Dependence on, any particular determinate Objefts. For notwithftanding fuch Foreknowledge, any particular Being might either have exifted or not exifted, according to his Sove- reign Pleafure.
CHAP. X.
WE come now to fuch Ideas of the Divine Per- fedion as we derive from the Confideration of other Beings as a5lually exijlent. Which Ideas denote no particular Perfecftions of the Divine Na- ture, but only thofe of its Aftiohs.
L The
Exigence ^w^ Nature of G O D. si
I. The firft of thefc we obferv'd to be Goodhcfs or Benevolence. Which, together with Government and Providence, yields us a more fenfible Proof of the Truth of all our former Ideas of God.
The Word Goodnefs may be taken either in a Me-
taphyfical Senfe, viz. as denoting the Hime with the
general Perfeftion of the Divine Nature, or elfe in a
[ Moral Senfe, fo as to fignify a Notion of our Minds
I derived from the Confideration of the Excrcife of
\ certain particular Perfe6lions of that adorable Nature
with Reference toother Btrings. And 'tis in this
latter Senfe we take it here.
By Goodnefs m this Senfe, we here underlland the free Delerminalion and Exercife of the Diviiie IVifdoin and Power in creating and fufaining or preferving the H^orld for the wifefi and bejl of Ends.
That Creation and Suftentation, confider'd liitfj Reference to the Deity, are reputed Ads of Goodnefs^ proceeds from hence, that they are concciv'd to have deriv'd from the Perfection of the Divine Nature, without any Couftraint, or the leail Determination from any Thing ExterntiK
Had the Deity created and fuflained the World by an external Nectjfity, luch as the Stoicks imagin'd, k muft be confefs'd he would have been as far trom ftieriting the Denomination of Good or Benevolent, jls any Inftrument in the Hand of an Architedh
But if we only fuppofe the Realbns for creating and Hill prcferving a World were ever fuch and fo early perceiv'd by the divine Intelk6l, that the teeity was never indetermin'd in that Rcfpctt, nor luld have omitted it in Confiftenee with the internal Perfe^ions of his own Nature ; the Cafe muft be low'd to be very different. Hy this Supp6fition both the Liberty and Goodnefs of the great Crea- tor are fufficiently fecur'd j as we obfcrv'd when wc treated of Liberty.
F Now
8 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the
Now that all the A6ts of the Deity muft needs come under the Notion of Goodnefs, may be firmly demonftrated from pur general Idea of his Perfedion. For being compleatly fufficient and independently happy, he could have no pofTible Temptation to Evil : Since that could only proceed either from natural Imperfedion, or from Depravation ; from both which the felf-fufficient Being was eternally remov'd. To imagine that the great Creator could a6t either for no End at all, or for a chief End that was either Evil, or lefs Good, or Indifferent, would be to fuppofe that the moft perfeft Wifdom could adt Imperfedly, i. e. Unwifely, without the leaft imaginable Byafs or Temptation.
By what has been obferved, it appears, by the Way, that Goodnejs, as it agrees to the Idea of God, can properly be no other than the free or unconftrain- ed Determination and Exercife of his Wifdom and Power, as regulated by that original Fitnefs which is in the Nature or Circumftances of Things and Ac- tions. For that there is an original Fitnefs and Un- fitnefs in the Ideas and Relations of fome Things and Adions, muft be confefs'd •, unlefs we will fay, that it was as fit for the Deity either to have created no Inhabitants of this noble Structure of the World, or elfe Inhabitants neither capable of relifhing the Pleafure which its Furniture could afford, nor of thanking and praifing him for it, as to have created fuch a Being as Man, a Being equally ca- pable of both.
To demonftrate that the Deity has indeed a6ted according to the moft perfe6l Notion of Goodnefs, it remains that we diredlly prove there has a(5lually been a Creation, which we before prov'd to be pofTible ; or that thisvaft, orderly, and moft beau-r tiful Scene of Things was the Work of that all-wife, free, and omnipotent Being, who, though indi-
gent
Fx'iftence and Nature of GOT). %i gent of no other Being, has given E^diftence and a Foflibility ot' riaj^pincfs to Beings innumerable.
Now this is X necL'lIiiry IiJ^rcncc from our Obfer-k vation of the World, comparM with the rational Principles eftabhfli'd in the Kcginr/mg of this En- quiry. For if we take a confiderate View of Things, we Ihall eafily perceive, that in al] that beautiful and furprizing Variety of Beings with which we arc I acquainted, there's none can lay ajuftClaim to io [high a Privilege as that of an abfolute Nccefiity of Exiflence. The far greater Part are evidently void of Life, Underjlanditigy Liberty, and fuch other Perfedions as we have found ourfelves obliged to afcribe to a Being that thus neceflarily exifls. And as for ourfelves, and fuch others as have fomc faini^ Refemblances of thofe Perfedions, our Mutability alld abfolute Incapacity of fecuring to ourfelves the Poffefiion of them, are infallible Proofs that we can laim no Right to 'em through an abfolute Necef- ity. But if not through an abfolute Neceffity, then C can be only by Vircue of the Caufality of fome )tiginal fuperior Power 5 which^ as we formerly )rov*d, could be no lefs than Omnipotence •, and that X)uld originally refide in none but the Eternal Beings Wiofe Exiftence isabfolutely neceflary, and who, by !^nfequence, poffeffes all pofllble Perfedions.
And that the Divine Goodnefs has not only dif-
;over'd itfelf in the Creation of the Univerfe, but:
ftill no lefs concern'd in fuftaining or preferving itj
equally certain. 'Tis clear from what we before
bferv'd, that a Creature can't fubfift with an abfo-
ite Independence. To exill thus independently, is
) exift neceffiirily in the moil: abfolute Senfe. But
bfolute NecefTity of Exiftence is by no Means a-
teeable to the Notion of a Creature. Therefore,
nee the Creatures continue to exift, it can be only
y a Dependence on the Goodnefs of that omnipo-
F 2 tens
84 >^^ Impartial Enquiry into the
tent and mod beneficent Being which at firft proda*,
ced them.
But if the Univerfe was at firft created, and is ftlll fuftain'd or preferv'd by no lefs than an Al- mighty Power, this inftrufts us in the Idea we ought to form of the Greatnefs^ as well as the Good- nejs of that Eternal Nature which is the Subjeft of that Power. For fince Nothing can, without a Contradiction, be faid to adt immediately on what is at a Diftance, 'tis clear that fuch a proper univerfal Suftentation (which could be the original Effe£t of none but the Eternal Being) can't be fuppos'd with- out an univerfal intimate Penetration and Omnipre- fence.
Nor can the Suppofition of fuch a Penetration be ' reafonably fufpefted to be inconfiftent with that fub- ftantial Diftinftion which is neceflary to be alTerted between the Creator and his Creatures. For the Creatures may, notwithftanding, very well be diffe- , rent Beings and Subftances, in as much as they are^ not only, for the moft Part, entirely deftitute of fiich Perfedions as we have difcover'd in the Eternal, Being, but are, in the general, the ultimate Sub- jedls of fome or other Property, which (as inclu-, ding Imperfeftion) can't birt be unapplicable to^ Him ; fuch as Mobility, Divifibility, Qc.
If indeed, with Spinoza, we will needs confine"" ourfelves to the ftrideft Notion of Suhjlance, and allow it to agree to nothing but what is abfolutely independent, wc muft then, with Him, banifh all real Dlverfity of Beings out of the World, and af- fert but one Subftance or real Being, and muft, by Confequence, allow that there's no other Deity but the Material Univerfe. But fince, on the contrary, we are afllir'd, that befides the original or inde- pendent Being, there are Subjects of Attributes not only very different, but contrary to His (fuch as were mention'd above) confequently, as we muft,.
1 • not-
Exigence and Nature of GOT). 85 nocwithftanding the moft intimate Penetration, al- fert an immutable Diftindlion between them and the independent Being, io we may in the larger and no lels proper Senfc, allow the Name of Suhjlance to both. For to be the ultimate Subje<fls of peculiar \ Attributes or Properties, is, according to the origi- I nal Signification of the Word, to be dijlin^l Sub- fiances. This makes it clear, that Spinoza does no k[s than beg the whole Quellion in Debate, when as a Foundation for his pretended Demonftrations, he fuppofes lb dogmatically, and without the lead Proof, that Nothing is properly a Subftance but what is abfolutely independent •, or, as he exprefTes I it, ff^bat exijls in itfelf, and is conceived by itfelf^ or whofe Conception does not need nor require the Concept \ tion of any other Thing in order to its being formed * : Which he afterwards explains, when he tells us, *Tis ihe very Nature of Subjlance to cxifl, or its EJfence ne- cejfarily includes Exijlence **. And yet it is on this too ftrait Definition of Subftance, together with the Suppofition of the Abfolute Infinity of Extenfion, and an abfolute material Plenum, (both which, we con- ceive, will be likewife fufficiently confuted in the Second Part of this Enquiry) that the main Articles of Spinoza's Creed are built.
• Per Subftantiam intelUgo quod in fe eft et per fe concipitur, hoc efly id cujits Concept us non indiget Concept]* alterius re: a qm forma' ■ •i debeat. Spin, in E//^. P. i. De/. ■^.
** j^d Naturam Subftantia: pcrtin^t exiftere ; hoc eft, ipftus Ef- (tntia involvit nect-Jfario Exijientiam. Id. Prop. 7.
CHAP. XL
HE next Idea of the Divine Sufficiency or
Perfedlion with Regard to other Beings, as
i^ually exiftent, is derived from the Vifible Effedls
of Wifdom CO he obferv'd in the World ; and it
F 3 may^
8 6 An Impartial Enquiry into the may, perhaps, noc unfitly be exprefs'd by the Word Government. Under which we fhall crave Liberty to comprehend All the A5is of the Wifdom of the Om- tiiptent Beings as moderating or governing his own Ac- tivity^ both in -propfing his Ends, and in difpofing and managing the feveral Creatures agreeably to their Na- tures, for the moff effeSiual Attainment of them.
T\\t great End oi the all-wife Creator in the Pro- duftion of the World, we may be aflur'd, was the univerfal Benefit and Happinefs of his Creatures accor- ding to their feveral Capacities. For, as we have al- ready prov*d, that the Perfedion of his Nature was abfolutely inconfiftent with the Propofal of a chief End in the Creation, which was either Evil, or lefs Good, or Indifferent ; fo the fame Perfedlion may convince us, that his End in creating the World, could not be any Good or Advantage to Himfelf, who was indigent of Nothing, and whofe eflential Happinefs was abfolutely incapable of the leail Ac- ceflion.
The Means which his Wifdom has employ *d for the Attainment of his Ends, will, in the general, appear to be,
1 . That moft exa6t and orderly Q^nfiitution and Vifpofition of the feveral Parts of the World. And,
2. That admirably prudent Regulation or Covern- 7nent of fuch Parts of it as are furniihed with a Prin-^ cipleofLife and Adion. Of both which in their Order.
I. In difcourfing on the former of thefe Means, we fhall here omit many of the ufual Inftances of Wifdom and Defign, not only becaufe they have been already fufficiently confider'd by others, but chiefly becaufe, being fuch as were abfolutely necef- iary either to the Whole, or to fuch Parts of the World to which they peculiarly belong ; they feem pot fo fit to be objeded to Men of Atheiftick Prin- ciples as Proofs of the Divine Agency, fince thej^; ^ ■ ^ may
Exigence and Nature of GOD. 87 may be eluded as mere neccfTary Pre-requifites to the prefcnt State of Things. For, may an E^ncurean Atheijt fay. We are not fo abfurd as to imagine the Effeils ot Chance to have been fubjed to the rigo- rous Laws ot Mechanifm, or that the eternal felf- motive Matter of the Univerfe combin'd at the firft into none but regular Models. For it is infinitely probable, there have been innumerable Worlds in the boundlefs Extent of Eternity, which, by realbn of their Confufion and Irregularity, fuccefTively dif- folved into their original Atoms, e*rc a World fo regular as this could be compos'd. And even in the prefent Frame of Things, it is not to be imagin'd (in Confidence with our Principles) that the feveral Parts were all at the very firft Hit fowell difpos'd as they now appear to bs : It being equally probable, that innumerable Beings have exifted in it, which, becaufe of fome ellential Defeft in their Conftitu- tion, foon returned to their firft Principles, or elfe wanting a Capacity to propagate their Species, be- came extinft. According to this Scheme, a Perfon of that Charafter will be fir from admitting fuch Regularities as Arguments of Wifdom and Defign ; as conceiving them to have been no more than was neceifary to the Continuance of the few cafual Ef- fects which he fuppofes to have furvived the infi, nite Numbers that have long fince perifhed.
We fliall therefore not only omit fuch Inftances of Wifdom and Defign, but fhall gratify our Epicurean fo far, as for the prefent, to admit his Principles of necefiary unintelligent Matter and eternal Motion. We'll even fuppofe (what we have likewife proved to be falfe) that this Motion was a capable Principle of Variety. Upon thefe Suppofitions we fhall not, at prefent, deny it to have been pofTible (though in- finitely improbable) that after innumerable fruftra- neous Rencounters and Combinations of the Parts of
F 4 Mat-
8S An Impartial Enquiry into the
Matter, fuch a Frame of Things might have chanc'4 to refult as fhoiild have had noeffential Defeat orBlun- der in it, but fo much Order and Harmony, at leaft, as was neceffary to the Subfiftence both of the whole, and its feveral Parts \ which is indeed the utmoll the Epicurean Principles are qualified to ac- count for with the leaft Shadow of Reafon.
In Requital for thefe liberal Conceffions, we fhall only exped:, that our Adverfaries will grant it to be moft realbnable to conclude, that a moft wife and be- nificent Caufe, if any fuch, would, befides what was rieceffary to the bare Subfiftence of his Creatures, have left fome Charafters of his Wifdom and Goodnefs im- prefs*d upon 'em, fufficient to diftinguifh 'em from the wild Effedsof Chance : Andconfequently, that if it can be made appear that the prefent Frame of Things (befidcs the Regularity neceflary to its Subfiftance) has fuch Charadlers of Wifdom and Goodnefs every where legible on it, they'll own it far more reafonable to believe they were the Impreflions and Signatures of fuch a Being, than the random Effeds of unma- nag'd Motion and Impulfe,
In Expedation of this, we fhall offer a few Things.
I, Suppofing, that after innumerable Ages, the Matter of the Univerfe, by an internal Principle of Motion, might atlaft, by mere Chance, have com- b)in'd into Somewhat like a World, yet it can't rea- fonably be imagin'd but that this World (though it might have had no fundamental or deftrudive Error in its Conftitution, yet) would have been full of Deformities and Irregularities in Things not eftential to the Subfiftence either of the whole, or of any of its Parts, Men of irreligious Principles might then, without Doubt, have been gratify'd \yith all the various Inftances of Blunder, Deformity, and Irre- gularity that can be imagin'd in Confiftence with the Conftitution of the World, and the Life of Animals.
But
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOD. 89
But what Pains mull they (vainly) take to difco- ver one fuch Inftance in the prefcnt Frame of Things ? And how difagrccabk an Employment muft it needs be to an Atheill, who has any Fond- nefs tor his Principles, to be at the Expence of fo much Labour to difcover Defe<5ls and Irregularities In that, which to an unprejudic'd Obfcrver, ftill appears more admirable, and which will never fail to ruggeft new Arguments, ilifficient to mortify liis Pride, and fliock his Infidelity ?
To inftance only in a few Particulars, which may feem the moft exceptionable.
If the Cragginefs and outward Deformity of Rocks and Mountains oficnd his Sight, a little Enquiry will be fufficient to convince him, that thefc are not to be attributed to a Defed; of Skill and Contrivance, but are partly owing to accidental Caufes, (fuch as Earthquakes, Tempefts, Inundations, l£c.^ and partly to be afcrib'd to Defign. For they may be confider'd as the Foils of Nature, whofe Deformity is wifely contriv'd to fet oft' the Beauty of her no- bler Parts.
If the minuter Parts of Nature feem void of Beauty and Regularity, a Microfcope will foon un- deceive him, and raife his Contempt into Wonder and Aftoniiliment. For many of thefe difcover more furprizing Characters and Signatures of the Divine Wifdom, than moft of its larger Produc- tions ; fince in thefe we fee all thofe Miracles in a narrower Compafs, which we ufe to admire in the larger Dimenfions of the more bulky Objects. Thus if we look upon the Seeds of Plants, we fhall find they arc no other than the entire Plants in Mi- niature. So that their Procreation is, in Reality, nothing elfe but Nutrition and Growth of Parts. The fame has bgcn obferved of the firft Rudiments of Animals.
If
90 An Impartial Enquiry into the
If certain Species of Animals feem defedlive, their very Defecfls, (which yet are only comparative) will yield an Argument of Contrivance and Defign. For feveral jMembers would have been abfolutely ufelefs in fome Parts^of the World (fuppofe in the Wa- ter, or within the Surface of the Earth) which yet it was not fit fhould want their proper Inhabi- tants.
If he look beyond the Earth and its neighbouring Planets, and view the wide Spaces of the Heavens, Ihinine with the united Glories of innumerable fix'd Stars, he'll fee little Caufe to objed that thefe are not difpos'd into regular Figures, but feem carelefly fcattered like Seeds upon the Earth. For this feem- ing Diforder may be faid to reprefent fomething more noble and majeftick, and which more fenfibly ilrikes the Fancy than the moft regular Models of human . Art. Befides, 'tis plain, that neither our Station, nor the Imperfedion of our Sight, will permit us to view the Heavens to the beft Advan- tage. 'Tis probably but as a Point, ifcompar'd with the remoter Spaces of the World, which bounds our Profped. From whence we may have as little Reafon to attempt to form an Idea of the whole, as an Ant to judge of the DimenfionsandBeauty of the Earth by what may be obferv'd in a Mole-hill. But how beautifiil an Idea of thofe remoter Spaces would the new Philofophy give him, which, with fo much Reafon, from the Analogy of Nature, con- cludes the fixed Stars to be the Centers of fo many particular Syftems, and as fo many Suns to diftri- bute Light and Heat to their peculiar Planets .? This Hypothefis would reprefent the Univerfe to him as an Aflembly of innumerable Worlds, each full of the Marks of the great Creator's Wifdom, ranged at Diflances the moil regular and convenient that can be nnagin'd. For 'tis notcjQubted but the
' Di-
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 91
Diftancts of the Planets of our Syilem are actually luch.
The Deformity of fome Things confifls in Ima^ gination only, proceeding from Antipathy or Aver- fion •, fuch as is the Hatred between Men and Ser- pents, ^c.
The feeming Want of Beauty in others might proceed from Defign. For did the fame Comelinefs difcover itfelf in all the Parts of Nature which is fo remarkable in fome, the Art of Man would have no Subjedt to wor^yupon, or at leaft, could not exert itfelf without me Regret of marring the Work of his Maker.
Befides, the Difigreeablenefs of fome things may frequently proceed from the peculiar Make of the Senfes, or Complexions and Conllicutionsof our Bo- dies. For it is not unreafonable to think, that a ve- ry exquifite Figure and Contexture of Parts may fometimes caufe none of the moft agreeable Imprcf- fions on our Senfes and Conftirutions. This may appear from the regular Shapes of the minute Parts of Salts •, and from the Effedls of Poyfons, which are found to be very different on different Animals.
To conclude. The prefent Frame of Things feems fo far from being juftly chargeable with Blun- der, Irregularity, or Deformity, that, to the lefs confiderate, divers Inflances of Regularity and De- fign may appear fuperfluous. Of this Sort are the regular Shapes and the Colours of divers Stones, and particularly the curious Figures of the Leaves of Plants which are found naturally reprefented on Coal-Slate. The wife Author of Nature has noc left even the dark Entrails of the Earth without Te- ftimonies of his divine Skill, to the End that ob- ferving Men might no where want Motives to ad- mire and adore him,
II. Suppofing it might fo have happen'd, that the Univerfe fhould have yielded no imaginable Inflancc
ot
92 An Impartial Enquiry info the of Blunder and Deformity, yet, 'tis inconceivable, on the Hypothefis of Epicurus, that every Thing fhould be difpos'd/or the Bejl, as in the prefent Sy- ftem of Things. As,
I. That Nothing lliould be without its Ufe. The Obfervation of the World long fince oblig'd the. Philofophers fthough, fome of 'em, not very par- tial to the Caufe of a Deity) to confefs and lay it down for a Maxim, That Nature does Nothing in vain.
'Twere a ridiculous Labour to undertake a Difco- very of the Ufefulnefs of every Thing in Nature, which isfo various and exuberant in her Produftions. It will be enough, if we can manifeft the Ufefulnefs of fuch Things as are fubjedl to common Obferva- tion and Experience. For if none of thefe are with- out their Ufes, we have all the Reafon in the World to conclude the fame of all others.
We fliall fingle out fuch Inftances as may feeni the moft unaccountable.
Though the Obliquity of the Earth's Axis may feem irreconcileable to Mathematical Exaclnefs, yet we are to confider, that to this we owe the pleafant and ufeful Variety of Seafons, and the fitteft imagi- nable Proportion of Heat and Cold, Light and Darknefs, that is poflibly confident with the Figure' of the Earth.
If it be faid, the Other Planets are fet at too great a Diftance from the Earth, and by Confequence, are the lefs capable of fupplying the Abfence of the Sun's Light, we fhall fee Reafon to believe, that this was fo order'd to prevent a greater Inconvenience than that of Darknefs, viz. die Deftrudtion of Plants and Animals by excefHve and diforderly Tides or Elevations of the Sea, which are obferved to depend on the Motions and Neighbourhood of thofe great Bodies.
To
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 95 To die HvM S>lari (though many of them ieem to be made only to twinkle, and appear to be almoft- as infigniiicant Members ot" the World, as cither a Spark or a Glow-worm, yet) we partly owe the Ib- lid Advantages we reap by Navigation •, not to mention the greater Advantages ot Habitation, Con- venience and Delight, which they (or at lealt the Planets, which from the Analogy of Nature, we may probably conclude do attend them) may yield to innumerable nobler Beings than ourfclves.
To the Mountains^ which fome have mifreprefen- ted as the Wens and Excrefcences of Nature, we owe the molt pleafant Profpedls, the moll delicious Wines, the richeft and moft ufeful Metals, Mine- rals, and other Foffils, and that which is more than all, the Convenience of navigable Rivers and Foun- tains.
To the Seas we are indebted for thofe vaft Quan- tities of Vapours which refrefh and fructify the Earth, and for our fpeedy and commodious Paflage to the rcmoteft Nations. Both which Bleflings we muft in a very great Degree have wanted, had the Proportion of the Waters to the dry Land been con- fiderably Icfs than at prefent.
If Poijbns are fometimes dellrudlive, yet when skilfully prepared, they become beneficial, and the Means to preferve Life, when Food is infufHcient to that End.
To PFhirkvinds and Thunder we owe the Difilpa- tion of Pellilential Steams, and the cleanfmg of the Air, the chief Inftrument of Life.
In fliort, if the /lir be fometimes the Vehicle of Infedion and Blading i if the IVaters be render'd unfafe by Rocks, Quickfands, and Whirlpools -, if the Fire be prone to Conflagrations ; if the Earth fometimes trembles, and fwallows up its Inhabi- tants i neither are thefe without their Ufes. If ic was fit to implant in us the Principle of Fear, ic
could
94 An Impartial Enquiry into the could not be amifs to place us among fuch Obje(5ls as are apt fometimes to excite and exercife it. If it be natural to Men, as Creatures, to be defedlible or capable of Degeneracy, then whatever contributes* to retain them within the Bounds of Duty and Al- legiance, and thereby prevents a greater Evil, be- comes itfelf an Advantage. But what could have been a more effe(5lual Curb on Vice, or Spur to Virtue, than that which is apt to remind us how eafily the Elements may be arm'd againft us to our Deftru6tion, and the very Supports of our Lives become the Inftruments of our Maker*s Juftice ?
2. 'Tis ftill lefs conceivable on the Principles of Epicurus^ how the fame Thing fhould have been dif- pos'd for fuch Variety of particular Ufes as may be obferv'd in the World. To obtain a great Number of Ends by as few Means as may be, is the higheft Point ofWifdom. But nothing can be imagined more admirable in this Refpeft, than the prefent Frame of Things. Thus, though the human Body is compos'd of a great Variety of Parts, yet how much more various and numerous are their Ufes ? How many are the Ufes of the Hand, which, di- reded by Reafon, is inftead of all other Inftru- ments ? How many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, the Ear, and the Tongue ? And, if we take a deeper View, and look into the minuter Parts of which thefe are compounded, what can be more ad- mirable than the Variety of Aims and Intentions that may be obferved in each. The feveral Ufes of the Structure and Pofition of each fingle Mufcle, have been computed by Galen, in his Book De For- matione Fa;tus, to be no lefs than Ten. The like' may be obferv*d with Reference to the Bones and other fimilar Parts •, but efpecially with Refpeft to the Members, and fuch Parts as are heterogeneous or dilTimilar. Yet it is not to be doubted, but that a
far
Exiftcncc and Nature ofGOT). 9S far lefs Degree of Uft^fulnefs In many of thcfc mighc have been iufficienc to our Subfiflence.
3. 'Tis lefs accountable by the Epicuyean Prin- ciples, how every thing fhould be adapted 10 its particular Ufes in the fute ft and mojl regular Man- ner, Yet what Inllrument could be better fuited to Vifion than the Eye, to Opcrauon than the Hand, to Motion than the Foot or Wing ? What could have been invented fo convenient as the Diilances, Inclinations and Celerities of the Planets of our Sy- ftcm ? What could be more nice and exad; in the ' general, than the Adjuftment of the Make of the Bodies, and the Degrees of all Senfations of Animals to their common and particular Circumftances ? This whoever has obferv'd, can never enough admire. Yet neither can fuch Exaclnefs in all thefe Refpecfts, be imagined to have been of abfolute Neceflity to the Subfiflence and Prefcrvation of Animals.
4. 'Tis no lefs unaccountable by the Hypothefis of Epicurus^ tliat fo many different Parts fhould io fitly and harmoniouHy confpire to one common Ufe» How different are the Parts that contribute to Mo- tion and Nutrition in Man and other Animals ? Yet how fit is their Pofition, and how exquifitely regu- lar is their A6lion ? But what is chiefly to be noted, is, that all thele Parts were not abfolutely neceffa- ry to the A(fts themfelves, but only to the Perfec- tion of *em. For had the leafl Part been wanting, the A(fts, though they might have been perform'd, would have been imperfedt or irregular •, and yet fliould others have been added, they could not have been better'd or improv'd. A Man might hava been capable of Nourifhment without the Afliflance of the Tongue or Spittle ; but then it muft have re- quir'd more Time, and been attended with lefs Plea- fure. A Bird might have been capable of Flight without the Direction or Steerage of its Tail •, but then it would have been lefs fteddy and difficultly
go-
96 An Impartial Enquiry into the govern'd. And by the Addition of thefe fhow in- confiderable foever they may feem in themfelves) the A6ts are render'd fo perfedl, that the Wit of Man is incapable of making the leaft Improvement.
5. *Tis ftill lefs accountable by the Principles of Epiairifm, that almoft every thing fhouldbe disposed, not only for Ufe, but for Ornament i The Beau- ties of Nature need no Artifice to varnifh and itt them off. 'Tis a fufficient Acknowledgement of this that the moft admir'd Artifts never propofe to excell, but to imitate it. The naked Eye may con- vince us of the exquifite Colours and Proportions of the greater Parts of the World ; and the Micro- fcope will furprize us with the far more admirable Stru6lure and Symmetry of the leffer. But in No- thing is this Beauty more remarkable than in Ani- mals and Vegetables. Yet fure none can be fo ab- furd as to imagin, that mere Colour and Proportiorr in the outward Make of their Bodies was of abfolute Neceffity to their Subfillence. Nor is it a Jot more reafonable to conclude, that the fo curious Embroi- dery of the Veins, Arteries and Fibres, in their in- ward Conftitution, was thus neceffary. For a skilful- Anatomift or Botanift knows how to feparate divers" of thofe Parts without the DeftruCtion of the Sub- je6l. And yet fuch Beauty and Exadtnefs in the outward and inward Make of Plants and Animals, is not only every where to be met with in the World, but both are diverfify'd almoft infinitely and beyond Imagination.
6. 'Tis equally unaccountable by that Hypothe- fis, that the moft noble and ufeful Parts of Animals Ihould always be either well fecufd^ or elfe double. Thus the Heart and Brain, which 'twas requifite fhouldbe fingle, are lodg*d in the interior Part of the Body, and ftrongly fortified with the Bones of the Head and Breaft. The Lungs and Kidneys, though likewife placed within the Body, yet, becaufe by rea-
fon
Exigence ^?/^ Nature of G O 1}. 97
Ibn of their Office more fubjedt to Accidents, ard double -, to the Knd that it by Obftrudions, or any other Mifchief, the one fliould become unfervice- able, the other might be llirticient for the Support of Life. Thus likewife the Eyes, being of Necef- fity plac'd in the exterior Part, are given us by Pairs, and guarded by Eye-brows and Lids fortified with Brillles. And not only fo, but in fome Animals, by whofe Method of living they are more expos'd to Danger, we may obferve a peculiar Provifion for their Security, by Means of a certain horny move- able Membrane, which being tranfparent, hinders not the Sight even at the Time when it guards it from Accidents. This may be obferv'd in Frogs, and, with fome Variety, in divers other Animals. Yet thefe Precautions can't be pretended to have been of abfolute NecefTity to their Subfillcnce» any- more than thofe in the former Inftanccs to our own, 7. 'Tis equally unaccountable by the Principles of Epicurus^ that all ufelefs Exfeuce of Members in Animals fhould be 'avoided. As the great Author of Nature has been very bountiful with Refped to the Multiplicity of the Ufcsoffuch Organs or Mem- bers as he has beftow'd, fo he has been no lefs fpa- ring and frugal with Reference to the Organs them- felves. As there is no Part but what has its Ufc in the general, fo there's rone but is fuited to the par- ticular State and Circumftances of the Animal to which it belongs. Thus Animals, whofe peculiar Make or Conllitution has qualified them to be the conftant Inhabitants of the w^atry Element (which is not fo fit for the Conveyance of Sounds) are obferv'd to want the Inftrumcnts proper tor the forming of Sounds. And thus Animals which have Teeth on both Jaws have but one Stomach, fince in them more would have been fuperlluous, and unneceflary to Digcftion. Wjiereas, had the Epicurean Hypo- thtfis been true, we might have exptcftcd to have
G fccn
9 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the
feen all imaginable Inftances of Superfluity as well
as of Defeat.
But here I apprehend it may be objefted, that
divers of thefe Inftances of Contrivance and Defign
are to be obferv'd in fuch Animals as are faid to be
•bred of Putrefaftion and Moifture.
But admitting there are fuch Animals, and that
their Make or Conftitution yields equal Appearances
of Wifdom and Skill with that of other Beings, 'tis
evidently moil reafonable to conclude from thence, that they likewife derive their Original from a wife
or intelligent Caufe : And fo much the rather, be- caufe Wifdom is ever moft illuftrious, when it pro- duces a regular Effe6t from irregular or indifpos'd Materials. At leaft, no Admirer of Epicurus can imagine fuch a conftant Regularity as is obferv'd in thofe Animals, to have been purely cafual in any tolerable Confiftence with his own Principles, which fuppofe fuch innumerable Blunders to have happen'd at the original Coalition of the^Parts of Matter.
Yet that this Opinion is a great Miftake, is fuf- ficiently clear from the Difcoveries of divers of the Moderns, who have made it appear, that there is no Animal produced in the prefent Courfe of Nature but by Means of fome other Animal from fome pre- txiftent Seed.
Others will perhaps allow the mentioned Inftances of Wifdom, but will chufc to afcribe them to an eternal material Anima Mundi^ or Soul of the World. But this Notion of a Soul of the World is no other than a corrupt and difparaging Idea of God, and has already been confuted.
Lajlly^ Others will poflibly have Recourfe, with the
- Spinoz'ifis^ to that long fince exploded Hypothefis of the Eternity of the prelent Frame and State of Things, and will pretend to reverfe the Edge of our Argu- ment, by producing the Regularity and other Per- fedions of the World to prove it to be that necefla-
ry
Exiftcncc and Nature of GO 7). 99
ry Being which wc formerly difcover'd, and not the Effc<5b of Wifdom and final Caufes. But this Con- ceit has likewife been abundantly confuted already, when we demonftrated the Exillence of a Being pof- fefledofall poflible Perfedion, in Oppofition to the Exillence of abfolutely ncceflliry Matter and Mo- tion, and likewife the Pofllbility and Reality of a Creation. And perhaps it needs no better Confu- tation than that of the Epicurean Poet Lucretius himfclf, arguing from the late Beginning of Hiftory and the Invention of Arts and Sciences,
. — — - Si nulla fuit Genitalis Origo Terr arum et CcoH^ femperq^ue ccterna fuere Cur fupra Bellum 'Thehamim et Funera Trojce Non alias alii quoque Res cecinere Poetcs ?
But grant the World Eternal, grant it knew No Infancy, and grant it ever new ? Why then no Wars our Poets Songs employ Beyond the Siege of I'bebes, or that of Troy ?
Creech.
So that upon the whole, it muft be confefs'd by fuch as ever us'd the leafb Obfervation and Reflec- tion, that the World every where abounds with fuch Chara(flers and ImprelTes of inimitable Wif- dom, as make it infinitely reafonable to conclude it to be the Creature of a perfeftly wife and beneficent: Being.
II. The other of thofe Means employed by the Divine Wifdom for attainins; its areat Ends in the Creation, we obferved to be that admirable Regu- lation or Government of fuch Parts of the World a^ are furnifhM with a Principle of Life and Adlion, This we may perceive to be different, according to the Diverfity of its Subjects \ which are either rational or irrational, The Government of the former is by
G 2 Laws^
I DO An Impartial Enquiry into the
Laws, of the latter by Injlin5is. We fhall begin with the latter.
If we view the Adlions of brute Animals in ge- neral, we Ihall perhaps fee little Reafon to believe they proceed either from an innate intelligent Prin- ciple, or from the mere Mechanifm or Texture of their Parts.
I. Not from an innate intelligent Principle. For tho' divers of thofe Aftions, to which they have a natural Inclination, bear a near Refemblance of Con- trivance and Defign, yet their Invariablenefs fuffici- ently difcovers them not to be the EfFedls of Reafon. The Productions of Reafon are wont to be diverfify'd to an almoft infinite Variety. If all the great Ma- ilers in Architedlure were ordered feverally to com- pofe the moft exquifite Model of a Royal Palace that they could contrive, we fhould find the Models as diftinguifhable as their Authors. Or fhould the moft celebrated Orators in the World undertake to declaim on any particular Subjed, 'tis great Odds whether any two of them would be found exactly to agree in their Methods and Materials. Whereas in the moft admir'd Performances of Brutes the Cafe is very different. Birds of the fame Kind, in the fame Climate, build their Nefts of the fame Materials (if procurable) and in the fame Form. The feveral Communities of Bees, without any preceding In- ftruftion, frame their Habitations in the fame Man- ner, as well as fubmit to the fame Method of Go- vernment. And fwhich is no lefs confiderable to our Purpofe) they are unimproveable as to fuch A6ts as they perform by a natural Propenfion. We may ; perhaps as eafily teach a Stone in its Defcent to de- fcribe Circles, or any other the moft regular Fi- gures, as a Bird to build its Neft, or a Bee to com- pofe its Cells, by a new Model. And though, as to other Ads, towards which they have no natural Propenfion, fomc Brutes are capable of Improve- ment,
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOTy. loi
ment, yet this is no Proof of an intelligent Prin- ciple, but may be fufficiently accounted for from the Mechanifm of their Bodies. For frequent Ex- ercife producing an Aptitude to particular Ads, we may fitly refemble fuch Tricks of Brutes to the iVIo- tion of the Fingers on a Mufical Inftrument \ whicii frequently is regular enough, though performed without the ufual Attention or Perception. Yer,
2. Mere Mechanifm, or the Strufture and Orga- nization of their Parts, feems no fufficient Caufe of all the Operations of Brutes. This may ^appear from the Variablenefs of fuchunimprov'd Acftions of theirs as don't proceed from any natural Propenfion. As fome Adlions of Brutes are natural and uniform, fo others are fo flrangely diverfify'd, that they feem near a- kin to fuch as are voluntary. Which Obfer- vation may be made not only with Reference' to fuch Animals as are feemingly more perfetfb, fuch as Apes, Beavers, ^c. but even with Refpedt to fuch as are commonly reputed the meaneft and moft contemptible. If we look upon an Ant-hill, or in- to a Bee-hive, we fliall find thofe little Animals al- moll: as differently employ'd as the Inhabitants of a City : When, at the flime Time, they are every way befet with the fame Objcfts, and, for oughc appears, receive the fame Imprcirions from without, A fufficient Proof that the Diverficy in their Adions ought not to be afcrib'd to any external ImprelTions working on the Mechanifm of their Bodies, bqt ra- ther to fuch an internal vital Principle asdiredlsthe Motions of thofe who perform fuch ftrange A6lion3 in their Sleep.
We may therefore properly enough diflinguifli the
Principle of brutal A(5lion by the Name of Phanta-
fy ; fince this, even in ourfelves, is found to be di-
(tin^t from Reafon, and yet to be a vital Principle
.fufEciently difting'iilh'd from mere Mechanifm.
G 3 ' Now
\
102 Jn Impartial Enquiry into the
Now as Reafon is the governing Principle of Man, fo Phantafy is of Brutes. And as the Didates of every Man's Reafon, how different foever in Mat- ters of lefs Concern, or greater Difficulty, are com- monly uniform with Reference to Adlions of the ut- moil Confequence to the general Welfare of Man- kind, and are wont to come under the Notion of Laws -, fo in Brutes, the ImprefTions of Phantafy, how different and variable foever, in Cafes of lefs Concern, may yet be obferv'd to be uniform, when they diredlly tend to the Benefit and Prefervation of their refpedive Kinds •, and they are commonly call'd Inftin^s : Which Inflindls are in fome Refpeds the fame to Brutes, that Laws are to Men and other intelligent Creatures. Such are the Inftinfts of Gra- titude to Benefadtors, of Affociation for mutual De- fence, of Provifion for their young, and the like.
And herein is the Wifdom of the great Father of the World moll clearly vifible, in that he has im- planted fuch an uniform Principle of Aftion in thofe lefs capable Agents, which fo diredly tends to the Attainment of his moft beneficent End, the univer- fal Welfare of the vital Part of his Creation.
2. The other Method of Government inftituted by the wife Author of Nature, is by Laws : Which Government is twofold ; either of particular Perfons, or of entire Communities. Its Foundation is the abfolute Propriety of the Creator in his Creatures antecedent to Confent or Contradl. Its original Rule or Standard is the Nature and Will of the Supreme Governour. Its immediate Inflrumcnt is Reafon ; or that Faculty of comparing and con- necfling Truths already known, in order to the Illa- tion and Difcovery of other Truths before un- known.
The Exiilence or Reality of this Gorernment ap- pears from hence, that there are (as we juft now pbferved) certain uniform- beneficial Dictates of Rea-
Exiftcnce and Nature of G OD. 103 fon, with Regard to Matters of the highcft Con- cern to the Welfare and Happinefs of intcUigcnC Creatures, grounded on the natural Relations of Fie and Unfit, difcernable in Things and A6tions, of which every fuch Creature, ading like himfelf, can't be ignorant, fuch as Benefits are to he gratefully ac- knowledged and retalliated ; the general Good is to be indujlrioujly promoted and ?naintain*dy and the like. Thefe Dictates of Reafon are qualified to be a Rule of Action and a Standard of the Conduit of l.,ife. But whatever is qualified to be a Rule, with Refe- rence to the Ad;ions of Creatures, can be no o- ther than a Law with Regard to the Defign of the Creator, whofe immutable Intent fas was prov'd) can't but be the univerfal Good of his Creation.
In the Subjects of this Government are two prin- cipal Qualifications to be diftinguifh'd, Reafon and Liberty. Without the former they can't be quali- fied for the Knowledge of their Duty -, without the latter they can't duly difcharge it. Where a furlici- ent Degree of either of thefe is wanting, or incapable of due Exercife, there a Government by Laws would be ludicrous and infignificant. Where both concur in the requifite Perfection, they found an immediate Obligation to Obedience ; though poflibly with fome Variety proportionate to the Degree of the Perfedion of each. From this Obligation refults the Suppofition of Rewards and Punilhments, and of Jullice in proportioning and difpenfing them. Which appear to have the lame Foundation and Reafon with Government itfelf, 172;. The ablblute Propriety of the Creator in his Creatures, and the; fupreme Perfection of his Wifdom, which can't but immutably incline him to ad in Conformity to the States and Capacities of his Subjects, and to that original Fitnefs and Unfitnefs which is in the Na- tures and Circumftances of Things and Aclior J3ucof this more will be faid anon. /
G 4 V
'i04 An Impartial Enquiry into the
Were there no natural Laws fo univerfally pm- mulgated, Man, the moft noble of inferior Beings, who, by Reafon of his great Capacity, is qualified for fuch excellent Purpofes, would become far more mifchievous than the Brutes. His Wit and Contri- vance, when free from Obligation and Reflraint, would probably foon degenerate into Craft and Cir- cumvention. His Ambition would know no other Limits but thofe of his Power \ and an Ability to hurt would be reputed a fufficient Warrant to do fo. Every thing would be meafur'd by Appetite, and all the Virtues would fhrink into the narrow Prin- ciple of Self-interefl : The Effeds of which would be as various as either the wanton Caprices of Fancy, or the uncertain Fluctuations of the rougher Paffions. All Men would be Tyrants to the inferior Crea- tures ; and each Man (as far as confillent with his Ability and his prefent Notion of Intereft) would be fo to another. And in fhort, every thing would tend to a State of War and Confufion, as far as the pre- dominant Principle of Self-intereft and the natural Inclination to Society would permit. Which makes it evident both how neccffary fuch Government is to the great End of the Creator {vi%. the general Good of his Creatures, j and how unfuitable it would be to his VYifdom (and by Confequence, how im- polTible to him) to grant Men a Difcharge from the Obligations of Reafon.
In attempting lo make fome Difcovery of th* Methods of the Divine Wifdom in that Govern- ment which is defign'd for the Prevention of thefe Mifchiefs, we fhail firfl endeavour to form an Idea !of it as it regards Particulars, and then add fome- thing with Reference to it as it regards Commu- nities.
Though the Wifdom of the beneficent Creator In the Government of particular* Perfons as fucb, may well be fuppos'd in a great Degree inicrutable
by
Exl(\ence mid Nature of GOD. 105 by us, yet from the Confi deration of the Pcrfedions of his own Nature, and the Nature and Circum (lan- ces of the Subjeds of this Government, compar'cl with our Experience and the credible Tradition of former Ages, we may, quellionlefs, by the careful Ufe of our Reafon, attain fome tolerable Satisfac- tion. In order to which we fhall proceed by Steps, illultrating the Difcoveries of Reafon by the Confenc and Tellimony of the Scripture Revelation.
I. 'Tis evident, as isoe before obferv'd, that the great End or Defign of the "wife Governour of the fFbrldy is the univerfal IVelfare and Happinefs of his SubjeBs according to their feveral Capacities.
From hence we may clearly deduce the moft no- ble Principle of civil Society, viz. That Men are not lorn for themfelves alone, but that in all proper Cafes ihey ought to feek the Benefit and Happinefs of others to the utrnofl of their Power. For it is an indifputable Point, that the higheft Perfedion of Creatures can- not but confift in the neareft poflible Conformity to the natural Perfedions, as well as Will of their Creator, who is the molt perfed of Beings. Buc this Conformity can't be without the Pradice of whatever is good and virtuous, and beneficial. For that the Perfedions of God immutably incline him to ad in the bed Manner, was prov'd when we treat- ed of the Divine Liberty : And that the chief End of all the divine external Ads was the univerfal Good of the Creatures, was Ihewn in the Beginning of this Chapter.
2. As it is the Property of perfed IVifdom not only to propofe the befl Ends, but to chafe and employ the fiitefi and mcff conducive Means, fo we need not doubt but the wife§l of Beings makes Ufe of fuch Methods of Go- vernment as are mofl conducive to his great End (the general Happinefs of his Creatures) in Confiflence with 'the P erf colion of his own Nature, and with the St dies ^nd Capaciiies of his SubjcJJs.
3. Cofh
io6 An Impartial Enquiry into the
3. Confeque7itly^ we can't fuppofe his Intention to have leen to expofe the Happinefs of any of his Creatures to a 'perpetual Hazard : Since this would he to expofe his own great Defgn to the continual Danger of a Defeat.
4. TiDerefore^ ftnce intelligent Creatures are under a, fiatural Obligation to the Laws of Reafon, andfince iheir fupre?ne Happinefs could not but depend on their free Obedience to thofe Laws (as was proved ;) and fince the Exercife of Freedom or Liberty in imperfeti jigents could not be without a Poffibility of Difobedience^ it can^'t be fuppos'd to have been the Deftgn of the wife Covernour of the World always to fufpend their fupre?ne Happinefs on fo precarious and hazardous a Condition as that of a Free Obedience.
5. Tet a total Determination or Neceffitation of intel^ ligent Creatures to A£fs of Obedience^ is abfolutely in^ tonfijient with the very Notion of Government by Laws^ enforc'^d by Rewards and PunifJjments, and confeqiient- ly with the great Creator'' s fVijdom in qualifying them forfuch Government,
This is agreeable not only to Scripture and Rea- fon, but to Experience, and fufficiently accounts for the Permiffion of Sin in the World.
6. Confequently, whatever Opinion fuppofes fuch Ne^ ceffitation and is totally dejlru5iive of Liberty^ is alike inconfiftent with the Notion of Government by Law s^ and the Nature of the great and beneficent Creator.
Such, it is humbly conceiv'd, is the Opinion of an abfolute and particular Foreknowledge, as fup- pos*d to be founded on particular abfolute Decrees of all Events both good and Evil, and an univerfal efficacious Concurfe. For this plainly infers an uni^ verfal external Neceffitation, which can't but be en- tirely deftrudive of that Liberty or Freedom of Ac- tion in the Creatures which is requifite in a State of Tryal.
As for fuch who fuppofe an' abfolute particular f ternal Foreknowledge of all Events as future with- out
i
Exlftcncc and Nature of G O D. 1 07 out founding it on abfolute Decrees and an efficaci- ous Concurl'e in order to their Accomplifliment i though their Opinion fecms both more pious, and. not lb diredlly deftrudtiveof the Creature's Liberty, yet it is perhaps equally indefenfible. For, (noc again to mention its Inconfiftence with the Divine Abfolute Independence, nor to infift on its being de- Itrudivc ot the Divine Decrees, which by this Sup- pofition feem to be render'd unnccelliiry ; fince ic can't be imagin'd to what End a Thing fhould be decreed, if its future Exiftence would have been certain, and certainly foreknown, though no fuch Decree had been) this at lead is clear, that whatever is certainly or determinately foreknown, is fore- known to be fix'd or determin'd. But 'tis no lefs clear,that all fuch Events as entirely depend on human Liberty, (whofe very Nature in the pre fen t State we have proved to include Indetermination j can have had no fixing or pre-determining Caufe, and by Confequence cannot be affirm'd to have been Ob- je6ts of a certain or determinate Foreknowledge without a Contradidlion.
It can certainly be no Impiety to afiert, that Things can be foreknown only in fuch a Manner as their Natures admit •, particularly, that Effefts can be no otherwife foreknown than in their Caufcs. If the Caufe be necefTary for certainly determin'd to produce Its Effed) then Indeed the ElTcdt may be certainly or determinately foreknown, i. e. it may be foreknown as certain or determin'd to exift. For Inftance, when we fiy an Eclipfe is certainly fore- known, we can only mean that it is determined by the fix'd or eftablifh'd Order and Motions of the Heavenly Bodies. But • if, on the contrary, the Caufe be properly contingent, or fuch as is notfix- c 1, but either may or may not produce an EfTe(ft (fuch a Caufe as is every Man who is completely free or indetermin'd to ad) then the Eifeft buing
con-
108 ^An Impartial Enquiry into the contingent, indetermin'd, or uncertain, can be no otherwife known than as contingent, indetermin'd, or uncertain. For to fay an indetermin'd or uncer- tain Event was certainly or determinately foreknown, or (which is the fame) was foreknown as certain or determined, is to fay that it was foreknown not as itfelf but as another, i. e. that it was not foreknown at all, even while we intend to affert it to have been foreknown.
*Tis true, fome are pleas'd to objedl, that a cer- tain abfolute Foreknowledge makes no Necefiity of the Things foreknown. But 'tis conceiv'd, that tho' it does not make, yet it fuppofes NecefTity, and is therefore inconfiflent with human Liberty. For as a certain Knowledge of Things prefent is found- ed on a prefent NeceflTity of their Exiftence (fmce 'tis certain, that what Is, cannot but Be while it Is) fo an abfolutely certain Knowledge of Things fu- ture mull pre-fuppofe and be founded on a Future Neceflity of Things : For there's no other Founda- tion of an abfolute Certainty but Neceflity. Where- fore, a certain abfolute Foreknowledge of all Things and Adlions, if admitted, can't but pre-fuppofe an abfolute future Neceflity of all Things and Anions, and by Confequence, the Suppofition of fuch Fore- knowledge can't be defended, without afl^rting an abfolute and univerfil Fatality •, which, (as Dr. Clarke^ freely con feffes,) " Abfolutely deftroys all " Religion and Morality, and tends more to the ^' Difhonour of God, than the denying him a " Foreknowledge, which (on Suppofltion that fuch *' Foreknowledge and human Liberty are inconfi- *' ftent) would be impofllble, and a Con trad 161 ion to *' conceive him to have ;. and the Denial of which *' would, in fuch Cafe, be no more a Diminution <* gf his Omnifcience, than the denying him the
♦ DcmonJiratioUt p. 109.
*« Power
Exiftence and Nature of GOT). top i<< Power of working Contradicftions, is taking away I ** his Omnipotence.
I What the Dodor adds concerning the eternal j Certainty even of free Adions, grounded on the eternal or neceflliry Truth of all Propofitions rela- ting even to contingent or indetermin'd Events, has been already confider'd, Chap. vii. where we prov*d, that whatever Truth fuch Propofitions contain'd, could be no other than conditional, and by Confe- quence, no fufficicnt Foundation of an abfolute or certain Foreknowledge.
Nor can the certain Foreknowledge of contingent or indetermin'd Events, (it's humbly conceiv'dj be prov'd from the Scripture Prophecies. All the Scrip- ture Prophecies may be reduc'd to three Sorts. They are either Revelations of what is adually prefent (for a Prophefy is not always of future Things,) or elfe they are conditional Thrcatnings of Punifhments, or Promifes of Bleflings for certain Adions contingent- ly dependent on Man's free Determination, or elfe they are Declarations of the abfolute Decrees of God. But there's none that can be prov'd to be an abfolute Prophecy of what was purely contingent or indetermin'd to exiil. We are likewife to take No- tice, that fome feeming Prophecies are no more than Declarations of the ufual Courfe of Events.
Yet I am fenfible, there's a Text or two which may fecm to import a particular certain Foreknow- ledge of contingent Events. One is, Pfal. cxxxix. 2. Thou bcholdejl my Thoughts afar off. But this is agreed by the beft Interpreters to be fpoken of the Knowledge of prefent Things, even the mofk fecret, in Oppofition to the Apprchenfions of the Vulgar, who are apt to confider the Deity as fome- what afar off, or at a Diftance from us and our Af- fairs. Thus Montanus and Pag'nimis. And the /Ira- hick and Elhiopick Verfions render the original Word from afar^ and the Syriack, from on high. Accor- dingly
1 lo An Impartial Enquiry into the dingly Mollerus thus paraphrafes it, Deus intelUgit Cogitationes nojlras procul, i^c, God underftandeth our Thoughts afar off, i. e. though he may feem to be far abfent, and to negledl human Affairs, yet he does not fo refide in the Heavens as not to fee what is done upon Earth. By the fame Manner of fpeak- ing he is faid to look down from Heaven and heboid the Sons of Men,
And then, as for that Challenge made to the falfe Deities, Ifaiah xli. 23. Shew the Things that are to come hereafter^ that we may know that ye are Gods ;■ the moft natural Senfe of the Words in their Con- nexion, appears to be this : By changing the ordinary Courfe of Nature^ and determining and foretelling Things otherwife in themfelves contingent^ give Proof of fiich Sovereignty and a^ual Dofninion in the JVorld, as is the incommmncahle Prerogative of that God on whom all Things depend. So that it feems only to eftablifh God's Sovereignty in decreeing future Things ; noc any natural determinate Foreknowledge of purely contingent Events* This will perhaps appear by confidering the Inftances given in the preceding Ver- fes, fuch as the opening of Rivers in High Places^ and Fountains in the Midsf of the Valleys, &c. which are all fo many Inftances of God's Sovereignty over the' World, and his fole Prerogative of influencing or changing the Order of Nature at his Pleafure.
7. A Determination to Future Obedience (in a Matt' Tier agreeable to the Nature of an intelligent Creature) confequent on a Free Obedience in a State of Tryal, is 'highly conducible to the End^ and therefore moji fuitable j to the Charsuier of the wife and beneficent Governor of the World.
The Suppofition of fuch a Determination as thiSj not only fecures and promotes the great End of the moil: beneficent Creator, but admits a fufficient Ufe of the Creature's Liberty. And as it is very cori- fonant to Reafon, fo it is exactly agreeable to the
Chriftiaf!
Exiftcnce and Nature cf G OT). 1 1 1 Chriftian Scheme, p or the Scriptures fufBcicntly in- timate, that fuch ofthofe nobler Beings fknown to us by the Name of Angels) who preierv'd their In- nocence in a State of Tryal, were favcur'd with a Confirmation in Obedience and Felicity. And we are alTur'd that this will be the happy Cafe of fuch oihcr intelligent Beings, as fliall make a right Ufe of their Liberty in the Time of their rcfpedive Try- als.
8. 7is very agreeable to the Wifdom of the Supreme Governotir^ that the State of Tryal jhould he of Jome Latitude^ to yield Roo7n to Repentance and Amendment in Cafe of Tranfgreffion.
This is fufficiently confident with the Scripture Revelation. For there's no necefiary Reafon to conclude, that the Apofi^ate Spirits ("though in very different Circumftances from our own *) were doom'd to Unhappinefs immediately on their firfl Rebellion. And 'tis manifeftly agreeable to our Experience, whofe whole Life appears to be ordinarily no other than a State of Tryal. For that it is not the final State of Rewards and Punifhments, is mod evident from the prefent unequal Diftribution of Things *, which is in Reality fuch as has given Occafion to fome eithtT to doubt of, or to deny any divine Go- vernment. For the Truth is, there can be no pre- fent Government of the World at all, or at leail in cannot be worthy of God, if there be no equal Re- tribution to be expefted in a future State. But that there really is a Government of the World, and that this Government is worthy of God, has been already prov'd. Therefore fuch a Slate of Retribution is certain. To make this yet more clear, the Defign of God in creating and governing the World was the Good of his Creatures. The Good and Happi- nefs of intelligent Creatures .was plainly conneded
• Ste7/je Cbrijlian RiligioNfoundid on Rtefon.
with
! 1 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the with a Pracftice agreeable to the Divine Nature and Will. But fuch Fradlice, in the prefent State, is in many Cafes fo far from rendring Men more happy^ that it rather expofes them to greater Miferies and Infelicities than others. The plain Inference is^ there muft be a future State of Retribution, where the great Creator will fufficiently attain his original End or Defign, and where his intelligent Creatures fhall receive according to their feveral Praflices and Deferts ; and by Confequence the prefent State is the State of Tryal, and not the final State of Rewards and Punifhments.
This will afiift us in unravelling divers Intricacies in the Condudl of the Divine Government. For if this Life of Men here upon Earth be no other than a State of Tryal, we may ceafe to wonder that ill Men are not always punilh'd here, nor the virtuous rewarded ; or that the impious fo frequently abound with fecular Advantages, while the virtuous are di- llrefs'd and the Objeds of Contempt. For prefent Profperity or Adverfity can't, on that Suppofition, be either good or evil in themfelves, but may be in- differently either the one or the other, according to their Afpe6l and Influence on the future State : Which, as is moll evident, may be very different, as they are either abus'd or improv'd.
*Tis therefore very confiflent with the Wifdom of the fupreme Governour, to allow his Subje<fts fas he ufually does) the free Ufe of their Faculties, and to fuffer Effeds to follow the Influence of their imme- diate Caufes, without frequently interrupting the efta- blifli'd Order of Nature. *Twas very fit that Riches,
flonour, and Reputation, fhould ufually be the Ef-» edls of Induflry and prudent Management ; and that the contrary Eflecls fliould proceed from the contrary Caufes, without any peculiar Regard to Perfonsor Circum fiances. For Prudence and Indu- flry are political Virtues, and naturally tend to the
Good
Exiftence and Nature of G O T>. 1 1 3
Hood of Society, though they may be fometimes exercis'd by Perlbns morally vicious. But indeed when Indullry degenerates into Rapine and \'io- lence, and Prudence into Craft and Circumvention, then though their PermiflTion is ftill very agreeable to our Notion of the divine Government, (as being the Government of free Agentsj yet it may be fome- times very fui table to the Wifdom of the beneficent (iovernour of the World to interpofe, and to canfe lume Variety in theufual Series of Events. But Ex- juTience afTures us that this does not always happen ; and but very feldom when thefe Vices don't fo im- tncdiately tend to the Dellruflion of Society. For as to the Actions of particular Perfons towards each ether in this prefent Scene of Things, we find 'em, tor the moft Part, to refemble the celebrated Games ; among the Greeks ; wherein every Man was permit- ted to exert his whole Skill and Adivity, and in cafe of Vi(5tory, received his Reward, not according to the Quality of the Peffon, but that of the Perfor- mance.
9. An Interruption of the State of Try at hy a De- termination to certain ABs^ which the Divine Wifdom may have judg'd fit to he decreed for the general Good either of the whole ^Furld, or of entire Comtmtnities^ is fometimes very fuit able to our Idea of this Divine Go- 'Vernment.
Of this Sort, 'tis humbly conceiv*d, are all fuch human A6tions as may be certainly prov'd to have been abfolutely foretold in Scripture. For though feme of thofe Aftions, confider'd in their immediate Circumftances, without Regard to their remoter Confequences, may feem to have been morally evil, yet, with all due SubmiJTion, it appears to have been in no fort inconfiftent with the Perfecftion of the fupreme Governour to pre-ordain them in order to a much greater Good. P'or though ^we, who arc naturally fubjeft to a fuperior Will 3 we, who have
M no
1 1 4 An Impartial Enquiry into the
no Share in the fapreme Government of the World, nor any fufiicient Capacity to judge of or to deter- mine the Tendencies and Confequcnces of A6li- ons in their full Extent, may not ordain an A61, which, confider'd in its immediate Circumftances, appears to be Evil, that Good may come of it ; yet, it's conceiv'd the Cafe is widely different with re- fped to the fupreme Governour.
This, if it can be fet in a due Light, will perhaps prove no inconfiderable Expedient towards the re- moving of many Difficulties which have call fo thick a Darknefs on divers A6ls of the Divine Go- vernment. To which End I Ihall humbly offer the following Remarks.
I. 'Tis clear, that the Notion tvtno^ moral ymtu- ral Evil does not confift in its being any real Detri- ment to the great Governour of the World. When therefore we meet with fuch Expreffions in the Scrip- ture Revelation as feem to afcribe to him the Paf- fions of Anger and Revenge, or to intimate that Sin is any Diflurbance to his Repofe and Felicity, 'tis agreed by all fober Reafoners, that they are to be iinderflood as fpoken in Condefcenfion to human Ca- pacities.
II. 'Tis agreed, that no human Ad: is in itfelf con- fider'd either morally good or evil, but indifferent. Vi therefore any fuch Ad; becomes either good or;-, evil, it muft be on account of its proper Circumftan- ces and natural Confequcnces \ or by reafon of thef j Relations it acquires. Now though the original ; Reafon why the Notion of moral natural Evil be- ' comes affixed to any particular Relations of natural Ad:s, is not the mere arbitrary Pleafure of the Dei- ty, but his very Nature, yet 'tis that Perfedion of his Nature which muft be conceiv'd to have an im- mediate Influence on the Government of the World, and to be the Standard of all moral Evil whatever : Which Perfedion we have obfervM to be hisfFtfdom,
There-
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT>. lis Therefore, in forming a Notion of the moral Good or Evil of any particular Adl, we muft, it feems, confider it in all its Relations, or view it in all its proper immediate Circumlbinces, and remoteft na- tural Confeqiiences with reference to this governing Perfection of the great Lord of the World, viz. his Wifdom. According to which Method I conceive. That,
1. If the A61, both in its proper immediate Cir- cumilances and remoteft natural Confequenccs be a- greeable to the Notion, and conducive to the Ends of the divine or moil perfeft Wifdom, 'tis then in the compleatelt Senfe morally good, or fit to be ordain'd.
2. If the A(ft be difagrecable in its proper immedi- ate Circumftances to the Notion of the divine Wif- dom, and yet conducive to its Ends in its remoteft natural Confequences, then though it comes not up to the compleat Idea of moral Goodnefs or Fitnefs, yet 'tis not to be reputed morally evil, or abfolutely unfit to be ordain'd by an Agent not fubjedt to any Obligation to the contrary. But,
3. If in the lalt Place, an A<51 be neither agree- able to the Notion of the Divine Wifdom, nor con- ducive to, but dellrucftive of its great and moft be- neficent Uefigns in the Government of the World, then 'tis morally evil, or abfolutely unfit.
So that moral Evil appears to have two diftindt Notions ; viz. a DifTimilitude or Difigreeablenels CO the governing Perfedion of the great Lord ot the World (his Wifdom,) and likewife a Tendency to fi^ftrate his moil beneficent Ends in the Exercife of '•■ : Of which only the latter has immutably the cure of moral Evil.
III. It feems clear to me, that JloUnefs and JuJIIcp Li\o' ufually conceiv'd as diftinft Pertedions elTen- tial to the Idea of God) are not, in Reality, diffe- rent from his M^ifdom diverfly confider'd ; and by H 2 Con-
ii6 An Impartial Enquiry into the
Confequence are not to be the Standards of out Judgment of moral Evil as diftinguifhed from that.
If we duly refledl, we fhall perhaps fee Reafon to conclude, that by the divine effential Holinejs, No- thing elfe can be meant but the general indetermin'd Rectitude or Perfection of the Divine Wtfdom, where- by the Deity immutably perceives and inclines to what is beft and fitteft in governing the World. For this is plainly the Reafon of his Abhorrence or Difapprobation of moral Evil^ as being dire^lly contrary to the Ends of his Government : Which Difapprobation is ufually conceiv'd as the immediate Refult of his Holinefs.
And then as for the Attribute of Jufiia^ it can be no other, it's conceiv'd, than the Divine Wifdom confider^d as particularly determin*d to an equal Re- tribution. For fuch Determination is plainly the Reafon why the great Governour of the World is conceiv'd to be uncapable either of acquitting the impenitently guilty, or of finally punifhing the purely innocent : Which is the compleat Notion of Jujlicey as concern'd in the prefent Argument.
The confidering Holinefs and Juflice as effential Pro- perties in the Deity diftintft from his Wifdom, has not been without its Inconveniencies. Particularly, this appears to have confirm' d many in the mod ri- gid Predeflinarian Principles. For imagining it to be neceffary that all the Divine Properties or Attri- butes fhould be glorified in the Creatures, and look- ing upon Holinefs and Jufiice as two diftinft eflential Attributes, many fquite contrary to the Tendency of our prefent Argument) have proceeded fo far as %o infer, that 'twas neceffary Sin fhould be ordain'c' for the Glorification of the Holinefs and Juftite of €k)d in punifhing it. *
From
* Maccov. Difp. 17. p. li. Locus ' Miferecordia; ct Jujiiti.* mantfeftandje mllns fuijpit futurus, fi Pectamm non extitifet.^
Exiftcncc ayid Nature of GOT). 117
From this Account of the Nature o^ 7noral Evil, as well as of Holijiefs and Jujlicty it feems clearly to follow, that though the Supreme Governour can't, in Confidence with his Holinefs and Jujlice,(i. e. with the Pertedlion and Exercife of his Wifdom) pre-or- dain an Aft morally evil, or an Act both in its immediate Circumftances and natural Confequences, Idircdly tending to fruftrate the great Ends of his Wifdom in the Government of the World, yet to fuppofe him to pre-ordain an A61 or Event dif- agreeable in its immediate Circumftances, but, at the fame time conducive to thofe Ends in its remoter na- tural Confequences, is no Way inconfiftent with the Charafler of the moft Jtijl and Holy {i. c. of the ivi- feff) of Beings.
More particularly, fuch a Pre-ordination can't, 'tis conceiv'd, be inconfiftent with the Holinefs of God (or with the indetermin'd Reditude or Perfec- tion of his fFifdom) fince hereby he only ufes the moft conducive Means for the Attainment of the b^ft Ends : Which is fo far from being contrary to his Wifdom, that it yields us the moft perfect Idea of it.
Nor can this be inconfiftent with his Jujlice for his Wifdom confider'd as determin'd to an equal Re- tribution) fince in cafe of the Pre-ordination of fuch an Aft or Event for the general Good, the particu- lar Inftrument or Inftruments can't merely on that Account be capable of Guilt, or liable to Punifli- inent.
To clear