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PEEPS INTO PAKISTAN

M. S. M. SHARMA

Editor, "The Searchlight" and

Author of "Bhakti Muktavali" and "In Dead Earnest"

With

Foreword by

SIR C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

and Introduction by

SHRI N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR

Ex-Judge, Supreme Court of India

New Delhi

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This book is dedicated

to

SHRI PARAS NATH SINHA,

Managing Director,

Behar Journals Ltd.,

*as a token of the author's love and
gratitude for the encouragement he
had received in writing this volume.*

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SAFAR KHAN - A.M.

FOREWORD

The careers and vicissitudes of many journalists in India during the last few decades have been truly amazing. Some of them have been men of a wide range of knowledge, high principles and variegated culture, who often found themselves in a position of embarrassment, of acute division of opinion *vis-a-vis* the proprietors or directors of the Newspapers or journals wherein they functioned. Others have been temperamentally averse to staying too long in any one situation and neither the uncertainty of their financial position nor the frequent changes of habitat have deterred them from undertaking migrations from place to distant place in India or from one political and social climate to another.

M. S. M. Sharma is in a class by himself. Although during the last three decades there is not one branch of the journalistic profession which he has not assayed nor one political group in India with which he has not come into contact or collision, his fundamental characteristics have been his loyalties, religious and personal. He has an abiding and consuming faith in his religion and has specially dedicated himself to the devoted service of the *Jagadguru* of Sringeri and, as with the true Hindu *Sishya*, his self-surrender has been continuous and complete.

The doubts and perplexities of modern thought do not assail him and he does not play a double part as so many others do. The prominently displayed sacred ashes on his forehead, the sandal paste and the conspicuous *kunkum* are not discarded by him in any *milieu* whether his lot casts him amidst free-thinkers or men of different faith—Christian or Muslim. Even when his finances were precariously low, he would insist on making his annual pilgrimage to his chosen shrines in South India to Sringeri and the abode of *Kamakshi* of Kanchi, although he could not always afford the cost of a railway journey from Delhi or Karachi to the south.

These qualities of deep faith and loyalty were manifested equally in the domain of friendship and to those who befriended him and whom he befriended, his fidelity has been unquestioning and continuous through good report and ill.

I have known him from the time when he was a struggling journalist (practically—a penny-a-liner) through the days when he

was connected with the *Hindu* newspaper and the Associated Press of India and more than a dozen journals all over India, through the critical period of his sojourn in Pakistan, brought face to face with the currents and cross-currents of Karachi politics and the Jinnah regime, until he now finds himself the editor of Bihar's leading newspaper, *The Searchlight*, founded by my valued friends Sachchidanand Sinha, Hasan Imam and P. R. Das and associated with the names of Babu Rajendra Prasad and the present Chief Minister of Bihar.

It is not as well known as it should be how he continued at the risk of his own life, to work in Karachi in the troubled post-partition days until he had to effect a perilous and compulsory migration.

After the lapse of a sufficient period to allow for the formation of a detached opinion and calm consideration of the events of the critical years he spent in Pakistan, he has now attempted in this book entitled *Peeps into Pakistan* to make a survey of the politics and personalities of that newly created state.

He begins with an acute analysis of the mental characteristics of Jinnah who is generally regarded as the Creator of Pakistan. He points out with a true understanding of human motive and background how Jinnah who started as a fervent Indian Nationalist, was successfully played upon by circumstance. The book starts with the story of the early attempts to settle the Hindu-Muslim issue and the meetings which were arranged between him and certain Bengal leaders. He ascribes the failures of some of the later attempts to the clash of personalities between Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Jinnah. He also narrates the subterranean intrigues within the fold of the Muslim League in U.P. and the Punjab and the variegated tactics of Khaliquzzaman, the mover of the Muslim League Lahore resolution of 1940. The book contains a valuable account of the original initial opposition to Jinnah on the part of the Conservative group in England. Jinnah's later

insisting on the separation of Sind and the constitution of the then North West Frontier Province as a Governor's Province.

But, as Sharma rightly points out Jinnah was at the start definitely opposed to the revival of Pan Islam and the details are given of a little known interview between Jinnah, Sarojini Naidu and others, wherein following Dr. Besant's ideas, Jinnah asserted that Sind, which was India in miniature and was distinguished by the great religious and social tolerance of the Sind Muslims, due in the main to their Sufi culture, was the key to the solution of the Indian problem. It is reported that then Jinnah emphasized that if Sind's problem was solved he would really become the ambrosia of Indian unity. At that time it was taken for granted by Jinnah, Mrs. Naidu and many others that Pakistan would never come into being because England would be against it.

Sharma gives a most interesting account of the birth of Sind as a separate province, of the formation of the Hidayatallah Ministry (at the instance of Sir Lancelot Graham) and of Hidayatallah himself as a human paradox who, Sharma believes, was not in reality a communalist, but only a person who wanted power at all costs. A very remarkable pen picture is drawn of Hidayatallah's complex personality, of his numerous Hindu friends and his generous instincts, of the political crisis which led to the defeat of the Hidayatallah ministry.

Allah Baksh, who succeeded him is described as essentially an honest man who paid very dearly for his choice of Nihchaldas Vazirani, a modern Vicar of Bray, as his colleague. It was at this stage that the Congress Party in the Sind Assembly made its compact with the Muslim League and Sind's first League Ministry was formed, Nihchaldas having succeeded in getting into this Ministry also.

In chapter VII of this book under the heading *Luck comes Jinnah's Way*, Sharma points out that ultimately he pinned his faith on Sind, having for the moment failed to have his own way in the Punjab and in Bengal. A very remarkable account is given of Moulana Azad's discussion of Sind politics with various persons including Hoshang N. E. Dinshaw, the proprietor of Sharma's paper and Muslims belonging to various groups in which Sharma also took part. The conclusions of this conference were embodied in what was known as the "Azad Pact" whose basic idea was the promotion

of Hindu-Muslim accord. Jinnah fiercely resented this pact and its subsequent fate is described in an interesting chapter *Truth, First Casualty as Ever*, which is a story of amusingly sordid intrigues.

In subsequent chapters the action and reaction of various personalities in Sind politics are outlined and there is a remarkable description of Sir Hugh Dow's administration and the history of the historic conflicts with the Pir of Pagaro. Two of the victims of Sir Hugh Dow's wrath were B. T. Thakur, the well known Bank Manager and Sharma himself.

Following upon Gandhiji's arrest in 1942, Sir Hugh Dow promptly ordered the arrest of Sind Congressmen including Jairamdas Daulatram, who was then engaged in affording relief to the victims of a devastating flood. B. T. Thakur made a statement, which Sharma published in the *Daily Gazette* under the heading "A WHITE CONSPIRACY" and thereupon there came about the several attempts to muzzle Sharma's paper.

The story of the prosecution of Khuhro and of what Sharma calls *The Martyrdom of Allah Bakhsh* furnishes a remarkable psychological problem.

Hussain Hidayatallah to submit a memorandum. The memorandum which was accordingly prepared, in which Sharma himself assisted, was designed to avoid the partition of the country and it proposed a loose Federation. But, events moved very soon thereafter following upon the Naval Revolt and what Sharma calls a psychological blunder, namely the acceptance of Pakistan as a settled fact.

The *Daily Gazette* of Karachi changed hands during Sharma's absence in South India, but on Mr. Hoshang Dinshaw's desire he continued as its editor.

The story of Pakistan's triumph in Sind; the rise into prominence of the *Dawn* and of Altaf Hussain, its editor; the series of attempts on Jinnah's life and his becoming for all practical purposes a close prisoner in Government House; the widely vocal demand that was engineered in Karachi to apprehend Hindu leaders, who were supposed to have organised a revolt against the state; the persecution by the Pakistan Terrorist Society of Sharma himself for pleading the cause of the Hindus; the attempt of a person dressed as a Hindu to knife Sharma, being the fifth of its kind; the ineffectual endeavour by Jinnah to protect Sharma himself, are all detailed in a series of notable chapters, which close with an account of the inner history of the Kashmir events.

The Pakistan reverses in Kashmir produced a strong reaction in Sind and the anti-Hindu agitation grew in intensity. Sharma met Jinnah on his birthday on December 26, 1947. Jinnah wanted to know if Sharma was removing his family to India because of his apprehensions. He pledged his word to protect his family and on that basis Sharma left for India and when he returned in January 1948, he found that a census of all Hindu households had been taken in Karachi and that every Hindu home was subjected to looting, the men being assaulted and the women molested. Sharma points out that the only Hindu family house to escape depredation was his, thanks to the army patrol guarding it under the orders of Jinnah. The Ramakrishna Mission, which had done great service both in Sind and Bengal, was attacked. The inmates in the nursing home of Dr. Hemandas were attacked and molested. All the persons worshipping in a Sikh temple were attacked, the men folk being killed and the women being converted. At this juncture Sharma used his influence and contrived to get every employee of the *Daily Gazette* sent off to Bombay and Sh. 11

went to Delhi to give an account of the happenings in Sind to the Prime Minister.

On January 30, 1948, after the assassination of Gandhiji, the Muslim refugees who were devoted to Gandhiji wished to attack Jinnah and the premises and the employees of the *Dawn* newspaper. In retaliation Gandhiji's statue was overthrown. With this episode ends Sharma's connection with Pakistan.


But, not the least interesting portion of this book are those relating to the aftermath of the inauguration of the new state of Pakistan; of the working of the spoils system and the attempts of the job hunters for posts posing as martyrs; the headaches caused by Khaliquzzaman and others and their changes of policy; the interactions of Liaquat Ali and Khaliquzzaman and the disappointments suffered by Jinnah with the Muslim League. Jinnah suggested after the partition of India that the Muslim League had fulfilled itself and must be dissolved. His followers strongly opposed him and Jinnah was successively defeated when he proposed a League Constitution on a non-communalist basis. Sharma's theory is that Jinnah never really believed that Pakistan was coming, but when it came, it was too big a problem for him to solve.

In a short chapter, Sharma has given us details of the terrible Hindu-Muslim conflicts; the Pakhtoon movement; the attitude of Afghanistan; Jinnah's failure in Egypt and the futile propounds of the *Dawn* for a Pan Islamic state. In the end Jinnah became frustrated and was merely an ineffectual titular figure-head according to Sharma.

as the case may be. This book serves the purpose of what used to be called the *Journal in time* in French literary history and would be in its way as useful to the future historians as the diaries of literary men and statesmen beginning with Pepys and culminating with Churchill, Cordel Hull and Col. House, that chatty roving ambassador of Roosevelt.

Madras,
March 9, 1953

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIDIAR



Shri N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar

INTRODUCTION

My friend, M. S. M. Sharma, Editor, *The Searchlight*, Patna, needs no introduction to the public. He is an able journalist and a facile writer. He is not a news gatherer merely with a keen sense for ferreting out deeply hidden official secrets of public importance; he is a skilled artist who builds nice and interesting designs out of available material. He is also a philosopher and historian combined. Many ups and downs in life have not changed him or enthused him. He is the same cheerful, optimistic and strong journalist as he was in his college days and in the beginning of his journalistic career with strong loyalties and dislikes, although he is incapacity for compromise or reconciliation, although he is essentially fair and charitable, and a frank and sometimes inconvenient downright, he has been a prominent figure in the field of Indian journalism for over three decades now.

The series of articles that he wrote for *The Searchlight* under the caption *Peeps into Pakistan* were read with enormous interest by all those who wanted to acquaint themselves with the inner history of the events which ultimately led to the partition of India. His sketches of the personalities who played a leading role in the exciting drama were vivid portraits of their character and the motive which activated them into particular courses of action. No leading public figure who had a share in the development of the schemes that ended in the final catastrophe has failed to receive notice at Sharma's hands. The plots and the counter-plots, the machinations of politicians and their passions, prejudices and ambitions, friendships and animosities for the achievement of their political ends—have all been described with a wealth of detail and colour by a competent person who observed things not only from a distance as a mere onlooker but who himself participated in the happenings either in large or small measure.

Those articles have now been published in book form. It is true that much matter in them has faded away into insignificance even during the short period of about fifteen years. Events are moving with startling rapidity all over the world and the resulting kaleidoscopic changes are amazing, if not bewildering. A question of first-rate importance today recedes into the background as of very little

consequence tomorrow when other problems arise for solution demanding an urgent answer. But a knowledge of past history is an essential background to appreciate what we see around us today and what we may expect to happen in the future. Such knowledge is furnished by this book. Apart from the instructive and interesting estimates of the chief actors in the political drama, that led to the division of India, it also reveals the oft-forgotten fact that patriotic considerations of the true welfare and progress of the country are not always the main factors that guide politicians in their policies and that they are more often swayed by selfish motives for the attainment of power and position and the fulfilment of their personal ambitions and ends. Sharma is arresting in his narrative and he unfolds his story of recent history in a masterly manner.

New Delhi,
September 1, 1953.

N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR,
Ex-Judge, Supreme Court of India.



Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan and the author

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

On my return to India from Pakistan in 1948, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel of beloved memory suggested that I should write a volume of my experiences of Pakistan in a reminiscent vein. But the "Iron Dictator" qualified his command with a grave warning. It was that not until the last vestige of bitterness had subsided I should take up my pen. I flatter myself I am not temperamental. But it took me more than thirty months to expel every trace of bitterness that had taken possession of my soul as a result of my experiences of the early days of Pakistan.

I am not sorry for the restraint imposed on me by Sardarji. For, now I can claim that I have made every possible effort to write in a balanced spirit and reasonable temper. The idea of serialising the book in the first instance was pressed on me by Shri Vinaya Nath Narayan Sinha, an assistant editor of *The Searchlight* till not long ago. Shri N. K. Lahiri, the Magazine Editor of *The Searchlight*, literally goaded me into undertaking this literary effort. I had also received considerable encouragement in this respect from my valued friend of many years, Shri Paras Nath Sinha, Managing Director of the Behar Journals, Ltd., to whom I decided respectfully and out of gratitude to dedicate this book.

Perhaps, I have not wholly succeeded in suppressing my personality. But I can make this claim that I am speaking nothing but the truth in the following pages. I shall not, however, venture so far as to swear that I speak the whole truth. For, indeed, I do not. My reason should be intelligible enough. Cases are many in which for personal and political reasons I could conceive of no right to tell the whole truth lest I should compromise the chances or do or say anything even by implication to jeopardise the chances of Indo-Pak Unity and Hindu-Muslim Unity which are very dear to me. But I have not exaggerated, nor extenuated. As truth is always stranger than fiction, I have confined my treatment entirely to facts of history without any malice or bitterness. If even unconsciously I have been unjust, unfair or uncharitable to any person or institution mentioned in this volume I can only express my

sorrow and assure them that nothing was farther from my thought or object than to appear smart or take advantage of anybody's helplessness.

For his very flattering foreword which he had readily contributed to this book I am deeply beholden to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, the illustrious statesman of Southern India. For over forty years it has been my privilege to enjoy his confidence and generous support in my struggles in life. I am conscious that I can never wipe out the debt of gratitude I owe to this singularly great man whose encouragement and patronage at times of many a trial and tribulation have helped me to retain my faith in the inherent goodness of human nature.

For his fine Introduction to this volume I am no less beholden to my good, old friend, Shri N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Judge of the Supreme Court of India till not long ago. I may mention here that the first proposal that the articles should be embodied in book form had emanated from his lordship, while yet he was adorning the Supreme Court Bench. In fact, one day he wrote a flattering letter after perusing some of the chapters while they were being serialised, saying that the material and the manner in which I was dealing with the subject would make the book pre-eminently fit to be prescribed as a textbook for research study in universities. To his prompting I owe the decision to bring out the present book.

Nor can I omit to tender my thanks to the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jugal Kishore Narayan, the universally respected Judge of the Patna High Court, who, by his words of encouragement and benevolence, was the unconscious cause of the inspiration to bring out this humble attempt in book form. To the many readers of *The Searchlight*, who have been clamouring for an early publication of the book, I am no less grateful. To the Behar Journals Ltd., and its Managing Director, I tender thanks for the gracious permission accorded to me to reproduce the articles which had been originally published by *The Searchlight* as an exclusive feature. I dare not entertain such high hopes for this book as are held out for it by Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. But, if even in a small measure this effort should be of any use to the historian of the future on the look out for unbiased facts which might help him reassess historical values I should feel more than amply rewarded. The general support I have received for this

maiden enterprise has encouraged me to launch on a new book *Peeps into Bihar*.

My publishers, the well-known firm of Postal Bhandar, have always been good to me in a variety of ways. I hope and pray that I should be worthy of the confidence reposed in me by Acharya Ramlochan Saran, the head of the firm, and his children.

Sachchidananda Villas,
Sinha Kothi, Sinha Road,
Patna (Behar)
September 24, 1953.

M. S. M. SHARMA

PEEPS INTO PAKISTAN

I

INTRODUCTORY

Jinnah is generally described as the "architect of Pakistan". This, however, is only partial truth. The credit for the planning, if there was one, was certainly not Jinnah's. A Muslim student in England had given his name to a scheme prepared by an ex-member of the Steel Frame for the dismemberment of India. That was long before the World War II. Jinnah ridiculed the idea in those days. He was yet not only content but proud to be known as a sturdy Indian nationalist. During the war, circumstances of which he was not the master helped him ply a boat which somebody else had put on the high seas. Left to himself, he would never have ventured into the sea ; circumstances forced him. And, these circumstances were the creation of others. Before gaining an insight into the mystery of these elusive personalities who had made it easy for Jinnah to play the role of Quaid-e-Azam, it would be necessary to look back and make a probe into some unrecorded facts of Indian history.

Let there be no mistake about it. One who wants to understand Mr. Jinnah must shed the popular prejudices against him. Time was when he was sincerely anxious to settle the Hindu-Muslim issue for good. In 1936, he arrived at Calcutta to preside over the Bengal Provincial Muslim Students' Conference and was the guest of M. A. Isphahani at 5 Camac Street. In response to the invitation of a Calcutta journal, I contributed an article on Jinnah and described his greatness as the indefinable greatness of personality of whom the British Government was afraid even more than it was of the Congress at that time. A few anecdotes I had given of Jinnah in that article attracted the attention of Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy who suggested that I must bring about a meeting between Jinnah and some

representative Congressmen of Bengal. Contrary to my expectation Jinnah readily accepted the suggestion. Five of the Bengal leaders of whom two are yet alive—Dr. Roy himself and Mr. T. C. Goswami, together with three others now dead—Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, Kiron Shankar Roy and Devendra Nath Khan, conferred with Jinnah, for three days and nights and finally persuaded him to accept a compromise formula whereunder the impending general elections in Bengal would be fought on the basis of joint electorate with reservation of seats to the Muslims to the tune of 50 per cent. This formula which Jinnah expected he would get incorporated into the communal award was subject to revision at the end of five years when the communities concerned would review the situation and decide whether reservation of seats was necessary any longer. This agreement was subject to ratification by the President of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee after whose acceptance of it Jinnah was to approach Ramsay Macdonald for an amendment of the Communal Award. Sarat Bose who was the provincial Congress chief at the time somehow did not fancy this arrangement which, therefore, fell through. This story must be borne in mind in assessing Jinnah's mind in the year 1936 when he was anxious and willing to figure as a nationalist leader.

Now we go to the year 1937 when, after a series of wrangling with the British Government the Congress decided at last to accept office and power in the provinces. In Bombay, on the eve of the Congress acceptance of office, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, as Chairman of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of the All-India Congress Committee held a press conference. After the meeting dispersed three journalists still happened to stay on, and one of them asked Patel what he would do if Jinnah was obstructive. Entirely in a jocular mood, the Sardar retorted: "We shall put Jinnah and you in the jail!" Everyone laughed and there was an end of it. A week or two later, Jinnah held a press conference at his house. One of the three journalists above referred to nonchalantly told Jinnah that Sardar Patel would put him in jail and had said so. The newspaperman

thought he was joking but Jinnah took him seriously and really thought that the Congress would be so unscrupulous as to imprison him. Whether this unhappy incident influenced him in any way I know not. But suddenly he liquidated his legal practice at the Bombay High Court Bar and left for England in a few months by a P. & O. mail boat. He returned only in the middle of 1939 after making sure that in the fastly developing world situation the Congress would be obliged to boycott office once again and go into wilderness. His first public act on his return to India was the celebration by the Muslims of what he called "the deliverance day" to express his sense of relief and joy at the Congress exit from office.

A third factor which must be recalled relates to Uttar Pradesh which was then called the United Provinces. At the time of the 1936 general elections, there were at least three Muslim Leagues functioning in U.P. The one led by the Nawab of Chattari and the other by another inconsequential Muslim owed their genesis and activity to the inspiration of Sir Harry Haig, a former Home Member of the Government of India and Governor of U.P. Jinnah's Muslim League was the third in the field. Each one of the three disputed the representative character of the other two. Chowdhury Khaliqzaman, the erstwhile Congressman and non-co-operator, had joined Jinnah's League. In those days he was still a Congressman in his views but he joined the Jinnah League as a vote catching device lest otherwise he should be distrusted by his fellow Muslims. With Jinnah's permission, Khaliqzaman allied himself with the Congress and succeeded in routing the rival League at the polls. Khaliqzaman had come to an agreement with Jawaharlal Nehru. The actual agreement was never published. According to one version, Panditji had agreed that the Congress would form a coalition with the Muslim League at the time of taking office and Khaliqzaman had promised that he and his successful fellow-Leaguers would sign the Congress pledge. For reasons which must be obvious, Khaliqzaman divulged to Jinnah only the first part of the agreement and kept the second clause to himself. At the time of the formation of the U.P.

Ministry he hesitated to sign the Congress pledge and he was kept out. Jinnah thought and said that Pandit Nehru had broken his word. Khaliqzaman who knew that Jinnah was wrong in the belief dared not contradict him. That was because Khaliqzaman could not muster enough courage to admit to his leader that the original agreement included a clause which required him and his League colleagues to sign the Congress pledge.

Then we come to the League's Lahore resolution of 1940 which demanded a division of India and the constitution of a separate homeland for the Muslims from out of the areas in which they were in a majority. It is relevant to recall that the resolution did not specifically mention the word "Pakistan." That was a term which, Mr. Jinnah claimed, was given his demand by "the Hindu Congress". By this time he had become an unabashed communalist although he admitted to me once at Karachi that he really did not favour the dismemberment of India. But of this in a subsequent chapter. In the Madras session of the League in the cold weather of 1940, Pakistan became the official creed of the Muslim League. Lord Linlithgow, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery were the happiest to know that the one person whom they had most feared was voluntarily coming to help them reap a harvest of the sowings of their ancestors whose definite policy was *divide et impera*. Although he knew that his latest stunt was being exploited to his disadvantage by the British bureaucracy, yet Jinnah declined to play the part of an open stooge. The bureaucracy's game was to play him against the Congress. In this it succeeded all right. But where it failed was in its attempt to secure his open co-operation with the British Government in their war effort. Taking his cue from Gandhiji's attitude to the communal award, Jinnah would neither accept nor reject the British approach. His followers openly co-operated with the British Government but he had not the courage to stop them. He invariably followed Gandhiji's technique but only after Gandhiji had definitely and irrevocably taken a particular step. Allah Bakh once made fun of Jinnah and said that "this elusive

Allah Baksh was then Premier of Sind, having succeeded Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah, who lost the confidence of the Legislative Assembly on a vital constitutional issue. Just as Allah Baksh was about to leave for Jinnah's camp to sign the League pledge. A. Krishnamachari, Manager of the Karachi Branch of the Associated Press of India, who got scent of this secret arrangement caught Allah Baksh by the collar and explained to him the implications of the death warrant he was signing against himself and his political future. Allah Baksh woke up. His awakening meant a huge disappointment to Jinnah. The mission of the Sind visit proved an unadulterated failure. Without Sind Pakistan was impossible of realisation.

II

THE HURDLE THAT WAS SIND

There is a general belief in the country that, when in 1927, Jinnah demanded the separation of Sind from Bombay and its constitution as a full-fledged governor's province, he had already begun to think in terms of Pakistan. This is a mistaken impression. The reasons which drove him to ask for the separation were different.

I vividly recall a conversation one cold morning in March, 1927, soon after Holi, between Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and Jinnah. It was in the latter's well furnished room on the top floor of the Western Court in New Delhi. A few days earlier, towards the end of February, Jinnah had presented a multi-point programme for what he called the lasting settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem. This programme he outlined to a meeting—one of the smallest in my memory—which had met to hear him in the open space in the Eastern Court compound. Among Jinnah's demands were two which disturbed many thinking Indians including Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpatrai. One of the two was the separation of Sind and the other the constitution of the North West Frontier Province as a governor's province with an executive council and ministry and a legislative council with a majority of elected representatives.

In an interview which he gave the Associated Press at the time, Lalaji characterised the move as an effort to revive Pan Islam with the co-operation of the Hindus if possible. Pandit Motilal Nehru preferred to be silent but he watched the developments before he committed himself either way. S. Srinivasa Aiyangar, the Congress President of the year, who was deputy leader of the Congress party in the Central Legislature, could find no flaw in Jinnah's demand and publicly declared that Jinnah's proposals merited serious consideration. Incidentally, this statement of Srinivasa Aiyangar was the starting point on which grew an impassable and wide gulf between

himself and Pandit Nehru. But that is another story which is not strictly germane to this narration.

This subject was discussed at a small dinner party one night early in March of that year under the hospitable roof of Dr. M. A. Ansari. Hakim Sahib Ajmal Khan was there ; so was Pandit Motilal Nehru. Besides Sarojini Naidu and the host, the only other person present was Dr. Syed Mahmud. Jinnah's demands were discussed threadbare and at last Sarojini Naidu offered to call on Jinnah and attempt a probe into his mind. I was already closeted with Jinnah taking an interview on this identical subject for the Associated Press of India when, lo and behold, who should walk in but India's Nightingale whose arrival put an abrupt end to my interview.

With her accustomed frankness Sarojini Naidu made a straight dive into her subject. Jinnah listened patiently and then gave Mrs. Naidu an insight into his own mind. I was an interested listener of course but neither of the two leaders minded my presence because both of them gave me credit for respecting confidences. As I was in duty bound, I orally reported this conversation the same evening to my boss, Mr. K. C. Roy, at his residence 4, Underhill Lane, Delhi. But this is the first time when I am making any public reference to the Jinnah-Sarojini conversation, although I had covered the subject matter piecemeal in some articles which I had written to the Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi newspapers between 1936 and 1946.

I have not before me at the moment the notes which I had taken soon after I emerged from Jinnah's room on that historic day. The notes were among the possessions "lost" during my exit from Pakistan. But the *Forward* (1936), the *Kaiser-i-Hind Illustrated Weekly* (1937 and 1938) and the *Daily Gazette* (now the *Civil and Military Gazette*—Karachi edition) had published references to this famous interview in connection with some thing or the other.

Jinnah asserted to Mrs. Naidu that nothing was farther from his mind than a revival of Pan Islam which he derided as hateful to him. "Do you think, Mrs. Naidu," he asked, "I could be a communalist like your Muhammad Ali?" He was

referring to Moulana Muhammad Ali who was his *bete noire* at the time. He added: "I am an Indian nationalist, first, foremost and last."

Whether Jinnah spoke with mental reservation when he declared his faith in Indian nationalism, the historian of the future alone can decide. But Mrs. Naidu obviously believed him and shared her views with her fellow-guests of the previous night. The final result was that the Congress party ultimately gave in to Jinnah and agreed to the constitution of the N.W.F. as a separate Governor's province and the separation of Sind from Bombay. I must, however, point out that there was at least one person who had been consistently seeing reds and blues into the new move which he persisted in calling the beginnings of Pakistan. That was my old friend and colleague Durgadas, now joint editor of the *Hindustan Times*.

Why, then, did Jinnah ask for the separation of Sind? In so many words, he told his distinguished visitor: "Well, Mrs. Naidu, I shall tell you exactly why. You, Congress people, in your mad frenzy for the Khilafat, have effectively deprived me of an all-India political platform. I am reorganising the Muslim League for the purpose. I admit the League is still weak and is very much divided. Sind and N.W.F. Muslims are today willing pawns in the hands of the reactionaries. Educated Muslims are not slow to exploit this reactionaryism to their own individual advantage. By advocating for Sind and N.W.F. a separate and individual existence, I hope to strengthen my League and effectively muzzle the others."

The reader would recall that in the earlier chapter I had made reference to the existence of more than one League at the time.

Without any further invitation from Sarojini Naidu, Jinnah proceeded to explain the why of his demand for Sind separation. According to him, Mrs. Annie Besant, to whose introduction, by the way, I owed my personal acquaintance with the Quaid-e-Azam to be, had once given a picture of Sind. Sind, she had told Jinnah, was India in miniature. Muslims formed 23 per cent of India's population and Hindus 23 per cent of the population of Sind. Impressed, as she was, by the toleration of

Sind Muslims on account of their Sufi philosophy approximating to the Hindu Vedanta she had told Jinnah that, if the minority problem was solved in Sind, it would be automatically solved in India. Jinnah told Mrs. Naidu: "Now, then, Sarojini, I want Sind for that definite purpose. I am determined to deserve the title you had conferred on me as "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity".

This picturesque title has a story behind it. During the first world war, Mrs. Besant had started her Home Rule Campaign. The bureaucracy was intolerant of her virulent and unceasing activity so characteristic of her. It did not mind the Home Rule propaganda so much as Mrs. Besant's heroic and single-minded endeavour to bring together on one platform all the opposing elements in India's political life. She was straining every nerve to reunite the extremists and the moderates, the Hindus and the Muslims. She had already received the blessings of Dadabhoy Naoroji, the Grand Old Man of India. Lokamanya Tilak was roped in. At that time Jinnah was the President of the Bombay Home Rule League. He gave Mrs. Besant every help to bring about a fusion of the extremists and the moderates. He went further and offered Hindu-Muslim Unity. His plan was that, if the Hindus and Muslims together presented a joint scheme of reforms, even the bureaucracy could not resist it. Jinnah was right. At the Lucknow Congress in 1916, under the presidentship of Ambika Charan Muzumdar, a joint session of the All-India Congress Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League drafted what was known then as the Congress-League scheme of reforms. Subsequently, this scheme was substantially incorporated into the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms although with the hybrid monster of dyarchy. Just before the Lucknow Congress, Mrs. Naidu who had known Jinnah's co-operation with Mrs. Besant in this uphill task called Jinnah "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity". Jinnah was never tired of exploiting this title, as we would see further in a later chapter.

Waving aside a new caller, who withdrew immediately, Jinnah adverted to the Pan Islam fear and said: "Now, Mrs. Naidu,

let us make no mistake about it. You cannot simply have Pan Islam. The Britisher would never yield to your demand. It suited his purpose to break the Khilafat Empire of Turkey in violation of his own solemn promises to the Indian Muslims. They are fools who think that Britain can be coaxed into re-uniting Islam by agreeing to create a corridor between Karachi and Constantinople."

I was too young in those days to appreciate this argument. But in later years, it appeared to have some force. Even after her release from prison in 1945, Mrs. Naidu was amongst those who had thought that Pakistan could never come because the Britisher would be against it. Lord Wavell's emphasis on India's "geographical unity" confirmed this belief. And, so did the early attitude of the British Cabinet Mission. But I must not anticipate.

In that historic talk between Jinnah and Mrs. Naidu, the name of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah often cropped up. For some reason which he did not disclose, Jinnah characterised Sir Ghulam Hussain as an arch-reactionary who was intent on selling the fortunes of Muslim India for a mess of pottage. "This fellow," said Jinnah, "has been using the Sind Muslims to ascend to his unholy ambition. I must save the Sind Muslims and organise them for my own use. My ambition is Hindu-Muslim Unity."

Some days later, in the lobbies of the Central Assembly in Delhi, Lala Lajpatrai pounced upon Pandit Motilal Nehru and told him that, if the Congress was going to back Jinnah's demand, it would inevitably be committing itself to an ultimate division of India which, he added, "would mean a betrayal of the Punjab." Lala Lajpatrai mentioned this incident to Sachchidananda Sinha a few months later at Patna on the occasion of the annual session of the All-India Hindu Mahasabah and asserted that the first betrayal of Indian nationalism had taken place at Lucknow in 1916 and now eleven years later they were planning to drive the wound deeper into the flesh.

III

HOW SIND CAME INTO BEING

The Hindu Mahasabha would never reconcile itself to the separation of Sind. From its point of view, the opposition to Jinnah's plan was perfectly natural. The Mahasabha organised Hindu opinion in Sind which was then a part of Bombay. The Hindus told themselves: "In the existing order, as part of Bombay, we belong to the majority community. But if Jinnah's demand is conceded, we shall become a minority." On the other hand, Muslim members in the Bombay Legislature at the time gave the proposal their wholehearted support. A legislature in Karachi was something which appealed to their vanity. Some of them hoped to become executive councillors or ministers.

Be it, however, said to the credit of the Sind Muslims that, at no time, did the League move appeal to them as a communal plan devised either to harm the Hindus or to advance their own interests at the cost of their Hindu brothers with whom they moved on the friendliest terms. In their scheme of things, as they could visualise it, the Sind Hindus were really and genuinely to be co-sharers in the new prosperity which, they believed, would be theirs, once Sind was separated from Bombay.

Like a shrewd man, Jinnah made no attempt to appeal to the communal conscience of the Sind Muslims in those days. Nor was he anxious to address big public meetings in Karachi or anywhere else in Sind. His talks were confined to individuals or groups of individuals. As he knew that communalism could not thrive in the soil of Sind, he took jolly good care to avoid anything that might savour, even distantly, of communalism. He could play this non-communal role to his advantage and with good effect because Jinnah himself was a Sindhi. By a Sindhi, I do not mean that he could speak the Sindhi language or even understood it. He was a Gujerati Muslim. His grand father or great-grandfather had migrated to Sind and settled down at Karachi. The family was Hindu. It was Jinnah's

father who became a Muslim. In fact, there are two theories current in Karachi—one, that Jinnah was born a Muslim, and the other, that in his childhood or boyhood he embraced Islam along with his parents. Jinnah himself would never talk about his parentage.

Whatever his parentage or religion, his claim to be a Sindhi was correct, although few outside a limited circle knew it. But the fact gave him a decided advantage in the sense that it gave him an opportunity to speak to the Sindhis as a Sindhi. He told them of their ancient culture, their own language, philosophy and literature. He made no reference to Islam or the Muslim League. His plan was not only to disarm opposition but to give it no opportunity at all. In this decision he was right.

Sind Muslims are a happy-go-lucky people. They are a strong and sturdy race. By instinct and training, they are generous. They would not hurt a fly. It might be said of them that they were truly non-violent, their non-violence being the non-violence of the brave, not of the coward. One must know Sind to appreciate the great quality of the Sind Muslims. It never occurred to them that Islam could ever be in danger in this country. When fanatic Moulvis from the Punjab tried to stir the Muslim conscience of Sind in the holy name of religion, the Hindus had no reason to feel disturbed because the Sind Muslims themselves were anti-communal to the very marrow of their bones and just laughed at the silly fables and myths coined by the Punjabi propagandist at whose face they did not hesitate openly to laugh. None knew this Sindhi Muslim trait better than did Jinnah himself. A fine strategist, he very naturally refrained from attacking Sind on this point.

In the early years at least Jinnah made a conscious effort to canvass Hindu support also for his plan of Sind separation. Thus in those days he was always anxious to get some prominent Hindus to discuss the League plan with him. But Sind Hindus were a shrewd lot. With their knowledge and experience of the condition of the minority community in the neighbouring province of the Punjab, they feared the worst. Without actually

coming into conflict with Jinnah himself, they started organising Muslim opinion against the separation of Sind. This, however, was a tactical mistake. If they had argued the matter from the point of view of Sind as a whole and told their Muslim compatriots the advantages accruing to Sind from its connection with Bombay, the story might have been different. But the birth of Pakistan was preceded by a hundred "if's" as we could see today. In those days, there was some genuine apprehension among Sind Muslims that if their province was separated from Bombay they would be virtually ruled by the Punjab Muslims whom they hated. Their reason for this hatred was simple. The Sind Muslims had not had their share of modern educational facilities. Lord Minto's communal representation had brought to the legislature many a Sindhi Muslim who was not even literate. In the Sind division, in the name of communal representation, the Punjab Muslims succeeded in elbowing the Sind Hindu who was better educated and certainly far more polished. The sympathy of the Sind Muslim was on the side of the oppressed Hindu. Why it did not strike the Hindu leaders of the time to exploit this fact and organise opposition to the separation of Sind is a question which only the historian of the future would be qualified to answer.

One section of the Hindus made another mistake. They said that, if Sind was to be separated from Bombay, it would be well for it to be tagged on to the Punjab in order to enable Sind to enjoy the benefit of the Punjab administration. No graver tactical blunder could be committed. Even the most rabid Leaguer among Sind Muslims was anti-Punjabi. To tell him that he was to be handed over to his hated neighbour was to invite him to rush into Jinnah's arms. In those days, my friend, Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro, was almost the only prominent Sind Muslim to join Jinnah's camp. A very reasonable man in many ways, even Khuhro could not shake off the anti-Punjabi feeling which was inherent in the Sind Muslim mind. At this distance of time I am often tempted to wonder what indeed could have possessed the Sind Hindu spokesmen in those days to forget their native shrewdness. Shamdas Gidwani, the elder

brother of Choithram Gidwani. was the loudest to revive this slogan at a later day. Of the Gidwanis I shall have something to say later on.

Once in Bombay between the first Round Table Conference and the second, Jinnah who accosted me in the High Court corridors one afternoon referred to this Hindu opposition and said with glee that he had almost succeeded and all that remained was the actual separation. I retorted: "There is many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip." Jinnah fired back: "Yes, that slip is the Hindu Mahasabha's, not mine!" So indeed it proved to be in the final reckoning. But the odds were great. For instance, the Sukkur Barrage which had made a fine garden of the desert that Sind was had cost the Bombay Government several crores. Would a small province with barely 8 districts most of which had not the benefit of the Sukkur irrigation facilities be able to undertake this huge debt which could well be a milestone round its neck at the very inception? But Sir Samuel Hoare had made up his mind and there was an end of it. Sind did become a separate and individual unit in its own right on the All Fools' Day, 1936. Sir Lancelot Graham was appointed first Governor and was assisted by an advisory council for twelve months until provincial autonomy with a council of ministers responsible to a fully elected legislature which came into being on the same day in 1937.

Jinnah had hoped for much from Sir Lancelot Graham whom he had known pretty intimately in the Central Assembly in New Delhi. The common bond between them was their hatred of Vithalbhai Jhaveribhai Patel, the elder brother of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. An imperialist to his finger tips, Sir Lancelot who was then Secretary of the Legislative Assembly department in Delhi wagged his tail to Vithalbhai who was then President of the Central Legislative Assembly. Vithalbhai cut the wagging tail. In the old days, Jinnah and Vithalbhai had been inseparable friends. That was in the heydays of the Home Rule movement. Both of them also figured as fellow signatories of the famous Memorandum of the Nineteen—a document signed by 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council and asking for

a measure of provincial autonomy for India. This was before 1919. In the year 1919, Vithalbhai was in England in connection with the Government of India Bill on the parliamentary anvil. So was Jinnah. For the story I am repeating here I am obliged to the late Lord Burnham, the proprietor of the *Daily Telegraph* who, it would be recalled, toured India nine years later as a member of the Simon Commission. I had to cover the early part of the Commission's tour and had good opportunities of knowing the commissioners, particularly Lord Burnham and Mr. Attlee. Burnham's story was this. He was the host at a party at which both Jinnah and Vithalbhai were guests among others. Jinnah said something about beards. The irrepressible Vithalbhai retorted in his usually lighthearted manner and referred to Jinnah as a Muslim renegade. Jinnah himself never claimed to be an orthodox Muslim. In fact, he prided himself that there was nothing in common between himself and "these fellows", as for instance, he told me at Gaya on July 9, 1939 when I saw him for a brief while when he had just emerged from the Bihar provincial league conference over which he had just presided. It was one thing to crack a joke with Jinnah in strict privacy but it was a risk to do it in company. Anyhow, the fact was there that from that time onwards he looked upon Vithalbhai as his arch-enemy. Sir Lancelot had no reason to be kind to Vithalbhai's memory. Jinnah thought that he and Lancelot Graham together could make strange bed-fellows, nevertheless bed-fellows for all that.

But what Jinnah did not realise was that, with all his faults, Lancelot Graham was a strictly constitutional governor. He would not call the League to form the ministry. The new Assembly of 60 had more than half a dozen parties. It would be more appropriate to say that the half a dozen groups were clans rather than parties in the political sense. The League did not contest the election but nine leaguers had managed to get returned. The nine included Sheikh Abdul Majid, G.M. Syed and Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, all of whom were destined to play a surprisingly bigger role on a later occasion. Of the 22 Hindu (rather non-Muslim as we must say) seats, the Congre-

captured a majority. It was the only party which had fought the elections on a party basis. Save for the 14 Congress members, 9 Leaguers and 3 Europeans the rest who were 34 in number were all independents. In communal terms, however, the house was composed of 35 Muslims and 25 non-Muslims of whom three were Europeans pledged to support any Government in office. Influence was brought to bear on Lancelot Graham to institute a League ministry. For some reason, he had decided on asking Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah to form a ministry although the latter was an independent and had no party to support him.

IV

A HUMAN PARADOX

Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah was a human paradox. Truly, he was a creature of the old bureaucracy. He was a struggling lawyer practising at Hyderabad (Sind). The decision of the Congress, the Muslim League and the Khilafat Conference to boycott the legislatures in pursuance of the non-co-operation programme gave Ghulam Hussain the opportunity to ascend the ladder of eminence in the official world. He was prevailed upon by the Commissioner of the Sind Division to stand for the Bombay Legislative Council. Ghulam Hussain needed no pressure. Shrewd by instinct and circumstance, he saw in the success of his election his future glory. He cultivated assiduously the affection of Sir Leslie Wilson, Governor of Bombay who appointed him as minister in charge of the local self-government portfolio. As minister, he placed himself willingly and ungrudgingly at the disposal of the English section of the Indian Civil Service. M. R. Jayakar and K. F. Nariman formed the principal opposition and threatened to defeat Government at every available opportunity. Ghulam Hussain organised the Sind Muslim votes which were always cast in favour of the Bombay Government. This arrangement incidentally provided Ghulam Hussain with a ladder by which to rise to official eminence. Later on, he became Home Member of the Bombay Government and was the favourite of Sir Frederick Sykes, another Governor of Bombay who, at the time of the great civil disobedience movement, trusted Sir Ghulam Hussain completely and in fact, described him as "His Excellency the Governor of Bombay *de facto*".

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that Ghulam Hussain was a communalist. That, he certainly was not. Most of his intimate friends were Hindus. He either entertained them or was entertained by them. To him communalism was just a handle to work his fortunes up. Even in his Muslim League days, he was known for his

non-communalism. But he was certainly a political reactionary in the sense that he believed in the divine mission of British overlordship, as he once told an American journalist during the world war II. Both by his friends and his foes it used to be said of him that the lure of office was so ingrained in his blood that he would willingly sacrifice everything including his religion, provided he could bask in official sunshine. He never did a favour save for a consideration. But even his detractors admitted that he was never guilty of a false promise. If a thing was impossible of being done, he invariably told his petitioner that he could do nothing about it. Where he could do something, he always demanded a fee. Once, he told a friend jocularly that, even if Lady Hidayatallah asked an official favour of him, he would charge her a fee.

All this might be true. They might be false also. But there is no doubt that he left behind him nearly a crore worth of property and cash. His enemies exaggerated the figure. But nobody disputed that he was one of the wealthiest men in Sind. He had certainly no patrimony. He was born poor ; his legal practice could not give him enough to keep himself going without borrowing, let alone the maintenance of his courtesans of whom he never got tired—no, not even when he was 70. And, at that age he was the Governor of Sind. He could not have saved money, for his official salary was hardly enough to meet a fourth of his expenses. His lavish hospitality easily outdid Sachchidananda Sinha's reputation as a host. His intense devotion to Bacchus alone cost him something verging on five digits a month. To describe him a drunkard would be absurd. Ghulam Hussain just swam in a tank of whisky. He had no use for that limpid liquid which you and I would call Adam's ale. He preferred something strong—whisky unrelieved by soda water. He was always surrounded by boozers, whether he was at home or at the club in the evening. He always stood the drink for others at his own cost. Never mind if his purse was regularly filled by favour-seekers. If he earned by both hands, he spent with both hands. So much money came to him that he did not know what to do with it. That part of his wealth which

cluded his generous spending accounted for a crore or a little over, but not very much more.

Everybody knew his weaknesses but everybody loved him nevertheless. There must have been in Ghulam Hussain an indefinable something which attracted everybody to him. Even the Sind Congressmen who had no reason to be politically grateful to this arch-reactionary had always some good word to say of "Sir Sahib". R. K. Sidhwa, for instance, fought him relentlessly on the floor of the Sind Assembly but outside its precincts, he was an admirer of Sir Ghulam Hussain whom, only an hour earlier, he had torn to pieces in a legislative debate. So far as I knew, there were only two Hindus who did not like him and said so. These two were my friends Shri Jairamdas Daulatram and Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani. Probably, these two were the only Congressmen who never asked "Sir Sahib" for a favour. But Ghulam Hussain knew how to keep them in check. Shamdas Gidwani, the elder brother of Dr. Choithram, was a favourite of Ghulam Hussain. Jairamdas's nephew, Tikamdas Wadhvani, the eminent Karachi barrister, was one of the steadfast friends of Ghulam Hussain. Ghulam Hussain's policy was that, if you could not have access to your favourite girl, you should at least let her know that you were not above kissing her favourite dog or cat. Almost the only Congressman who relentlessly ran down Ghulam Hussain without regard for consequences was my friend, Lalji Mehrotra who beat Ghulam Hussain's hospitality hollow. But the difference between the two was this. Ghulam Hussain did not worry about the political affiliations of his guests. Lalji did. Lalji's table was almost the exclusive monopoly of his political associates and sympathisers.

I have said that Ghulam Hussain was a shrewd person. He could smell your loyalty to him with the ease of a tiger sure of its prey. If he suspected you of disloyalty, he did not mind, provided of course you did not figure as an obstructionist. If you, by any chance, took it into your head, to thwart Ghulam Hussain in any of his ventures, he did not strike you down at once but always gave you notice. But if you were so foolish

as to ignore his warning, woe be to you and yours. Khurho owed his misfortunes of recent days to his failure to recognise this trait in Ghulam Hussain. Once he deprived his opponent of his "poisonous fang" as he loved to call it, he forgot that he was dealing with a man who had presumed to stand between him and what he believed to be his natural right to tower above others. He would even back you although in a small way and help you retrieve your lost fortune. He was not unforgiving, according to his own standards. He could both kick and kiss. He did this to perfection. There was no unnaturalness about his acting. "Live and let live" was his motto.

His generous instincts were his peculiar trait. As a friend he was constant. Naturally, he expected you to be equally constant. If you erred, he never forgave you. There is a person in Karachi, Khan Bahadur A. K. Gabol by name. This man is the son of a butcher. Ghulam Hussain conceived some affection for the mass of flesh known as Gabol and raised him from the gutter. Gabol greatly profited by this sudden stroke of luck. He became the president of the local district board by Ghulam Hussain's favour. He then became an M.L.A. and Ghulam Hussain's parliamentary Secretary. Gabol's job was to pander to the old man's whims in every way. He would dine and drink with the boss, lead him faithfully to the courtesan at the appointed hour and bring him safely home. That was about the only business he did to justify his Rs 500 salary. Once, however, Gabol made a miscalculation. Without weighing the *pros* and *cons* of a move, he calculated that Ghulam Hussain's political future was as good as sealed and although he had not the courage to vote with the opposition over a successful vote of censure, he managed to absent himself at the time of crucial voting. Ghulam Hussain lost. But Sir Hugh Dow defied the legislative verdict and continued to keep him his Premier. Gabol realised his mistake and started paying court again. A trained courtier he knew how to bear being spat upon. Ghulam Hussain's forgiveness, when it was given, was full and unreserved. It meant a fortune for Gabol.

I owe it to Ghulam Hussain to say that they are wrong who

say that he was anti-Congress. Most certainly he was nothing of the kind. In another chapter, I shall have occasion to recount a famous memorandum which he had submitted to the British Cabinet Delegation. If that memorandum had been accepted by the British there could be no Pakistan and Jinnah would be dished all right without a cause to grumble in the open. If the present Bombay Ministry ransacks the dusty files of the Bombay Secretariat, it is bound to discover that, but for Ghulam Hussain's firm interference, they would have killed Gandhiji at the time of the Harijan fast. Willingdon had no love for the Mahatma. Gandhiji was in prison. British "statesmen" hoped for Gandhiji's "death". The one man to put his foot down was Ghulam Hussain who saw to it that everything was done to humour Gandhiji. This single act of virtue should be enough to drown his scores of vices.

Now, we go back to Jinnah. It was in 1924 that Ghulam Hussain met Jinnah for the first time. Jinnah was still a nationailst. Ghulam Hussain was an uncertain factor but devoted to the lure of office. My readers might be surprised to know that Jinnah was against separate and communal electorates in those days. He tried his best to make a convert of Ghulam Hussain to the cult of joint electorate. He failed. Ghulam Hussain feared that he would have no chance in a joint electorate. Probably he was right. But with his experience came a change in Ghulam Hussain. He became a protagonist of joint electorate and started organising Sind Muslims to resist the League demand for communal representation. By this time Jinnah had become the apostle of separate electorates. Again he tried to convert Ghulam Hussain; again he failed. Ghulam Hussain was, however, prevailed upon to join the League. But over an issue involving party discipline in a party which certainly did not exist except in name in those days, Jinnah deprived Ghulam Hussain of his primary membership. But later still, as we would see in due course the two leaders agreed to an alliance. Ghulam Hussain not minding the need to excel before the august Quaid-e-Azam, Jinnah's vanity was satisfied.

At the time Sir Lancelot Graham had to call somebody to form the first Sind Ministry and he offended Jinnah's vanity most by calling upon Ghulam Hussain to form the ministry. Lancelot Graham's contention was that there was no organised party which could command a majority in the legislature. He argued that Ghulam Hussain was as good as anybody else and could stay in office so long as he continued to enjoy the confidence of the popular house. I do not think that Jinnah ever forgave Lancelot Graham for his failure to consult him before appointing his Premier. At the first test, Sir Ghulam Hussain's constitutional strength collapsed. A strictly constitutional governor, Lancelot Graham declined to keep Ghulam Hussain in office any longer, although this excellent precedent was deliberately ignored and set at nought on a later occasion by that prince of reactionaries, Sir Hugh Dow. Allah Baksh came into power and the Congress Party turned him out and installed the League in his place. The Congress party in the Sind Assembly, without knowing what it was doing, was steadily playing into Jinnah's hands and unsetting the apple cart.

SIND IN THE MELTING POT

In 1939 Ghulam Hussain faced his first political crisis in life. It was over a budget demand. He lost the battle. He went to Sir Lancelot Graham and begged him to disregard the vote of the popular legislature. Logically and factually the Premier's representation was correct but the flaw in it was mainly constitutional. Lancelot Graham would not listen. He literally compelled Ghulam Hussain to submit his resignation. He told the retiring Premier that his exit might prove the ruin of Sind as had been represented to him but as a constitutional governor he had no choice.

Ghulam Hussain had anticipated an adverse vote. His espionage was perfect. A master strategist, he thought of ways and means of neutralising the opposition which was to be led by Allah Baksh of beloved memory. He convened a private meeting of the Muslim members of the Assembly. Many of them had benefited in the past by his patronage. So as however not to take his chances with them, he made everyone of them swear on the Koran that he would vote against the cut motion the next day and vote with the Government. It was at about midnight when his Muslim friends gave him their word of honour and swore by the name of the Holy Prophet (may his soul rest in peace!) that they would sooner commit suicide than betray their friend, philosopher and guide. Almost for the first time in his life, Ghulam Hussain refrained from his customary whisky which, however, he gave very freely indeed to his guests.

Let not my readers get a shock. It is true that Islam prohibits drink. But with all their piety and devotion, the Sind Muslims do not mind breaking the Prophet's commandment over this issue at least. The Hindus of Sind also are generally devoted to Bacchus. A brief experience opened my eye to this trait which I had little suspected. Coming from Bombay, I changed train at Hyderabad to go to Karachi. I got into a

first class compartment which I shared with many Hindus some of whom were members of the Sind Legislative Assembly. After the train left Hyderabad and before she reached Kotri, bottle corks were broken and strewn all round. I too was offered a glass which, of course, I politely refused. One of them, a well-known Hindu member of the opposition, expressed his surprise and asked whether I was a Congressman to refuse to drink. I said I was Congress-minded although not a 4-anna member of the organisation. "So are we" was the ready response, "we do not mind the drink. Why should you?"

Even the law holds that a contract entered into over a glass of the drink which inebriates is void. No wonder, Ghulam Hussain had the surprise of his life next day. It was not that the Muslim members forgot the promise they had given the Premier. They remembered it all right albeit the bellyful of whisky with which they swore over the *Koran* to stand by Ghulam Hussain. The only trouble was that the other party had also arranged to meet them and supply them with whisky too. The *Koran* was not forgotten either. Impartially, the Muslim members swore to the other side that they would stand by it.

That Ghulam Hussain was flabbergasted would be a gross understatement. He told the Governor in so many words that the M.L.A's did not understand politics and that their verdict could not count. On the other hand, Lancelot Graham's position was equally clear. He knew, none better, that counting of heads and not of sense was the soul of democracy or what passed for one under the Government of India Act (1935). This much credit should be given Lancelot Graham—that he was honest enough to enforce his gubernatorial will and refused to be influenced by extraneous considerations.

Allah Baksh was then sworn in as Sind Premier. A more honest man was difficult to find in the whole of Sind. He had not had very much of education. Although for a term or two before the partition of Sind he had been a member of the Bombay Legislative Council, he had seen very little of India and known much less of its geography or history. One day he

asked Hatim Alavi while at lunch whether Bengal was not between Delhi and Lucknow. But with all his shortcomings, he made an excellent Premier. He understood the constitution and its implications as if he had been a constitutional lawyer. He had robust commonsense. He rarely lost his temper. Of shrewdness, as Lancelot Graham once told me, he had more than plenty. He might not be able to make a good draft in English but he was sufficiently well-versed in the art of diplomacy. He would never trust an I.C.S. official to make his drafts for him although he made the tin gods of the civil service believe that Allah Baksh was their best friend in whose hands their interests were safe enough. He employed a personal secretary whose business it was to make drafts according to his instruction. Let no one believe that a draft merely on the ground that it had been made by a literary genius, passed muster with Allah Baksh. Nothing of the kind. By sheer experiences he had learned the meaning and significance of particular expressions. He would insist on a correction here or a transposition there and the result was that the change invariably made for better 'copy', to use a journalistic expression.

Allah Baksh's principal mistake was his choice of Nihchaldas C. Vazirani as his Hindu colleague. If the new Premier selected him for his ministry, he had good cause. Nihchaldas played a prominent part in turning out the Ghulam Hussain Ministry. As a political intriguer Nihchaldas had few equals in any country. He was just a police court legal practitioner who managed to come out victorious in the general election. He knew how to appeal to the fear complex of the Hindus who were slowly persuaded to pay homage to the theory that Nihchaldas had been specially ordained by a merciful Providence to guide and lead them to victory. This superstition which was broadcast by the *Sind Observer* of which he was a director bred a belief in the Muslim mind that, if they should have Hindu co-operation, Nihchaldas Vazirani's co-operation was inevitable and necessary. Let it not be supposed that Nihchaldas was a communalist. He was no more one than

was his *bete noire*, Ghulam Hussain. If communalism served Ghulam Hussain's interest well, it served Nihchaldas's interests even better. Like Ghulam Hussain, he was fond of office. But while Ghulam Hussain's chances of office were slender if a particular ministry fell, Nihchaldas's were unaffected. As the belief had been generated in political circles that Nihchaldas was an inevitable addition to a ministry intent on success, every ministry, whatever its political hue, was anxious to secure Nihchaldas's co-operation. But the price of Nihchaldas's co-operation was a place in the ministry. Whether it was a League Ministry or anti-Jinnah ministry, Nihchaldas was sure of his place in it. Thus, for instance, both Moulana Abul Kalam Azad and Muhammad Ali Jinnah expressed their wonder how Nihchaldas could manage to squeeze himself in as if he were the greatest common measure or the least common multiple in any ministerial sum in legislative arithmetic.

When he joined the Allah Baksh ministry, Nihchaldas had hoped that he would be the boss of the show for all practical purposes. But while he took no pains to repudiate this impertinent notion, Allah Baksh, nevertheless, did nothing to dispel it. The Premier consulted him all right. But he did not always abide by the advice. The ambitious mind of Nihchaldas rebelled against this state of things. So from inside the ministry he started intriguing against Allah Baksh. The *Sind Observer* followed suit and faithfully painted Allah Baksh in dark colours. It was not necessary for my friend, the late Mr. K. Punniah, its talented editor, that anything that he advocated should have even a pale semblance of truth. To him Nihchaldas was truth. To be more precise, Punniah was a helpless slave at the hands of a masterful Mr. Nihchaldas. Not being very popular with his directors who were constantly dissatisfied with his conduct of the paper, Punniah argued his position this way. Even if he was unpopular with them, it was unlikely that the directors would muster sufficient courage to do him any harm so long as he was the lucky recipient of Nihchaldas's confidence. In Sind, the practice used to be—I earnestly hope it has changed now—that, so long as a person was in the enjoyment

of office, you should always decide to agree with him, although the honoured official knew that the moment he stepped out of office, even his spaniel would not take notice of him. Knowing this trait in Sindhi character, Punniyah boldly constituted himself as the unofficial publicity officer of his friend and patron, Nihchaldas C. Vizirani whom, before he rose to office, he used to call by his name but always thereafter he consciously "sirred" him in a tone and manner which might cause considerable embarrassment to any other person than Nihchaldas C. Vazirani. It used to be said of Lord Curzon that he kept time to two longitudes—one of London and the other of Calcutta. But Nihchaldas improved on this formula and as minister he saw to it that his time was accurate to the Nihchaldas longitude and that time was the time which Punniyah should adopt. The directors of the paper contented themselves by appointing an editorial committee of which Nihchaldas was one to whet the leading articles from day to day.

This arrangement served Nihchaldas's interests perfectly because Nihchaldas could make and break ministries at will and always ensure a place for himself in any ministry which succeeded the defeated one. But, alas, this was the beginning of the end so far as Sind Hindus were concerned. Although I was the editor of a rival paper in Karachi, I once pleaded with the directors of the *Sind Observer* in a friendly way that they could not eat the cake and have it too and that, if, as they professed, they were out to protect the cause of the Hindus in Sind, they must weigh things well and do nothing which would inevitably strengthen the hands of the Muslim League which, luckily, was yet far from being popular with the Muslims of Sind. The value of my disinterested advice was realized by them only six months after Pakistan had become a settled fact.

Now, in the year 1940, history repeated itself and Allah Baksh's ministry fell. All the old tactics were repeated to perfection. The only constant factor in the Sind Assembly was the Congress-cum-Hindu block which could muster a strength of a little over a third of the popular House. One of the 60 members being the Speaker of the House, the actual majority

with which to turn out a ministry was barely 30. Among the Hindus Mr. Daulatram, ex-district judge and ex-minister in the Ghulam Hussain Ministry always voted for the ministry in the last instance. The Hindu votes were just 22 excluding Mr. Daulatram who must not be confused with Jairamdas Daulatram. All they needed to test their strength against a ministry in office would be no more than eight votes or ten from the other side. Unfortunately, the fluid element in the Muslim camp was always ready to offer its votes for any decent consideration. The highest bidder managed always to win.

The Congress party in the Sind Assembly discovered that it could play a vital part in the constant intrigues of Assembly politics. Two of its leading members, Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani and Prof. Ghanshyam, were resentful of Allah Baksh's mounting popularity with the Congress high command and Mahatma Gandhi. This was something which they had not anticipated while they helped Allah Baksh succeed Ghulam Hussain. Disappointed by the discovery that Allah Baksh wielded greater influence with the Congress high command, they hated him and made common cause with the Muslim Leaguers to unseat the hated man by every means in their power. They thought they could kill two birds with a single stone. Allah Baksh of course was one. The other was my good, old friend, P. N. Mehta, the Karachi manager of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company, who was a sort of unofficial intermediary between Mahatma Gandhi and Allah Baksh. Wardha in those days attached more importance to P. N. Mehta's disinterested reports than to the Congress party in Sind or the Hindu Mahasabha's organ, the *Sind Observer*. It must be said to the credit of Nihchaldas, Choithram, Ghanshyam and Punniyah that they managed to push Allah Baksh out of office and nearly succeeded in discrediting P. N. Mehta in other quarters. But both of them survived the shock then. Alas, however, the fall of the Allah Baksh ministry brought to the surface all the worst elements in human character. The only man to gloat over this misfortune was Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah.

SIND'S FIRST LEAGUE MINISTRY

Allah Baksh's exit was entirely due to intrigue, the main responsibility for which should be shouldered by the Hindus led by Nihchaldas Vazirani and the Congress party led by Choithram P. Gidwani and Prof. Ghanshyam. The Sind legislators knew the immensity of their power and used it whenever opportunity occurred and without regard for consequences. They played with the devil and were at last consumed by the devil.

There is an *Upanishadic* story which I often used to relate to Karachi audiences those days to illustrate the politics of Sind.

An ambitious fool was once told by his neighbour that, if only he could get a devil to serve him, he could easily become the king of all earth. The fool went to the nearest forest and came across a great Rishi. He prostrated before him and begged him to confer a boon on him.

The Rishi assented and asked what he desired.

The fool replied, "I want a devil to serve me."

The wise seer warned the fool against the dangers. He said, "My dear, the devil will obstruct your spiritual evolution. It would eat you up if it was not satisfied with your treatment."

Mistaking this expostulation for unwillingness to carry out a word of honour, the fool told the Rishi: "Well, Sir, if you won't give me a devil, I shall cut my throat and die in your very presence."

The Rishi was overwhelmed by his inability to convince the fool. "Each fellow must suffer his own *karma*." So saying he called for a devil and handed him over to the supplicant fool. But he warned the fool: "My dear boy, this devil will obey you. But be sure to keep him constantly busy. If ever you fail to give him orders, beware, he will eat you up alive."

"Oh, Sir is that all? Do not worry. I shall keep the fellow busy all right," said the fool and took the devil along with him.

Before reaching home, he wanted to test the devil's power.

Espying a large tract of waste land, the fool turned to the devil and said: "Let us have a beautiful palace here with all the conveniences appertaining to royalty."

He had not closed his lips when the most beautiful palace of his dream danced before his naked eye.

The poor fellow was flabbergasted. He said: "Let us have a fine and populous city round about."

In less than a minute, there was a city.

"Now, what about a population?" he asked.

In another second, the city was buzzing with life.

The fool then said: "I shall be king of this city. Let me have a crown and queen."

But the devil would not let him admire the new creation, for already before the fool, was the prettiest princess awaiting to be embraced by the king-to-be, and she had a dazzling crown in her hands.

This agreeable sight made the fool look more foolish. Again the devil interrupted and asked: "What next?"

He gave one order, then a second, a third, a fourth, a fifth and so on *ad infinitum* but in less than five minutes all his ambitions had been literally fulfilled and he could not think of any more.

But the devil said: "If you do not keep me busy, I shall kill you."

The poor fellow was frightened. In his fright he forgot all his ambitions. The princess, the crown, the palace and the kingship that was waiting—all these appeared insignificant to him. So to save his very life, he doubled up to the forest again and found himself at the Rishi's feet. The saint looked round and discovered the devil closely on the fool's heels.

Realising the situation without being told, the Rishi called the devil and pointed to a dog sleeping near by and said: "Now, straighten out the dog's tail and come back quick for fresh orders."

The devil tried for twelve hours but in vain. He returned to the Rishi and said: "Release me from my obligation and I shall call off the contract."

Jinnah got for Sind a legislature all right. But the legislature proved a devil to those unaccustomed to the implications of democracy.

Well, by kicking Allah Baksh out, Nihchaldas, Choithram and Ghanshyam got the devil of the Muslim League to taunt them and challenge them.

Mir Bundehali Khan Talpur, a scion of the ancient Mirs of Sind, now a wealthy and prosperous Jagirdar, was called to form the ministry. Mir Sahib is a very honest man. But he was too fond of the pleasures of life to worry about office or ministership. Anyhow, the Leaguers succeeded in persuading him to agree to be elected their leader. Now, the one thing which Mir Sahib would not do was to sign the League creed which, it would be recalled, had by this time, definitely committed itself to Pakistan. Mir Sahib was accepted as leader without his having to pay formal homage to the League.

And then a League ministry was formed. The most outstanding members of this Mir Cabinet were Sheikh Abdul Majid, Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro and G. M. Syed. It goes without saying that Nihchaldas was there too. Hindus in the interior of Sind conferred on Nihchaldas the spontaneous title of "Pir". Nihchaldas himself enjoyed being called Pir Nihchaldas. An irrepressible fellow, he laughed out this scorn.

The Mir Ministry had an easy time of it. It came after the 1940 budget and expired before the 1941 budget. It might have faced the legislature successfully but for the rumours of corruption and bribery. Sir Lancelot himself was not tired of running down his ministers to every visitor who called on him.

Nobody whispered the slightest to Mir Sahib's disadvantage. The Mir was too fond of opium and his harem to worry about money of which he had enough and to spare. A deputy collector who was his secretary made a neat pile in his name. But one may be sure that Mir Sahib himself was blissfully ignorant of this transaction—indeed of any transaction within or without the ministry.

Sheikh Abdul Majid who was finance minister of the Mir

Government was a Muslim Leaguer all right but not a devotee of Jinnah. He had the knack of calling a spade a spade. No one suspected him of bribe taking because even as a minister he did not mind travelling by a tramcar or omnibus. He was far too much of a philosopher to take the ministry seriously. Ever prepared to vacate the place which came to him by fluke, he was ready to embrace the life of poverty which he had always known. He encouraged no visitors and there was no question of his taking any bribe. Of Sheikh Abul Majid I shall have something very special to say in a later chapter.

G. M. Syed about whom also I may have to devote more than one chapter was the education minister of the League Government. He was the most restless person in the ministry. An idealist to the core, he was itching for reforms in every direction. Like Krishna Ballabh Sahay of the Bihar ministry, Syed believed in action, not in mere words. How over the zamindari issue he became unpopular with his own party leaders should be reserved to a later chapter. Syed of course was far too respectable to think of bribe which nobody would have the courage of offering to him. As education minister he threw a bomb-shell on the Hindu public. He promoted a scheme which insisted that the medium of teaching in Sind would be Sindhi. This proposal was not half so innocent as it would appear. It threatened to extinguish the entire population of Gujeratis, Marwaris and Maharashtrians who formed the majority of the population of Karachi and had made the capital of Sind the rich and wealthy city which it was. To say that Syed was anti-Hindu would be to sacrifice truth for logic. But that his programme, if successful, would eliminate all Hindus, be they Sindhis or non-Sindhis, could admit of no doubt. The trouble about Syed was that nobody in the ministry would take him seriously although he was the only person amongst his colleagues, who enjoyed the unqualified confidence of M. A. Jinnah who, if he had any love for any human being, gave all of it to Syed in those days. As we would see in a subsequent chapter, this love evaporated on both sides.

About Khuhro, of course, there were different versions as there were about Nihchaldas. But there is no doubt that Khuhro was the strongest man of the Mir Ministry and the ablest parliamentarian on the floor of the Sind Assembly. So as not to invade the region of what in the very nature of things must be treated in a separate chapter, let us hold our souls in patience for yet a while about Khuhro.

But Khuhro and Syed were far too strong and individualistic to serve Nihchaldas's purpose. Among the Hindus of Sind there was an uproar. Nihchaldas was far too long with this ministry whose policies he could not influence. So he decided that the Mir Ministry of which he was a live limb should share the fate of the Allah Baksh ministry.

As usual, the *Sind Observer* fired the first shot. The orgy of murders and dacoities in the Province was by no means a novel feature. It might be said that it was a normal feature, although professional criminals were really afraid of Ghulam Hussain and Allah Baksh who were too strong to bend. Newspapers which hitherto winked at these murders and dacoities were told to serve their clientele by exposing the state of lawlessness in the country. Nihchaldas's greatest achievement of this period was his successful advocacy with the Karachi Chamber of Commerce which, at his instance, published a memorandum which, for sheer literary merit and exposition of the implications of democracy, was unrivalled. In fact, I was amongst those who wrote strongly welcoming this memorandum in my paper, the *Daily Gazette*.

I had said that the *Sind Observer* fired the first shot. It set the ball rolling, Nihchaldas being the captain of the team represented by Punniah's paper, "Govern or Get out" was the caption of a really able and highly argumentative article which Punniah wrote on the occasion. It was designed to bring the Mir administration into contempt.

In the meanwhile Mir Bundejali Khan Talpur was quietly resting in his opium den. Even when the League daily in the Sindhi language approached him for an interview so as to put something into his mouth, its representative found Mir Sahib

dozing and incapable of discussing anything serious. If you attacked Mir Sahib, he did not mind it at all. All he cared for was to be left alone with his opium and his bevy of pretty girls.

Sir Lancelot Graham himself was heartily tired of the ministry by this time. He had fallen in love with Allah Baksh in the days of the latter's Premiership. So the Governor of Sind did his bit to discredit the Mir ministry although he did his job within strictly constitutional limits.

The story of the rise and fall of the Mir Ministry would read like a fable of the Arabian Nights. But before going further into the subject, we must deal with the general situation in the country at the time with particular reference to Moulana Abul Kalam Azad's historic mission to Karachi—a mission which, by all accounts, was a perfect and unqualified success.

VII

LUCK COMES JINNAH'S WAY

The year 1940 was a trying year for India. The Congress went into the wilderness, having relinquished office in the provinces as a protest against the British Government's general attitude in the wake of the war with Hitler. Neville Chamberlain resigned in England and was succeeded by Churchill who was destined to lose India for Britain. Churchill's accession to power brought about a dramatic change in Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India. This nobleman who had pretended all these days as a friend of India and attempted to cultivate Mahatma Gandhi suddenly changed front. His attitude to the Congress suddenly stiffened. Power intoxicates even saints. Linlithgow was most certainly not a saint. In any case he had not come out to this country for his spiritual salvation but to strengthen the roots of British rule.

It was Sir Bamfylde Fuller, a former Lieutenant-governor of Bengal, who likened the Hindu and the Muslim to two wives of whom the younger one, the Muslim, was the favourite. Under orders from Whitehall, Linlithgow put into practice this virtue of doubtful moral value. But we must not forget two essential things. One was that *divide et impera* was a settled policy of Britain in India. Secondly, the Englishman who was a past master in the science of escapology could always argue to himself and satisfy himself that he did everything on principle. If he murdered Charles I he did it on principle. He impeached Warren Hastings on principle and on principle again he retained for himself all the looted property which had been removed to England. Bred in an atmosphere which believed that all was fair in politics as in love and war, it was no surprise that Linlithgow revealed even to Gandhiji the iron hand behind the velvet glove.

An additional glove to the already gloved hand was already ready with which to greet Jinnah. The Quaid-e-Azam had just demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims. The word

Pakistan had not yet been officially coined. Linlithgow started wooing Jinnah. That the Viceroy exploited Jinnah could admit of no doubt. But another feature of this transaction has not received the attention it deserved. Jinnah, if he created the belief in the official mind that he had allowed himself to be exploited, made conscious and successful attempts to exploit officialdom and its high priest, the occupant of the viceregal chair. To Jinnah the Congress was an obstacle to the realisation of his ambition. With the Congress out of the picture he hoped for a new heaven and a new earth of which he would be padushah, the rest of the world paying court to him. Circumstances played into his hands. He was not going to lose the opportunity. He began to talk in Congress phraseology; he issued edicts to provinces to reorganise the provincial Muslim League and get ready to form League ministries.

His reasons were obvious. In the Punjab he could not persuade Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to change the nomenclature of his ministry from one of Unionist to League. Fazlul Huq in Bengal had as strong a personality as Jinnah and could not be depended on to play the role of an obedient and unquestioning slave. The North West Frontier kept Jinnah miles and miles away from Peshawar; it was too Congress-minded to look at Jinnah. Of the four Muslim provinces in India, one was definitely inimical to him; two were indifferent and just tolerated him. Sind as a chessboard offered potentialities, undefined but big. But he did not know how to proceed in the matter. He was indeed in a fix.

It was precisely at this time that the Sind Assembly Congress party generously made way for the Quaid-e-Azam's invasion of Sind. Jinnah had to wage no battle. But luck favoured him and one fine morning he heard that a League ministry had been installed in Sind. Now he could play the high command to the Sind ministry. I have a notion that Jinnah had always a soft heart for the Sind Congressmen who solved his difficulties for him. He also accepted their title of Pakistan to shout in Hitler's language. From then onward, he began to shout in Hitler's language. He constituted himself as a *fuehrer*.

Ordinarily the British Government would have suppressed his presumption. But at this moment it suited their war policy to let Jinnah ride the high horse. Nor would it surprise those who could remember that this very British Government raised the communist party in India and hugged and kissed it and left it loose on the Indian world—all this in the holy name of war. The one person who most benefited by this policy of Britain was the august Quaid-e-Azam.

If the Sind Congress party had any sense left in it, it should have gone out of the way to keep Allah Baksh in power. But Jairamdas Daulatram had no softness for Allah Baksh who would not kneel before him. So, poor Allah Baksh went out of office. This drama deeply offended that realist and statesman, Vallabhbhai Patel, who, in a moment of anger, called Sind a small province with small men and smaller brains. Few Sindhis were scandalised by this brutal description of their character. In fact, groups of Sindhis could be found in every street corner, admiring the commendable candour of the Sardar.

The Congress high command was greatly worried. Gandhiji was already talking in terms of his individual civil disobedience movement and was only waiting for the verdict of his inner voice. But the high command was anxious that Sind Congress politics should not be a deadweight on the parent body at a critical moment. After a great deal of anxious discussion it decided to depute Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President, to Sind to bring about unity amongst the people of the province.

Now, Moulana Sahib arrived at Karachi on December 13, 1940, the very day on which Mr. K. Srinivasan inaugurated the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference in New Delhi as an answer to Sir Reginald Maxwell's arrogant challenge. On account of Moulana Sahib's visit, I had to cancel my proposed trip to Delhi; I nominated A. S. Iyengar to deputise for me.

Just a fortnight before Moulana Sahib's visit, Mr. Jinnah also had paid a visit to Karachi. Sindhis vied with one another in making the Quaid-e-Azam's visit a grand national festival. The Karachi Corporation voted an address and a civic reception

One of the most crowded public meetings did him honour at the Khalikdina Hall where, probably for the first time in his life, he addressed the meeting in what Hatim Alavi jokingly called Jinnah's Urdu. Jinnah was entertained to tea by the Sind Premier, Mir Bundeali Khan Talpur. Acting on certain information, the source of which I would not disclose even today, I published a story the next morning in the *Daily Gazette* saying that Mir Sahib had signed the League creed and joined the Muslim League as a full-fledged member but the fact was, by mutual agreement, to be kept a secret. Mir Sahib was angry with me but when I offered to contradict the version on his written authority, he kept quiet. Jinnah tried to worm it out of me how I managed to tumble into the secret but without success.

It was at this time that Moulana Sahib came to Karachi. Be it said to the credit of the Sindhis that they gave the Congress President an equally magnificent reception and ovation. Moulana Sahib was the guest of Lalji Mehrotra at whose house he received many a deputation from all and sundry. The most prominent among them was the Sind Provincial Muslim League of which Sir Abdoolla Haroon was President. But Sir Abdoolla was not then in Karachi. He had gone to the Middle East.

Moulana Sahib discussed Sind politics with all parties concerned individually and then collectively. I too had the good fortune to be summoned by the Moulana to give some evidence on a particular point. Those who held conversations with him were, amongst others, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah, Allah Baksh, Mir Bundeali Khan Talpur, G. M. Syed, Sheikh Abdul Majid, M. A. Khuhro, M. H. Gazder, Nihchaldas C. Vazirani, Dr. Choithram, B. T. Thakur, Seth Partabdas and Rao Bahadur Shiv Ratan Mohatta.

Probably the reader would like to know the significance of the talks by the Congress President with the last three of the above-named persons. These three gentlemen represented the Sind Hindu Panchayat, a most powerful body among Sind Hindus. Thakur, Partabdas and Mohatta held that the Hindus of Sind should make no attempt to exploit the divisions

in the Muslim camp and that they should even go further and promote unity in the Muslim camp if Hindu interests were to be secured. This was a sensible view to take and incidentally it coincided with my own with which luckily for me, my proprietor, Hoshang N. E. Dinshaw was in whole-hearted agreement. Just a brief mention here of Hoshang. He is the senior partner of the well-known firm of Eduljee Dinshaw. His paternal uncle F. E. Dinshaw's name ought to be familiar to Congress stalwarts as a friend of Mahatma Gandhi. Hoshang was not a politician but his heart was very sound. About this Nature's own prince, I shall say something later on.

As a result of his talks with the several interests which interviewed him, Moulana Abul Kalam Azad came to the following conclusions:

(1) If the Congress started any direct action, Sind was to be exempted from its operative part:

(2) The Sind ministry should be reconstituted and be composed of six ministers of whom two would be League Muslims, two non-League Muslims and two non-Muslims:

(3) So as to hold the scales even between all parties, the Premier should be a non-League Muslim:

(4) Adequate measures should be taken by the ministry to restore law and order in the province; and

(5) Under the auspices of the ministry, an intensive Hindu-Muslim unity campaign should be undertaken and the Government budget should make a special allotment therefor.

These conclusions which were known as the Congress President's Award were embodied in a document known as the Azad Pact. The signatories to this pact were Mir Sahib, Khuhro, G. M. Syed, Nihchaldas, Ghulam Hussain and Allah Baksh. A schedule to the pact guaranteed Congress support to the ministry based on this formula. Sheikh Abdul Majid agreed to the Pact but declined to sign on the ground that Sir Abubakar Haroon, the Provincial League Chief, had a right to be consulted in advance. As Haroon was away, he did not put his signature although he promised support.

Then came the question which of the two four League

Muslims were to make room for two non-League Muslims. G. M. Syed spontaneously gave it in writing on the spot that he would resign. Sheikh Abdul Majid who, again did not sign any formal document, also agreed to retire in the interests of Muslim unity as a guarantee of security to the provincial minorities.

The reason why the Congress President decided to keep the Sind Congressmen out of any direct action programme was noble. He did not want it to be said that the Congress exploited Sind politics with any ulterior motive. Moreover, he realised, and said so, that to drag Sind into the vortex of direct action would be tantamount to suicide for that young province in whose interest alone the award and the pact had been conceived. Then one evening, Moulana Sahib addressed a public meeting and, although he did not reveal the terms of the pact, every one knew that something had been done to ensure peace and order in the province.

I had an unofficial copy of this agreement which, although I had promised not to divulge, I had to publish on January 20, 1941 in circumstances which would be related in the next chapter.

Sir Lancelot Graham was anxious to meet Moulana Sahib and offered to send him an invitation if he would but agree to accept it. My effort to persuade Moulana Sahib proved futile. Sir Ghulam Hussain fared no better. In the circumstances, Allah Baksh thought discretion to be the better part of valour and refrained from making any mention to the Congress President. I must say, however, that the one person who heartily welcomed the Pact was Sir Lancelot Graham.

VIII TRUTH, FIRST CASUALTY AS EVER

Jinnah's discomfiture on discovering the success that had attended Moulana Sahib's Sind mission knew no bounds. The Quaid-e-Azam who was in Delhi at the time literally lost his temper. Telegrams flew hither and thither. Sheikh Abdul Majid was amongst those who was asked to explain why, without previous consultation with the all highest, he had promised to sign the Azad Pact. Sheikh Sahib replied that he had not signed the pact. That was true enough. Khuhro was summoned to Delhi. He had to stand Jinnah's cross-examination for over three hours at a stretch and then dismissed for the day but only to come back the next day to stand another probe.

Khuhro stood his cross-examination well. He came out of the Quaid-e-Azam's room with a comfortable and satisfied smile playing on his lips.

Press correspondents who collared him could get little out of Khuhro who returned straight to Karachi without wasting a minute lest otherwise Jinnah should summon him again to his dreaded presence. Coming to Karachi he held urgent consultations with his friends. The object of the hurried consultations was made clear a day later. He wrote a letter to the *Daily Gazette* denying the existence of any such pact as the paper had reported.

Before publishing the letter, I inquired whether among Khuhro's consultants was G. M. Syed also. I was considerably relieved to know that he was not. For, Syed was not in Karachi at the time. Albeit his many faults, Syed enjoyed the reputation of speaking the truth fearlessly even if it had meant his personal ruin.

Then I ran up to Khuhro and asked him whether he seriously meant me to publish his denial of the very existence of the Azad Pact. He nodded in the affirmative.

Then I reminded him that, as a result of his earlier talk with

his ministerial colleagues, it was agreed that, in pursuance of the decision to have an all-parties ministry, Syed and Sheikh had offered to resign their ministerial positions and make room for two non-League Muslims.

Khuhro would not vouchsafe a straight answer. He said that it was for Syed and Sheikh to answer my question.

Thereupon, I ventured to ask him whether he had forgotten the fact that in pursuance of the agreement, Syed had already signed his resignation letter which was handed over to the Congress President.

Khuhro replied that he did not recognise my right to cross-question him.

I returned to my office crestfallen. Was I to publish Khuhro's letter or reject it? If I published it, I must release the terms of the Azad Pact which had been hitherto kept a close secret by common agreement. If I did not give it publicity, the *Daily Gazette's* reputation would suffer. On the basis of the existence of such a pact, I had already discussed and commended the principles on which it had rested.

Then I came to know that the *Sind Observer* also had received a copy of the letter addressed to the *Daily Gazette*. Khuhro evidently wanted to make sure that either of the two papers would publish it. After I left his house earlier in the evening, Khuhro decided to write to the *Sind Observer* too. He feared evidently that I might not give publicity to his letter.

My belief was that the *Sind Observer* would not even look at the letter because Khuhro had called false a document to which Nihchaldas himself had appended his signature. Punniah was keen on publishing it. His reasons were made clear to me later on. He really had no idea of the terms of the pact. Even Nihchaldas did not take his favourite editor into his confidence. The *Daily Gazette* had beaten the *Sind Observer* hollow during the Moulana's visit and given publicity to details which the latter paper had missed.

Then I went to Nihchaldas and told him: "Nihchaldas, the position is this. I want your permission to publish the terms of the pact although you had not given me a copy of it. The

fact is that, if I do not publish the pact tomorrow, newspaper readers in Sind would be prone to think that I had beguiled them with cock and bull stories all these weeks until Khuhro put the lid on what they would be entitled to consider a lying campaign in the name of scoops."

Nihchaldas was magnanimous though within circumscribed limits. He cross-examined me on the details of the pact. At the end of a 10-minute trial, he said: "I would neither confirm nor deny your assertions. I am not a director of the *Daily Gazette* and I cannot obviously prevent you from doing what you apparently consider your right and duty."

That was enough for me. I thanked him for his magnanimity and returned to my office where I had to burn midnight oil. The next morning the *Daily Gazette* together with Khuhro's statement gave a full recital of the genesis and growth of the disputed pact and released the pact in full, leaving it to the readers to choose between the P.W.D. Minister and my paper.

Incidentally, I disclosed another closely guarded secret. It was this. Pending the reconstitution of the Sind Cabinet on the lines of the Azad Pact, Mir Sahib had promised to appoint Allah Baksh as education minister in the place rendered vacant by Syed's resignation, thus giving partial satisfaction to the pact. At that time, the belief was that Sheikh Sahib's written resignation was only a matter of days or weeks at the most and that the Finance Minister would append his signature to the document after officially informing Sir Abdoolla Haroon soon after the latter's return from abroad. Later on, however, at the instance of Abdoolla Haroon, Sheikh Sahib declined to resign although he was ready to be dismissed.

The publication of the much discussed Azad Pact created a stir. People who did not know that Allah Baksh was coming back to the ministry were delighted. Allah Baksh himself was embarrassed. I had no time to consult him because he had returned to Shikarpur when Khuhro decided to throw a bomb-shell on an unsuspecting and unprepared public, just to oblige his leader. Let me say it in Khuhro's defence that by no

means he was the first offender in this respect to collapse before a stronger personality and deny all truth in self-defence. Eighteen years before Khuhro quailed in the august presence of his leader, another great personality in the Congress hierarchy, to save his own skin from a powerful and masterful personality greater than himself, threw me to the wolves by similarly repudiating an agreement between two rival factions in the Congress camp. Save Sarojini Naidu, M. A. Ansari, and Sardar Vallabhbhai, the others who had played a notable part in this drama are still happily alive. To Dr. Syed Mahmud's inherent love of fairplay I owed my complete and unequivocal vindication. So as not to embarrass Syed Mahmud, I shall not revive the memory of that scandal of 1923. In any case, it is not relevant to the present book.

Now, to resume the narrative. It should be remembered that Syed's resignation letter was not the only secret document in existence. Mir Sahib's written word that he was a full-fledged member of the Muslim League was kept a secret with Jinnah. If G. M. Syed did not repudiate the story of his resignation Mir Bundejali also did not dispute the correctness of his "voluntary" accession to the Muslim League.

Were that all, it would be easy. There was another complication. In the discussions between the Congress President and the Sind politicians, it was agreed that two Muslims should be of non-League persuasion in the provincial ministry. Allah Baksh and Ghulam Hussain were to represent the independent Muslims outside the League fold. Pending the formal resignation of Sheikh Sahib, a place was found for Allah Baksh in the place rendered vacant by Syed's resignation. What about Ghulam Hussain? Supposing that at the instance of the League bosses, Sheikh Sahib refused to come out of the ministry, what indeed was to be done to give effect to the conditions of the Azad Pact?

At this time, discussion centred round Mir Sahib's reported membership of the Muslim League. The Sind Premier was far too honourable to profit by any loophole and he offered to step out of the ministry if Sheikh Sahib stuck to it. In any

case, it was understood that before the budget session of 1941, Mir Bundeali would resign and Allah Baksh would get sworn in as Premier.

Early in March of that year, Sir Ghulam Hussain from the Opposition challenged the right of Mir Sahib to function as Premier. The Azad Pact, whatever its merits, had no constitutional significance. Nevertheless, the Mir was unnerved. He could not decide on the next step. Nihchaldas, in the meantime, quietly crossed the floor and took his seat with the Opposition. He was cheered by the Opposition and jeered at by the League benches. Mir Sahib had the House adjourned, went to the Governor and submitted his resignation for himself and the Cabinet as a whole.

The next day, Allah Baksh was sworn in as Prime Minister of Sind. Almost at once he announced the names of his colleagues. They were Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah (in charge of home portfolio), Pirzada Abdus Satar (P.W.D.), Pir Illahi Baksh (education), Nihchaldas Vazirani (revenue) and the Premier himself (finance). The sixth minister's place was still vacant. Left to himself, Allah Baksh would have preferred to take in Rustom K. Sidhwa who, like Satyamurti in Madras, had made a mark in the public life of Sind and had sacrificed everything in the Congress cause. But the Pact had laid down by implication that the Congress was not to join the ministry although it would give it every support. Thus Sidhwa had to deny himself the chance of a ministerial position.

Sir Abdoolla Haroon had returned from the Middle East by this time. He held telephonic conversations with Jinnah and as a result of the talk he issued a statement to the press challenging Sir Lancelot Graham's "impertinence" in taking the law into his own hands and appointing a non-League ministry on his own initiative and in violation of all constitutional propriety.

A brief *communiqué* from the Government House put the lid on the controversy. It narrated the circumstances in which Mir Bundeali submitted his resignation. It added that, as in duty bound, His Excellency asked Mir Sahib whether he was going to exercise his constitutional right of advising the

Governor and recommending his successor and Mir Sahib mentioned Allah Baksh's name. In conformity with constitutional usage and traditions, His Excellency invited Allah Baksh to form a council of ministers for him.

This straightward *communique* put Mir Bundchali Khan Talpur out of court with the Quaid-e-Azam and the rest of the Muslim League. That was because he did not tell them that it was at his instance that the Governor called Allah Baksh to form a new ministry. It was not that Mir Sahib deliberately hid the truth from them. It just did not strike him—not even when they were discussing the terms in which Abdoolla Haroon's statement was to be couched. The fact was that Mir Sahib was not conversant with the constitution or administration. Of either the one or the other he knew precious little. As a matter of fact, an ambitious deputy collector was ruling the province for Mir Sahib.

The next day Mir Sahib attended the Assembly and took his seat with the Opposition. It was discovered that even with his accession thereto the Muslim League party had barely ten members on its roll.

G. M. Syed was called upon by the Provincial League and the all-India high command to submit his explanation on pain of expulsion. But Syed stood his ground and braved his breast. He refused to resile from his position and stated that what he had done had been dictated entirely by consideration of Sind's welfare. The worst was by no means over. It was just to begin.

IX

LEAGUE IN A SULLEN MOOD

All the four Muslims in the second Allah Baksh ministry were non-Leaguers, although all of them excepting Allah Baksh became Leaguers later on, not because they were in sympathy with the League ideal but because of other circumstances in which they had to choose between the wilderness and office. But that is another story.

It was not Allah Baksh's mistake that the League was not represented in his Cabinet. The Premier tried his very best to coax the League party to nominate two representatives. G. M. Syed also strained every nerve to persuade the League to fall in line with the Azad Pact. But his efforts were unsuccessful. Jinnah had willed that the Azad Pact must be buried, lock, stock and barrel. If the Leaguers were permitted to join the new ministry, Jinnah's political prestige stood to suffer. The Quaid-e-Azam, therefore, sent an urgent message to Sir Abdoolla Haroon to be prepared to take every disciplinary action in case there was any attempt, overt or covert, to defy his mandate. I have reason to believe that Khuhro and Gazder resented this unreasonable attitude of the Muslim League fuhrer but they were helpless.

About Khuhro's attitude I heard from himself one day in the Sind Secretariat corridors. Curiously enough, I came to know of Gazder's reactions from Jinnah. One day when I chanced to meet Jinnah in Delhi, he asked me certain questions in the belief that I was probably behind a letter that he had received from somebody in Karachi. Once satisfied that I was genuinely ignorant of what precisely he was driving at, he explained the position. According to the Quaid-e-Azam, Gazder was not at all satisfied with Jinnah's mandate. He somehow wanted to come to an agreement with Mahatma Gandhi and he urged Jinnah not to lose time in promoting Hindu-Muslim unity.

"Well, Mr. Jinnah," I pointed out, "I understand all this

Where exactly do I come in? You appeared to have a notion that I was behind it. Not that I am ashamed of any move calculated to promote Hindu-Muslim unity which to me is second religion. But what I cannot understand is the veiled insinuation which I observed in your tone before your recital of the contents of Gazder's letter."

Jinnah thawed for once and replied: "My dear fellow, this chap, Gazder, suggested to me, that my friend Mr. Sharma should be asked to approach Mr. Gandhi and bring about a meeting between him and me. I naturally wondered whether you had inspired the letter as your name was mentioned in it."

That was news to me. Immediately on my return to Karachi, I met Gazder who was then occupying the city's mayoral chair. He confirmed Jinnah's version and added that Jinnah's answer to him was polite but evaded the issue.

I looked into Jinnah's letter which merely told "my dear Gazder" that the Quaid-e-Azam was sensible of the soundness of the proposal and that, when the time came, he would not hesitate to contact Gandhiji and even summon Mr. Sharma if necessary.

There is an impression among many Hindus that Gazder was their enemy. This notion is not justified by facts. Of his innate sense of fairness he gave ample evidence during his ministership when he presided over the home portfolio.

Now, just before the constitution of the new Allah Baksh ministry, Pir Illahi Baksh issued a statement to the press challenging Jinnah's right to speak in the name of Sind Muslims and claiming for Allah Baksh a position of equality with the Quaid-e-Azam, his claim being that, if Jinnah was the President of the All-India Muslim League, he (Allah Baksh) was the President of the Nationalist Muslim Conference. Coming to know of this statement from the Associated Press, Allah Baksh who never believed in bluff and bluster or rudeness motored to Illahi Baksh's house and persuaded him to withdraw the offensive references to Jinnah. The statement which appeared the next morning was different from the original manuscript submitted by the new education minister.

The public, of course, did not know of the change. Even newspapermen did not know the reason behind the eleventh hour amendment.

Well, the reason was this. Allah Baksh was anxious that the door must still be kept open for the League to come into the ministry. According to A. K. Iyengar who was with Allah Baksh at the time when he was talking to Illahi Baksh, Allah Baksh was prepared to resign his ministership and persuade Pirzada Abdus Satar to follow suit so that there would be two League Muslims on the ministry to counterbalance the non-League Muslims. This arrangement suited Illahi Baksh all right. Illahi Baksh thought that, in that case, he would be the Sind Premier. He never even thought it possible that the old man, Sir Ghulam Hussain might be the probable choice in the event of a reshuffle.

Almost the first thing which Allah Baksh did on assuming the Premiership of Sind was to constitute a Unity Board. I had the honour to be invited to serve on it. Our Chairman was Jamshed Nusserwanji, a disciple of Annie Besant and a devotee of Gandhiji. Many people in India do not know the greatness of Jamshed. He is a real yogi in the true sense of the term. Born with a silver spoon in the mouth, he nevertheless spent all his time and money in relieving the indigent and the sick of their suffering. An 8-anna partner in a prosperous firm, he had already mortgaged his future claims also. Every available pie went to charity. Jamshed's idea of charity is curious. No one who goes to him shall return empty handed or disappointed. He does not even pause to discover whether one who solicits his help has recited a genuine case. If you did not find him in his office or at home, you could be certain of catching Jamshed in the infectious diseases hospital or the leper asylum. Jamshed is a radiator of joy all round. You have to be with him just for five minutes and you may be sure that all your pessimism and cynicism would vanish as the dew before the morning sun. This universal friend of everybody was the chairman of the Unity Board. But the Unity Board's life was short. That was because of many a factor, not the least

of which was the new Governor, Sir Hugh Dow, who had come to Karachi to widen the gulf between the two communities in the interests of British imperialism. A narrow-minded person every inch of him, who could not see beyond the nose, Dow was the last person that should have been sent to take over the governorship of a young province which needed sympathy and understanding. Dow was no neutral. He was worse. He was intolerant and oftentimes vulgar. He had his instructions to weaken Allah Baksh and the Congress. He did both. By a sheer coincidence, the Congress Party in Sind did not also believe in the mission of the Unity Board. The Leaguers were out of it. Dow was the third point of the eternal triangle. I shall have much to say about Dow at a later stage.

Almost the very first person with whom Allah Baksh came into conflict as soon as he took the reins of administration in his hands was the then chief judge of the Sind Chief Court who insulted everybody right and left in the name of judicial independence. He fancied himself as the special messenger of God to relieve this country from the tentacles of the misguided folks who thought that in political liberty lay their salvation. He was an I.C.S. man. He was responsible for the queer theory that criticism of even an executive order made by a judge would constitute contempt of court. This man was honoured by Sir Ghulam Hussain in the days of his first ministry. Sir Ghulam had been an advocate of the Chief Court. But Allah Baksh was made of a different mould. He would not humiliate any person on earth but he was far too proud to submit to any humiliation at any other person's hands, be he so high as the chief judge himself.

Now the question arose who should appoint the public prosecutor and the Government pleader. The Chief Judge held it was his prerogative. Allah Baksh thought, and very rightly so, that a judge had no manner of connection with the appointment of a Government advocate any more than he could dictate to any private party whom alone he should employ as his pleader in that court. The *Sind Observer*, ever ready to have a fling at Allah Baksh, upheld the Chief Judge's contention.

The *Daily Gazette* supported the Prime Minister's stand but added that no great harm would ensue if the chief judge was consulted as a matter of courtesy rather than as one of obligation. Then arose the question who should call on whom first. Allah Baksh consulted many including me. I said that the usual practice was for the ministers first to call on the judges who would be bound then to return the call. But the chief judge had other notions. I shall not repeat here the story of the controversy but soon the chief judge learned that rudeness and presumptuousness did not always pay. When one day I wrote in my paper that Sir Victor Coutts Trotter, a former Chief Justice of Madras, used to call on the Law and Judicial Member of the Madras Government whenever he had any business with him and the reverse was the case when the Government spokesman had anything to transact with the Chief Justice, the Sind Chief thought and told a friend that mine was an inspired article. As was usual with him, he jumped into what, I told him later on, was an uncorroborated and untenable conclusion. Then one day I had the satisfaction of seeing the Chief Judge send his card to Allah Baksh waiting for an interview.

In Karachi there was a yellow sheet known as the *New Sind*. It used to thrive on unmentionable scandals. Its editor M. U. Ahbasi who was pronounced a blackmailer by the Sind Chief Court enjoyed the private confidence of the Chief Judge who often gave him interviews and encouraged him to write and assert that every other minister was a corrupt man and should be dismissed from office. Making himself odious in the eyes of every interest in Karachi, the Chief Judge was the lowliest person in the Capital of Sind. Sir Godfrey Davis—that was the Chief Judge's name—was anxious to have a contempt of court act in Sind. I was one of those who felt that such an enactment in Sind would expose the new paper press to Juhalid zulum. I had the satisfaction of preventing such a measure from being placed on the statute book so long as Sir Godfrey was the Chief Judge of that Court. I must say one word about Ahbasi before I finish this part of my narration. He was a

great believer in Hindu-Muslim Unity. As a friend he could be and was, a "brick".

The budget of 1941 was a League budget prepared by Sheikh Abdul Majid before his exit. The Leaguers did not move any cut motion. On the whole it was a peaceful session. But outside the legislature, everything was being done to discredit Allah Baksh and his administration. The person who had undertaken this task of discrediting Allah Baksh was my friend, Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi, now editor of the *Sind Observer*. Rashdi and I have been very intimate friends. But I can never forgive him for his concentrated propaganda of hate to the disadvantage of a really saintly person like Allah Baksh. Rashdi is the cousin of the late Pir of Pagaro, the leader of the Hurs, who was hanged by the British in the name of law. He is the rightful heir to the Hur *gadi*. But there was not much love lost between the two cousins. As a matter of fact, for the protection of Rashdi, the Government of Sind has given him an armed bodyguard. Without the benefit of college education, Rashdi is a first rate scholar in the English language and literature. His animated conversational powers were unrivalled. But somehow, Rashdi had taken it into his head to run down Allah Baksh. Yet, by that time, Rashdi had broken away from Jinnah, as we would see later on. The *Sind Observer* of Punniah which had not much love for Rashdi, suddenly developed a *flair* for toleration and extended its columns to Rashdi to air his views against Allah Baksh. The propaganda which had been started by the Muslim League resulted in anti-Allah Baksh groups in almost every village in Sind. Allah Baksh was described as a *kaffir*, a hireling of the enemies of Islam. Yet Allah Baksh did little to combat this nefarious campaign.

A COLOURFUL PERSONALITY

Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi is a colourful, lively and lovable personality. Nothing which he does not know of Sind is worth knowing. He can be a deadly foe. But if he swears his friendship for you, you may depend on him to save you at the cost of his own life. He is a fairly well-to-do person and owns some considerable land in his own right. A spendthrift, he is always needy. But this Omar Khyyam is no beggar. Politicians dreaded him in those days because he knew all their weaknesses. Unlike Abbasi, Rashdi never cashed his knowledge of embarrassing things. Proud of his birth and parentage, Rashdi instinctively abhors pettiness or meanness. He is an intellectual, a historian, a writer and journalist, a first class sportsman, an admirable rifle shot. Had he been the Premier of Sind, he could have succeeded in welding together all the conflicting elements of Sind's political life. His persuasive logic would make a convert of any perverse man to Rashdi's own way of thinking. There is another trait in Rashdi's character. If you went to him for the elucidation of some point which had eluded your diligent inquiry, he would readily put you wise without seeking to colour your judgment or injecting his own prejudices unto you.

Syed who too, like him, staked his by no means small landed interest in a very rich part of Sind. Khuhro is one of the biggest landholders of Sind. That he and Rashdi could not get on well together in those days should not be surprising. Khuhro was intolerant of land reforms. His wealthier rival, Mir Bundeali, was far less intolerant. Today, however, Rashdi and Khuhro sail in the same boat. Obviously, the two friends and sometimes opponents had decided to sink their differences in the cause of saving Sind's soul.

In the early days of the Pakistan idea, Jinnah relied almost entirely on Rashdi. It would be news to many to be told that the famous Lahore resolution of the Muslim League in 1940 demanding the creation of a homeland for the Muslims from out of contiguous areas where the Muslims were in a majority was the draft of Rashdi. The foreign department of the Muslim League which had been made over to Abdoolla Haroon, was entirely Rashdi's creation. Jinnah's robust faith in Rashdi's commonsense was very great indeed. But when Rashdi had the temerity to question the wisdom of any particular move of his leader, Jinnah was touched to the quick. He had wanted Rashdi not to argue with him but argue for him with others. To the Quaid-e-Azam, Rashdi was merely a supplier of argument and reason. If Jinnah thought that he could keep this intellectual giant under his thumb he was soon to discover his mistake.

At the Madras session of the Muslim League during the Christmas of 1940 or a little later, the Subjects Committee of the Muslim League debated the Pakistan issue. Some person suggested that if Pakistan was adopted as the League creed, the Hindus would get nervous and Gandhiji would come offering terms. In those days, Jinnah looked upon Pakistan as nothing more than a bargaining counter. So this proposal of some insignificant person appealed to him. He was expecting Rashdi to give the proposal his whole-hearted support. But Rashdi shocked and disappointed the Quaid-e-Azam by his reasoned opposition. His argument was somewhat like this. If your demand was embodied in a mere resolution it gave you

room for compromise but if you adopt it as a creed, the danger was that in case you failed you blackened your own face. A creed, he argued, was in the nature of a fundamental law while a resolution was merely in the nature of statutory law. Rashdi discovered that he could not even get a seconder. So by paying Moulana Zafarali Khan of the *Zamindar* fame a modest fee of Rs. 50 he got him to announce that he seconded Rashdi's amendment. But the next day in the open session, Zafar Ali backed out, someone else paying a better fee for refraining from giving his support to Rashdi. Rashdi returned to Sind and organised his opposition to Jinnah. If the Hindus had known how to utilise him and profit by his experience and knowledge; they could have successfully resisted Pakistan. But mistakenly they pinned their faith in Nihchaldas whom they foolishly believed to be their deliverer.

For revealing this brief incident about Zafar Ali, I must apologise because I owe a deep debt of gratitude to him. On one occasion after the creation of Pakistan, I visited Lahore to find out for myself the state of things in that disturbed city. Near about Anarkali, my taxi was surrounded by an inimical crowd which, with "Allaho Akbar" playing on their lips, came menacingly to assault me. To speak the perfect truth, I was afraid that I was going to be murdered, and I had already started making my peace with my God by muttering some prayers. Suddenly in the crowd, I espied Zafar Ali who, recog-

having been interned by the British Government. All the propaganda machinery of the British Government was set in motion to discredit the Pir and paint him as a monomaniac and marauder. I met the Pir only once and that was in the company of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah. Pir Sahib hardly struck me as the unlettered and dangerous person he was described to be by the agents of British imperialism. He was a proud man, keen-witted and well-informed. During the World War I, Pir Pagaro was an internee along with some Bengal revolutionaries who had instilled into him ideas of liberty and nationalism.

Now, there was a legend going in Sind that a quarter of a century after the first war, another war would break out and the British would have to go out of India, leaving Sind to be ruled by a Sindhi. This prophecy was attributed to a Sindhi saint of a former day. Whether the Pir Sahib knew of this legend or believed in it, we know very little. But the very currency given to this legend unnerved the powers that be who were in no mood to take any chance. They must have believed in the efficacy of such prophecies. They must have also thought that, by their cleverness, they could neutralise the prophecy. Who could be the person in whose hands Sind could go if they quitted India? The British exhausted at least a hundred names by resorting to the familiar process of permutations and combinations. At last they lighted upon the Pir of Pagaro. If this fellow was going to be the arbiter of British destinies in India, he must go. So they interned Pagaro at Karachi.

People of India can have little idea of the huge following which Pir Pagaro had. To nearly a hundred thousand Muslims known as the Hurs of Sind, the Pir of Pagaro was the visible symbol of Allah, the Creator and Sustainer of all the worlds, and a direct representative of the holy Prophet of Islam. At his bidding they would be ready to rush into fire without a thought. To avenge any dishonour to him, they would brave the worst danger in life.

Pir Sahib's palace in the interior of Sind was really a big fortress. If you went as the invited guest of Pir Sahib, you had

to acquaint yourself with the manners and customs of the locality and the conventions of the palace. If any attendant, of whom there were hundreds, took it into his head that you so much as intended to slight the Pir, he would unhesitatingly drive his sharp knife into your heart or throat without a second thought. Pir Sahib himself was a hospitable host. Once my friend Hatim Alavi was invited to the Pir's palace. He jocularly told the Pir that he would first get his life insured for a heavy amount and then make it a point to visit him. Hatim is given to slight exaggerations in his desire to make an event of his narration sound picturesque. Nevertheless, there was an element of truth in his fear.

Be that as it might, there was not an iota of truth in the propaganda put up by the British administration that the Pir of Pagaro was a communalist and was intent on exterminating the Hindus. This story was the special invention of the British secret service to justify before the civilised world their hanging of the poor, undefended Pir after caging him like an infuriated tiger. On the other hand, I can quote at least a dozen instances to prove his great sense of toleration and his abiding faith in Hindu-Muslim unity. One of the private charges levelled against him was that he was an admirer of Mahatma Gandhi and cared next to nil for Jinnah. Had he been a political reactionary fates might have been kinder to him.

Government replied by pounding their homes and the Pir's fortress with the aid of live bombs. The Hur menace continued to dog their footsteps till the very last day.

If really the legend referred to in a previous paragraph was true, then it would appear from events that it was fulfilled literally and in a full measure. The British quitted India all right. Jinnah who was a Sindhi came to rule over Sind as Governor-General along with other Provinces of Pakistan. I had a good mind to meet Dow in Patna and ask him before he quitted India how and what he felt after all he had done to discredit the straight, honest and patriotic Pir of Pagaro.

Somehow or the other, the Pir's followers took it into their head that Allah Baksh, Sir Ghulam Hussain, and Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi were responsible for the humiliations heaped upon their chief's head. Rashdi was well protected. The Hurs tried hard to get at Allah Baksh and Ghulam Hussain and pound them to pieces.

XI

GERMS OF A GREAT TRAGEDY

How Ghulam Hussain came to incur the wrath of the Hurs is a curious but interesting story. After the fall of his Sind Ministry, Ghulam Hussain was practising in the Sind Chief Court. He accepted a brief on behalf of the Pir Sahib of Pagaro for a modest fee of Rs. 3,00,000. He was to appear before the Governor of Sind and secure certain facilities for the Pir who had been ordered to be interned in the holy name of war. The Pir was allowed to call on Sir Lancelot Graham at Government House. Many theories were set afloat, some of them fanciful, dangerous and slanderous. It was understood, however, that the Pir was not confined to the precincts of a jail but was permitted to live in state in a Karachi bungalow strictly guarded by armed police.

raising its ugly head in other parts in India, particularly in Calcutta where the Great Killings had shocked the humanity all the world over in the year 1946.

The result of the mistaken impression on the part of the Hurs was responsible for a major tragedy. The Hurs believed that because Ghulam Hussain had again risen to power and was in charge of the home portfolio he would, necessarily and as a matter of course, order the release of the Pir Sahib of Pagaro. This hope did not materialise ; it could not. Both the Pir and the Hurs interpreted this to imply Ghulam Hussain's unwillingness to do what they thought his simple duty in return for Rs.3,00,000 which he had received as lawyer's fee for advocacy before the Governor of Sind.

One thing must be borne in mind. The suppression of the Hurs was on the Government of India's cards. Lord Linlithgow's Government were terribly afraid of the Pir on account of the prophecy to which reference had been made in an earlier chapter. That was not the only cause. During the Great War of 1914-18, the Pir of Pagaro had been interned as a "dangerous political criminal" for no valid reason and had been lodged in the Midnapur jail in Bengal along with Bengal revolutionaries. That was during the viceroyalty of Lord Chelmsford. The Pir Sahib allowed himself to be initiated into the cult of the bullet by the Bengal revolutionaries. Certainly it was not a spirit of communalism that drove him to take to political thinking. He probably believed that he was destined to be the future ruler of Sind. When the Second World War broke out, his ambitions were naturally revived. Whether he took any active step in the direction of realising his dream, there is no evidence to show. But that the Government of India got panicky is quite certain. In his capacity as the Home Minister of the Government of Sind, it was not possible for Sir Ghulam Hussain, even if he so willed, to get the Pir at liberty. That was because of the parliamentary amendment to the Government of India Act (1935) vesting in the Governor-General all residuary power during the war. Lord Linlithgow was personally the autocrat of the show—the Great

Moghul. His will was law in fact. That Sir Ghulam Hussain could do little to give any facility to his ex-client, the Hurs could not appreciate. They started murmuring and grumbling against Ghulam Hussain's alleged betrayal of their chief.

Somehow some personal adherents of Sir Ghulam Hussain started a propaganda in the meantime, suggesting that the real "culprit" was Allah Baksh who was the Sind Premier at the time and that, if Allah Baksh was only reasonable, it would not be difficult for Sir Ghulam Hussain to fulfil his "contract" with the Pir. Whether Sir Ghulam Hussain was aware of this subtle propaganda, it is difficult to say. Knowing him as I did fairly intimately, I am inclined to believe that the old man who was known for his generous instincts and uprightness in matters of friendship could hardly have been a party, active or passive, to this nefarious campaign. Some of the actors in this drama are still alive. One of them is my good old friend, Khan Bahadur A. K. Gabol to whom reference was made in an earlier chapter. The result of this propaganda was that an anti-Allah Baksh campaign was set afoot in the Hur area.

whatsoever. He was of those of whom it might be said that they laid greater store by earning the goodwill of the people than by promoting their good. Of this, however later.

Allah Baksh's ministry had no smooth sailing. The Governor could have helped Allah Baksh to remove and smooth the obstructions that were artificially put in the Premier's way. But Sir Hugh Dow must have set his heart on having Sir Ghulam Hussain as his Chief Minister, although Sir Ghulam had no party backing in the popular legislature. Allah Baksh's second ministerial career was thus full of troubles. There was almost daily conflict between the Sind Premier and the Sind Governor. Sir Hugh Dow was intent on securing for himself every vestige of power, reducing the ministers to the position of mere automatons. Sir Ghulam Hussain who was a first rate courtier managed to steal himself into the affections of the Governor by conceding to him all that the latter yearned for, although Allah Baksh resisted the deliberate inroads made by Dow into the ministerial field.

Before Sind was made a separate province, Sir Ghulam Hussain had been practically the Governor of Bombay save perhaps in name. As Home Member of the then bureaucratic Bombay Government, he enjoyed wide and extensive powers. The Home Member in those days was in charge of the civil services. Naturally every member of the Civil Service looked to Sir Ghulam Hussain for patronage because Sir Frederick Sykes, the then Governor of Bombay, had practically abdicated his position to Sir Ghulam and said so pretty openly. In 1929 or 1930, Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, who was then a member of the Bombay Legislative Council, gave a dinner party in the Taj Mahal Hotel in honour of Sir Ghulam Hussain. I well remember an incident on that occasion. Among the guests were Sir Hugh Dow and myself. In those days, the great man was just Mr. Dow and a very junior and humble member of the Indian Civil Service. He had not yet developed the arrogance which took possession of his soul in later days. At that time, he was probably either an Under-Secretary or Deputy Secretary in the Bombay Finance

Department. Being a considerable junior, he was seated at an inconsequential end at the dinner table. He somehow wanted to be taken to Sir Ghulam Hussain and presented to him. The ever proud Khuhro was too self-centred to notice Mr. Dow's anxiety to shake hands with Sir Ghulam and sit by his side if only for a minute. Mr. Dow condescended to accost me, his neighbour, and requested me to introduce him to Sir Ghulam Hussain. I responded. Mr. Dow looked very proud and happy when Sir Ghulam Hussain gracefully shook his hands and bade him be seated by his side and conversed with him for a few minutes. In those days Mr. Dow used to address Sir Ghulam Hussain as "Sir" in a very humble manner. It must have pleased Sir Hugh Dow's vanity to be addressed by Sir Ghulam Hussain as "Sir" in his gubernatorial days. Allah Baksh was the Chief Minister. Sir Hugh Dow, in his capacity as the Governor of Sind, gave preference to Sir Ghulam Hussain whom, for all practical purposes, he treated as the Chief of the Sind Cabinet.

In the meantime, the Hur menace had assumed fearful proportions. The Hurs were resolved upon removing every person whom they looked upon as an obstacle to the Pir Sahib's accession to the Sind *gadi*. They started by derailing running trains and creating a general sense of insecurity in the public mind.





DR. J. H. HARRIS

XII
DOW'S HARVEST OF WHIRLWIND

Had he a spark of imagination, Sir Hugh Dow might have saved the catastrophe which was threatening Sind. He had no sympathy with or for the people. It would not be very difficult to gain an insight into his diseased mind. There was in Karachi an old Englishwoman, an octogenarian—a cripple, both physical and mental. This woman was a literary genius and author. She had written several books, all of them painting India in the darkest possible colours, to the most notorious of which Sir Hugh Dow willingly wrote an introduction. That tiny volume written in the most exquisite English prose might be described as a first cousin to Miss Mayo's *Mother India*. The main burden of the book was to present the Hindu as a freak of nature, and the Muslim as an angel but only if he would be content to aim at nothing higher than to serve his English master as a *Khansama*, butler or footboy. My good and amiable friend, Sir Hugh Dow, commended this book to the public.

It was perhaps surprising that Sir Hugh conceived a natural dislike for the Pir of Pagaro who was, by no means, content to play the butler or *Khansama* to His Excellency the Governor of Sind. It little struck Dow's small brain that, if he presumed to sow the wind, he could not escape a harvest of whirlwind. His pathetic faith in the infinite capacity of the Defence of India Rules and in his own wonderful and infallible genius spurred him on to perpetrate one error after another with impunity bordering on condescension. He could not visualise the potential danger to which he was exposing Sind by the arrogant and thoughtless humiliations which he heaped on the devoted head of the Pir of Pagaro with a pertinacity worthy of a nobler cause. Dow himself was protected but his ministers had to pay a very heavy price. I shudder to recount some of the happenings in quick succession in the year 1942. To please the Governor of Sind.

the obliging Sind Legislative Assembly placed on the statute book an anti-Hur Act which was discussed in a secret session, not open to the public or the press. Sir Hugh Dow beamed with satisfaction when the report formally reached him that his will had become the law of the land. But the Hurs were not the kind of people who, like the average Sindhi Muslim, bowed to destiny and allowed their alien rulers to kick and humiliate them, particularly their chief, the Pir Sahib. The Hurs accepted the challenge but Dow's bullet would not and could not subdue them.

helping his fellow passengers by praying to God Almighty from under his cushioned seat.

Two versions found free currency. The one alleged that the Hurs were on the look out for Allah Baksh but mistakenly killed Ghulam Hussain's son. The other which found an equal number of votaries favoured the view that failing to get at Ghulam Hussain would not leave the headquarters, the Hurs chose his son for their victim. Which was the correct theory? Nobody could say. Sir Hugh Dow at least did not care. He was a staunch believer in the invincibility of the British bullet provided it was handled by an Englishman. Without so much as consulting his Ministers, he quietly handed over to the military authorities the administration of the districts dominated and frequented by the Hurs. We had martial law all right. But no martial law was formally declared. Even the promulgation of this lawless law depended on certain prerequisites. The civil administration must break down. It was not enough for it to break down; the civil authorities must declare that they were no longer able to control the situation. Then the head of the Administration surrenders the administration to the military authorities after a due declaration of martial law by civil authority. All these conditions were literally fulfilled before martial law was declared in the Punjab in 1919. Sir Michael O'dwyer had abdicated before Lord Chelmsford declared martial law. In Sind none of these formalities was observed. We were quietly told that martial law had been promulgated and Major General Richardson was the martial law administrator. In fact, it was Richardson, not Dow or Linlithgow, that made this announcement.

My first and open conflict with Dow was caused by this martial law. The *Daily Gazette* of which I was editor, dared to suggest that even the preliminaries to a declaration of martial law had not been gone through and that even if an act of indemnity could save the martial law officers, it could not possibly indemnify the civil authority which had surrendered without even formally abdicating its function and declaring its

ability to cope with the situation. Sir Lancelot Graham, being an expert student of constitutional law, used to encourage such writings. His ambition was to satisfy and abide by every constitutional implication. I either forgot that the new "Ruler" was Dow or believed that Dow would be thankful to me for pointing out the serious flaw in his action. The result was that the Press Officer was deputed to give me a warning. It was merely oral. No written warning would be given. Unwillingly I disturbed the hornet's nest by writing to the Press Officer and asking how I had erred. I quoted copiously from Keith and other authorities on constitutional law to establish and prove the correctness of my position. I, of course, got no answer although I knew that my letter had been forwarded to Government House. But I had reason to know that I had incurred the displeasure of such an august person as the personal representative in Sind of His Britannic Majesty. This displeasure took novel forms to which I should not advert, lest otherwise a historical narrative should degenerate into an autobiography.

delivered with his peculiarly cockney intonation which unerringly betrayed his parentage and early associations.

As if this was not enough to try Dow's soul, the Americans came into the scene. Their arrival in Karachi was welcomed by the Indian residents of the locality. Newspapers published special supplements to commemorate July 4—the American Independence Day. General Brady in charge of the American forces was a fine person who made many friends amongst Indians. Dow would have raised a statue for the American General if only the latter had refrained from bringing the white race into contempt and ridicule by mixing with the "natives" so freely and on terms of intimacy. This was bad enough but the worse was yet to come. The great Governor of Sind had condescended to be present at the headquarters of the American forces on the occasion of the Independence Day. The Union Jack and the American Stars and Stripes were majestically waving in the air. But the American soldiers pulled down the Union Jack and hoisted the Stars and Stripes higher as if to do honour to the Governor of Sind on his arrival. Many of us connected with the newspapers might not have known this incident but for Sir Hugh Dow's caution which sent us informal warnings not to give publicity to it. The flag incident was repeated by the Americans at the time of the visit of the Duke of Gloucester also. In proportion to the love and esteem which he commanded in Indian quarters, General Brady became *persona non grata* with the British authorities. And, Sir Hugh Dow as the visible and self-conscious symbol of that undefined but very assertive British Majesty conceived it to be his primary duty to hate any person who had anything to do in any way with General Brady. Two of the victims of his wrath were B. T. Thakur and myself.

B. T. Thakur's offence was that he gave an evening party to meet General Brady. Mine was that I was one of the several guests at the party and was found speaking very intimately with Brady. The story about Thakur is better related in the next chapter so as to avoid repetition and in order to piece events together, the better to appreciate and follow them.

Returning from the party in honour of Brady, I found that a letter was awaiting me from the Press Officer. It asked for an explanation why my paper had published the news of an incident in which a British soldier had behaved rudely and offensively to some women. I was also asked to disclose the source of my information. I declined to oblige. On the authority of the Governor, the Chief Secretary told me that the Defence of India Rules had armed His Excellency with sufficient power to compel me to disclose the source of my news. I politely acknowledged the rude suggestion but added that I knew of no law which could claim dominion over man's soul, although it could mangle his body. Then and there Dow decided that either I should be bundled out of the *Daily Gazette* or the paper should be repurchased by Englishmen and run for their benefit and in the interests of the Little Englanders of the Sind Club.

While Sir Hugh Dow was exerting all his might to renovate the fastly vanishing British prestige in Karachi, he soon discovered that he was powerless to check the Hur menace which defied the military might with impunity. Literally the Hurs ruled over many areas where formerly the British had held sway. The press instructions in the holy name of war prevented the publication of this news but everybody knew—none more bitterly than Sir Hugh Dow—that the prestige of the Steel Frame had been shaken to pieces. As he was not able to bring the Hurs under control, Dow directed his attention to Congressmen. But to his chagrin, the Sind Congressmen had been bound down by their President, Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, not to do anything which might disturb the peace of Sind in whose interests he had exempted the Sind Congress from the operative part of any decision in favour of civil disobedience or direct action.

XIII GANDHI'S QUIT INDIA AND AFTER

Following the passage of the "Quit India" resolution by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay on Mahatma Gandhi's motion, all the prominent Congress leaders were arrested overnight and removed to unknown destinations. On August 9, 1942, Karachi disappointed Sir Hugh Dow by staging a demonstration of protest against the high-handed manner in which in the holy name of war, the liberty of peaceful, unoffending and innocent citizens was put under serious restraint. Dow was exasperated. It was not the demonstration that worried him so much as the reported unrest in the camp of the Karachi police almost exclusively manned by Muslims. Without serving any formal notice, the lower ranks of the police struck work on August 10. It was a complete and successful strike. The street traffic became disorderly. Pandemonium prevailed in the city. Mr. Pryde, the district Superintendent of Police, was powerless to end the strike which was perfectly peaceful and unaccompanied by any ugly scenes either from the strikers or from the citizens.

Dow could do little to resolve the unexpected tangle. It was Allah Baksh who managed to get into touch with the strikers and finally succeeded in persuading them to call off the strike and show to the world that the Sindhis were a law-abiding people and that the Sind Police would not create a situation which might be exploited to disadvantage by the criminally inclined sections of the population. The speech which Allah Baksh made was in Sindhi. I could not understand a word of what he said although from his intonations and gestures it was possible to realise that he was appealing to their emotions and sentiments. Many of the policemen gaped at Allah Baksh, tears trickling down their face. The next day the strike was called off.

Of their own accord and without any prompting from the Press Officer, the daily newspapers of Karachi took counsel

asked them if England had not been promising Swaraj for half a century and more and what else really could be wanted to ensure co-operation in war effort. Pearson was scandalised. He came into my room and delivered a sermon to me on the character of the English race. He said: "Sharma, put your faith in us, we shall not fail you." As he left without waiting for my reply, I published the next day under glaring headlines the 52 talking points circulated in America by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai. These 52 "points" merely discredited India at India's cost, her character and capability.

The next day Pearson proposed to stage the Hitlerian trick of occupation first and explanations afterwards. On the afternoon of January 19, 1943 a leading article written by Low had been smuggled into the lino room. How it was smuggled would be an interesting anecdote but I should not reveal it because the party concerned sincerely repented afterwards and apologised to me. Anyhow, the rule in that office was that no matter meant for the edit page could be composed without the editor's initials. So the manuscript came to me. The foreman who brought it said that it had been personally handed to the lino department by the august Sir Francis Low. For the first time in the course of this transaction I lost my temper. I was reading the article when Low walked into my room and asked if I was busy. I retorted with blue pencil in hand that I was trying to edit his copy. Then I gently asked him what the procedure in the *Times of India* would be if a stranger presented an editorial for publication. Low was a typical Scotchman and had no sense of humour. He walked out of my room. All Karachi was saying that the next day's issue of the *Deccan Gazette* would appear with K. G. Swami's name as editor. Swami himself thought so but he did not like the idea. With the promising the position of some valued friends I could not materialise. The next day's paper bore my name.

But by that time, my senior proprietor had arrived from Calcutta. He called on me and I told him the available ways adopted by the *Times of India*.

must have been rudely surprised, therefore, when one fine evening a party of armed policemen, plying a boat to approach him, claimed him as a guest of His Britannic Majesty. Jairamdas was lodged in the Hyderabad prison.

Dow was not the sort of person who would count the cost of any particular move. Was he not a sun-dried bureaucrat? He was entertaining the local European population in high glee when word was brought to him that an exasperated people had risen in revolt against this unwarranted and mean arrest of Jairamdas in circumstances that would do no credit to the British Government. College students throughout the Province struck work. Poor Dow had no chance of stagemanaging an artificial show designed to make it appear that the provincewide demonstration was a Hindu show in which the Muslims did not or would not take part. Telegrams came to him from the districts that purely Muslim schools also joined in the strike and there was no knowing when this would stop. Near about Sukkur, rails were removed and there was a train disaster. Then Dow appealed to the newspaper editors of Karachi for their co-operation and even told them that Gandhiji had not asked the students to stage a strike. It took nearly three months for the strike to end. In the meanwhile, young boys and girls were belaboured mercilessly by the police under the direct orders of the Governor.

In the chairman of the Hindu Panchayat, the situation produced certain reactions which Dow little suspected. The Chairman, as the reader would remember, was my friend B. T. Thakur who at the time was the Sind Regional Manager of the Central Bank of India. Now, Thakur called on me one evening and handed out a statement of his. The statement was a dignified and reasoned protest against the high-handed repression in the name of law and order and it made a plea that, for the duration of the war, India should be administered by a commission composed of delegates deputed by the allied nations if she was to be expected to offer her co-operation in war effort. This statement had secured the approval of Allah Bakhsh and this fact, when made known to Dow, simply made the Governor

shake with anger. Then and there he decided to punish all the three culprits—Thakur for having fathered the statement, Allah Baksh for giving it his seal of approval, and my humble self for giving it publicity in my paper, the *Daily Gazette* which, until my occupation of its editorial chair, used to be the voice of the diehard European community of Karachi. Dow's affections for my paper had been kindled by the writing of a European predecessor of mine who advocated in 1932 that Mahatma Gandhi should be hanged.

Thakur's article was telegraphed to Linlithgow and Reginald Maxwell both of whom, according to the version prevalent at the time, caused it to be conveyed to the higher authorities of the Central Bank in Bombay that it would be in their interest if they gagged Thakur. I cannot vouch for the correctness or otherwise of this report. But the very next day, Thakur was told by the Managing Director of the Central Bank to refrain from taking part in politics and public life. Now, those who know Thakur will not be surprised to hear how he reacted to this intimation. He resigned his appointment. Ramkrishna Dalmia fancied him for the Bharat Bank in formation. But for reasons which would not be germane to this narrative, Thakur declined to associate himself with Sethji. Politely declining the offer, he went to Calcutta and founded the United Commercial Bank.

Now, Thakur had been disposed of. Then there remained Allah Baksh and myself. By about the third week of September, 1942, a conference of ten Europeans of Karachi, both official and non-official, met at Government House and advised Dow what course to follow for the future. Mr. Blackwell of Burns, Shell, a notorious reactionary, was one of the ten. During Rumour had it that Blackwell suggested the repurchase of the *Daily Gazette* by the European community and the dismissal of Allah Baksh from the Premiership of Sind. I had no tangible evidence by which to test the correctness of Dow's version but subsequent events made it appear that there would have been no smoke without fire.

Having failed to attend the first session of the A.M.N.C. in

account of Moulana Abul Kalam Azad's visit to Karachi in December, 1940. I decided to be present at the second session in Bombay to be held in the first week of October, 1942. I need hardly say that, in order to avoid Hur trouble, I sailed to Bombay and returned by the sea route. Sir Hugh Dow who never moved out of the Government House alone thought I was a coward to sail by sea and not travel by train. But let that pass. My programme in Bombay was suddenly upset by a wire from Allah Baksh demanding my immediate return. Leaving some of my luggages behind, I rushed back to Karachi which I reached on October 9. I reached Allah Baksh's house at about 2 p.m. and learned that Sir Hugh Dow had dismissed his Premier that very morning.

Now, this news was a great blow to Sind and its political future. Dow's contention was that Allah Baksh had forfeited the Governor's confidence—a strange ground indeed to interpret the constitutional term, "holding office during the Governor's pleasure." Pressure was brought to bear on me by Dow's agents to support the dismissal of Allah Baksh. After giving a polite hearing to a high official who did me the honour of calling on me to convey the august message of Dow, I quietly wrote my articles—I think five in all—to prove the Governor's action unconstitutional and unprecedented. Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions* had provided me with a number of reliable precedents in the British Dominions and Colonies to hold Dow's action to ridicule. The burden of my song was that the Governor's "pleasure" was not absolute but was dependent on and governed by the confidence of the legislature in a particular minister. The Governor could not dismiss a minister enjoying the confidence of the popular legislature any more than he could retain one who had lost the confidence of the House. That this was not liked by Government House goes without saying.

Now, before I narrate the tale of how the reactionary elements conspired to do away with me or acquire the *Daily Gazette* to sing the praises of the Steel Frame, I must briefly refer to certain incidents which followed Allah Baksh's

dismissal. Dow sent for Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah and asked him to become his Premier. Sir Ghulam Hussain agreed. But it did not strike either Dow or Ghulam Hussain that a new ministry must be formed because the Allah Baksh ministry was automatically dissolved with the dismissal of its Chief. But Dow would not agree. Ghulam Hussain did not mind either course so long as he was assured of the Premiership of Sind, although in the new circumstance he would have to function at the beck and call of the Governor and advise him as he would be directed to advise. Yet, some of us took hurried counsel. P. N. Mehta of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company advised Allah Baksh to call on Ghulam Hussain, wish him success and assure him of his co-operation for what it was worth. Allah Baksh readily agreed. The reason was that we were anxious about Sind's future—that the administration should not fall into the hands of the bureaucracy or the enemies of the Congress. But Nihchaldas would not agree to this proposal. He thought that a defeat on the floor of the House would finish Ghulam Hussain and Allah Baksh would have to be recalled to office. But in so arguing, Nihchaldas did not know either Dow or Ghulam Hussain. Events were soon to prove the correctness of my fears.

For once, Nihchaldas declined to serve in Ghulam Hussain's Cabinet. Pirzada Abdus Sattar also went into the wilderness along with his chief. Ghulam Hussain was anxious to form a stable ministry. He summoned me to advise Thakur to accept the finance ministership of the Sind Government, a seat being found for him within the statutory limit of six months. But Thakur was not agreeable. On a later occasion he declined Jinnah's own invitation to become his personal adviser. That part of the story, however, must come at a later stage. The new ministry of Ghulam Hussain took long to be formed. The Premier had no party to back him. G. M. Pannu particularly hated the old man like poison. The Hindus were solidly behind Nihchaldas because Nihchaldas presented himself as a follower of Allah Baksh. Ministerial jobs were offered to Khudhoja willing to join but he refused them. Ghulam Hussain

XIV

A WHITE CONSPIRACY

The bureaucracy in Sind got perturbed by my occupation of the editorial chair of the *Daily Gazette*. Even Sir Lancelot Graham who was friendly to me in a number of ways was apprehensive that I might be critical of the British Government and Lloyd George's "Steel Frame". He had at least the candour to say so to me. But being tolerant by training and disposition, he could be a neutral. All that mattered to him was that war effort should not be impeded. In this he had no reason for worry. Both the leading papers of Karachi were pledged to support war effort, the *Sind Observer* going so far as to question Mahatma Gandhi's wisdom and statesmanship in opposing India's participation in the war. My paper could not write in support of Gandhiji's war policy but it would not write anything against him. This was heinous enough a crime in the eyes of the Sind bureaucracy under Sir Hugh Dow's rule. My other failings were that under my charge the *Daily Gazette* which, till not very long ago, had been the voice of the Steel Frame in Sind had changed colour and had even dared to announce its new policy as one of "India first, foremost and best". This Dow could not tolerate. He almost lost his temper when he discovered that, in carrying out this policy, I was promoting Hindu-Muslim unity, although Dow had succeeded in filling the communal unity move inaugurated by Allama Iqbal under instructions from the Congress President. My third crime was a weekly feature of appreciative character sketches of Indian leaders - of Congress leaders, "to be prepared" a Dow once put it to some mutual friend. In fact, he told this friend that the name I ought not disclose: "It is easy to see the name of Punjab, but this other fellow throws a lot of mud at me. I am a retiree and never cross the line - he is the one - do not name the two".

The British in Association with the King's Government, the Steel Frame and the Steel Frame's policy...

tive steps to repurchase the *Daily Gazette*. Their friend, philosopher and guide, Sir Hugh Dow, offered to set the ball rolling. One day in the last week of September 1942 who should walk into my room in the *Daily Gazette* Office than that redoubtable "friend of India" Mr. E. G. Pearson, Managing Director of Bennett Coleman & Co., proprietors of the *Times of India* and allied publications. He wanted to see the press. I took him round. I instinctively knew that Pearson's interest was not spontaneous. Allah Baksh who was still Sind's Premier had warned me of Pearson's visit. Not desiring to take his chances with the telephone, he personally called to acquaint me with this impending visit. Incidentally, he added: "If your proprietors are wanting to sell the paper, let me have the first option." A few hours after Pearson's visit, I left for Bombay for the A.I.N.E.C. although Narayan B. Juvekar, Assistant General Manager of the *Daily Gazette*, a very amiable, loyal and dutiful friend—pressed me to cancel my trip and stay on to resist the white inroad.

I went to Bombay and returned on the day of Allah Baksh's dismissal from office. Then nothing more was heard of Pearson's mission. But suddenly in January, 1943, Pearson and his editor, the newly created knight, Francis Low, accompanied by some members of the *Times of India* editorial and printing staffs had pitched their headquarters in Karachi. Mr. K. G. Swami was there. To his warning I owed my knowledge that, taking advantage of the absence of Hoshang Dinshaw from Karachi, Pearson proposed to acquire the *Daily Gazette* somehow with the co-operation of a junior partner. How they could do it was a mystery. But the mystery was of less than twenty-four hours' duration because the next day these amiable visitors occupied two rooms in the *Daily Gazette* and started planning. Pearson and Low used to step into my room off and on but all we discussed was philosophy. So as to draw the Low-Pearson combine, I resorted to a trick. Amery had spoken in Leeds or Manchester saying that the Britishers were committed to confer Swaraj on India. The next morning's editorial in the *Daily Gazette* took the Congressmen squarely to task and

asked them if England had not been promising Swaraj for half a century and more and what else really could be wanted to ensure co-operation in war effort. Pearson was scandalised. He came into my room and delivered a sermon to me on the character of the English race. He said: "Sharma, put your faith in us, we shall not fail you." As he left without waiting for my reply, I published the next day under glaring headlines the 52 talking points circulated in America by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai. These 52 "points" merely discredited India at India's cost, her character and capability.

The next day Pearson proposed to stage the Hitlerian trick of occupation first and explanations afterwards. On the afternoon of January 19, 1943 a leading article written by Low had been smuggled into the lino room. How it was smuggled would be an interesting anecdote but I should not reveal it because the party concerned sincerely repented afterwards and apologised to me. Anyhow, the rule in that office was that no matter meant for the edit page could be composed without the editor's initials. So the manuscript came to me. The foreman who brought it said that it had been personally handed to the lino department by the august Sir Francis Low. For the first time in the course of this transaction I lost my temper. I was reading the article when Low walked into my room and asked if I was busy. I retorted with blue pencil in hand that I was trying to edit his copy. Then I gently asked him what the procedure in the *Time of India* would be if a strange person on editorial for publication. Low was a typical South Indian and had no sense of humour. He walked out of my room. All Karachi was saying that the next day's issue of the *Deccan Chronicle* would appear with K. G. Swami's name on the masthead. I was proud of my the position of one about this. With a sense of awe, the public belief and Pearson's expectations of the *Deccan Chronicle* for next day's paper were mine to lose. But by the time the paper appeared it was a different story. I had seen it before it came. He called it a "hitlerian trick".

people to gain control. I said: "Hoshang, if you want to sell the paper do so by all means; I kept on all these trying days just to hand over the paper to you." As we were talking, a message came to me from Yusuf Haroon who conveyed Jinnah's views that it would be a suicidal step to sell the paper to an English firm and that, if the proprietors were anxious to sell, he would purchase it. As Hoshang had no thought of selling the paper then, the entire transaction had to fall off. But there was one little difficulty. Somebody else who had the right to commit Hoshang legally had already agreed to sell the paper. Even the terms had been fixed. The only thing remaining to be settled was the mode of payment which was to await Hoshang's return and stipulation. Hoshang and I took counsel. Then Hoshang told Pearson that he would like shares of Bennet Coleman's to be allotted to him to the value of the sale price of the *Daily Gazette*. Pearson's face fell because if that was done, Hoshang would be a proprietor of the *Times of India*. So the deal was off because Pearson could not tolerate the idea of an Indian partnership. I wish Pearson was not so peevish. He could have handed over the *Times of India* to really good hands.

Dow's plan was thus averted. But I was to pay a price. That took a novel form. Pearson went on taking "friendly interest" in the conduct of the *Daily Gazette*. On the occasion of Swami Vivekananda's birthday, my paper published a special article on Swamiji from the pen of no less a person than the exalted Chief Justice of the Federal Court of India, the Hon'ble Sir Maurice Gwyer. Pearson wrote to Hoshang that it was unfair that in a province with a Muslim majority, "Sharma should think of publishing things about an obscure Swami." It little struck Pearson that he was arguing himself unknown when he called Swamiji obscure. Curiously, the quotations from Swamiji had been all in favour of Hindu-Muslim Unity. Then Satya-murti died. The *Times of India* failed to take editorial notice. The *Daily Gazette* wrote a big article. This occasioned another "friendly" complaint from Pearson who could not tolerate the idea of an editorial article on a small man. Unfortunately for

Pearson just a few hours before the arrival of his letter *Reuter* had cabled to this country a good summary of a 400-word leading article on Satyamurti by the *Times* (London). I wrote something stinging to Pearson. But this letter was not posted.

Sir Hugh Dow's anger took novel forms. He forgot his gubernatorial dignity, and started a personal fight. Sind had liquidated the barrage debt. Sir Ghulam Hussain argued that with the liquidation of the barrage debt, the governor's special responsibility in respect of Sukkur barrage ceased. I supported the contention. Dow wrote a 2-column letter to the editor and claimed that his special responsibility was inherent and did not and could not lapse. Naturally, I had my revenge and alongside of the letter which I published, I tore the Governor to pieces for his ignorance of the undertaking given by Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir Phiroze Sethna. This was part of the published proceedings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Government of India Bill, 1935.

Dow was the laughing stock of all Karachi the next morning. So he took advantage of a rotary dinner and asked who was this Madras editor who presumed to advise Sind on constitutional matters. I retorted that the distance between Karachi and Madras was far less than between Karachi and London. Then I also wrote to Dow insinuating that a gentleman would never speak a rough word about one whose position rendered it impossible to give an equally rough retort. I added also that I was not an adept at flattery which was the only road to his affections. Dow wrote back a handsome letter in his own hand writing and assured me that he did not intend to attack me. Strange. But I took him at his word and closed an unpleasant chapter. At the time of Dow's departure for Bihar to take over the governorship of that province, I admonished him both in writing and by a personal talk that Sri Krishna Sinha in Bihar would not be so pliable as Ghulam Hussain in Karachi and he would have to be more careful about his dignity and position than he was wont to be in Sind.

Dow and Pearson were not typical of the Englishmen who were not given to petulance. But in Sind Dow in a fit of temper

threatened to take action against me for daring to publish over my name an appreciative character sketch of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Having failed to get a paper to support his cause, Dow now more openly identified himself with the Muslim League and the protagonists of a division of India. Whether he was inspired in this by Low I know not. But I know this. Before the arrest of Congress leaders, G. M. Syed went to Bombay and pleaded with Jinnah that he should not obstruct Gandhiji in his Quit India campaign. Jinnah for once was amiable and agreed that Syed's advice was the only proper course. After Gandhiji's incarceration, he was going to issue a statement. In fact, Syed had prepared me for it and I had promised him that I would give it first class publicity. But the statement never came. For on the day when the statement was to be issued, Low called on Jinnah and was closeted with him for over an hour. Then Jinnah became *persona grata* with Linlithgow and even started abusing Gandhiji for nothing. Dow made much of Jinnah of whom he was genuinely afraid. The stage for the division of India, I think, was set at the Jinnah-Low interview which was at the instance of Lord Linlithgow. Being an honourable man, Syed lost his patience and started straying away from the Jinnah fold. But for a considerable time he continued to flirt with Jinnah in the hope of converting him but it was no good.

ALLAH BAKSH, THE MARTYR

1943 for Sind was indeed a bad year. Dow had tightened his grips, thanks to Ghulam Hussain's willingness to play second fiddle to his ex-deputy Secretary who was now Governor of Sind and had promised to keep him on the saddle notwithstanding any constitutional obstacle in the way. The result was a brutal display of force on January 26, 1943. Such Congressmen as were still physically free very naturally desired to celebrate the Independence Day. Dow had decided in advance that the function should not take place. He ordered indiscriminate arrests of Congressmen in anticipation of any trouble they might make. The main sufferers were the college students but they defied Dow and his bullet. The Press officer was called upon to issue instructions to the newspaper-writers warning them against bringing out any Independence Day supplement.

In the meantime, Allah Baksh was living a quiet life in his village home in Shikarpur. He attended the budget session of the Sind Assembly. One day late in April he took me out for a drive and told me that something told him that he was not going to die a natural death but would probably be murdered by somebody. He had told his brother Moula Baksh almost the same thing. Moula Baksh informed me that Allah Baksh was getting increasingly religious and was in prayer for almost the whole time of the day except for the brief time he took to have an occasional bite of lunch or dinner. Pizada Abdul Sattar was with us on the occasion of our drive. He thought and I agreed with him that the ex-Premier was in the grip of an overwhelming sense of depression and that things really had not taken such a bad turn as to give room for his apprehensions although the Huns were known to be intent on taking his life. In the quiet belief that everything was all right with the best of worlds I took leave of Allah Baksh and on the following day my conversation with the *Daily Gazette* Editor at Shikarpur

short spell of leave to spend a few days with Sir Mirza Ismail at Jaipur and then at Mount Abu for a little mental and physical rest.

It is a habit of mine even now to read no newspaper or to engage myself in needless correspondence during a holiday which to me is a rare experience. But while walking leisurely through the bazar street of Mount Abu along with my host, Rajamantrapravina A. V. Ramanathan, Prime Minister of Bharatpur, the radio helped by a loud speaker yelled the news of the murder of Allah Baksh at Shikarpur by a party of ruffians who had made good their escape and could not be traced. Cutting short my holiday then and there and in a mood of sorrow and misery, I rushed back to Karachi where, to my mortification, I discovered that the League camp was in high glee while the common man in Sind had not ceased to mourn the violent death of their undisputed leader and friend. The *Daily Gazette's* Bomaby correspondent interviewed Jinnah for a word of sympathy with the bereaved family but the Quaid-e-Azam had nothing more to tell him than that he had nothing to say! Ghulam Hussain, of course, paid a very handsome tribute to his ex-chief and colleague.

Karachi was full of rumours and theories. One thing must be said to the credit of Sir Hugh Dow. He set the entire police machinery at work to trace and bring to book the murderers of his ex-Primier. In meting out justice between Indian and Indian, the Englishman was peerless and had no equal. The whispering galleries of Karachi with their headquarters in the Karachi Club started the rumour that Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro, the Revenue Minister in the Ghulam Hussain cabinet, had been suspected of having organised the murder of Allah Baksh and that his arrest was imminent. It appeared that in the course of their investigations the police had come across two clues:—(1) that while he was in a mood of fury Khuhro had exclaimed to his tenants if there was not one fellow amongst them who could do away with Allah Baksh; and (2) that certain parties of Hurs had been given refuge in his estate by Khan Bahadur Khuhro.

Newspapers, of course, could not give publicity to rumour-compromising the reputation of men in authority. But a rumour of this kind did not require newspaper publicity. Almost on everybody's lips Khuhro figured as the murderer of Allah Baksh. As a matter of fact, a high Muslim dignitary in Karachi actually suggested to me that I should publish in the *Daily Gazette* every morning, goading the Sind Government to bring Khuhro to book and hang him. Much as I loved Allah Baksh, I could not bring myself to agree to this course. It was an article of faith with Mrs. Annie Basant whose judgment was law to me that public trials by newspapers were the worst form of tyranny and that no person, however, low and lowly, should be treated as guilty of high crime unless and until he was adjudged such by a competent court of law. The judgment might be criticised and torn to pieces in the light of the evidence let in; it was open to a journalist to suggest that the interpretation put on any piece of evidence by the presiding judge was wrong or open to question; but it was no business of newspaper to arrogate to itself the functions of a judge. This was Mr. Basant's dictum which, albeit his differences with her, K. C. Roy of the Associated Press enthusiastically held as the first and foremost principle which no working journalist could afford to ignore. Being a student of both, I declined to do anything beyond what my normal function as an editor required me to do, namely to give objective publicity to news as and when events developed.

A few days later, however, events took a dramatic turn. A Government House bulletin announced the resignation of his office as minister by Khuhro. This was at about 11 O'Clock in the forenoon. The news spread like wild fire throughout the city. At once thousands of people rushed to Vithalji Park where Khuhro was living. At about 2 O'Clock in the afternoon the Police Superintendent called on Khuhro. Khuhro and effected his arrest. Later he was removed by police car to the railway station where the party extra to Lahore Mail for Subbar where Khuhro was kept in the night. He was, I remember, surprised to see the police and the

application moved on his behalf was rejected by the District Magistrate of Sukkur.

Now, the Hindu-edited newspapers of Karachi committed a most unforgivable indiscretion. They started a newspaper trial of Khuhro. They published sensational reports of alleged evidence and judged and pronounced Khuhro guilty of the murder of Allah Baksh. Entirely from a psychological standpoint this was the most foolish thing to do. Khuhro was not exactly popular with his fellow Muslims of Sind. By nature and upbringing, he was a trifle vain and always considered himself to be above the crowd. The Muslim Leaguers of Sind found in this a favourable opportunity of bolstering up their cause. Their organ, *Al Wahid*, a Sindhi daily, was used for the purpose of representing to the Muslims that Khuhro was hailed as murderer by the "Hindu press" because Khuhro was a Muslim Leaguer and favoured Pakistan. It also stated that the Hindus were demanding the blood of Khuhro so that the demand for Pakistan might be scotched in their beloved province. As it happened, all the papers which had pronounced Khuhro guilty were anti-Pakistan. This slogan was then carried into the villages. For the first time in Sind, a definitely and pronouncedly anti-Hindu movement was started. It found favour because it was presented as the only way to save the Muslims in their own homeland. The ignorant peasant who cared two hoots for the Muslim League all these years began to look upon the League as his saviour and upon Khuhro as his born advocate who was being assailed for no crime but that he was the exponent of the rights of Muslims in their own homes.

Nothing could be more untrue than that Khuhro was a communalist in that sense. He was far too liberal for that sort of low politics. He was never in the good books of politically minded Muslims for this very reason. Now, he became a hero for nothing. The Muslim League which had failed to make an appeal to the Sind Muslims now became as popular as the Congress organisation in the rest of India—the liberator of the Muslims from the "tyranny of the Hindus and Hindu Congress". In the whole of Sind there never had been more

than a few hundred members of the League all these years. Thanks, however, to the war on Khuhro by the "Hindu press" the League membership in Sind swelled to hundreds of thousands.

The tactician in Jinnah was not slow to exploit this situation because if Sind fell into his hands, his mission was easy. He paid a visit to Karachi in June, 1943. He was Yusuf Haroon's guest. The Quaid-e-Azam was feted everywhere and made much of. Even Ghulam Hussain who used to say that he suspected Khuhro of having organised Allah Baksh's murder thought that discretion was the better part of valour and started abusing the Hindus for vilifying "innocent Khuhro". He even went to the length of suggesting to the All-Highest of the Muslim League that he should take up the defence of Khuhro and expose this "Hindu cunning and conspiracy". But Jinnah was far too shrewd to accept the advice. Ghulam Hussain and Jinnah who would not look at each other all these years were now the best of friends. Ghulam Hussain used Jinnah to prop up his ministry, and Jinnah made use of Ghulam Hussain to gain the affections of the Muslim public of Sind. Ghulam Hussain gave a big banquet in Jinnah's honour.

Jinnah held a Press Conference at Yusuf's place. It was popularly supposed that I was Jinnah's favourite. But I fare'd very badly indeed at this Conference. I knew I was putting an indiscreet question but I ventured to ask whether the Quaid-e-Azam would condescend to say a few words about Allah Baksh whose martyrdom had moved the people beyond words. "Go and ask your Hindu Congress and abuse me if you want," was all that Jinnah would say in reply. As if to make amends for this rudeness, as soon as the Conference was over, he called me and posed for a photograph with me by his side. On the eve of the birth of Pakistan there was another press conference at another place when Jinnah had requested me to put to him a

passed to exempt him from the penalty clauses of the Government of India Act (1935) so as to retain his membership of the Legislature. Even Jinnah persuaded him to take it up. With a resoluteness which was marvellous, Abdul Majid declined the offer to the great mortification of Jinnah and Ghulam Hussain who had thought probably that a poor man was necessarily a purchasable commodity. Jinnah's present visit to Karachi was with the object of holding the All-India Muslim League session in Karachi taking advantage of the anti-Hindu feeling which was increasing as a result of the unthinking newspaper trial of Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro. Sir Hugh Dow played the part of a courtier to Jinnah. That was perhaps understandable. Even the unbending Sir Godfrey Davis, the chief judge of the Chief Court of Sind, paid court to the All-Highest. Even at this moment it would have been possible to upset the League calculations in Sind. Alas, however, Nihchaldas made the mistake of thinking that Hindu interests would be served by securing Khuhro's conviction and capital sentence.

XVI

LEAGUE'S NEW BID

Jinnah's highest ambition in life was a hazy notion that he must be hailed as a born deliverer of men from bondage. Accustomed to the arm chair politics of the pre-Gandhian era, he was not willing to sacrifice his striped shirt and top hat. Even the very idea which had now taken possession of his soul had been stirred by the unique esteem and popular favour in which Gandhiji was held by the people irrespective of merely political considerations. In his young days, Jinnah had been a *chela* of Pherozeshah Mehta hailed as the Lion of Bombay. From Pherozeshah for whom he had the highest regard and respect he had heard that a young and nervous but self-reliant Hindu barrister from South Africa had called on him to solicit his support for the Indian struggle in the dark continent against the humiliations heaped on his fellow-countrymen by a white coloured section. Gandhiji himself had admitted that in the domineering presence of Pherozeshah Mehta he had felt himself overawed and almost speechless. This impression left in his mind was to Jinnah a fountain of new ambitions to be realised. If Pherozeshah could dominate over Gandhiji why not Jinnah? Although he possessed not even an iota of the invincible logic and impressive learning which made Pherozeshah a real lion amongst men, did not Jinnah make up for all the deficiencies by an abundance of superior qualities backed by sheer impudence which could easily hide his ignorance and make him the next feared of his countrymen? Had not sheer impudence cured Hitler of his inferiority complex? Unlike Hitler, Jinnah was not a political animal.

would have preferred, if it was humanly possible, to share the glory, if not the responsibility, of the nation's leadership through the Congress on a basis of 51 : 49, the lesser share of course being the "bania's" lot generously conceded to him by the fuhrer to be of Muslim politics. But the trouble with the Hindus was that they were too logical and far too unpractical for his purpose. To appear in the role of a communalist politician was distasteful to this Muslim barrister who had always said that he had nothing in common with them. But he had no other go than the Muslims whose credulity he ought to exploit to the fullest extent and carve out a position for himself. For, had he not noticed that in Bombay the Khilafat Committee in the non-co-operation days collected lakhs and lakhs of rupees from the poor Muslims and spent the money like water? It was not money that counted with Jinnah. Even his enemies admit that he was the most incorruptible person in our chequered public life. But power? He liked nothing better than that people should worship him as they would a temple idol. In the early days of his struggle with the Muslim League, he had to meet with determined opposition at the hands of the Moulvis who objected to Jinnah on several grounds. He never offered prayers, never knelt facing Mecca ; he did not even know the *Kalma* ; he had married a Parsi wife and given his daughter in marriage to a Christian. So Jinnah decided that, if he must have any pull with the Muslim community he must woo the Moulvis, albeit his contempt for the class which he always described as ignorant, unkempt and intolerable. His object was to become another Gandhi. So he set about flattering the Moulvis and called them the traditional interpreters of the Prophet and his commands. Personally he cared no more for the Prophet than for the Moulvis whom he wooed to gain his political ends. He formed new *jamiets*. The Britisher served him also to gain influence over this class. Jinnah might not have known that he was being actively aided by the British secret service. If he knew he did not care. What he did care for was a position from which he could challenge Gandhi. The Moulvis helped him attain that

position. They got reconciled to his ways and winked at his pots of whisky. They were now willing to treat Jinnah's vices as the price they had to pay for his leadership.

Sind had never been kind to Jinnah. The Sindhi Muslim priests at least declined to come under the Quaid-e-Azam's influence. Thank God, Khuhro's arrest and imprisonment followed by the unhealthy policy pursued by the "Hindu press" gave him ascendancy over the Muslims of Sind. He was very anxious, therefore, that the All-India Muslim League session must be held in Karachi that year. Big preparations were made for the session. The League session which was held in the third week of December 1943 was a spectacular success. G. M. Syed was the Chairman of the Reception Committee. His address was almost exclusively devoted to a narration of Sind's contribution to India's composite culture. Jinnah had not prepared a speech in advance. His was an *extempore* oration delivered in his broken English but it was very impressive. Although 99 per cent of his big audience did not understand a word of what he said-- for most of them knew Urdu or Sindhi and no English--Jinnah had the satisfaction of being lustily cheered at the end of every other sentence of his address. M. H. Gazdar and Yusuf Haroon who were perfect masters in the art of window dressing had posted volunteers at particular corners of the pandal with instruction either to start clapping their hands every now and then or crying "Quaid-e-Azam Zindabad" every two or three minutes. The demonstration was intended and staged for the very special benefit of foreign correspondents who had come to Karachi to watch the show. That the American correspondent who was greatly impressed was made known by their dispatches which were cable-d back to the country by the ever obliging *Press*.

Jinnah spoke for nearly three hours. But his speech could be summarised in half a dozen sentences. He said that

Excellency characterised as India's "geographical unity". This was a perfectly innocuous theme ; indeed it was nothing more than the repetition of a bare truth. But Jinnah needed no reason to attack an opponent. Nearly half of his speech was devoted to an "examination" of Wavell's innocent statement. At the end of the speech, he called me and asked what I thought of his speech. I said I would tell him the next day. The next day, of course, he had no need to summon me, for I had already commented on the speech in an editorial in the *Daily Gazette*. That article said that Jinnah's attack on Wavell was not quite convincing although the Viceroy could have desisted from giving expression even to a piece of truth and that, if I was to confuse Wavell, I would ask him whether he had the courage to ask for the inclusion of Kandahar into the Indian territory on the grounds that Kandahar was the birthplace of Gandhari, the mother of Kauravas of the *Mahabharata* and that Kandahar emphasised the geographical unity of ancient India. The day after the session was Christmas Day which was also the birthday of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. I ventured to ask him whether on this day of universal peace and goodwill he would not or could not think of coming to a reasonable understanding with the Congress and the Hindus and restore the peace of the motherland. But Jinnah would not vouchsafe an answer save to wave his hand and nod his head in a supercilious manner as if meant to indicate that he knew better.

The Karachi session of the Muslim League had succeeded in uniting all the sections of the Sind Muslim community. Muslim members of the Sind Legislative Assembly, almost without exception, joined the League Assembly party although they had been returned on independent tickets. Moula Baksh who got elected to the seat rendered vacant by the martyrdom of his elder brother, Allah Baksh, was practically the only Muslim member of the Assembly to claim to be independent. Ghulam Hussain was extremely happy because he was now assured of a solid majority to back him on the floor of the Legislature. Besides, the three European votes would be cast in

his favour in connection with any critical issue. What more did he want? For that matter, what more could he want? A ministership was his only ambition in life. But, the poor man little knew that exactly one year after this "solid unity" had been established, his position was effectively challenged by the Sind Legislative Assembly on the censure motion of Sheikh Abdul Majid over a supplementary demand for grant moved by the over-confident Premier. Ghulam Hussain lost the demand and the House had to be prorogued on account of the constitutional crisis that had developed on account of the adverse vote.

Dow was not Lancelot Graham. He was determined to continue Ghulam Hussain as Premier, Constitution or no Constitution. In this at least he might be said to be a votary of the pragmatic school of legislation. He told Ghulam Hussain not to worry. It was not in Ghulam Hussain's blood to resign a job. On a previous occasion, he had to be bundled out of office by Lancelot Graham who insisted that an adverse vote of the Legislature had automatically dissolved his ministry. Allah Baksh had then to be called to form the ministry. But Dow knew better. To him all was fair in love and war. He was at war with Indian nationalism and he was admittedly in love with his tottering Premier, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah. He put life into his Premier and told him to reconstitute the ministry and go on with the job all right without fear of being turned out.

Things which followed occurred with incredible rapidity. Ghulam Hussain's parliamentary secretary, A. K. Ghel had quietly deserted the House at the time of that crucial division over Abdul Majid's motion. In December, Ghulam Hussain dismissed him and would not see him for a while. Ghel was to be cautious, pretended to be a Communist, and tried his very best to prevent the formation of a new ministry. The failure was his because Ghel did not take it to his heart. He

So the Premier literally (not merely metaphorically) knelt before Moula Baksh and begged of him to join his ministry. Pressure was brought to bear on Moula Baksh from other quarters also. But Moula Baksh insisted that although he was willing to join his Cabinet, he would not join the League, nor even allow himself to be adopted as a member of the League party in the Assembly. After a good deal of wrangling, Ghulam Hussain agreed to Moula Baksh's condition. He gave his word of honour in the presence of Dow himself that nothing would influence him to betray Moula Baksh or to have him turned out if Jinnah himself issued a papal bull to the contrary.


But both Dow and Ghulam Hussain did not know Jinnah. The result was that both of them had to back out of their plighted word. Jinnah sent a papal bull from Bombay insisting that if Moula Baksh did not join the League he must go. Then Ghulam Hussain pleaded with Moula Baksh to join the League and promised him that his membership would be kept a close secret. Dow also told the new minister to agree to Ghulam Hussain's suggestion. It little struck this great Governor that he was departing from the honourable traditions of his predecessor. But Moula Baksh resolutely declined to oblige Ghulam Hussain and challenged him to dismiss him. Ghulam Hussain was in a fix. But the ever obliging Dow suggested a way out. He asked Ghulam Hussain to resign and reconstitute his ministry without Moula Baksh. At the time of Allah Baksh's dismissal, this high dignitary, it would be recalled, declined to interpret the vacation of the Premier's office as a constitutional crisis calling for the automatic resignation of all the other members of the Cabinet. This time it suited him to give a constitutional colour to Ghulam Hussain's resignation. In less than a week, by this process, Moula Baksh's ministerial career came to a very abrupt end. Virtually, for all practical purposes, Dow must be held as having dismissed his revenue minister, Moula Baksh, for no other reason than that he refused to join the League, although he had been assured that he needed not. Sind was again exposed to the intrigues of professional politicians who made mincemeat of Sind's interests.

MORE MUDDLE; WORSE CONFUSION

Neither in Bengal nor in the Punjab had Jinnah any voice. In the North-west Frontier, of course, he had no influence worth the name, although he had succeeded in propping up a so-called League ministry. This was done with the active co-operation of the British Governor of the Frontier Province who, as if to oblige Jinnah and in obedience to the direction of his master, Lord Linlithgow, deliberately created an artificial majority for the League in the Legislative Assembly by keeping all the effective Congress members of the Assembly behind prison bars in the holy name of war. Even so, the League Ministry was afraid of facing the Legislature. Sind, then in the circumstances prevailing, was the only area in which Jinnah could satisfy his insatiable ambition to function as dictator.

If Moula Baksh had refrained from contradicting the press report that he had refused to sign the League creed, all might have been well. As a matter of fact, Ghulam Hussain's advice to Moula Baksh was that he must let the press say anything it pleased. But Moula Baksh would not agree. He was far too honourable a man to accept and act upon Ghulam Hussain's advice, although, on a later occasion, he voluntarily joined the League and signed its creed when he found that the anti-Hindu feeling generated in the Muslim mind was far too strong for him to face or control.

So as to remove all the difficulties and so as to keep Jinnah flattered, Ghulam Hussain quietly resigned "without any commitment" to the parties concerned. Karachi Leaguers with whom I used to be on friendly terms, socially speaking, admitted to me one day that the situation was complicated but Syed was the only member to foresee no end of trouble to Ghulam Hussain whom he hated openly and said so. Ghulam Hussain sought Syed's co-operation. Syed was the President of the Sind Provincial Muslim League at the time. He declined



Major Wynn and Major Watt caught by the camera on arrival at Karachi



Left to right: Mrs. Pasha Haroon, Begum Kamaluddin, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah, Begum N. A. Haroon at a social function in Karachi



Mr. Yusuf Hussain (center) with Mr. J. A. ...
1950

to have any truck with Ghulam Hussain whom, in a statement, he characterised as a "corrupt and intolerably dishonest stooge of British Imperialism".

As a matter of fact, Jinnah's sudden reliance on Ghulam Hussain had angered the Leaguers. Syed wrote an 8-page personal letter to Jinnah. This was a charge sheet against Ghulam Hussain. He asserted that the Hindus as well as the Muslims were with him and against Ghulam Hussain and all of them intensely desired a change of the ministry. Jinnah's reactions were not made public. I managed somehow to get a copy of Syed's letter and published it exclusively in the columns of the *Daily Gazette*. The letter was in the nature of a challenge to Jinnah who had simply given a direction to the President of the Sind League to function as an obedient and faithful follower of Ghulam Hussain. This was the beginning of the rift between Jinnah and Syed culminating in the latter's expulsion.

The Haroon family exploited this situation to its own advantage. For long, it had been a war between the Ghulam Hussain family and the Haroon family for supremacy in Sind politics. But neither could gain ascendancy as Syed was far too strong for both of them. Anwar, Ghulam Hussain's eldest son, had married Sir Abdoolla Haroon's daughter. The two-families were occupying houses opposite each other's. If you called on Ghulam Hussain, a spy of Haroon would be certain to carry the report to his master that you had deliberately ignored him. On the other hand, if you called on the Haroons and returned in a hurry without paying your respect to Ghulam Hussain you might take it for granted that Ghulam Hussain would consider you as an enemy. For a newspaperman, this curious trait was a source of inconvenience. Be that as it might, the Ghulam Hussain family and the Haroon family decided to close up the ranks and sink or sail together, sharing the honours of the public life of Sind. So Yusuf Haroon was deputed by Ghulam Hussain to Bombay to plead with the Quaid-e-Azam against Syed.

In the meantime, Nihchaldas C. Vazirani started a stunt. It was to the effect that Ghulam Hussain had decided to have Syed

interned in his village home. It was not as if Ghulam Hussain was incapable of silencing a political opponent, especially when he had the backing of his patron, Sir Hugh Dow, who hated Syed like poison because Syed would never kneel before the Governor. Here I might relate a custom among the zamindar members of the Muslim community in Sind. It was the practice amongst them, while shaking hands with the Governor to cover their palm with a handkerchief which would, later on, be passed round to be kissed by the loyal gentry with due honour and affection. In a Province where even the Mirs did honour to Dow, Syed's attitude was resented by Dow who looked upon himself as the personal representative of Allah and indeed was recognised as such by the worshippers of office and power.

The effect of the kiteflying by Nihchaldas was very unfortunate. I had negotiated with Ghulam Hussain for the release from the jail of all Congress and Hindu prisoners. This I did, not as a newspaper editor, but in my capacity as the President of the Sind Civil Liberties Union. The shrewd man that Ghulam Hussain was realised the good such a move would bring him. Unfortunately, Nihchaldas's myth which Syed believed and publicised had proved to be a source of luck to Yusuf Haroon who not only had it officially contradicted but also took steps to ensure that the talks of an all-party ministry failed.

Ghulam Hussain, however, continued to be the target of criticisms from all and sundry for his betrayal of the Hindu ministers who had remained with him in his darkest day. Even Ghulam Hussain had a conscience. But Jinnah would not permit him to have any truck with the Hindus unless the Hindus came to him as Hindus and sought cooperation. So, Ghulam Hussain discovered a method by which he could please both Jinnah and the Hindus. His proposal was that he should employ Hemandas Wadhvani and Rai Sahib Gotalder as advisers to the Sind Ministry on Rs. 1,500 per month for each. The proposal found favour with the Haroon who saw in it an opportunity to weaken the opposition of Syed

Assembly Party in Sind, convened a meeting of his party to consider the situation. Reports said that Ghulam Hussain had sought a Congress-League co-operation. The Congress Party, however, favoured an all-party ministry more or less on the basis of the Azad Pact which had been practically killed by the Muslim League, although three of its leading members, Syed, Khuhro and Abdul Majid, had signed it. Syed, on the publication of the statement of the Congress Assembly Party, issued a statement clarifying his position as the President of the Sind League. He asserted that when Sidhwa had approached him originally with this formula for a solution of the ministerial tangle, he had made it clear to him that while the Muslim League Assembly Party would willingly consider a League-Congress-Hindu-Independent coalition, neither he nor his party would consider any proposal which favoured a coalition "with the group of Muslims under Khan Bahadur Moula Baksh". This was on March 25, 1945. In other words, Syed was playing with Jinnah's backing.

The *hukum* had come from Jinnah that the Sind Ministry should be a wholly League ministry. But Ghulam Hussain who was merely using Jinnah as a vehicle to gain his end was all the time nervous and apprehensive about his future with the Sultan of Pakistan, as the Sind Premier jocularly described the Quaid-e-Azam to his intimate friends. So he was carrying on with everybody who could or would provide him with a majority on the floor of the Legislature. He had approached R. K. Sidhwa for a coalition. Sidhwa was willing for a coalition provided the basis of representation would be on the model of the Azad Pact.

It was as a counterblast to this move of the Premier that Syed issued his statement referred to in a previous paragraph. He wanted to show that he was a more orthodox Muslim Leaguer than his old and corrupt rival. With that idea in view, he made it plain that he would have no truck with the Muslims of non-League persuasion. It was also meant to be a kind of challenge to the Quaid-e-Azam to keep his hands off Sind politics.

By this time Sheikh Abdul Majid had broken away from the League. He was a force to contend with in any party warfare on the floor of the legislature. As a strategist, he had few equals in the legislative house known for intrigues which were as erratic oftentimes as the treacherous course of the River Indus. He had formed an Independent Muslim Party with himself as leader. He revealed his party's resolve to press to a division his one rupee cut motion on the voting of demand for grants under head "General Administration" in the week following. He added that he had every hope that the Congress Party would throw in its weight of influence and strength on his side because he was convinced that it was no part of the function of the Congress ministry to worry about an alternative ministry unless it was prepared to follow either of the two courses, namely: (1) to accept office and help form a coalition government; or (2) to follow the Assam example and dictate how the future ministry should be formed. Sheikh Abdul Majid's interpretation of the Congress Party's long resolution on the subject left no other alternative for the Party than to follow his lead for weal or woe. Sheikh Sahib expressed the opinion in public that the Congress Party's resolution on the subject was curiously worded. He asserted that the operative part of the resolution belied the preamble which was a charge sheet against the Ghulam Hussain Ministry and had endorsed practically Syed's open and damaging charges against Ghulam Hussain. "I shall, therefore, content myself," declared Abdul Majid in an interview to the *Daily Gazette*, "by recalling Gandhiji's direction to the Assam Congressmen and would tell the Sind Assembly Congress Party that it must destroy corruption and bribery."

These charges were made pretty publicly and were not privileged pronouncements. But Sir Ghulam Hussain would not move his little finger to bring Sheikh Sahib and his friends to the book. Nor would he issue a statement refuting the charges made against him. There was still one point to be cleared. Syed had called on all Muslims to unite under the League banner and root out Ghulam Hussain's corruption. Sheikh

Sahib publicly replied to Syed and stated that if he could be convinced that, by his joining the League, the cause of the Muslims could be promoted and fostered, he would have little hesitation in responding to the appeal. But as things were, he added, by joining the League he would only have to support and keep in power the existing ministry, while in fact his own group had little in common with the League "ideals". By responding to Syed's appeal, he feared that he would be guilty of a compromise between God and Satan.

Muslim League circles, however, were confident that the Congress Party would support the Ministry despite Syed and Sheikh. Events were soon to prove that they were wrong. The truth was that Syed, who was convinced of the unanswerable logic of Sheikh, felt obliged to vote against the Ministry on the motion for the demand for grants. In the previous chapter, it was stated already that Ghulam Hussain lost heavily but was propped up by the constitutionally unscrupulous attitude of Sir Hugh Dow.

Then Syed sent a long telegram to Jinnah and told him that the Leaguers of Sind were with him and that Jinnah was wrong to force Ghulam Hussain on them. But Jinnah was taciturn. He made Syed eat the humble pie and apologise to him. Syed is a very emotional person. He thought that he had found his real leader in Jinnah. He had not yet begun to suspect that Jinnah had other ambitions in life. Perhaps a brief study of Syed's general make up would help understand the politics and personalities of the time in Sind. Jinnah rode the rough and high horse. He exploited Syed's loyalty to the extreme. At last he lost Syed. That was what the Muslim Independents were anxious for.

XVIII

G. M. SYED: A STUDY IN CHARACTER

G. M. Syed represents Sind's eternal soul. To seek to understand Sind without knowing Syed is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. In his arrogance, Dow thought he could ignore Syed. But he never could get anywhere near the soul of Sind. Syed has no university degree. But on that account you could not call him an uneducated person. He is not a widely read man either. But if you carried the impression that he was an ignoramus, you would be grievously mistaken. He often acts on instinct. Those instincts, as my friend Jethmal Parsram used to say, were invariably dependable if they confined themselves to the spiritual sphere. For, let there be no mistake about it. Syed is essentially a spiritual person to the very marrow of his bones. He often retires into solitude at Sann, his far-off village home, to commune with God and Nature. He often gets lost in his meditations which, sometimes, go on for weeks at a stretch.

I have not known any Indian politician whose attachment for Gandhiji was greater than G. M. Syed's. Time was when he was a Gandhite. He forsook the Mahatma's camp for a while and preferred to play the role of an aggressive communalist. As a communalist politician he was a failure. For, he could never bring himself to hate the Hindus, although, as Sind's Education Minister in the Mir Bundehali Cabinet, nobody was more aggressive than Syed. But that was a passing phase. Syed is subject to constant fits of moodiness. One mood would drive him to assume the role of an active politician but when it changed, he would willingly sacrifice everything for the good of his fellowmen, denying himself every comfort to which he was accustomed. He is a strange mixture of many a conflicting quality. With his rich experience of human character in its various phases, Jinnah was able to understand Syed. The result was that the Quaid-e-Azam, albeit his lack of love for anything smacking of religion or spirituality, succeeded in

creating the impression in Syed's mind that he was a spiritual entity. When in the grip of a tide of overpowering emotion, Syed could be expected to do anything. In the belief that Jinnah was a highly evolved spiritual soul, Syed was content to merge his individuality in the individuality of his newly found master and leader, the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. But when disappointment came, as it was bound to come sooner or later, he was the most miserable creature in existence.

Time was when he was a robust nationalist, drinking deep from the wells of wisdom of Lokamanya Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi. How, then, could such a person turn to communalism for a change? Even in the days when he and Syed were in opposite camps, Choithram used to swear by Syed's honesty of purpose and his freedom from personal aggrandisement. Jethmal Parsram was a devotee of Annie Besant. In his scheme of things, Syed came only next to Annie Besant. And, Jethmal was not the kind of person to be easily lured into any glittering camp for love or money. He had fought Syed but at the end of the fight he almost always embraced him. Syed indeed is a conundrum even to those who are near and dear to him. He is known for his sterling character. His absolute freedom from the vices usually associated with the landed gentry of Sind marks him out as a gem of the purest ray serene. He is one of the very few zamindars who are not devoted to Bacchus. Most of the zamindars and jagirdars of Sind are known for their impudent and disgusting claim to the exercise of what they openly say is their right to violate the modesty of any fair girl on their estate grounds. One of the many causes that led to the movement for the liberation of *Haris*, as the *kisans* of Sind were known, was the desire to put an end to this very despicable habit of the zamindars. To the credit of Syed, be it said that he is almost the only exception to that vile and beastly habit known to be a weakness with his fellow zamindars and jagirdars.

As Minister of Education to the Sind Government, he had undoubtedly done many a thing which deeply stirred the Hindu

community. For instance, he was responsible for arabicising Sindhi. Now, Sindhi is one of the few north Indian languages which could claim the greatest degree of kinship with Samskrit. Let me give an illustration or two. *Pakshi* in Samskrit connotes a bird: the same word in Sindhi reads *Pakhi*. Similarly *Akshi* which in Samskrit means the eye becomes *Akhi* in Sindhi. For some reason, this craze for the arabicisation of Sindhi took possession of the soul of Dr. Daudpota, the Director of Public Instruction to the Government of Sind. The learned doctor is an Arabic scholar of no mean merit. His attempt to arabicise Sindhi met with Syed's favour. This created a gulf between Jethmal and Syed. To say that either Syed or Daudpota was a communalist or anti-Hindu would be to indulge in an exaggeration which could not be substantiated. Syed, despite his association with a communal body like the Muslim League, always believed in and preached the cultivation of a sense of catholicity in his fellow Muslims. For instance, he used to say openly that no one could be a true Muslim or a loyal follower of the Holy Prophet who did not believe in and failed to pay homage to the Prophets of all religions and in all climes. He used to condemn the vulgar criticisms levelled at the Lord Shri Krishna by ignorant Moulvis emanating from the Punjab. He held that Shri Krishna was a Prophet and was entitled to unquestioning respect at the hands of the followers of Islam. This is one of the cardinal principles taught and insisted upon by the Holy Prophet whose followers in India and Pakistan often honour this cardinal teaching more by the breach than observance. With an admirable record of toleration, if Syed wounded the feelings of the Hindus by his attempt at arabicising Sindhi, it must be attributed to a passing fancy, one of his moods which as had been already said, was subject to constant changes. Nor do I believe Daudpota to be a communalist. Although an orthodox Muslim, his staunchest friends are Hindus. Begum Daudpota, it might be recalled, was Acharya Kripalani's niece—an educated and prightly girl full of vivacity and a sense of humour. In the 1946 general elections in Sind, she opposed the Muslim League candidate

for the women's constituency, although she failed.

The reason which, perhaps, contributed to the description of Syed as a communalist, was his advocacy of the cause of the tenants. Most of the zamindars were Muslims but there were a few Hindus also. It suited the Muslim zamindars to represent to their Hindu counterparts that Syed was an anti-Hindu and was on that account pleading for the reform of tenancy laws. It was just a coincidence that the entire tenantry in Sind was Muslim. Those who stood to benefit by tenancy laws were Muslims. But that was just an accident. It was Syed's misfortune that the Indian press which supported the abolition of zamindaris in other parts of India characterised as communal the activities of Syed in the direction not so much of abolishing the zamindaris as on securing permanent tenancy rights for the exploited land labourers of the soil. Syed's greatest collaborator in this field was Jethmal Parsram whom many Hindus looked upon as half Muslim because of his devotion to Sufism. Jethmal knew and understood the cardinal principles of the Ancient Religion of the Rishis much better than his Hindu critics. Incidentally, this great friend of Muslims, this man who toured all India striving to present the Sindhi Muslims in favourable light, could not find a place in his beloved Sind after Pakistan came into being. Jethmal's recent death in fearful and sad circumstances was a deadly blow to Syed.

There is one question which has not been answered yet. The question is this: If by temperament and training Syed was not and could not be a communalist, how is one to account for his association with the Muslim League in its worst days? The answer is to be found in Syed's psychological make up. I have already stated that he was a nationalist to the very marrow of his bones. I have often asked myself the question how it could or would be possible for a person of Syed's liberal views and attitude to sail under a communalist flag. The answer was once furnished to me by Choithram. That version of Choithram was confirmed by Allah Baksh himself on more than two occasions. Before the advent of provincial autonomy, there was functioning in Karachi a public body known as the Sind

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PEOPLE INTO PAKISTAN

People's Association which attracted to its membership roll many a distinguished and intellectual Sindhi, Hindu as well as Muslim. One of the moving spirits of this association, the last meeting of which was held in 1940, was Allah Baksh. Another was G. M. Syed. Allah Baksh and Syed had fallen out. In the Congress camp there was a good deal of rivalry and jealousy. Vallabhbhai Patel came to Karachi to settle the dispute between one set of Congressmen and another on the one hand and, on the other, to regulate the relations between the Congress Party and the other Muslim and other parties in the Sind Legislative Assembly. Amongst those who called on Sardar at Karachi was G. M. Syed. It was a pity that nobody in the Congress camp had warned Vallabhbhai of Syed's emotionalism and rough and ready manners. The result was that Vallabhbhai judged Syed to be an office-hunter. After hearing him patiently, he asked him: "Now, do you want a place on the Ministry? If so, tell me plainly without beating about the bush." Had Syed known Vallabhbhai, he would not have misunderstood him. For, Vallabhbhai was almost Syed in his rough and ready manners. He differed from the Sind leader only in the sense that while Syed was all emotions, Vallabhbhai was entirely free from emotions, and if he was, he knew how to control and hide them from the prying gaze of the vulgar. Anyhow, the result was that Syed was deeply offended and he straightaway rushed into Jinnah's arms. Jinnah who had been unsuccessfully fishing on Sind's troubled waters found in this conversion of Syed a glorious opportunity for himself. It was in 1945 when I met Sardarji at a nursing home at Poona after his release from internment at the Ahmednagar Fort that I told the Chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Board how he had misjudged Syed. In Karachi, P. N. Mehta of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company took Syed in his own able hands and succeeded in painting a better picture of Vallabhbhai for Syed's benefit. In February, 1946, when Vallabhbhai came to Karachi in connection with the impending elections to the Sind Legislative Assembly, I had the satisfaction of seeing cordial relations restored between Sardar and Syed, although

to be candid, there was no political talk between the two. In fact, politics was strictly eschewed.

Syed is a very much misunderstood person. He was misunderstood by Jinnah also because Syed would not function as Ghulam Hussain's camp follower. Perhaps, if Jinnah had agreed with Syed, there might have been no Pakistan. Jinnah preferred Syed when no influential person from Sind could be persuaded to join his Muslim League in an active capacity. Ghulam Hussain's coming changed the entire phase of the course of events. I have a suspicion that Jinnah was planning to get rid of Syed who was proving to be a source of nuisance to him and that Ghulam Hussain's accession provided the opportunity to push out Syed. Ghulam Hussain, whatever his character and albeit his tendency to corruption, was the more influential of the two and could deliver the goods for Jinnah. In that reckoning Jinnah was right. But in losing Syed, he lost Sind's soul, although he gained Pakistan of a sort—a truncated Pakistan.

It must be said to Syed's credit that once Pakistan became a settled fact, he reconciled himself to the inevitable and advised his followers to be loyal citizens of the new British Dominion. He devoted his energies, his body and soul to discover a lasting solution to the problem of the Hindu minority. But in this he had to meet with disappointment. That part of the story will be related in a later chapter which would deal with the newly created Pakistan with all its implications, its scope and limitations.

In the few months preceding the establishment of Pakistan, Syed created many an uncomfortable situations for the League of which he was Provincial President. Top ranking leaders of the Muslim League were compelled to come to Karachi at regular intervals to appease Syed if possible. Khaliqzaman came once; then came Liaquat Ali; then a deputation of three League leaders came. All of them discovered that Syed was correct and that Ghulam Hussain was corrupt to the core. But their advice to Syed was that he must make up with Ghulam Hussain who was in the good books of British Imperialism. But they

little knew that Ghulam Hussain actually betrayed the League cause at the back. That is a big story which is not known to the League circles even today.

JINNAH'S MOVE TO CONTACT SAVARKAR

Most people either in India or Pakistan do not know even now that during the war years when everybody thought that Jinnah had become unbreakably strong, he once lost his nerve to such an extent as to seek a secret contact with Vinayakrao Damodar Savarkar with the object of securing, if humanly possible, a League-Sabha Pact. It is difficult to say whether Jawaharlalji or Sardar Vallabhbhai had ever been told of this true, although unrecorded, event. Hypothetical propositions are of little value in politics. Nevertheless, I often ask myself whether, if the Congress leaders had known of this amazing incident, they would or could have done something to avert the Lahore Agreement of June 3, 1947 breaking India into two States, one of them definitely and admittedly communal. Be that as it may, it is necessary to disclose this move of Jinnah if only to enable the average person in either country to appreciate and assess Jinnah's values at their true worth.

At one stage, Jinnah had lost his nerve. Few people would believe that this man of iron could lose courage. But is not truth always stranger than fiction? Many of Jinnah's followers started grumbling at his failure to placate the Congress at a time when that body was making a supreme sacrifice for the liberation of the motherland. A few of them who were the loudest to shout "Quaid-e-Azam Zindabad" at public meetings did not hesitate to tell him that his attitude was suicidal to the interests of the League. With his superciliousness for which he was so famous, Jinnah nodded them away. But he was disturbed in mind. In 1943, he decided that if he could not come to an agreement with Gandhiji he would at least make an attempt to contact Savarkar and bring about a League-Sabha Pact. So, he quietly broached the subject one day at Karachi to Dr. Hemandas Wadhvani, Minister for Public Health to the Sind Government. Dr. Hemandas rushed to Bombay where, after a series of interviews with the ~~Minister~~

Mahasabha leader, he returned to Karachi and told Jinnah that, as soon as he returned to Bombay, the two leaders could meet and review the situation. This was after Linlithgow had blackened Jinnah's face by refusing to pass on Gandhi's communication to the League leader.

Jinnah was then in Karachi to appear before the Chief Court of Sind in an appeal preferred by Mir Bundeali Khan Talpur. One evening at the Secretariat restaurant, Mir Sahib gave a tea party in honour of the Quaid-e-Azam. There was a large and distinguished gathering which included the very proud and vain Chief Judge Sir Godfrey Davis, who used to protest that he was far too independent to be present at any political or even semi-political social gathering. I was itching to show myself off before the Chief Judge and to prove to him that, unlike his lordship, as he loved to be described, whether inside or out of the Court room, I could be more at home with the League Fuhrer and even be familiar with him. Non-chalantly I walked to Jinnah's chair and after accosting him, asked when he would be meeting Savarkar in Bombay. For once, Jinnah betrayed his uneasiness. He got up and took me aside and asked: "What is this nonsense you are speaking about?" I replied that I was talking sense all right and volunteered the information that the news had come to me from Bombay and that, in fact, I was commenting on it the next day in my paper.

By this time Jinnah had recovered from the shock. He asked what my relations were with Dr. Hemandas. I answered: "Cordial enough." I added: "If you meant to imply that the news had come to me from Dr. Hemandas you would be mistaken. I have not met him for over a week." Jinnah made one request. "Please do not publish the news. But you are at liberty to suggest that it would be good for the country if I and Savarkar (not Savarkar and I) could meet and review the situation in the interests of the country's peace."

I complied with the request. A day or two later, Jinnah left for Bombay. I was daily on the look out for some news of the Jinnah-Savarkar meeting. But the news never came. The Associated Press of India wires would not be carrying the news

but I had made other arrangements. The idea was that Savarkar should formally call on Jinnah sometime after dusk. As a matter of fact, quite a good deal of time was wasted in discussing who should first call on whom. Jinnah claimed the honour of being called upon because he was senior to Savarkar. Savarkar agreed. Even then the meeting did not take place.

On the very day that Jinnah was getting ready to receive Savarkar at his residence on the Malabar Hill, a ruffian called at his house and aimed what was intended to be a deadly blow at Jinnah with a big knife. Jinnah parried the attack and the would-be-murderer was caught. This incident in my opinion demoralised both Jinnah and Savarkar. One did not hear anything more about this abortive or aborted Jinnah-Savarkar meeting. The Hindu Mahasabha leader quietly followed Jinnah's footsteps to the extent of making his house an armed camp. After that incident it was far easier to gain access to the Viceroy's House in Delhi than get anywhere near Jinnah or Savarkar. A visitor was invariably subjected to all kinds of harassments and scrutiny before he was admitted to the presence of either of the two slaves of the devil of communalism.

Earlier, the Muslim Leaguers—sensible men amongst them—became more vocal and even summoned enough courage to tell Jinnah that he could not afford to ignore Gandhiji. The Khaksars were openly in revolt against the Muslim League. The Momins would have nothing to do with Jinnah whom they would not touch as if he were an untouchable. Jinnah felt that he must make a show of wooing Gandhiji if he was to retain his League leadership unchallenged. So he utilised the Delhi session of the Muslim League to make a move in the direction of contacting Mahatmaji. He said: "Nobody will welcome it more than myself if Mr. Gandhi is now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League. Let me tell him that it will be the greatest day both for Hindus and Muslims. If that is Mr. Gandhi's desire, what is there to prevent him from writing direct to me? (cheers). Who is there that can prevent him from doing so? (renewed cheers). What is the use of going to the Viceroy? Strong as his Government

may be in this country, I cannot believe that they will have the daring to stop a letter if it is sent to me (further cheers). It will be a very serious thing indeed if such a letter was stopped."

Gandhiji responded. He wrote a letter to Jinnah. But the Viceroy's Government did dare to stop it. Ordinarily, after his heroics and challenge, Jinnah should have waged a war on Linlithgow. He did nothing of the kind. Linlithgow told Jinnah that he had stopped the letter and added that it was Gandhiji's obvious desire to disturb the good relations between Jinnah and the British Government. In this Jinnah found a face-saving device. He withdrew the offer he had made to Gandhiji. He even abused Gandhiji and accused him of wanting to create a rift between the great Quaid-e-Azam and His Majesty's Government. It is always safe to hit a caged lion.


Jinnah was a very astute person. But his astuteness did not protect him from the attacks he was subjected to at the hands of his own followers who called him names for what many of them considered and said was a dishonourable attempt at stabbing Gandhiji in the back. The little hold he had secured over Sind was definitely lost to Jinnah on account of his betrayal of Gandhiji and his total surrender to Linlithgow. Even Ghulam Hussain called Jinnah a crafty and unscrupulous trickster. But this was said in private.

Khuhro in the meantime continued to be in jail and stood his trial for the alleged murder of Allah Baksh. In his absence, Yusuf Haroon, the ambitious son of Sir Abdoola Haroon, made a bold bid to capture the provincial league. His rival was Gazder. But Gazder did not command the confidence of Jinnah to the extent enjoyed by Yusuf. But as Home Minister of the Sind Government, Gazder behaved like a gentleman and would not do anything to molest the Congress prisoners. He had waged a battle royal against Dow himself. As Home Minister, he was also responsible for keeping the press satisfied and calm.

Things then began to move fast. Gandhiji started his famous fast which moved all the country from one end to the other. To the credit of the Sind Leaguers, be it said that they offered special prayers for the health of Gandhiji. This move-



The Three-Man British Cabinet Mission to India. The members of the Mission are Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of Exchequer and Mr. A. V. Alexander, Defence Minister. Mr. M. Sundareshan of A.P.L., Karachi is also seen in the picture.



Mr. H. J. ...
Mr. General Secretary of the Muslim League arrives in Karachi to settle the
Mr. G. H. Hidayatullah and Mr. G. M. Syed

was a definite blow to the prestige of Jinnah but Jinnah could not raise his little finger against the move.

Then, of course, came the Karachi session of the League. That I have already covered in a previous chapter.

Khuhro's trial went on at a slow pace. Jinnah refused to accept the brief to defend him. Khuhro was convicted by the lower court—the district judge of Sukkur. But on appeal the conviction was set aside and he was set free. At Karachi, the reception accorded to him was one of the grandest. Even Ghulam Hussain who had not much love for him was obliged to be present at the railway station to do him honour. Jail-going had done some good to Khuhro. He became more religious. All the local Muslims claimed him as their leader. Dow took the hint and invited Khuhro for lunch. Ghulam Hussain got nervous but he could do little. He had to find a place for Khuhro again in the ministry.

Once after Khuhro had rejoined the Sind Ministry, Liaquat Ali Khan paid a visit to Karachi to settle the dispute, if he could, between Ghulam Hussain and Syed. I had the honour of being introduced to him by his host who was no other than Khuhro. In Liaquat's very presence, Khuhro asked how, if Pakistan was conceded, they proposed to run it. He opined that partition would harm the Muslims although in public he always defended the League's demand for a partition of India. He was honest enough to admit in private that Pakistan was only a bargaining counter. For that matter, his protestations notwithstanding, Jinnah had not any other notion either.

We shall hurriedly review the entire period covered in 1944 in the hope of resuming the talk which had been obstructed by Linlithgow. But Jinnah was stubborn and would not move an inch to define his Pakistan. Then Gandhiji offered the Rajaji formula which had been based strictly on the Lahore resolution of the League. Jinnah rejected this as truncated Pakistan although three years later he was fated to get not an inch more than what the Lahore resolution had demanded. The failure of the Gandhi-Jinnah conversation was a great blow to the Sind Muslims who had hoped that something would be

done to bring about lasting unity between the Hindus and the Muslims.

Then came the British Cabinet Mission which received a warm welcome at Karachi. Sir Ghulam Hussain had decided to kick the League and Jinnah if possible. He discussed with me the main plan of a confidential memorandum he proposed to submit to the Cabinet Mission. If the British Government had accepted that plan, Pakistan would have been conceded but as an acceding state to the Indian Federation. To me was given the privilege of drafting the memorandum.

GHULAM HUSSAIN'S REVENGE

Students of contemporary events of history in India immediately preceding the partition of the country should be familiar with the story of the British Cabinet Mission, its achievements and failures. The presence in it of Sir Stafford Cripps who in 1942 had left India in a rage and had vowed vengeance on the Congress for making an unadulterated failure of what was then known as the Cripps Mission generated some misgivings in the popular mind. It might be recalled that Sir Stafford's offer in that year on behalf of the British Government over which the redoubtable champion of all that was reactionary, Mr. Winston Churchill, presided had been unceremoniously rejected by the Congress on the advice of Mahatma Gandhi who with his remarkable genius for expressive phraseology of his own coinage, characterised it as a "post-dated cheque". But it must be said to the credit of Sir Stafford that when he returned to India in 1946 with his Cabinet colleagues under the leadership of Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Labour Secretary of State for India, he behaved remarkably well and even appeared as if he had forgotten that he had any grudge against Gandhiji or Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. This truly remarkable English trait which refuses to allow temper or temperamentality to get the better of the need to take a practical view of life and take into consideration what is and obviously cannot be helped is worthy of cultivation in India and Pakistan where memory plays havoc and logic is disconcertingly devastating—a little too much to aid human progress. Without saying so in so many words, Sir Stafford Cripps made it plain by his general attitude and sympathetic approach to the Indian viewpoint that, if in 1942 he was the mouthpiece of an essentially reactionary Government of Great Britain, he was today here in India as the representative of a Labour Government which had the courage to snub Churchill and would dare to liquidate the British Empire

if thereby alone he and his colleagues could save Britain's face in the eyes of the civilised world.

It is not within the purview of this volume to review at length the various stages of the Cabinet Commission's conferences with the divergent interests which might have confused and confounded a deputation of any other nation than Britain. But a friendly approach was made possible and easy by the frankly worded statement of Congress leaders who, on their release from their internment, repudiated any responsibility for the violent rebellion which, by his incurable stupidity, Lord Linlithgow had unwittingly given rise to. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant in 1945 not only disowned the 1942 movement but also declared that no such movement had been officially initiated by the Congress or by Mahatmaji. They had thus tacitly endorsed Gandhiji's earlier declaration from his prison in September 1942 that the wholesale mass arrests of Congress leaders appeared to have made the people wild with rage to the point of losing self-control. "I feel," asserted the Mahatma, "that the Government, not the Congress, are responsible for the destruction that has taken place." Gandhiji's straight statement could carry no conviction in the British camp at the time when it was made. Linlithgow who should know Gandhiji better made one of the worst blunders of his life—in fact, the most tragic. He preferred to believe that Mashruwalla's untenable and stupid interpretation of Gandhiji's teaching was more authoritative and more dependable than Gandhiji's own assurances. It little struck the Viceroy that he was dealing with a man who would sooner plunge himself into the fire than tell an untruth even to save his face. If he had even an iota of historic sense, he should have remembered that this greatest man of the age had the courage needlessly to own responsibility for an outbreak of violence in Chauri Chaura in 1923 and recalled his 'no tax' campaign, only to walk unwittingly into the trap laid for him by Lord Reading.

In the issue of the *Hurizon* which came out the day after the arrest of the Congress leaders, Mashruwalla who had been

associated with Gandhiji all his life and was presumed to be conversant with the Mahatma's inner mind gave a disastrous lead which was at once a total repudiation of Gandhiji's teachings. I read that issue of the *Harijan* a few days later at Jaipur while I was staying as Sir Mirza Ismail's guest under his hospitable roof. I can recall vividly the shock which it produced on this statesman whose love for Gandhiji was a peculiar trait in him. Had he not dared while he was Dewan of Mysore to ignore the warning of the British Resident and the British Viceroy, to accept and treat Gandhiji as a State Guest in Mysore? Had he not again in 1938 simply brushed aside the British Resident's dictatorial "instructions" and received Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who had come to Bangalore to inquire into the tragedy of Vidhurashwaththa? Spontaneously and in a voice choking with rage, Sir Mirza Ismail, as he tossed the *Harijan* literally to my face shouted: "This man, Mashruwalla, has killed Mahatma Gandhi. He does not know Gandhiji but the people and the Government will think that he is Mahatma Gandhi's mouthpiece." Shri C. Rajagopalachariar repudiated the stupid interpretation of Mashruwalla and was laughed at by the mad crowds.

It is not part of the mission of this book to review at length all the tragedies in the wake of Mashruwallah's unwarranted and unfortunate interpretation which gave Gandhiji a bad name in the eyes of the Allies. On August 15, 1942, Mahadev Desai who, if he had been consulted, would have corrected the erring and erroneous meaning put into Gandhiji's "Do or Die" slogan, died of "heart failure". My own impression is that the heart failure was nothing less than murder in its purest form. I find it difficult to believe even today that he was not actually killed by the British authorities so as effectively to silence him. August 15, 1942 was the anniversary of the first outbreak of the first war of Indian Independence. In their fright, the Britishers must have killed good old Mahadev. My friend A. S. Iyengar who was destined a few years later to function as the publicity mouthpiece of the arrogant British Government of the day actually told Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar at a press conference

in Delhi a day or two after Mahadev's death that in his own mind he had no doubt that Mahadev was the victim of pre-meditated murder at the hands of the British military in India. When the Cabinet Mission arrived in Delhi and when Sir Stafford Cripps learned that Iyengar was publicity officer for the British bureaucracy, he accosted Iyengar and declared amidst the derisive cheers of the pressmen assembled: "Oh, Mr. Iyengar, so the poacher becomes watchman!" But this is by the way.

In an earlier chapter I have stated that Ghulam Hussain's respect for Gandhiji was genuine and that as Home Member of the bureaucratic Government of Bombay, he refused to allow Gandhiji to die of the fast which he had undertaken. The effect which Mashruwalla's statement produced in the grand old man of Sind was one of hatred for Mashruwalla. Although on account of his insatiable love of office and power he had sold his body and soul to Jinnah for a mess of pottage, Ghulam Hussain was biding his time to have his revenge upon Jinnah when a suitable opportunity should arrive. This opportunity arrived when after the Cabinet Commission reached Delhi, it had caused an invitation to be sent to Ghulam Hussain to submit a memorandum and help the Mission come to a settlement. Within an hour or two after the receipt of the invitation, Ghulam Hussain hurriedly called on me and took me away with him to his house where we discussed the *pros* and *cons* of a weird scheme he had in mind. At the end of the talk, he said, "Look here, Sharma, this Pakistan must not come and Jinnah should be dished. Please produce my memorandum tonight and give it to me tomorrow without fail."

The task was, by no means, an easy one. But I had the able assistance of my friend P. N. Mehta (not of Dalmia but of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company). Mehta is a clear thinker. Were I India's Prime Minister, I would unhesitatingly employ this puny, little person as my Ambassador to the United States to neutralise the wicked propaganda of Pakistan. Now, with Mehta's help, I managed to make a draft by about 4 o'clock the next morning. In fact, the memorandum was typed out at

Mehta's house in Mahatma Gandhi Road, Karachi. Unfortunately, the copy which I had with me had hurriedly to be destroyed in 1947 after Pakistan came into being. But I can still recall the salient features of the memorandum which Ghulam Hussain, after meeting Jinnah in Delhi quietly submitted to the Cabinet Mission at the Viceroy's House.

The plan, which was Ghulam Hussain's own, was this. India should be a federation but a loose federation with only three subjects allotted to it, namely, Communications, Defence and Foreign Relations. Ghulam Hussain believed and said that the first two items should necessarily include control over a number of industries in the Provinces. In this belief he expected that a day would come sooner or later when a stronger federal centre would automatically come into being. Now remained the question of how to appease Jinnah. Pakistan as conceived by Jinnah did not appeal to Ghulam Hussain. He thought it would harm India and the Muslims. So he found a *via media*. It was a bold scheme which he had not the courage to communicate to the Congress Party which, in that case, might have judged him better. The federating units would be regional sub-federations composed of different provinces. Thus there would be an Eastern Zone, a Southern Zone, a Western Zone, a Northern Zone and a Central Zone. The Eastern Zone was to be composed of Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. By this means, Ghulam Hussain planned to weaken the Muslim League in Bengal. The Southern sub-federation was to be composed of Madras, the southern States of Travancore and Cochin and also Mysore. The whole of the Bombay Presidency together with the Maharashtra, Gujerat and Kathiawar States would constitute the Western Zone, while Sind, the Punjab, the North West Frontier and the United Provinces with all the Indian States in their territories would be the Northern Zone. The Central Zone would consist of the Central Provinces, Hyderabad, Gwalior, Indore, Rewa, Jaipur, Jodhpur and other States. The advantage of this scheme according to its distinguished author, was that for all practical purposes, excepting perhaps in the Southern and Western Zonal Federations, the Hindu and the Muslim elements

would be more or less equal and balancing. This, he felt, would concede Pakistan of a sort without its baneful features. I have reason to believe that Lord Wavell pressed Ghulam Hussain to permit him to take Gandhiji and Jinnah into his confidence. But Ghulam Hussain would not agree because he was terribly afraid of Jinnah's biting tongue. What might have happened and what could or would have happened, if Ghulam Hussain's scheme provided the basis of discussion? It is useless to speculate.

Sir Ghulam Hussain's memorandum must be read against the background furnished by the Cabinet Mission itself. Discovering that the contending parties to the dispute could not come to an agreement between themselves, the Cabinet Mission on May 16, 1946, made a proposal as a basis for discussion and further exploration. The Mission's offer was a Union of India with a Federal Government functioning in the Capital of India. The provinces would retain all residuary powers. The Provinces, moreover, were to be regrouped into three sections. The treaty to be arrived at would govern Indo-British relations. The plan for an interim Government was rejected by the Congress which did not agree to the regrouping of the provinces. But it was a compromise with the League. Although I have no material evidence to come to such a conclusion, it is my belief that the Cabinet Commission, after mature deliberation, made something out of Ghulam Hussain's plan but watered it down a great deal. Churchill characterised the Cabinet Mission's plan as an "able but melancholy document". Melancholy it was, it did not take into account the Indian States which Ghulam Hussain had included in his plan which might have met with the approval of the Congress if only Ghulam Hussain had permitted Wavell to mention it to the Congress deputation. The Congress, however, agreed to that part of the Cabinet Plan which offered to summon a Constituent Assembly.

NAVAL REVOLT AND AFTER

Events in Sind in 1946 moved with such incredible rapidity as made it difficult even for trained professional journalists to keep pace. Several factors combined to give the Hindus a false sense of security. Echoes of the naval revolt of Bombay were heard and enacted in Karachi also. The Navy boys in Sind's capital, as if not to be beaten by their comrades in Bombay, staged a demonstration of their own. They suddenly disturbed Karachi's placid life by firing a naval gun. Had the gun been turned towards the city side, a good part of Karachi would have been blown up. For a moment it looked as if the city was in the grip of an earthquake. It was some time before people realised what it was.

This minor revolt had a curious effect on the nerves of Sir Hugh Dow and Major-General Hind, commander of the Sind-Baluchistan army district. Both these men were known for their stupid adherence to the cult of the white man's burden. Hind who, in his earlier days in Delhi, had been known for his suavity and courtesy had turned over a new leaf (alas for the worse) under the direction and advice of his bosom friend, Sir Hugh Dow. He developed curious notions, not the least of which was his honest belief that in the holy name of war he could expect to boss it over the newspaper editors of Karachi. If, albeit his newly developed and therefore clumsily practised bureaucratism, his regime was not a total failure it must be attributed to his luck in getting the services of trained publicity men who knew the psychology of newspapermen. Captain Wasi and Captain (now Colonel) C. S. Andrades (now News Editor of the *Times of India*) were popular figures in Karachi's newspaper world. To them and not to Hind was due the excellent publicity which the British war effort got at the hands of the Sind newspaper press as a whole. Poor Hind imagined that he could refuse newsprint supply if an editor did not pay

"Quit India" demand might well have been given effect to a year and a half before its time.

While the naval revolt had left an unpleasant odour behind it for the steel frame of which Dow was the life-breath, the Hindus of Sind, particularly the Congress sections amongst them, began to believe that Swaraj had already come. In a sense their dangerous complacency was perhaps natural. The naval revolt was by no means a communal affair. The Muslim section of the Navy completely co-operated with the Hindu rebels. The Hindus thought that this revolt had sounded the death-knell of both the British overlordship and the Muslim League communalism. They were right but not about themselves as later events showed.

Right about this time, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had thundered again and again that neither he nor the Congress would have any truck with either the communal-minded Muslim League or its arrogant fuhrer, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. This assurance too contributed to the false sense of security in the Sind Congress and Hindu camps. The hold that Panditji had over the Sind Muslim masses was something one could not easily imagine. When he arrived in Karachi in 1946 in connection with the Congress election campaign he was accorded a reception which eclipsed every previous demonstration in honour of any political personage. Right from the sea-airport in the heart of the city where he was to address a mammoth public meeting, it was a sea of human heads. It need hardly be emphasised that the bulk of the crowds was Muslim. The reception which Karachi accorded to Jinnah a few months later when he came as Governor-General designate of Pakistan was comparatively poor and not even worth mentioning.

Wherever Jawahar went, he was hailed as a conquering hero. Apprehending that some mischief might be done by the leaguers from the Punjab, Sir Gorden Hargrave took the precautionary measures to guard Panditji's person. One day in the forefront of the special contingent was Panditji, victorious tour on the North Western Frontier, the first

policeman who, braving the intense cold of the season, was travelling to guard Panditji's valued and valuable person. Jawaharlalji even as India's Prime Minister hates and resents the precautions taken by the police to guard him. One could easily imagine how he would have reacted to the Sind experience. With that sudden impulse which he could never control and had never controlled, he opened the door and literally kicked the policeman and swore that he was not wanted. When this news reached Karachi, with that generosity which had always marked his relations with the Hindus, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah prohibited the newspapers from giving publicity to this unfortunate incident lest it should be given a communal colour. Neither Jawaharlal Nehru nor Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah could be called a communalist. Ghulam Hussain knew and understood the greatness in Jawahar. Unfortunately, Jawahar never understood Ghulam Hussain. He did not even make an effort. In underrating Ghulam Hussain, he made a Himalayan blunder.

Be that as it might, the truth was that circumstances so conspired as to leave the Hindus of Sind complacent. The election in the early part of 1947 was a complete victory for the Muslim League. All the non-Muslim seats went to the Congress. By this time Sir Hugh Dow had gone over to Bihar. He had left Sind on the All Fools' Day, 1946, unhonoured, unwept and unsung. He had been succeeded by my good friend, that arch-intriguer, Sir Francis Mudie who went one better than Dow to foment communal rivalries. Mudie had one advantage over his predecessor. Although bureaucratic like Dow, he had no false sense of prestige. He could move on terms of equality with the prince as well as the peasant. Dow at least had advised Ghulam Hussain to make an attempt to include at least one Hindu in his cabinet. Mudie was made of different stuff. He advised his Premier not to have any truck with the Congress Party unless it agreed to function as a Hindu party and offered cooperation as a party representing the Hindu minority of Sind. This was an advice which found favour with Mr. Jinnah.

Between Mudie and his helpless Premier, the elections in Sind were admirably managed so as to make it appear that the Province was indisputably and demonstrably League-minded. Officials had instructions to close the polling booths within an hour of their opening. Every name on the voters' list had voted! Yes, of course, even those who had gone to the other world obliged the Muslim League by casting their votes in favour of the League candidates. Curiously enough, they must have fought shy of sunlight. So, the presiding officers obligingly permitted them to vote before 8 A.M. The reader is entitled to reconstruct events in such ways as are open to him.

In such an atmosphere surcharged with artificial communalism, Jinnah deputed to Karachi—a person calling himself a Muslim divine—the Pir of Manki Shariff. This Pir who later on regretted his part as a stooge of Jinnah did his worst to stir up communal feelings in Sind. Night after night at the Idgah maidan he gave free vent to his fairly strong pair of lungs. Loud-speakers carried his message to every part of the city. He said that the Frontier Gandhi and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib were Hindu hirelings. He thundered that it was the sacred duty of Muslims to kill *kaffirs*. But be it recorded to the great credit of the Sind Muslims that his fervently outrageous appeal fell on deaf ears. This too had a quietening effect on the Hindus who preferred to abide in a false sense of security.

But that was not all. On September 2, 1946, Lord Wavell had formed a national Government with Pandit Nehru as its Chief. The Muslim Leaguers would not join the new Cabinet. But they resented the stroke of luck which put the "Hindu Congress" in positions of vantage and power. Even before the Congress took office, Jinnah had persuaded his followers to observe August 15, 1946 as a day of protest. The Great Killings of Calcutta were engineered by the Muslim League to strike terror into the heart of the Hindus. Even in those days despite the appeals of the Punjab Muslim divines who invaded Sind in hundreds, the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims of

the Province were cordial enough. No Muslim from the Punjab dared to take the offensive for the fear that the Sind Muslim reactions would be such as to dish the Punjabi.

That in these circumstances the Hindus felt their position safe was not to be wondered at. The general attitude of the Sind Muslims was, not only outwardly but also inwardly, friendly to their Hindu brothers. That was so even of the Leaguers. The Punjab Muslims could not simply tolerate this state of things. Their temper was aggravated when they discovered that Swami Ranganathananda's weekly discourses on the Gita at the Karachi branch of the Ramakrishna Mission attracted a goodly number of Sind Muslims whose sense of toleration was such as the Prophet of Islam (May God's Peace be upon him!) had preached and practised in his day.

Not even did the Leaguers of Sind honestly think or expect that Pakistan was coming. They were thoroughly demoralised by Pandit Nehru's tour. Many of them privately told me that it was their robust hope that Panditji's mission would succeed and India's unity would continue to be maintained. The Punjab-U.P. hierarchy is all powerful in Sind today. I shall advisedly refrain from mentioning names. I had an opportunity of being closeted with Pandit Nehru for a brief while during his stay at Karachi. But I could not tell him what the Leaguers had told me in confidence.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL BLUNDER

Muslim Leaguers in Sind realised and said that the prospect of Pakistan had receded. This was no part of their propaganda tactics. They honestly believed that Jinnah had bungled by refusing the invitation of Pandit Nehru to join the National Government. Many of them openly stated, although for the sake of their own personal safety it would not be for me to divulge their names, that in order to placate the Muslim minorities in Hindu-majority provinces, the Quaid-e-Azam was definitely sacrificing the interests of the Muslims of the Muslim-majority provinces of which Sind was one. One such Leaguer explained to me how his colleagues felt about it. Jinnah wanted 50 per cent representation for the Muslims in Hindu provinces. That would be gain for the Muslims. But in return, provinces like Bengal, where the Hindus were in a statutory minority would greatly suffer. While in the Punjab and Bengal the statutory minority might become a majority in any census operation, because the difference was very small, the position of the Muslims in Sind where the Muslims constituted 77 per cent of the population and in the North West Frontier Province where they were more than 95 per cent would become unenviable. "Why should we sacrifice," they argued, "to flatter the small Muslim minority in other provinces?"

Moreover, they felt and declared, although not in public that the League had become a spent force. Jinnah had missed the bus, according to them. Although the Muslim League had issued a circular to the League Government of Sind to ignore any instruction or direction emanating from Delhi, Ghalib Hussain quietly ignored the League High Command's wishes. What, however, was most objectionable from the Sind Muslim point of view was not even the fact that Jinnah had been elbowed out but that Sardar Baldeo Singh, a Sikh, had been put in charge of the Defence Portfolio. Of this view the loudest protagonist was G. M. Allana, the brain of the Sind Muslim

League. Now, Allana was in Calcutta at the time of the Great Killings. He had watched personally how the Sikhs had given it back to the Muslims with a hundredfold compound interest. Allana used to say that Sind would get reconciled to the National Government if a Sikh was not at the head of the Defence Department.

All this was talk. In the nature of tangible evidence, Yusuf Haroon's deal with the Central Government of which Pandit Nehru was the head proved that even a close adherent of Jinnah like himself got sick of the Quaid-e-Azam and his ways. That Yusuf believed that Jinnah was finished ought to be evident from his open attempt to secure a contract for and on behalf of the Government of India to purchase food supply from Sind and export it to the needy provinces. Babu Rajendra Prasad, who was the Food Member of the Nehru Cabinet, must have been surprised to find his old friend Abdoola Haroon's son kneeling before him for this contract. Rajen Babu himself is a very tolerant person. But what did amuse me at the time was that, although *Al Wahid* during the time when Yusuf was associated with it had criticised Rajen Babu in vulgar language for daring to write about the impracticability of Pakistan, Yusuf could go so far as to bend himself for a contract. Anyhow, this incident ought to prove that the Muslims themselves were in a very depressed state of mind.

Even at this time I fail to see why the Congress did not think fit to utilise this opportunity to make a deal with other sections of the Indian Muslims. But Jinnah had, by this time, realised his mistake. He wanted somehow to gain even an inch of ground, if possible, in the Government of India. He wrote to Lord Wavell asking for an interview. This was as a result of the confabulations at Mr. Liaquat Ali's Delhi residence. Lord Wavell was in no hurry to answer. The reason was this. At the time when Pandit Nehru accepted his invitation to form a Government, he had stipulated that although the Government would be an irresponsible Government under the Government of India Act (1935), he and his colleagues would not be responsible to the Viceroy but function as if they owed their allegiance

and final responsibility to the people of India. Lord Wavell had accepted this condition which had been ratified by His Majesty's Government. That being so, Lord Wavell felt, as a man of honour and a gentleman, that he must have no deal with Jinnah save on the advice of Pandit Nehru. The presumption was that Lord Wavell would refuse to see Jinnah if Pandit Nehru disapproved.

For the information which I herein record I am obliged to a high army officer who enjoyed the confidence of Lord Wavell and was one of the very few Englishmen who remained true to India's salt and had strained every nerve, alas unsuccessfully, to prevent India being broken up into fragments of narrow domestic walls. Well, here is the story. After lunch on a certain day, the Viceroy mentioned to Pandit Nehru that Jinnah had written to him asking for an interview. Would Nehru like him to receive Jinnah? Panditji replied that it was Wavell's business and he had nothing to do with it. By what might be, after all, a mere indiscretion, Panditji revived the Government of India structure into a Viceroy's Government from a Nehru Government which it was by consent. I have reason to believe that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was not even apprised of this incident. There is no warrant for the belief in certain quarters that Vallabhbhai was agreeable to this course. By a curious coincidence I was in Delhi on the fateful day and had just come after my interview with the army officer mentioned above. Vallabhbhai ridiculed the notion and said that Wavell could not dare to invite Jinnah over the heads of his colleagues.

In the meantime, however, Gandhiji went on pressing the need for the absorption of the League elements. Then Jinnah was called by the Viceroy. He had his way. He insisted that the Congress should do away with the nationalist Muslims in the Cabinet. He had allotted to the League the portfolios ~~that~~ he had desired. He preferred the Home and Defence portfolios of course. But Vallabhbhai was a hard nut to crack. ~~Nehru~~ stood by the Defence Member. Liaquatli became ~~Finance~~ Member of the Government of India. Sardar ~~Abdullah~~ Nishtar, I. I. Chundrigar and other worshippers at ~~the shrine~~

of the Quaid-e-Azam were duly installed in the Government of India. J. N. Mandal was a nominee of the League. Jinnah himself preferred to remain outside.

In Sind at least the feeling was that Vallabhbhai would give no quarter to Jinnah and that if Gandhiji restrained Vallabhbhai even then Jinnah would have to be content with the crumbs left over for those who came to dinner in the second or third batch. In that estimate of Vallabhbhai's ability and shrewdness, the Sind Leaguers were correct. But what happened was that Jinnah completely bypassed Nehru. By right it was Nehru's privilege to be interviewed by the League Chief. It was also his right to allot portfolios. Unfortunately, however, what happened was that Lord Wavell was restored to a position which had lain dormant.

From within the Cabinet, Liaquat Ali forgot the country or even the Muslims and waged a relentless guerilla warfare, the object of which was nothing more than to prove to the world that Indians were a divided people who would not trust, or co-operate with one another. While the League was outside the Government fold, it was directing the lawless element from behind the screen. Now it was doing things openly. Wavell was helpless. The Congress felt powerless to put an end to this. Jinnah's hope was that he would so manoeuvre things as to compel the Congress to resign in order to enable him to take complete charge of the Government of India. That was at least what he told Sind Leaguer, Yu of Haroon being among them.

Liaquat Ali was angry with the Indian business men who had supported the nationalist cause throughout. Day after day at his residence—8, Harding Avenue, New Delhi, where now the Pakistan High Commission is situated—he took counsel from all and sundry. At last he evolved a plan which he hoped to strike at the very existence of the hated Hindu. He put forward every conceivable and imaginable idea to the test of normal business. At last, in the wake of the creation of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali and his colleagues left Delhi for the purpose of a trip to Hyderabad to meet the Government of that State. It was on the 15th of October, 1947, that the Central Government had

formulated for the extinction of the Indian business community has now become a popular slogan. Thus, the Muslim League had a double victory. It not only gained Pakistan but it also left behind it in India a trail of bitterness calculated ultimately to impede the growth and expansion of wealth in this country.

Things became very hot indeed. Wavell was succeeded by Mountbatten who could always smile in and enjoy any company. I am not sure whether I am grateful or ungrateful for the kind of freedom which this august member of the British nobility carved out for India. In Pakistan, of course, his name was very popular. To this man was due the Lahore Agreement of June 3, 1947. The Congress at last agreed to divide India. This decision came as a shock to the Sind Hindus, certainly vastly more so to the Punjabi Hindus who, like their Sindhi brothers, had been content to pin their faith in the Congress.

The division involved a partition of Bengal. But the Bengalees at least have no right to find fault with the Congress for the division of their Province. The Congress leaders took the precaution of consulting representative public opinion in Bengal, before it affixed its signature to the infamous document which cut India in twain. Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, and many others conferred together and gave "their whole-hearted approval" to the partition of Bengal, although Suhrawardy opposed it because he might lose his Premiership for ever.

There is a notion among the Sind and the Punjab Hindus that Mahatma Gandhi had also betrayed them. They say that Gandhiji had assured them that there would be no Pakistan save over his dead body and that he had broken his word. This is an erroneous view which has no basis in fact. Gandhiji was no party to the Lahore Agreement. At that time he was in East Bengal. He instructed Acharya Kripalani to oppose the move tooth and nail. When the division was agreed to in the very face of his opposition, he told Kripalaniji at Delhi: "Oh, even you have betrayed me! Were I twenty years younger, I would start a new movement to break this agreement." But being a practical idealist, Gandhiji directed his attention to secure the

safety and well-being of the minorities in either dominion. He begged of the Hindus in Pakistan to stay on in the new dominion. He also appealed to the Muslims here not to think of Pakistan. It was Gandhiji's hope that the two dominions together would make conditions which would be a paradise for the minorities.

At the time the Agreement was entered into between the British Government, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, I was away in South India on a holiday. Returning to Karachi, I took the earliest opportunity of contacting Gandhiji who, consistent with his devotion to the cult of Hindu-Muslim Unity, appealed to me and through me, my friend P. N. Mehta to continue to stay on in Karachi until things become really and incurably impossible.

I can honestly say that both Mehta and I made every effort to function as Pakistan citizens without surrendering our Indian nationality. But things took a violent turn. It was a chapter of disillusioned ideals. But let me not anticipate.

So Pakistan became a settled fact. All the logic and facts were on the side of the Congress and the Hindus. But a relentless destiny over which we had no control or influence gave its verdict in favour of the Muslim League. Before that Agreement was actually implemented, we ought to have seen to it that the Muslims who, like Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib, had sacrificed their best for India's lasting interests were moved to this country if only to give the revengeful Leaguers no opportunity to vent their unholy wrath on those whose only fault was their patriotism.

JINNAH HERALDS PAKISTAN

During my absence in South India the *Daily Gazette* had changed hands. I was not aware of it till my return to Karachi. Curiously enough Seth Ramkrishna Dalmia of Delhi had purchased the paper at a fancy price. The actual deal, however, awaited my return. I felt a little surprised and not without reason. Before anybody thought that Pakistan could or would come into being, I had myself proposed to Sethji to purchase the *Daily Gazette*, my motive being to save the paper from falling into the hands of the *Times of India* group. At that time, Ramakrishnaji showed no interest in the paper although his biggest industrial enterprise was located at Karachi. Through a local friend I had also sounded another well-known industrialist who, however, evinced little interest in the matter because he was convinced that Pakistan was coming and he felt no inclination to transfer his affections to Karachi. But on my return to Karachi after my holiday, I discovered that Ramakrishnaji had volunteered to take over the *Daily Gazette* and obviously offered a decent price. Before I could say a word, my proprietor with whom my relations had been extraordinarily friendly choked me off by saying that I should continue to edit the paper for Seth Dalmia for six months at least as he (Hoshang N. E. Dinshaw) had already committed himself in that regard. Even today I would be ready and willing to leap into the fire if • thereby I could serve Hoshang who had been more of an elder brother than an employer to me. It should not be surprising, therefore, that I bowed to his decision. The arrangement was that along with Narayan B. Juvalekar, the General Manager of the *Daily Gazette* and Dingomal Narain Singh, eminent barrister of Karachi, I should fly to Delhi and meet Dalmiaji.

By a curious coincidence almost at the same time, I got a telephone message from Yusuf Haroon who said: "Quaid-e-Azam would be obliged if you would personally be present at his Press Conference summoned at Delhi. He particularly

requests that you should meet him for about half an hour before the conference is due to meet." This was a surprise to me. But I readily accepted the invitation. Which professional journalist would fight shy of an adventure, especially one which comes his way—unasked! So, according to schedule I reached Delhi and stayed as the guest of Jaidayal Dalmia. The next day I was to meet Shri Ramakrishna Dalmia. But as I had an earlier engagement with the Quaid-e-Azam, I put off my visit to the new owner of the *Daily Gazette* till the afternoon.

Jinnah's Press Conference was scheduled for 12 noon. But I was ushered into his presence as early as 10-30 A.M. in his lavishly furnished office room at 10, Aurangzeb Road. Jinnah received me with the utmost cordiality and, after shaking hands, straight-away dived into the subject he had in mind without any preface whatsoever. He started by expressing the hope that I would continue to stay on in Karachi and assist him in bringing about better and more cordial and lasting relations between the two communities. I was little prepared for this kind of attack from Jinnah of all the people under the sun.

"Do you know, Mr. Jinnah," I asked, "that the *Daily Gazette* has been bought by Ramakrishna Dalmia?"

Jinnah beamed with pleasure. "That is very good news, my dear fellow! I say it is very, very good news."

He kept on repeating these words at least four times.

"I would make it worth while for you with Dalmia. Do stay on in Karachi," he thundered as if he was delivering a public lecture.

I said I was under an obligation to Hocheung to stay on for six months at least.

Jinnah intervened and shouted. "That is both. You cannot go out of Karachi."

I laughed. I flatter myself that I was one of the few persons who dared to provoke the august Fichtel of Pakistan.

Jinnah then came to brass tacks and said he was taking me into confidence. The long and short of his lecture to me was just this. Now that he had got Pakistan, he had a duty to perform towards his Hindu subjects. He had to be very careful and

agreed to divide as brothers. There was no trail of bitterness. There could be no question of any exchange of populations now.

"Hindus of Pakistan will have to live in Pakistan and the Muslims of India will have to live in India," he averred.

The next question was what kind of treatment awaited the minorities in Pakistan.

"Generous to a fault," he said and added: "Whatever might be the attitude of India—I hope the Congress will be just—we of Pakistan are resolved upon a policy of generosity to the Hindus and other minorities. I am going to show how the minorities should be treated."

As if as an afterthought, he observed: "Of course, I expect complete and unquestioning loyalty to Pakistan at the hands of the Hindu minority."

To another question he replied that he would unhesitatingly give the Hindu minorities in Pakistan all the privileges he had demanded for the Indian Muslims.

"There would be no interference with religion," he said in reply to yet another question. "Everybody would be free to follow his own religion without molestation."

"My ancestors in Arabia," he added, "had set a lesson in toleration."

This answer was not on the agreed list. I could not repress a smile verging on contempt because I knew, coming as I did from Karachi that Jinnah's parents were Hindus and Jinnah himself had never visited Arabia.

The conference was then over. Altaf Hussain of the *Dawn* reported in his paper that the editor of the *Daily Gazette* had plied the Quaid-e-Azam with the maximum number of questions. The poor fellow little knew that his leader and I had rehearsed the questions and answers. But I have a notion that Altaf Hussain never forgave me for what he thought my presumptions and impudent cross-examination. About this I shall have something to say later on.

That very afternoon I paid my respects to Mahatma Gandhi and faithfully reported to him every word of my talk with Jinnah. Gandhiji was pleased and he even suggested that I

sharp. He made a brief statement. It was this. He had received thousands of telegrams and cables from all over the world—"I tell you", he repeated, "from all over the world, and thousands of them"—"congratulating me on my appointment as the Governor-General of Pakistan."

"It is physically impossible for me," he added, "to acknowledge all these telegrams and cables. I just want to say how grateful I am for these congratulations and good wishes."

So far as Jinnah was concerned, the Press Conference was at an end.

Nobody ventured to put any question. Jinnah asked if anyone wanted to elicit answers to any question.

I got up and said: "Mr. Jinnah, your statement does not call for any questions. Obviously no question can directly arise from your statement and you are not likely to tolerate other questions which you would be bound to consider irrelevant and say so."

Jinnah nodded his head in a patronising manner and with a wave of his hand, said: "Now, you put any question you please. I shall try to answer to the best of my ability."

The first question I put was not on the agreed list. But I risked his displeasure and asked how he who had always claimed that he would take no office under the British Crown had accepted to serve as the Britannic King's representative in Pakistan."

Jinnah was surprisingly calm and suave. He said that my question proved that I had not understood the position.

"I shall tell you," he said and added: "I have accepted no office under the British Crown. It is my people that have called me to this office."

Then came my second question—"Had you not stated in the past, Mr. Jinnah, that there should be an exchange of population between India and Pakistan? I suppose, now, that the division of the country would be followed by preservation of Muslims from the former and of Hindus from the other side?"

"You are mistaken," declared Jinnah.

And he continued that the old demand for the exchange of population was cancelled. It is a thing for the past. There is

PAKISTAN COMES INTO BEING

Less than a week was all that remained between Jinnah's arrival in Karachi and the actual inauguration of Pakistan. The first thing that Jinnah did was to order the Sind Government to vacate the Secretariat and seek sanctuary in military barracks so as to make room for the Secretariat of the Pakistan Government. In the belief and hope that Pakistan was going to be a paradise for the minorities, the Hindus of Sind—yes, even those who had resisted the demand for a bifurcation of the country—got reconciled to the inevitable and co-operated with their Muslim fellow-citizens to make the formal inauguration ceremony a spectacular success. As a matter of fact, most of the money—indeed all the money collections—for the purpose had been contributed willingly and ungrudgingly by the Hindus. That was so because of the practical approach to issues on the part of the Sind Hindus. It would be a mistake to think that Acharya Kripalani was representative of the Sind Hindu genius. Kripalani knows not the art of compromise albeit his claim to have sat at the feet of so noble a teacher as Mahatma Gandhi. The average Sindhi Hindu is a practical realist. He was determined to make the best of a bad bargain and contribute his mite to the success and well-being of the newly created British Dominion. Had only the Pakistan officialdom been a little more imaginative and a little less intolerant, Pakistan could have shaped itself into a real Paradise. But that is another story which will be dealt with in its due place.

For weal or woe, Lord Mountbatten had fixed the date for the partition of India. Astrologers opined and said that the zero hour fixed for the formal inauguration of the two dominions was not very auspicious. But India preferred to ignore the advice. Pakistan on the contrary, chose not to put itself in opposition to the planetary influences. Its rulers, therefore, advanced their National Day by a day and celebrated it on August 14, 1947. The Constituent Assembly was formally

should not be tired of working for Hindu-Muslim Unity. He gave me his blessings.

Armed with Gandhiji's blessings and backed by Jinnah's support, I returned to Karachi where, in collaboration with Dr. Hemandas Wadhvani, we formed a Minorities Association, my paper itself announcing that it would be the voice of the Pakistan minorities.

At Karachi I found Ghulam Hussain in a blue funk. The Sind Premier was angry with Jinnah. In fact, he was fretting and fuming. Even flasks of whisky could not cool or quieten him. He told me that in a moment of weakness and more out of courtesy than any other feeling, he had been foolish enough to send a wire to Jinnah suggesting that he must locate the Pakistan capital in Karachi, and "that fellow instead of thanking me only to decline my offer, has readily consented to accept my proposal!"

Ghulam Hussain felt that he had driven Sind to the slaughter house. "These Punjabis will now throttle us," he deplored with tears in his eyes.

Literally sobbing, the old man exclaimed that he had committed one of the most unforgivable crimes by joining the Muslim League in a moment of weakness.

But the thing had been done. I tried to console the old man and said that he must now revert to his old role of a promoter of Hindu-Muslim Unity and do his best to help the Hindus who were terrified by the speeches of such irreparable Muslim divines as the Pir of Manki Shariff.

Soon Karachi got busy to accord a welcome to Jinnah. Less than a week was all that remained for the Quaid-e-Azam's arrival. Ghulam Hussain convened a meeting. The Hindus of Karachi contributed 95 per cent of the money collected for the reception of Jinnah and the celebration of the Pakistan Independence Day on August 15, 1947. The remaining 5 per cent although subscribed, was never paid. Khulna was among the 5 per cent group. Hindus got almost reconciled to their fate, Ghulam Hussain offering to stand by them.

At Jinnah's instance, some of us had started a Pakistan Minorities Association of which Dr. Hemandas Wadhvani was President and I one of the Vice-Presidents. I had been somewhat merciless in my criticism of Nihchaldas C. Vazirani in the earlier chapter of this book. But let me say it now to his credit that nobody was more enthusiastic than he in offering his co-operation to the Minorities Association so as to instil into the minds of the Hindus the ideals of citizenship of the new State. Narayan Malkani, himself a true disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, returned from Delhi after his confabulations with the Great Master and developed his idea of a Minority Board with headquarters both in New Delhi and Karachi. The object of this board was very simple. It was to persuade the Hindus of Pakistan to stay on in Pakistan and live honourably as respected citizens and to persuade the Muslims of India to forget their old alignments and live as citizens of India. Amongst those who took part in the celebrations of the board, Nihchaldas was the foremost. All of us had really thought that the worst phase of communalism was over. But we had counted without our host.

That redoubtable host was no other than my friend, Altaf Hussain of the *Dawn*. Now, this man has a profound genius to argue in a circle. He can never discuss a question straight. Having helped the League acquire a homeland for the Muslims by means of despicable methods such as mass killings of Hindus, Altaf Hussain could not easily shake off his ardently conceived hatred of the Hindus. His brain is as curved as his body which is both ugly and repellent. One of his Muslim admirers used to say that he was about the nearest approach to Goebbels in every way. I had never had the opportunity of seeing that stunted growth in the political confidence of Adolf Hitler. But knowing Altaf Hussain as I do, I cannot visualise the idea that Goebbels could have been more than this emaciated genius. How can you conceive of a circle which is more circular than another circle? ~~Remember~~ it that regardless of race or nationality or religion—being of the family, Altaf was the younger brother of Adolf Hitler's

summoned. Lord Mountbatten, as the Governor-General of India, made a State entry and formally inaugurated the new Dominion. Thousands of Hindus lined the streets as Mountbatten and Jinnah entered the Assembly chamber in State. The thing was done. Everybody heaved a sigh of relief that, at long last, the tension was over and normal life would function again without hindrance. The next night, that was on the night of August 15, Jinnah gave a reception. It was a brilliant success. Again, all who counted in Pakistan were there. Among the guests were Bhimsen Sachar, Kiron Shanker Roy, Nihchaldas C. Vazirani and, I believe, Mr. Justice Mahajan also, besides numerous Muslim leaders both from West and East Pakistan.

A few days earlier, H. S. Suhrawardy had come to Karachi. At his instance, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah had got round a party to meet him. Suhrawardy claimed that he was there as the representative of Mahatma Gandhi and armed with the Mahatma's authority, he pleaded for Hindu-Muslim Unity and Indo-Pakistan Unity. He appeared to have forgotten the role he had played as Bengal's Premier in the days of the Great Killings of Calcutta. Anyhow, one suggestion of his was acceptable to many of us who listened to him. That was at a party I gave him at the office of the *Daily Gazette*. He said that every patriotic Indian and every patriotic Pakistani should fly the two national flags together. I took him at his word and had to pay a very heavy price. As a matter of fact, I had consulted Jinnah, who approved of the suggestion of the ex-Bengal Premier. So, the front of the *Daily Gazette* building probably flew the two flags together on August 15. That evening, the flag was hoisted at the main entrance of the Government House, which was happy to do the same. Returning crewed by two persons, I saw the *Daily Gazette* building. Some Parsi Mr. in the and then I as

in the days when Sastriji was Agent to the Governor-General of India in South Africa he had come across Desmond Young who was then attached to a Cape paper. Sastri and Young had met often. When Sastri returned to India, his choice fell on Desmond Young who became editor of the *Pioneer*.

Altaf was anxious that the *Dawn* must come out on August 15, 1947. But the press equipment was not complete. The rotary had yet to be erected. So the new *Dawn* had to get hold of some other printing press to do the printing. Desmond Young first came to me and asked to see the *Daily Gazette* Press. He was taken round. On his return, he made the proposal that I should undertake to print the *Dawn* for a few weeks until its press was ready. I politely refused. My reason was this. In law, the printer of a newspaper was as responsible for what appeared in the journal as the editor or the publisher. If Altaf Hussain was to edit the paper, I reckoned that he would write some hot stuff which, even if not actionable, might be open to objection on the ground of taste and good breeding. Desmond Young was disappointed but he was frank enough to admit that my apprehensions were "about right". So, he approached the *Sind Observer*. Now, this organ of the Hindu Mahasabha, which had never spared a non-Hindu or even a pro-Muslim Hindu, was only too anxious to oblige the Pakistan fanatics in the hope that in future it might succeed in stealing the affections of the Pakistan hierarchy. The *Dawn* was printed for several days at the *Sind Observer* Press, Punniyah, its talented editor being the foremost amongst Hindu journalists to see in Altaf Hussain a saint and gentleman.

But in the very first issue which the *Dawn* brought out in its own press it made a vulgar attack on the *Sind Observer*. The attack was designed to set ruffians on poor Punniyah who, with tears in his eyes, ran to me for advice. But Punniyah would not accept my advice. Instead, he wore a fez cap, leaving me in the lurch. Altaf Hussain was so intolerant of me that he could not even tolerate the idea of my walking proudly with my caste-marks on, although I was free from the besetting sin of communalism in any shape or form. The result was that

the dark with open eyes. I must admit that I was foolhardy enough to think that I could convert even Altaf Hussain. I must own my defeat.

The second thing which Altaf perpetrated was to describe India as "the enemy". Jinnah's arguments would not move this monstrous editor of the *Dawn*. Altaf wanted to know what the attitude of Sind Hindus would be if "the enemy" was at war with Pakistan. The Hindus became nervous. Taking advantage of an invitation which the Minorities Association had extended to him this incorrigible fellow had the effrontery to repeat the question at our meeting. Luckily, again, I had the presence of mind to reprimand Altaf and add that, we saw no reason why there should be a conflict between India and Pakistan and that we were out to ensure friendly relations between the two brothers. But right under our nose, a big and ugly conspiracy was afoot. Many of us knew that one was on, but few of us realised its magnitude. It related to Kashmir. This was in less than three weeks after the establishment of Pakistan.

Altaf published a cartoon designed to represent me with my *tripundra* on. The caption given was: "The mud-lined forehead of the editor of the *Daily Gazette*." Curiously, some Hindu agents of Pakistan in India have also repeated this joke. Since then I became a marked man among the new arrivals who constituted the majority of Karachi's population. But of this in a later chapter. My sin was that Yusuf Haroon had offered me the editorship of the *Pakistan Herald*. I had rejected it. I wish now I had not, if only because Altaf could have found no place.

Even while printing the *Dawn* at the *Sind Observer Press* Altaf Hussain published fearful cartoons of things supposed to have occurred in India. Altaf's son is a good cartoonist. This young man, however, could draw no cartoon which was neither vulgar nor terrifying. Altaf himself supplemented the cartoons with loathsome writings. For instance, we in Karachi were told that the Muslims were being butchered in India by the million. Within ten days of the establishment of Pakistan, the total number of the Muslims alleged to have been killed in India had already exceeded the entire Muslim population of undivided India! The reader might be disposed to smile in derision. But I am reporting this fact faithfully and without exaggeration. Abbasi of *New Sind* was the first to detect this defect. Chancing to meet a director of the *Sind Observer* I told him that for precisely the reason that Altaf was bound to abuse his privilege I had declined to print the *Dawn* in my press. But the mischief had been done. Punniab, however, lost his nerve; all his old heroism had disappeared. So I had to take courage in both hands and expose the fallacy of Altaf Hussain's figures which were as astronomical as they were absurd. I knew that I would become a marked person. But one had to do one's duty. But let me own in gratitude that, when I discussed this matter with him, Punniab encouraged me to expose the mischief. Punniab little realized then that he would have to take extraordinary measures to have his person protected from the attention of his own folk. But having been told by Carroll to stake my all and fight for the rights of minorities in Pakistan, I kept my

his temper. At the best of times, Jinnah had never been guilty of sweet temper.

Once Pakistan became a reality, the august leader of the Muslim League was shorn of all his power and prestige. There were few in the Pakistan Cabinet, save perhaps Fazlur Rahman and J. N. Mandal, who paid any serious attention to Jinnah. Those claiming to be in the know of things attributed this change in the mentality of the Pakistan hierarchy to an injury supposed to have been inflicted by Jinnah at a most crucial hour to the cause of Pakistan. This theory had no basis in fact. But they said that, after agreeing to divide, Jinnah met Mountbatten again and said that he did not want Pakistan but would be content with an honourable settlement with the Congress and the British Government in a united India. Mountbatten—so averred the rumour-mongers who crowded the streets of Karachi—snubbed Jinnah and said it was too late to think of an alternative. Jinnah is no longer with us in flesh and blood. Practically the one and the only person who could perhaps throw some light on this mystery is Mountbatten himself.

Whether by choice or compulsion, Jinnah, for all practical purposes, was a close prisoner in Government House. He was rarely visible to the public. Those who had the honour of seeing him reported that he was often moody and fitful. This moodiness might be due to a number of other causes, one of which at least I could vouch for from my personal knowledge. Within a day or two of the establishment of Pakistan, there was a howl for the apprehension and arrest of certain Hindu leaders supposed to be guilty of organising a revolt against the State. The subject was brought before the Quaid-e-Azam. The lawyer in Jinnah detected a flaw in this position. You could not organise a conspiracy to overthrow the State by force before there was a State. This was Jinnah's difficulty. But Jinnah or no Jinnah, they were determined to exhibit the might of the clenched fist which really was as old as the early days of Pakistan. The result was that a number of Hindus, really or supposedly attached to the R.S.S. were forcibly seized and

A DEEPLY LAID CONSPIRACY

Within a week or so of the inauguration of Pakistan, some desperadoes made an attempt on Jinnah's life. Their attempt was foiled by the guards at Government House. Who the miscreants were, was never told. It was a top secret. All that was known was that a party of four or five sturdy men, clean shaven, managed to effect entry into Government House. They were armed with lethal weapons. They were overpowered and handed over to the police. A few days later, it was whispered that the party was composed of Sikh rebels against Pakistan. But the inner circle in the Pakistan hierarchy whispered among themselves that the attempt on the Quaid-e-Azam's life was the work of some disgruntled Muslims who, coming from the Punjab, were dissatisfied with the condition of life and the by no means rosy prospect facing them. They had got impatient by their discovery that Pakistan was not, and could not be, a paradise in which, as they had been led to believe and expect, milk and honey to overflow.

Nor was this attempt on Jinnah's life the first of its kind. On another occasion, several months later, another party of Punjabi Muslims tried to scale the Government House wall and were duly caught and marched to the prison. Between August 1947 and February 1948, there must have been at least four more attempts, all of them by Muslims. Although every one knew about the incidents, nobody had the courage to speak about them in public. Certainly, the newspapers printed about them. Anyhow, the result of these continuous and concerted attempts to kill him made Jinnah very nervous. He became a bit jittery and started to keep a heavy guard on his person. The Government House was a big and imposing building. The Government House itself was a grand edifice with the main entrance to the north. At one end, a grassy road led to the main gate of the House. At the other end, a road led to the

colleagues a newspaper editor might be proud to work with. Like me Rane stuck to Karachi till the last. There was yet one more attempt on my life. But out of respect for Gandhiji I shall not make any reference to it although it was far more serious than the reader would imagine. The last two of the threatening letters I made over to Khuhro who forwarded it to Pryde, the Inspector-General of Police. If a probe was made, it yielded no result. I have my own suspicions. I have some ground for the belief that the Pakistan Terrorist Society was no other than my amiable friend, Altaf Hussain of the *Dawn*. And the painter of the caricature was his own son, the terrific cartoonist.

All this was before September 3, 1947. The fifth attempt on my life was on September 2, 1947—the anniversary of my journalistic birth. The next day, the terrorist society started its open career of molesting and murdering the Hindus. Ramaswami Quarter was a part of Karachi, almost exclusively occupied by middle class Hindus, most of whom were artisans or clerks. Its placid life was suddenly disturbed one fine morning—September 3, 1947 to be precise—when an innocent, unarmed and unoffending pedestrian was suddenly stabbed and killed. Before the neighbours could come, the miscreant effected his escape. Thereafter, many more stabbings were staged with deadly effect, day after day. Then, Muslims were set up forcibly to occupy the living quarters of Hindus in every part of the city. It was a curiously lawless technique. A party of Muslims would break open the house and turn out the womenfolk and the children. In those days the Pakistan Government were really anxious that nothing must be done to disturb the peaceful life of the Hindus. I had myself met Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister, and Mr. Fazlur Rahman, Minister of the Interior, on several occasions and at the latter's instance, the District Magistrate of Karachi, assisted by a *posse* of Karachi's armed constabulary, succeeded in restoring their residential flats to the Hindus. But soon a time came when it was a physical impossibility to put an end to this nefarious activity. Even then the Hindus did not lose courage or hope.

thrown into the prison. One might ask on what ground I relied for my supposition that the mass arrest of Hindus within less than a week of Pakistan had not met with Jinnah's approval. The *Dawn*, as usual, screamed. The *Sind Observer* dared not say a word, although one of its own directors—a wealthy and respectable lawyer—had been seized unceremoniously and cast into the prison. I wrote in the *Daily Gazette* a brief article couched in restrained language and said that this exhibition of violence on the very threshold of the new State did not augur well and that, in any case, it was unlikely to infuse confidence in the minds of the Hindus. Jinnah approved of the stand I had taken and through a mutual friend, a Muslim, sent word to me to pursue the line I had taken.

When the *Daily Gazette* took up this cause, I, as its editor, was singled out by some unknown person or persons to be the recipient of anonymous letters threatening my life if I did not desist from pleading the cause of the Hindus. These letters were written in English and on a letter paper, on the top of which appeared the legend: "The Pakistan Terrorist Society" in bold letters. As if this was not enough, there was also a caricature to give the legend a halo of reality. A human skull suspended on a stand of human bones was the caricature. The first two or three letters I ignored. But the fourth and the fifth had been preceded by actual attempts made on my life. One of these was by a woman in *purdah* who had managed to gain entry into my flat and was seen in my bedroom. She was apprehended by my Muslim bearer who tore "her" veil and discovered it was a "he" after all. The intruder had a sound beating administered to him by the *Daily Gazette* workers at whose instance I allowed the front door outside the flight of stairs opening on the Amin-Beasant Road leading to my flat to be closed. Thereafter I used the spiral staircase leading from my flat to the office compound. The Pakistan Terrorist Society had, by means of this type of catching me. On another occasion a woman dressed as a Hindu but in a white sari entered my room and stepped out of my office but her escape was stopped and she was by a constant turn. Please, note that the above is a true story.

a malevolent crowd which howled and yelled at the Quaid-e-Azam who was rescued to safety by the Lahore police which, as the reader would recall, had actively aided the miscreants in their game of exterminating the Hindus from the Punjab only a fortnight earlier.

Jinnah and Liaquatli returned to Karachi a few weeks later. I had requested the Quaid-e-Azam to preside over the Annie Besant birthday meeting but he quietly excused himself and would not even send a message, although he spoke to me about Mrs. Besant and her services to India in laudatory language. I could see that Jinnah was afraid of openly associating himself with the Hindus. Try as I might I could not get an idea of the reason which took him to Lahore in hot haste. Several days afterwards, I heard the story from a friend. If I disclosed his name, he would be dislodged from a big position and would either be killed or cast into prison. Anyway, the long and short of it was this. While Delhi was honestly thinking that India and Pakistan were going to live a neighbourly life, a deep laid conspiracy was born in Lahore. It had been promoted by my good friend, Laik Ali, then Prime Minister of Hyderabad. Laik Ali wanted to confer with Jinnah and Liaquat. They invited him to Karachi. But Karachi did not suit him because, as he said, the city was pestered with a majority of Hindus. He preferred Lahore where the Muslims had heroically got the city cleared of the last vestige of Hindu elements. Thus it was that Lahore was pitched upon.

According to the information vouchsafed to me by my friend who ought to be nameless in the interests of his own personal safety, some far-reaching decisions were taken at the Lahore conference, the "bed-ridden" Governor-General of Pakistan and his no less "dangerously ill" Prime Minister participating in the discussions. Laik Ali promised to utilise the reserve funds of Hyderabad to develop the Karachi harbour. He had already transferred to Karachi a little over Rs. 5 crores. It was at his instance that Pakistan agreed to the accession of Junagadh, although it would not be difficult to prove that, as a lawyer, Jinnah picked not a few holes in the proposal. It was also

My own staff was getting nervous. But the Superintendent of Police—a fine, sturdy gentleman—addressed my workers and staff and assured them in the name of the Quaid-e-Azam that the guardians of law would protect them at any cost and they had no need to be apprehensive. But Altaf Hussain had greater influence with the Muslim masses coming from the Punjab. It was from the *Dawn* office that paid murderers were sent about their murderous work.

On the day when sometime in mid-September Jinnah gave a reception at Government House to the Sultan of Muscat who presented the Quaid-e-Azam with a sword of Islam, I had the opportunity of meeting the Governor-General of Pakistan. I was one of the twenty invited guests. Jinnah was already looking emaciated and care-worn. He gave the impression that some secret worry had deprived him of his wonted superiority complex. He was moving among the guests like an automaton and showed little interest in the event at which he played the host. Almost about this time we heard a yell emanating from the main gate of the Government House. Liaquat Ali was hastily despatched. At night we heard that it was a crowd of Muslim refugees who were crying for Jinnah's blood and Liaquat Ali succeeded in appeasing the crowd. The same night the Pakistan Secretariat clerks staged a big procession and paraded the town, looted Hindu shops and assaulted a few passers-by.

The next morning, Mr. Liaquat Ali left for Lahore and was soon followed by Jinnah. A few days after these top men of Pakistan had reached Lahore, the Associated Press started reporting almost hourly bulletins reporting and reviewing their births, its rise and fall and what not. The reports could be little credited and unrespected. Not only would you be liable to get a diatribe if you doubted the veracity of the reports, but you would also be liable to get a good thrashing if you doubted the veracity of the reports. The reports were so full of contradictions and inconsistencies that it was a wonder how the Pakistanis could believe them. The reports were so full of contradictions and inconsistencies that it was a wonder how the Pakistanis could believe them. The reports were so full of contradictions and inconsistencies that it was a wonder how the Pakistanis could believe them.

KASHMIR SIDELIGHTS

Rumours said that Jinnah was won over to the proposed invasion of Kashmir by a successful but by no means subtle appeal to his insatiable vanity. Backed by Liaquat Ali, Laik Ali set the ball rolling. He told the Sultan of Pakistan: "Quaid-e-Azam, we have planned that the Pakistan troops dressed as raiders will invade Kashmir and occupy Srinagar and that on such and such day you will drive in State through the picturesque roads of Kashmir and enter the Maharaja's palace and occupy the throne." Jinnah was a lover of pageantry. He had always dreamed of himself as an oriental potentate surrounded by courtiers paying humble homage to the All-Highest. Then justice and law before the attractive picture held out by Laik Ali faded out of existence, self-glorification substituting itself in the place of law. The Quaid-e-Azam gave the sanction.

This, however, could have been a very well-guarded secret but for Altaf Hussain who became more menacing in his attitude to the Hindu minorities. Once he even went to the length of asking some of us what we would do and how we would acquit and deport ourselves, supposing Pakistan invaded Kashmir and started occupying that territory which, according to him, was Pakistan's by right. Few of us could answer this hypothetical question. But the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan in the meantime lent colour to the possibility of an invasion of Kashmir. Discreet inquiries in a certain quarter now known to be in the good books of the Pakistan hierarchy yielded fruit and we knew that a date had been set for the invasion and agents had been despatched to the Frontier Province. What the exact date was few of us could know. But the prospect of an invasion appeared certain.

On his return from Lahore Jinnah held a meeting of his Cabinet at Karachi. For all practical purposes, he was the Chief of the Cabinet although he was only the constitutional and figurative head of the Pakistan Government. This meeting

decided that Hyderabad would decline to accede to the Indian Union and would take the earliest opportunity of declaring its independence so as to enable it to be a dependency of Pakistan. It was further decided that "dressed as frontier raiders", the Pakistan armed forces should invade Kashmir.

and not deliberately deprive himself of the opportunity of knowing things first hand in the interests of the oppressed Hindus. "But even routine papers are not circulated to me," was what he wailed but he held back his proposed resignation. That was the first phase of the Kashmir struggle.

There is another matter of relevant import. It was stated at one time—that was long before the Kashmir invasion—that Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir had paid an *incognito* visit to the Governor-General of Pakistan and discussed with him the conditions under which his state could accede to Pakistan. It was then suggested that His Highness was much pleased by his visit although the Governor-General's daily circular made no mention of this august guest. According, at least, to one Pakistan Minister who blurted out to a friend in my hearing although not in my presence, Quaid-e-Azam was mollified by the Maharaja of Kashmir's report that all that Vallabhbhai wanted was that Kashmir should accede to either dominion—it did not matter which—but he would not tolerate the pretensions which drove the gilded gentry to claim "independence".

Was there an understanding between Jinnah and the Maharaja of Kashmir? Did the latter agree to accede to Pakistan? Or on the other hand, did he promise to sit quiet with folded hands and abet Pakistan to seize Kashmir so that it might not be said of him in India that he had sold his birth-right for a mess of pottage? Some of us in our privacy used to discuss these issues. But no answer was forthcoming. Some day, I suppose, the historian of the future would unravel the mystery and reveal to the generations yet unborn the whole story in detail. But there was another question to which we were able to find an answer. It was this. Were the Government of India aware of any attempt at alleged double-dealing on the part of the Maharaja of Kashmir? His enforced abdication lent colour to the suspicion that his intrigues might be no news to New Delhi. But in fairness it must be admitted that there was no positive evidence to prove this. At its best the evidence was merely inferential.

decided to have an inner Cabinet to deal with the urgent problems arising from day to day. One would imagine that the proposed sub-committee of Cabinet ministers would be composed of three or four members of the ministry. But the actual constitution took our breath away but we could not give expression to our sense of surprise for obvious reasons. The inner Cabinet was composed of all the ministers of the Central Government minus Jogendra Nath Mandal. And, that was the inner Cabinet of the Pakistan Ministry!

Poor Jogendra Mandal, who in the honest delusion that the august Quaid-e-Azam was the born deliverer of the scheduled castes had worshipped Jinnah as if he was an *avatar* of the Great Being on High, got one of the worst shocks of his life. By a curious coincidence—but was it coincidence?—from the time of its constitution it was always the inner Cabinet which functioned and took decisions on all subjects, major or minor. The Cabinet itself was never summoned. Jogendra Mandal, who had rushed to Jinnah's bosom in the hope of elevating himself, found that he had been deliberately excluded from his rights as a Cabinet minister. He was the Law Minister of the Government and regularly drew his salary. But that was about

railways to opt for Pakistan where they could find no employment. But Muslims in the secret service were advised to stick to their jobs. I have a fancy—I sincerely hope I am wrong—that our secret service in Lahore at the time of the fateful conference between Jinnah, Liaquat Ali and Laik Ali failed Delhi either by accident or design.

Now, immediately after the raid began in Kashmir, the Muslims of non-Sindhi extraction in Karachi became openly aggressive. Murders of Hindus increased. People were deliberately thrown out of their houses. Any policeman who presumed to come to the rescue of the aggrieved party was mercilessly assaulted. The police itself got demoralised. No aggressor was ever apprehended. Jinnah had committed one of the most tactless blunders. He had known that a procession of refugees had started from East Punjab just as a Hindu caravan wended its way from west to east. Both Dr. Hemandas and I appealed to the Quaid-e-Azam to stop the incoming refugees at a point on the border of Sind so that the communal peace of the Province would not be disturbed. Jinnah had been originally agreeable to this course. But after the decision to invade Kashmir he became indifferent, and indeed arrogant. The refugees upset the placid life of Sukkur and then invaded Hyderabad where they did everything in their power to loot Hindu property, murder Hindus and dishonour their women. And then, the procession was coming towards Karachi. Our appeals to Jinnah to stop them at least in Malir where there was accommodation for nearly 60,000 people, thanks to the innumerable number of barracks built in wartime, fell on deaf ears. The refugees were allowed to come into Karachi. But little was done to receive them. There was no accommodation for them. They had no employment. Many of them starved. They openly grumbled that the Hindus had a better time of it in Pakistan. The *Dawn* of course did not fail to exploit the situation to strike terror into the hearts of the Hindus of Karachi. It asked one day—why one? Actually it did for many days—how the Hindus who were living in palatial houses and had everything which contributed to a happy

With all this, there is yet another matter which needs some elucidation. Did the Maharaja play or did he attempt to play the discredited role of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare? It was known that His Highness had signed an instrument of accession to India. That was after the raiders had launched their campaign of destruction. Could it have been the Maharaja's move to set one party against the other and profess to be the friends of both with the object of grabbing some indefinite advantage from both? This only the State department of the Union Government can answer with any degree of certainty.

In those days Pakistan used to boast that, while it could get first hand information about most things in India, India could get little from Pakistan. Perhaps this boast was based on solid ground. For instance, not till after the raiders had rushed into Kashmir were the Government of India aware of the big decision taken at Lahore. Incidentally, the commander-in-chief of Pakistan—an Englishman—was known to keep himself in touch with certain high officers of the Indian Army—also Englishmen. But did the latter warn the Government of India of the danger ahead? Probably not. For, if they had, the presumption would be that Delhi would have been prepared for an emergency. But actually, it started to make preparations to send troops by air to defend Srinagar.

Very probably in those days, India's secret service was not very dependable. That service which had been strengthened and fostered by Sir Frederick Puckle in the days of the World War II was exclusively composed of Anglo-Indian and Muslims. Sir Frederick, whose *Fifty-two Points About India*—an infamous and slanderous volume—was obligingly fathered by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai in America, took jolly good care to exclude Hindus from the secret service. After partition, Jinnah extended a general and generous invitation to the Moslems personnel in the Government of India's employ to opt for Pakistan. With the object of dislocating communications in India, Jinnah was even prevailed upon by his followers to persuade even the Muslim officers and technicians in India

JINNAH IN A TEMPER

There was no doubt in the Pakistani mind that the "raiders" would seize Srinagar and all that remained was to plan for the Quaid-e-Azam's triumphal entry into Kashmir's capital. As a matter of fact, the Quaid-e-Azam's sartorial outfit claimed their first attention. At one stage it was even whispered that the best tailor of Saville Row in London should be commissioned, regardless of cost, to undertake this business which must beat hollow Caesar's historic entry into the Eternal City.

Anything like a possible reverse held no place in their calculations. It was to be a case of "he came, he saw, and he conquered—*veni, vidi, vici*". It is always a pleasant experience to pursue a retreating bull. But when the brute so far forgets himself as to turn right about and face the pursuer with his flaming eyes and gory horns, well, is it not altogether an entirely unwarranted departure from the programme? Yet, this was what happened in Kashmir. So long, of course, as Kashmir was unable to offer any resistance, it was an easy go. But when the Indian troops beat back the "raiders", Pakistan became furious.

But what did it matter if the first few engagements spelt disaster for Pakistan? One could always make up. It was openly stated that Britain was supporting Pakistan in this struggle and had promised her full co-operation. Whether this boast was based on solid ground many of us could hardly venture to say. But it seemed likely in the light of precedents of pre-partition days. Had not Britain always backed the Muslim League which it had created to stem the tide of Indian nationalism?

As a matter of fact, however, British sympathies, if any, were not translated into action. Jinnah was feeling taller in his own estimation while the "raiders" had almost reached Srinagar. But is it not true that what man proposes in his vanity, good God always disposes in His wisdom? That was

and comfortable life would solve the refugee problem. The terror in the Hindu mind is better imagined than described. The echo of this appeal to low passions was to be heard a few months later.

The Nawab of Junagadh sought refuge in Pakistan. His Highness appeared to be an amiable gentleman who regretted the step he took to accede to Pakistan on the advice of his stupid Prime Minister. He did nothing to reverse the decision. He could not. He was a prisoner of the Pakistan Government for all practical purposes. I have a notion that, if he escapes to India, he will give out an unvarnished account of the scandals and intrigues in his court, which led to that civil revolt culminating finally in the abolition of monarchy. I have reason to think that the Nawab Sahib was more sinned against than sinning. He and his family were quiet. But not so one of his chieftains. The Raja of Mauvedar, a tributary of Junagadh, had also taken refuge in Karachi. He and his family had a suite of rooms reserved for them in the Silver Nest Hotel. The prince, a young and sturdy fellow, was intolerant of any Hindu visitor to the hotel whom he assaulted brutally. Once it was my turn to experience the prince's rage. That was while I reached the hotel at about 8 p.m. one night to join B. T. Thakur's dinner to H. S. Subrawardy. All bullies are cowards. The prince was no exception to the rule. Immediately he discovered my identity, he was all smiles and profuse apologies. The wave of optimism on the Kashmir issue generated a carefree attitude which generally was disastrous to the Hindu.



Fazlur Rahman, Minister of the Interior, Government of Pakistan and the author

precisely what happened. Hitler before Jinnah had been dreaming and forging plans for his triumphal entry into Moscow. German soldiers had pushed their way into Stalin-grad and Leningrad. Just at this moment when the German sun was majestically blazing in mid-heaven, the afternoon which usually heralded the inevitable nightfall set in. The rest has gone into the region of history.

What Hitler felt on that fateful day when the Russians succeeded in kicking back the Huns has yet to be told. But how the reverse in Kashmir reacted on the mock Hitler at Karachi was known to everybody in the Pakistan capital. Jinnah just lost his temper. That was all. As if the reverses in Junagadh were not enough, the cup of disappointment was full to the brim in Kashmir. Jinnah started raving. I am not exaggerating. He was seen by his own attendant raving all night and swearing at all and sundry including Jawaharlal Nehru. He lost his appetite and started living almost entirely on whisky. It was given out also that the great Quaid-e-Azam was suffering acutely from cancer of the tongue. The acuteness of this painful malady was aggravated by the knowledge that only God could stay the reverses of Pakistan in Kashmir. Nobody in the "Islamic" State thought of even offering a prayer to Allah.


Reports emanating from the Governor-General's House indicated that Jinnah, while apparently sitting at lunch, dinner or tea, often shouted: "Damn it, it is a fraud!" What was a fraud? To whom could the august Quaid-e-Azam refer and to what? Nobody could gain an inkling into the working of his inner mind. Everybody was afraid of approaching him. Only when the *Dawn* wrote that the accession of Kashmir to India by an instrument signed by the Maharaja was a fraudulent transaction, many of us, for the first time, knew what Jinnah's raving must have been about.

Whether by accident or design Jinnah's mental state was reflected in the writings of the Pakistani press. At about the same time there was a meeting of the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society in Bombay. At the main joint editor of the *Dawn*

Gazette I attended the meeting which had been called to discuss the ways and means of taking over *Reuter's* News Agency by the Indian Newspaper Press. On my return to Karachi after two days, I discovered to my dismay that, at the *Dawn's* instance, my reputation had been blackwashed and I had been described as an Indian agent. I preferred to ignore the attack.

But I was counting without my host—the redoubtable Altaf Hussain. The Sind Provincial Press Advisory Committee of which I used to be the Chairman was reconstituted in my absence by the aid of Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro, the Premier of Sind. Now, before the Bombay meeting referred to in the previous paragraph, Khuhro at a reception in his honour at the Karachi Club had made some vulgar attacks on the Hindus, although it was fairly well-known that he was amongst those who did not desire the Hindus to get out of Pakistan. The language and the trend of thought in the written speech struck many of us as strange. It transpired that Khuhro's private secretary had drafted the speech which was revised by Altaf Hussain before the Premier delivered it. I then wrote that the draftsman of the Premier's speech had been guilty of putting into Khuhro's mouth sentiments which were not his own. Both Khuhro and myself had a laugh over this the same evening after the article in question had appeared in the *Daily Gazette*. But Altaf Hussain had his own plan:

The new Press Advisory Committee did not include either Punniah or myself. Altaf constituted himself as the soul of the Committee. He had summoned an urgent meeting and got a resolution passed condemning the *Daily Gazette* for its article on the Premier and insisting on an immediate withdrawal of "charges" in the absence of which some dire action was to be taken against the paper and its editor. The only effect that the resolution produced in me was amusement bordering on contempt. I preferred to ignore the warning and also the invitation that I should appear before the Committee to stand my trial. Khuhro was approached to give me a "firing". He agreed but made not the slightest move, although our relations were somewhat strained at the time.



Khem Bahadur M. A. Khadro



Khem Bahadur M. A. Khadro

Dawn, the sworn enemy of the Hindus. At the risk of incurring his displeasure, I wrote in my paper protesting against his studied refrain from any reference to the Hindus in his speech at the Parsi function. I knew afterwards that Jinnah's distrust of Maharaja Hari Singh had deteriorated into a general distrust of the Hindus.

Now was this all. Mr. I. I. Chundrigar, Commerce Minister of the Pakistan Government, had made arrangements with Seth Jaidayal Dalmia that the State would subsidise him if he would inaugurate a Jute industry in East Bengal. He went to the length of suggesting that Sethji should try to transfer some jute mill or two from Calcutta to the Dacca side. What happened to this proposal is difficult to say. But it is now known that Jinnah put his foot down and told Chundrigar to forget it. He would rather allow Pakistani jute to get rotten than permit Hari Singh's "castemen" to dominate in Pakistan in the industrial field.

Indeed Jinnah was so far put out that he even forgot the courtesy due to the Indian High Commissioner whom he failed to invite for lunch or tea.

At about this time, I became an unconscious victim of suspicion on unfounded charges. It was like this. I had been in correspondence with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India's Deputy Prime Minister, who was vitally interested in the Minorities Board set up in Delhi and Karachi to assure the minorities in the respective dominions of fair treatment. One day Sardar Sahib had caused a telegram to be sent to the High Commissioner requesting him to ask me to proceed to Delhi in this connection. As there was nothing mysterious about the contents of this message because it was fairly well-known in Karachi that I had been in perpetual contact with the Sardar in connection with this subject, the telegram was couched in plain, honest English prose. Now, although the wire had been received in Karachi on a particular night, it was not delivered to the Indian High Commissioner till very late in the afternoon on the day following. In the meanwhile, it had been scrutinised by the Foreign Department of the Pakistan Government. Altaf

When the *Dawn* launched a series of attacks on Khuhro, the poor Premier hardly knew how to defend himself. It was certainly not my job to enter into the personal quarrels between the Premier and Altaf Hussain. One day Khuhro invited me to the Karachi Club Annexe where he confessed to me that he was frankly alarmed by Altaf's unscrupulous campaign. I replied that the fault was Khuhro's. Was it not true that even if you fed the cobra with nectar, its bite would produce mortal poison? From that day onwards, the Press Advisory Committee ceased to function. The *Dawn* retaliated by making unfounded charges against Khuhro. This resulted later on in the institution of a tribunal to inquire into those "charges".

The failure of the Pak aggression in Kashmir and the consequent rise in Jinnah's temper found expression in diverse forms. Jinnah sent me word one day that I must impress on Seth Ramakrishna Dalmia to pay the balance due on the purchase of Jinnah's New Delhi house without any further delay. I hardly knew how I figured in the transaction. I merely kept quiet. Jinnah decided on another day that he would have no truck with the Hindus. "They are all like this Kashmir Ruler," he said. The effect of this exclamation was that he revised his earlier notion that the Bharat Bank would function as the State Bank of Pakistan. I even now doubt whether Jinnah was sincere when he originally gave such hopes. But the Kashmir reverses helped him to wriggle out of a difficult position.

On another occasion, the Parsis of Karachi presented an address to the Quaid-e-Azam who in his reply made generous references to the greatness of that small community and praised it for its efficiency, acumen and patriotism. He assured the Parsis that they had a place in Pakistan. But by a curious coincidence he made no reference in this address to the position of the Hindus who, at his instance, had formed a Minorities' Association. Jinnah would not even accept a party at the house of the Minorities' Association composed largely of Hindus. Possibly he was afraid of running counter to the wishes of the

knowledge of constitutional law. The position outlined by Nazimuddin might be described thus. The Hindus were welcome to stay if they subordinated their conscience. My protest to Jinnah elicited no response.

Hussain was also consulted. He saw reds and blues into this honest telegram. Sri Prakasa was apprehensive. He asked whether I was going to attend the evening reception at the foreign office to the foreign embassies by the Quaid-e-Azam. I, of course, said I was going to. It was at that party that I learned from Jinnah himself that much ado had been made about nothing over this innocent invitation for me to visit Delhi. The inherently suspicious Altaf Hussain would not trust me. Even my speech in Bombay where I said that the lives of Hindus were safe in Pakistan was looked upon by him as a ruse to lull suspicion! Himself a man of dishonour, he could hardly be trusted to give credit to others for honourable intentions.

As a result of the virulent anti-Hindu campaign in the wake of Kashmir reverses, Hindus naturally decided to leave Pakistan for good. But every impediment was put in their way. I am sorry to say that even Khuhro sanctioned these illegal and lawless excesses by the so-called Muslim National Guards. Passengers were mercilessly belaboured, their luggages tampered with, some of them burnt and quite a good few of them being freely distributed among the "guards". I wrote again and again protesting against this vandalism but to no purpose. My hands were weakened also by Punniyah's writing in his paper that the guards were reasonable and inoffensive. Demoralisation with a vengeance! At this time when he was most needed to put courage into the hearts of the Hindus, Nihchaldas one fine afternoon beat a hasty retreat and migrated to Bombay.

I would say to the credit of Mr. Fazlur Rahman, Minister of the Interior, that he was sincerely anxious to placate the minorities. He and I had many an intimate talk at his residential flat. Although he was a friend of Altaf Hussain, he evinced keen interest in the welfare of the minorities. So Altaf Hussain sent an S.O.S. to Nazimuddin who came down to Karachi and held a Press Conference in which he had the audacity to say that Sir Muzza F-mail's special articles in the *Daily Gazette* pleading for Hindu-Muslim Unity amounted to treason. I had to retort in public that Nazimuddin needed to track up for

"That is true," I answered. "I am due to attend a meeting of the Newspaper Society there on December 30."

Answering another question of his, I replied that I would be returning to Karachi on January 6, 1948.

"But I was given to understand," he observed, as if very casually, "that you are removing your family because you are apprehensive of assaults on you."

I replied: "Mr. Jinnah, some misguided brutes have, of course, been aiming at my life. But I am not a coward. I have full faith in the dispensation of a wise Providence. There is no question of my taking away my family. I propose to put you on your honour. Laugh at me if you will but I am convinced that the blessings of my Guru Maharaj, a great saint and scholar, is proof even against organised rowdyism."

Far from getting angry over this exclamation of mine, Jinnah was fairly cool and collected. He said: "Do not worry: your family shall be safe: I shall see to it that no harm comes to them. Go with an easy mind and come back as soon as you can."

I must own to the Quaid-e-Azam's credit that he kept his word. Then and there he called Major-General Akbar Khan, the friend and colleague of General Cariappa in pre-partition India, and gave him some instructions. The result was that my house was guarded by armed military pickets to whose devotion to duty I owed the escape of my family in that general rioting of January 6, 1948.

There are two incidents which I must record before going further with this narrative. At the end of the party, Khuro called me and taking me aside, asked if I had received a letter of his which, although dated December 4 had been signed by him only on December 25. I said: "No." He replied that it was probably waiting for me at my office and he asked me to give it my personal attention. He indicated that he was trying in that letter to convince me that as Sind Premier he was not following an anti-Hindu policy as I might suppose but one which I had urged at a party given to the ministers of East and West Pakistan some months earlier. I found the letter which

JINNAH'S BIRTHDAY AND AFTER

The effects of the Pakistan reverses in Kashmir were visited on the helpless and unarmed Hindus of Pakistan. But on the whole the ministerial mind was far from being unhealthy. Khuhro himself spoke one thing today and another thing tomorrow. Nevertheless, his heart was sound. He openly backed the Hindus of Sind against the refugee aggression inspired and conducted by Altaf Hussain. Jinnah was too stunned to pull up Altaf Hussain. It was even whispered that the Quaid-e-Azam was terribly afraid of Altaf. Some close associates of the *Dawn's* editor were heard to say that one day Altaf had actually defied Jinnah and told him: "It was I that created you. I could even now destroy you!" This version, however, might be a fabrication. That was because Jinnah still continued to be popular with the Muslim masses who looked upon him as the enemy of the infidels. But amongst the refugees, Jinnah had definitely lost caste.

Jinnah's birthday in 1947 fell on December 26. It was a State festival. In the evening, Liaquat Ali held a garden party at his house. It was a crowded function. I was sitting in an obscure corner when suddenly came Begum Liaquat Ali who touched me by the shoulder and announced that she was going to lead me to the "slaughter house".

"Who would mind being led to Satan himself if led by such fair hands?" I exclaimed and got ready to follow the Prime Minister's spouse. Mrs. Liaquat Ali is a cultured lady full of sparkling wit and humour. She merely led me to the dais on which was seated the Quaid-e-Azam, ill at ease but trying to sit erect as if he was posing for a photograph. The moment I took my seat by his side, the Government photographer's Kodak clicked many a time. I suggested to the photographer in Jinnah's hearing: "Send it to the newspapers with the caption: 'The Lion and the Lamb'."

"I am told," said Jinnah, "you are flying to Madras."

the ancient regime and also in the present new era of independence."

I certainly was touched by this letter so characteristic of Khuhro who, on its very account, had to face trouble. A copy of this letter fell into the hands of Altaf Hussain and his friends. They planned for Khuhro's downfall. Khuhro is a trusting man. Somebody in his own Secretariat was a spy on him.

The second incident was this. Soon after I had taken leave of Khuhro, Altaf Hussain gripped me by the hand and congratulated me profusely on the honour done me by the Quaid-e-Azam. Then he asked when I was flying. I said: "By the midnight plane on December 28." "I wish you a happy and comfortable journey," he said and gave me leave.

As a matter of fact, however, at the last moment, so as to take part in the worship of Nataraja. Lord Shiva in a dancing pose, which fell on December 29, I cancelled my midnight flight and had it changed to the next morning's flight. When I drove in my own car to the Drig Road airport, I was told that my plane would take off at Mauripur, a matter of about 17 miles. I hurried just in time to catch my plane. In the evening when I reached Madras I discovered to my dismay and consternation that friends were mourning my death. It took me some time to know the midnight humour behind it. I was to have arrived by the earlier plane. But I did not know that the midnight plane took off at Karachi and soon after crashed, killing all the 20 passengers. I might have been the twenty-first. Not a few in Karachi also had thought I had perished because few people knew the eleventh hour change in my programme. I have no desire to suggest anything uncharitable. The distinguished leader of the Pakistan Terrorist Society must be presumed to be entirely innocent of the incident. At the same time I should say that many uncharitably suspected him.

In conformity with my programme, I reached Karachi in the afternoon of January 6, 1948. At Bombay I was joined by my friend, B. T. Thakur of the United Commercial Bank. A tail wind brought our plane an hour earlier than the scheduled time. But before we disembarked, an officer of the Air India

was fairly long and I was occupied nearly for an hour with it. At one stage it appeared to me that, according to Khuhro's calculations at least, Pakistan had made up her mind that both Kashmir and Hyderabad should be her own. The last part of the letter was a reiteration of his views about the Hindus of Sind. I shall reproduce this part of the letter. It stated:

"On several occasions, I have proclaimed from public platforms that the considered policy of my Government is to persuade Sind Hindus not to leave their native land in panic. I have given them every assurance of the security and sanctity of their life and property. I can proudly claim to have honoured these assurances fully in observance. My Government have also assured the Hindus equality of rights as our fellow-citizens of Pakistan and that they will not be discriminated against in pursuing their lawful avocations in services, trades and callings. We are most anxious to keep our Hindu nationals with us as a most essential element of our political and social life. I am glad to be able to claim that the Hindu exodus has now spent its force and even many of the evacuees who had taken panic flights are now returning to us in ever increasing numbers. These are obvious signs that Hindus do have confidence in our sincerity of purpose in the matter of protecting them against the depredations of the criminal and anti-social elements amongst our refugee influx. I hope you will give thought to the contents of this letter and will believe me when I say that I consider the presence of Hindus as essential to the prosperity and greatness of Sind and Pakistan."

In an earlier part of the letter answering certain criticisms of mine regarding the policy of his Government towards the press in general, Khuhro stated that he was far from wanting to curtail the liberty of the press and added:

"No one is in a better position to realise this point than yourself, because on several occasions you have been most vehement and unparrying in your criticism of the policies and actions of the Government of Sind both in the past and in

would not cure the wound. It could not. I urged planned repatriation.

My robust faith in the ultimate triumph of humanity was shaken by the painful discovery that the "educated and enlightened" rioters of the Pakistan Secretariat would not spare even the Ramakrishna Mission. The Karachi Branch of the Ramakrishna Mission had done yeoman service to the cause of the Bengal famine during the Suhrawardy Ministry. One of the Karachi donors who gave a lakh of rupees had stipulated that the sum must be spent wholly on the relief of Hindus. But Swami Ranganathananda, the President of the Karachi Branch, had no hesitation in turning down the offer because he said that humanity knew no barrier. The Sind Muslims—yes, even the Muslim Leaguers—paid homage to this great and good man for his broad vision and wide sympathy free from communal and religious prejudices.

The first place I visited after the rioting was the Mission quarter. My heart broke when I saw the extent of the vandalism which had broken the statue of Shri Ramakrishna Paramahansa. The books had either been burgled or strewn across the road after being torn. The holy shrine had been desecrated. Swami Ranganathananda was luckily out of Karachi at the time. But Swami Sarvagatananda, true to his name, remained unmoved and faced the wrath of the communalist crowd. What could be the reason for this unprovoked and unjustifiable act of vandalism? The Ramakrishna Mission attracted Sind Muslim crowds who listened with rapture to Swami Ranganathananda's exposition of the Bhagawad Gita and the Katopanishad. The Punjab Muslims wanted to do away with a centre which attracted the advocates of inter-communal unity. That was the sole reason.

Another thing which moved me beyond words was the injury they did to Hemandas Wadhwani. Dr. Hemandas was a humanitarian before anything else. His nursing home was availed of by the poor who received free treatment and free rations. Dozens of Muslims could always be found in the dispensary. In the nursing home was a Maharashtrian girl. She

Company boarded the plane and announced that the city was in the throes of serious rioting and that the authorities had declared a 72-hour curfew. This meant our having to spend the next two days at the airport. My car of course did not come. I phoned up Khuhro who was good enough to send me an escort to bring me home.

A most appalling sight awaited my return. The story gives me a shock even today. What happened was this. For four nights, the Pakistan Secretariat buildings were being fenced with barbed wire with the aid of improvised electric lamps. None attached any importance to this. In the meantime, apparently, a complete census of all the 60,000 Hindu households had been taken. All was quiet on January 6 morning. Everybody went about his business as usual. Suddenly by about 11-30 A.M. every Hindu house in that huge city was surrounded by menacing men, most of them coming from the Punjab. Every house was looted; women in many others were dishonoured; men were assaulted and some were murdered in cold blood.

As soon as he heard of this outbreak, Jinnah called Akbar Khan and told him to shoot to kill. "This must not happen," said Jinnah who was visibly angry.

Almost the only Hindu house to escape the planned depredation was mine, thanks to the army patrol guarding it. A week later, Jinnah complimented me in a Hindu refugee camp and said that I did well to pin my faith in Providence and God.

Khuhro and Akbar Khan did their utmost and strained every nerve to put an end to this sudden outbreak. But before they could move, the worst had been done. Nearly 2 lakh of Hindus left their homes and were in open space. The Pakistan Government did its best to afford relief. I had to open a relief camp for my workers in my office. With difficulty, I got extra. As most of my workmen had saved to & out of regard for me, I undertook to have them transported to India. Jinnah and Khuhro afforded every facility. But I must confess that I

Then after seeing that every employee of the Daily Gazette was shipped to Bombay, I sent away my family to South India in a special plane through Delhi. In Delhi, I met the Prime Minister and gave him a full account of this organised rioting. I added that it was my conviction that it had been planned in advance by the Secretariat. I stated, however, that the Ministers themselves and the Quaid-e-Azam had been taken by surprise.

I returned to Karachi alone. A fortnight later came the Prophet's birthday. The Pakistan Ministers brought pressure to bear on Khuhro and almost compelled him to release the Secretariat clerks who were to be charged with arson, looting, murder, rape and what not. Weak Khuhro relented. The worst crime against humanity went unpunished.

On January 30, the radio announced Gandhi's sacrifice. The Muslim refugees were sad and they wept that their one friend was gone. Jinnah called Gandhi the greatest Hindu. The Muslim mob in sheer anger went to attack him but Jinnah moved to Malir. The Dawn office was surrounded by menacing Muslim crowds which assaulted the Dawn staff, set fire to a bundle of papers and compelled Altaf Hussain to call Gandhi Mahatma and not Mr. Gandhi. Altaf in terror promised and he kept the promise so long as it suited him. He planned that very night to destroy Gandhi's statue opposite the Secretariat and the Chief Court.

was a nurse. She was in delicate health at the time. The Pakistan Secretariat clerks dragged this girl by force. What they did to her was not known. Perhaps they killed her; it might be they compelled her to embrace Islam. There was no trace of what had happened to her or her whereabouts.

In fairness to Jinnah I must record that he was the most shocked individual in Pakistan. He visited the Hindu refugee camps and at least at one of them, the iron man lost his nerve and shed a few tears. The extent of the damage could be gauged by this exhibition of Jinnah's sympathy. Jinnah had greatly overrated his hold on Muslims whom he could goad into lawlessness but he could not restrain them.

Jogendra Mandal was much upset. But what could he do? He was just a prisoner in his own house, watched by the hirelings of Altaf Hussain. This man made every effort to get out of Pakistan but we prevailed on him to stay on to protect the two lakhs of Harijans in the interior on whom the mad *multitude* of Pakistan had cast their greedy eye.

Khuhro was unrelenting in his search of the culprits. Most of the looted property was traced to the residential quarters of the Pakistan Secretariat officials and employees. He courageously arrested the men and put them behind the prison bars.

Ghulam Mohammad, Pakistan's Finance Minister and Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatallah, Governor of Sind, called on me one evening and took me to a refugee camp. Ghulam Mohammad addressed the refugees and told them they had wronged Islam and the Prophet by their violence and injustice. He made some quotations from the holy *Koran*. The refugees were sobbing. In a quarter of an hour, all the looted properties were piled up hill high to be restored to the owners who could claim them.

In the meantime there was a great disturbance in the temple at the time of routine, there were the usual prayers. It was reported that all the *idols* were smashed. What *idols* actually happened with the *idols* the media had been known of the *idols* being smashed by *idols* to *idols* and *idols* to *idols*.

Quite an army of job hunters invaded Karachi from time to time. Their mission met with failure. Amongst them was my friend Hossain Imam who had believed that he could cash his stewardship in the Council of State in India. He arrived in Karachi one fine morning and started cultivating all and sundry. His efforts to get newspaper publicity proved abortive. At last he approached Jinnah who in his characteristically offensive manner put him in his proper place and told him plainly to go back to India. According to Hossain Imam himself, the Quaid-e-Azam told him that Pakistan had not enough space to absorb all the job hunters! Hossain Imam returned to India but not altogether empty-handed. The chief of a society of intriguers found some job for him. And so, Hossain Imam returned to India to take an honoured place as a patriot amongst patriots and a maker of our Constitution and our laws! I do not know whether the Government of India ever realised the mischief which was Hossain Imam's role. If they did, they never gave the public any inkling into their mind. The Pakistan spying in Bihar could throw some light on the extensive mischief wrought by this patriot. Hossain Imam's value in Pakistan's eyes was a post-Jinnah development.

Another person who gave Jinnah constant headache was Chowdhury Khaliqzaman. In the early chapters of this narrative I have said something about this dignitary. He was a *chela* of Pandit Motilal Nehru in the heydays of non-co-operation. In the U. P. politics of those days he was considered Jawaharlal's right hand man. He was amongst the two dozen Congress politicians of the memorable days of 1934 which, under the lead of Ansari, Bhulabhai and Bidhan Chandra Roy, witnessed the revival of the then defunct Swarajya Party and successfully persuaded Gandhiji to give a reorientation to the Congress programme in the direction of carrying the fight for Swaraj to the British Government in their citadels—the secretariat and the legislative chamber. In 1936, he had joined the Jinnah League as a counterblast to the Nawab of Chattari's Muslim League. In those days Jinnah continued to be a nationalist; he had not yet become the idol in the communalist shrine. In fact, it was Jinnah who

XXIX PROBLEM FOR JINNAH

Job hunters amongst Indian Leaguers gave Jinnah quite a headache soon after the establishment of Pakistan. They pestered him for a share of the spoils. Many of them honestly believed that their "sacrifices"—Heaven alone knew what they could be or were—were alone responsible for the establishment of Pakistan. To his credit be it admitted that, although he issued bombastic statements congratulating the "Muslim Nation" on its success in the "struggle" for Pakistan, Jinnah realised that the gain of doubtful value was a fluke rather than a prize. The Britisher knew that he had to quit India. This very knowledge was a tribute to Gandhiji's "quit India" campaign which had made the Englishman's position in India extremely uncomfortable. Till then Gandhiji's non-violence provided some protection to the arrogant English conceits of his power and prestige. But in the face of the disbanded Indian National Army which did not believe in soft words and continued to nurture feelings of bitter resentment at Churchill's exposure of them to their own fate in Singapore, Malaya and Burma, and the League's co-operation with the British, things were not half as rosy for a peaceful Pakistan as many Leaguers believed. In Pakistan itself there were hundreds of Muslim adherents of Netaji Subhas Bose. They were Muslims of course but did not believe in communalism, much less in a communal raj. Jinnah felt that his position was not so sure while these nationalist-minded Muslims were there. He also feared a challenge from "Frontier Gandhiji"—Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He was in dread of Abdul Samad Khan, known as "Feroz Khan Gandhiji". Once at least, Jinnah had to admit to some extent that the Britisher left India to oblige the Indian people rather than the country, not to oblige the Muslim League but to oblige India. He said that he had to be very careful in the matter of job hunters would undermine the foundations of Pakistan. The foundations were far from strong.

The Quaid-e-Azam was all kindness and courtesy to the distinguished arrival whom the Pakistan press gave a screaming welcome, describing him as a hero who had sacrificed all that was best in him for the best and lasting interests of Pakistan. The difference in the treatment accorded to Khaliq from the one which had been the lot of Hossain Imam, did not escape the attention of the curious sections of the public who, however, could do or say little about it even by way of comment above a whisper.

Khaliquzzaman's ambition was insatiable. True, unlike Hossain Imam, he did not expect to be made the President of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Hossain Imam's approach was fundamentally defective from a psychological standpoint. His hunger for the Constituent Assembly chair involved and implied Jinnah's own retreat from a position which he coveted and occupied although admittedly it was strictly improper for a Governor-General to take the chair of a body forging the constitution of the country. Jinnah was not the kind of person to tolerate any invasion into his preserve. Hossain Imam was foolish enough to believe that his ex-Presidentship of the Council of State would stand him in good stead. He forgot that he owed his position to the favour shown to him by the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy. The poor man had to put up with Jinnah's biting tongue. He had entered the Governor-General's residence in great expectation but returned crestfallen, only to fall into the open arms of intriguers. But Khaliquzzaman behaved differently. He was a man of the world. He knew Jinnah's weakness. Born and bred in Lucknow, he was an ideal courtier. He knew how to flatter. Subtlety was the chief weapon in his armoury. He flattered Jinnah and told him that the very waves of the sea which would not recede at Canute's bidding would be bound to carry out the Quaid-e-Azam's command, only the Quaid-e-Azam would not trouble to embarrass the helpless Arabian Sea. I do not suggest that Khaliq said these things literally. But that was the spirit in which he spoke to the All-Highness of Pakistan. Jinnah's vanity was fully satisfied.

solicited the co-operation of Khaliquzzaman so that Chhatra-Pr League, if successful in the elections, could not function as a stooge of the bureaucracy to make Hindu-Muslim Unity impossible. Khaliquzzaman waged an epic battle and succeeded in defeating the forces of the Nawab of Chhattari who, however, was not, and never became the communalist of the Jinnah type of later days. Because he could get no place in the U. P. Ministry on his own terms, he became a full-fledged Muslim Leaguer.

Now, after the division of India, Khaliquzzaman reverted to his original role as a nationalist politician. But he was secretly engaged in some underground activity to undermine India's independence. The U. P. Government never published any news of the mischief wrought by Khaliquzzaman. The relevant documentary evidence which could secure his conviction for treason lies buried, I suppose, in the archives of the Lucknow Secretariat. It might be that at some future day the historians of the future might lay his hands on this file and give an authoritative account of Khaliquzzaman's brand of patriotic service. Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant has the reputation of being a firm administrator. But if Khaliquzzaman had approached Pandit Nehru with his accustomed and natural *coftness* for the Muslims and made a clean breast of it and expressed sorrow, I have little doubt that the Prime Minister would have pardoned him and even aided him to start with a clean slate. But Khaliquzzaman's conscience must have pricked him, or his crime was of such colossal magnitude, as would be difficult to melt even the pro-Muslim heart of the Prime Minister. Some day Khaliquzzaman quietly and suddenly loaded in Kalyan bag and baggage and with all his family, after selling away all his property in India. The question yet remains unanswered how Khaliq managed to escape without detection. On this point, the U. P. police has yet to furnish an explanation.

Well, be that as it might, Khaliquzzaman received a warm welcome in Pakistan. Obviously, he was expected. A comfortable, mediocrity bungalow belonging to the Nawab of East Punjab had been requisitioned and kept ready for his coming, and he had

by Khaliquzzaman. Liaquat entered the Indian Legislative Assembly for the first time in what was destined to be the last of its kind in British Rule. He was contesting a seat from his own home constituency. That, of course, was in U. P. To his consternation, his own mother and his wife threatened to canvass for his opponent. The situation was very serious indeed. The reason why Liaquat's mother and her daughter-in-law hated the Quaid-e-Millet is easily explained. According to Khaliq, Liaquat's first wife was his own cousin. This lady was abandoned by Liaquat who found in the new Begum a real helper and mate in the modern sense. The latter was a Miss Pant. She was a sister of the second wife of Devaki Prasad Sinha of Patna. The original Mrs. Liaquat became jealous. It was natural. Her mother-in-law gave her full support to the plan of dishing Liaquat's political career for good. This was a problem for the Muslim League. If the League lost its seat in the General Secretary's own constituency, all would be up for the communalists of India. So a special meeting of the League High Command met under Jinnah's presidentship and deputed Khaliquzzaman to resolve the crisis and save Liaquat from the ignominy which threatened to wipe him out of existence. Khaliquzzaman executed his mission with commendable success. How he did it he did not tell me. I deliberately refrained from asking him the reason why. It would not do to arouse suspicions in a professional courtier's mind.

Well, to this priceless service rendered by Khaliq, I should suppose, Liaquat owed his newly-found greatness in international politics. Liaquat, whatever his other faults, must have been blessed with the virtue of gratitude. So, according to rumours prevalent then, he had given his word to Khaliq to see him installed as Sind Premier. Almost the only person who was ignorant of this development was Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro himself. Liaquat took advantage of Ghulam Hussain's hatred of his Premier. He fanned the flame. He brought Khuhro into trouble. But he could not raise his friend, philosopher and guide to the pedestal of his dream. The Muslims of Sind were far too united to permit a stranger to elbow

Then came the next item on the programme. It was a good few weeks before Khaliquzzaman would take on hand the second item. Had he not served the League cause with single-minded devotion and unquestioning loyalty? Had he not lost his all and burnt his boats in India? Was it not fair, just and proper that Pakistan should compensate him sufficiently for all the great services he had rendered to the Muslim League and Pakistan? He was not asking for money. He had been paid enough by successive Home Members of the Government of India from out of the secret service fund to keep Jinnah on the British side. He certainly did not demand any gift in the shape of land. His ambition was more modest. He would be completing six months' residence in Karachi before long and then he would be entitled to be enrolled as a voter. Now, why should he not be made the Premier of Sind? He would not embarrass the Quaid-e-Azam by asking for a ministership of the Central Government. There were many applicants. But the Prime Ministership of Sind was a small thing. Jinnah had only to nod assent and everything would be all right.

Jinnah must have been embarrassed. But he could not turn out Khaliquzzaman as unceremoniously as he had kicked Hossain Imam from the Governor-General's house. Khaliq, moreover, was *persona grata* with Liaquat Ali. The Pak Premier allowed himself to be patronised by this king of intriguers. One day I accidentally learnt the secret of this attachment. Jinnah's unusual softness for Khaliquzzaman must have been due to the fact of revelation. I was in the habit of meeting Khaliq pretty often. We had known each other since the days of my association with the now defunct *Independent* of Allahabad over three decades ago. Moreover, both of us were living in the same street at Karachi. While in an expansive mood, even born courtiers could forget themselves. It was while he was in the grip of such a mood that Khaliquzzaman one day gave me an insight into the secret which had eluded so many people.

Here is Khaliquzzaman's story for what it is worth. I do not admit that for the sake of my own personal safety I took pains to test the correctness of the verbatim transcription of

JINNAH'S BIG HEADACHE

The All-India Muslim League was Jinnah's biggest headache. The Quaid-e-Azam did not know what to do with it. He wanted to shake it off. But it stuck to him like a leech. As early as August 10, 1947, he took a few of his adherents and followers into his confidence. It was his earnest desire to dissolve the League for good. His reasons were simple enough. At its Madras session in the Christmas of 1940, the League, after reiterating its Lahore resolution demanding a division of India on a communal basis, also changed its creed into one of attainment of Pakistan as defined by that resolution. To the controversy over this change my friend, Mr. Ali Muhammad Rashdi had contributed a great deal. I have already dealt with this matter in the first part of this book. Jinnah felt and said that, with the attainment of its object, the Muslim League had no function to fulfil and should, therefore, be dissolved honourably.

Had he anything like genuine faith in his own leadership he would doubtless have issued an edict dissolving the League then and at once. For all practical purposes, he had been the virtual dictator in the sense that whenever he urged a move calculated to emphasise the "cultural differences" between the Hindus and the Muslims, the mad *mullahs* of the Muslim League were only too willing and ready even to make him their Khalifa. But Jinnah knew his limitations. He heard—and very rightly so—that his influence which had stood him in good stead in respect of his destructive campaign, which had resulted in arson, bloodshed and murder on an unprecedentedly large scale would vanish the moment he sought to direct the League outlook and activity to constructive channels.

This was where he differed from his opposite number in India, Mahatma Gandhi of beloved memory. Although he could not muster enough courage to say so in public, Jinnah nevertheless recognised the superiority of the leadership of Gandhiji and his

Khuhro out of his job. Khuhro had of course to face a scandalous trial. In his absence his legal adviser became a Minister and then Premier and kept the job vacant for Khuhro. Had Khaliq come in, Khuhro would have been finished.

Precedent, they say, is the last refuge of a lawyer. It is also the first refuge of a narrator of history. I have a notion that Khuhro was brought into trouble for a second time, not long ago, with the apparent object of ensuring Khuhro's political extinction so that Khaliquzzaman might have a free existence. If Liaquat was living, I do not think the Sind Governor would have been permitted to close the chapter. The future of Khaliquzzaman is uncertain. But of this later. Jinnah, however, continued to have his headaches.

it was a knowledge of this mental attitude of the Quaid-e-Azam, which weighed with some of us including Dr. Hemandas Wadhvani, P. N. Mehta (not of Dalmia's), and Shivi Veiji Kothari, to name only three, to continue to stay on in Pakistan despite the pin-pricks—I must really say sword-thrusts—of the Pakistan Terrorist Society which had its headquarters in the *Dawn* office.

Even in this, Jinnah was doomed to disappointment although it must be said in fairness to Liaquat Ali that he unreservedly backed his leader in this respect. Be that as it might, this very sensible and broad outlook found no favour with the rest of the "Muslim nation" which, having tasted blood in India, was thirsting for more blood in "free" Pakistan. Albeit this very unfortunate trait which he had not the power to change, it must be admitted that Jinnah was determined to stake his all in pursuance of his partiality for making the League a non-communal political organisation.

Leaguers in India too had been howling for a meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League. In sheer desperation a meeting was summoned at Karachi just before the cold weather set in. Many leaguers from India attended the historic meeting which was held in the premises of the Khaliqdina hall on Mahatma Gandhi road. They included the present mock-hero of the Indian League in Madras. Amongst others were Abdul Matin Chowdhury, Latifur Rahman, H. S. Suhrawardy, Khwaza Sir Nazimuddin and—I believe but I am not sure—Yunus. Naturally enough, the meeting was not open to the press. Even so, we newspapermen managed to get some reliable news. Incidentally, I might claim that mine was the only paper to give some space to the acrimonious discussion within the Council.

The report which my paper published, although it stated that what I claimed to be authoritative news was not corroborated by any dependable authority, was widely believed and was not contradicted even by the *Dawn* which believed that my informant must be Jinnah himself. But there was no warrant for this assumption because Jinnah was afraid of seeing

singularly brave lieutenant—the Prime Minister of India. Even this hard-hearted man was visibly moved when he read authentic reports furnished to him by his own secret service which bore witness to the heroic manner in which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in utter disregard of his personal safety and defying the advice of his police chief, assaulted the mad crowds guilty of attacking innocent and unoffending Muslims in whose name the Quaid-e-Azam had done everything to embitter the majority.

After Pakistan, Jinnah's general attitude towards the minorities was healthy. He was sincerely anxious—I had already stated this in the earlier part of this book—to ensure that the Pakistan minorities were enabled to function as loyal and honourable citizens of the Dominion of which he was Governor-General by his own nomination. But he had not Jawaharlal's courage to raise his voice openly in defence of the minorities. He was physically afraid that any sensible lead by him would be certain to recoil on his own person with deadly effect. He knew that the devil he had raised would not hesitate now to devour him alive because he had no more brutality left in him to use the devil for nefarious purposes. The devil of his creation could only be used for destructive purposes; it would never listen to him if he had so much as raised his little finger to plead for inter-communal unity. The League which he used to raise to the top now stank in his nostrils. He dared not kill it. It was truly a case of being willing to wound and even kill but terribly afraid to strike.

Something had to be done about the Muslim League. The colleagues whom he consulted were unanimously of the view that, for his own personal safety, he should desist from giving a lead in that direction. He next fathered another plan which, if it was only accepted by his secret society which had done such terrible havoc in India before partition, would have inevitably raised the status of Pakistan in the eyes of the civilized world. Little has been said about his valiant effort to convert the Muslim League into a non-communal and national organization whose membership would be thrown open to all citizens of Pakistan regardless of caste, creed, race or religion. In fact,

table. He even claimed—although the claim was not wholly true—that he was always taking his orders from them and that it was in obedience to their mandate that he waged a fight for Pakistan and succeeded. But now, that Pakistan had been achieved he continued, they must boldly come forward to make sacrifices to make Pakistan a living and powerful entity.

His audience must have thought that the Quaid-e-Azam had a new plan of aggression. But in this they were disappointed. The Pakistan Terrorist Society's plan had been to invade India and capture Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Bihar and West Bengal. Everybody thought that Jinnah was going to unfold this plan and ask for their support and co-operation. If Jinnah favoured that plan at all is open to doubt. For, the strain of his speech took a novel form—novel from the League standpoint. He said that it was the duty of the Indian Muslims to be loyal to their own Dominion and realise that they were Indians first and Muslims afterwards! He went further and declared that it was his earnest hope that the Pakistani Muslims would not advocate a theocratic State but a national State. He expected that the Hindus whom only a few months ago he used to address as "our enemy" would be enabled to live in Pakistan as honourable citizens of Pakistan without molestation of any kind from the majority. His peroration which I did not hear was reported to me to be somewhat as below.

"I tell you that I still consider myself to be an Indian. For the moment I have accepted the Governor-Generalship of Pakistan. But I am looking forward to a time when I would return to India and take my place as a citizen of my country. In the interests of Pakistan I would appeal to Indian Muslims to be true to India, to be loyal to India even as I would tell the Hindus here to be true to Pakistan and to be loyal to Pakistan. That is the only royal road to our mutual problems."

Muhammad Ismail of Madras who had come to declare war on Jinnah was subdued. This eloquence of Jinnah saved the Quaid-e-Azam personally but neither the Indian members nor their Pakistani counterparts of the League Council would agree

me publicly. Anyhow, the facts were these. In his very first speech, Jinnah suggested that the Muslim League having fulfilled its purpose must be dissolved. He said that the All-India Muslim League was now a misnomer. Politically, and geographically, India and Pakistan were separate entities. It was impossible for him to function as the President of a political organisation which existed outside the frontiers of his own Pakistan. He asked the League to weigh the issue in its correct perspective and not to be influenced in its judgment by merely sentimental considerations which had no value.

This speech of the Quaid-e-Azam gave rise to an acrimonious debate. Almost for the first time in his career as the dictator of the League, his followers dared to express their differences openly. Those from India accused Jinnah and the top-ranking leaders of the Muslim League of having misled the Indian Muslims and landed them in danger. It was thus that they gave vent to their feelings. In so many words you assured us: "Pakistan in terms of the Lahore resolution of 1940 was the only guarantee of our well-being in India. We believed in you and believed you and we made no end of sacrifices. Now, that Pakistan is a reality you appear to have changed your attitude which now, to all intents and purposes, is a sort of apology for the Hindus of Pakistan who had opposed our demand." Many were the speeches delivered in this strain.

Jinnah known for his intolerance to opposition sat quiet for three or four long hours during which his leadership was impeached. He was described as the betrayer of the Indian Muslims. Even Pakistan Muslims dared not raise their voice against this just description of their dictator. Everybody was wondering what Jinnah would or could say in reply. He said nothing on the first day. On the second day, he presented the case for the defence. He appealed to the League Council to face the issue on a realistic plane. It was an undeniable fact that Pakistan was a separate nation. It would not be permitted, even if it wished, to function in India on behalf of a political organisation. This simple fact must be borne in mind. It might hurt but he proposed to place his card openly on the

Khaliqzaman was elected its president. It declined to function as anything but a purely communalist body.

This defeat virtually broke Jinnah's back. Whether he really believed in a non-communal League would be a question to which only the historian of the future might provide a plausible and convincing answer. My own belief was—it probably still is—that Jinnah decided by deliberation to appear in the role of an ultra-nationalist with no other object than to use the situation as a bargaining counter in respect of Kashmir. His following having deserted him, he had to take his stand on a different ground as a face saving device.

In fairness even to Jinnah, I must not omit to record the reparation he made to Gandhiji. He told the Council of the Muslim League that Gandhiji—he of course called him Mr. Gandhi—was a true friend of the Muslims and the Muslims of India should stand solidly by him who was their talisman. Again, I cannot say whether he sincerely believed in his own new estimate of the world's greatest man in history. Probably he did. That was because of his realisation that, but for Mahatmaji, there was not an iota of chance to get even a copper pie of the few crores which he had set his heart upon. Vallabhbhai, the Iron Dictator, the only person whom Jinnah continued to fear even after he had become the head of a State, was determined not to let Pakistan have that money if it was going to be used to arm Pakistanis to work untold mischief in Kashmir and through Kashmir, in India.

to the suggestion that the League should be dissolved. Jinnah relented and gave in.

The next move was to divide the League into the Indian League and the Pakistani League. The Indian League claimed its share of the funds still held by Jinnah. But this claim, although conceded in theory, was never honoured in fact. Unless a subsequent transaction gave the Indian League the part of the funds to which it was entitled—I am unaware of any such transaction—it may be taken for granted that the money which he had held in trust for the Muslim League continued to remain with Jinnah till his death. Being a clever lawyer, he must have argued it this way. He held the funds in trust for a united Muslim League. As neither of the two divided sections could claim to be the League for which he had collected money, he was entitled to keep the funds with him. Far be it from me to suggest that Jinnah had misappropriated the funds. Such a conclusion would be as wrong as it would be uncharitable and unfair. As Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah would not even accept a salary although the Pakistan Government was only too willing to vote him a salary which would make a Viceroy's mouth water. It is unthinkable that he could have swallowed the money, although his detractors in Pakistan—they were countless—who did suggest, although not above a subdued whisper, that like Abdoola Haroon who was supposed to have become a millionaire on the strength of the Khilafat and the Ali Brothers' defence funds, Jinnah had quietly added to his bank account the huge sums of money for which he had rendered no account; there were few men courageous enough to ask this proud man to do his simple duty of rendering accounts and having them duly passed by a qualified auditor.

And then Jinnah tried his luck with the Pakistan section of the League to convert itself into the Pakistan League—not the Pakistan Muslim League—and throw open its membership to Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis and others alike. Again, he was disappointed. The Pakistan League did not even give him the chance to refuse its presidency. Chowdhury

language would really convert human beings into worse than the beasts of the forest. For the first time people on this side of the border retaliated. The result was that the refugee trains settling Hindu passengers here had to go back with Muslim refugees.

Nor was this the only disillusion for Jinnah. There were others. He had hoped that Sind which had a reputation for inter-communal peace and amity would provide a base wherefrom he could resume his long-forgotten role of "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity", as Sarojini Naidu in her generosity once dubbed him. In a moment of weakness, he allowed the Muslim refugees from East Punjab to invade the precincts of Sind. He had banked on his ability to convert these men into human beings. Indeed it was his hope that he could and would become a spiritual force to reckon with like his *bête noire* Mahatma Gandhi. But unlike Gandhi he had not the courage to face a mob spreading chaos and destruction all the way from the Punjab to Karachi.

Yet another disillusion awaited the Quaid-e-Azam. Mountbatten was a hero in the eyes of the Pakistan Muslims. For, was it not due to the last Viceroy of India that Pakistan became a reality? Had he not carried conviction into the Congress mind as reflected by Jawaharlal Nehru and persuaded it to bow to Jinnah's demand and concede Pakistan if it was really anxious to be freed of the British Imperialist stranglehold? On this basis, the conviction had grown into the Pakistan mind that Mountbatten was anti-Indian and anti-Hindu. They argued it this way. As he must be anti-Hindu, he is pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan. Surely, he would lend the weight of his power and influence to any move calculated to disrupt India further and give strength to the forces of Pakistan. Whether any dishonourable proposal was ever made to Lord Mountbatten to betray India to Pakistan is more than I can say. But I do know that in the higher circles of Pakistan, the conviction grew that even though he had harmed and aimed a deadly blow at what Indian politicians were not tired of calling the fundamental unity of India, Mountbatten was far too

A SHATTERED DREAM

From many a point of view the truncated Pakistan which was all that Jinnah was able to secure in strict conformity with his much advertised Lahore resolution by which he used to swear, time and again, proved a problem which it was beyond the Quaid-e-Azam's ability to solve. He at least had hoped that the exchange of populations on which he used to lay stress with a gusto which was at once sickening and unpleasant would never materialise and that the minorities in either dominion would be enabled to continue to live unmolested and unhampered in their original homes. That was because he never believed that Pakistan was coming. Now that it gripped him by the neck he realised what a big folly he had committed by speaking irresponsibly about the exchange of populations. He knew that, if all the Muslims of India were to opt for Pakistan, the new Dominion would break to pieces.

But having set the ball rolling he found it difficult to recall it. The Punjab Muslims had seen to it that not a Hindu was allowed to remain in the Pakistan part of the land of the five rivers. Every Hindu living in Lahore was obliged to leave his ancestral home and go to India. Some of the most unmentionable atrocities occurred in Lahore. Rawalpindi fared even worse. Even Ramakrishna Dalmia's cement works in the Punjab were put out of action. It hurt Jinnah's soul to find that he could not raise his little finger to put an end to the orgy of murders, loots, dacoities, plunders and, what indeed was the most abominable of all, the abduction of women and children. One day soon after the partition, a refugee train left for Delhi but was stopped on the way near about Lahore. Almost everybody took delight in harassing the Indian citizens who were described as *fringis*. Women were dragged from the train and removed to the interior.

When this report reached Karachi, Jinnah felt immeasurably sad. He had never felt that his unmeasured and offensive

decried Jinnah as a traitor to the country and a stooge of British Imperialism. Jinnah was not the man to forget an affront. Moreover, Abdul Quaiyyum Khan had also published a book under the caption *Butter and Guns* in which he had extolled Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and exposed the vagaries of the British Government and the Muslim League leader whom he held in withering contempt. Jinnah's object in permitting the renegade to kneel before him was merely to make use of him in recruiting more traitors from the Red Shirts and then throw him like a sucked orange, once he had secured the co-operation of the Red Shirt leader. Unfortunately, the very move initiated by Altaf Hussain had been inspired by the Frontier Premier who indulged in the dream of using Kabul against the Frontier Gandhi and also against the illustrious Faqir of Ipi. It was not as if Jinnah thought that everything would be smooth sailing. For, he had abundant cause to know that the Faqir was far from being a friend of Pakistan which he wanted crushed by all the power and influence he could command. Neither the Faqir nor the Khan Brothers would pay homage to him. Had he been consulted by Altaf, Jinnah might have told the irrepressible editor of the *Dawn* that the contemplated move, far from strengthening the bonds between the new Dominion and the Pukhtoos, would widen the differences. Anyhow, the result of the puerile move inspired by Abdul Quaiyyum was hardly calculated to secure the friendship of Afghanistan for Pakistan in the difficult days ahead. Events proved that Jinnah's fears were not groundless. Altaf's juvenile presumption deprived Pakistan of a potent and powerful ally whom both Britain and Russia had feared all along. Jinnah or no Jinnah, the dice had been cast for Pakistan, and Pakistan lost the battle.

While Jinnah was yet in Lahore perfecting the arrangements for the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan troops dressed as frontier "raiders" still another unfortunate thing happened. A small deputation composed of a few insignificant newspaper editors from Egypt toured Pakistan as the guests of the Dominion Government. Jinnah's object in inviting this deputation

honourable a man and gentleman to listen to any proposal to betray India.

In the early stages of Pakistan the army was not quite dependable for the assertion of the majesty of law and order. There was evidence that the armed forces had lent a helping hand to mad crowds which indulged in pillage from Multan to Karachi. Jinnah was in fix. Almost for the first time it dawned upon him that he had been guilty of an egregious blunder in breaking away altogether with India and refusing to have a common governor-general. If Mountbatten had been requested to assume the governor-generalship of Pakistan also, the chances were that he would have been obliged to summon the aid of Indian troops to restore law and order. But it was too late. What could not be cured must be endured.

To add to this crop of difficulties and problems, Altaf Hussain who looked upon himself as the mouthpiece of the foreign department of the Government of Pakistan embarrassed Jinnah by two fantastic moves. He had the effrontery to contact the Afgan Ambassador to the Court of Pakistan and made proposals to him for an Anti-Indian front. What the Afgan Minister said in reply could only be conjectured. The sudden deterioration in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan should afford sufficient clue to Altaf Hussain's brazen-faced approach which, it might be surmised, had not received the assent of the Quaid-e-Azam.

The reason why this contact, when revealed, embarrassed Jinnah is not difficult to guess. It had been Jinnah's hope that by a miracle he might be enabled to enlist the support of Afghanistan to secure the co-operation of the Khan Brothers and through the latter, of the entire Pukhtoon race. Jinnah knew—none better—how slender was the hold of Pakistan on the Pukhtoon people as a whole. Although he accepted a renegade from the Frontier Gandhi's party and foisted him as the Chief Minister of the North-West Frontier Province, Jinnah distrusted the turncoat. His reasons were natural enough. He had not forgotten how, as the deputy leader of the Congress Party in the Central Legislature, Abdul Quasiyum Khan had

echoed the stupid hopes of the editor of the *Dawn*. Notwithstanding the support which Khaliquzzaman extended to the new move it met with scanty response even in the Pakistan press which instinctively distrusted this fantastic adventurer. My paper at least—the *Daily Gazette*—did not hesitate to ridicule the proposal and ask how, without several corridors, it was proposed to unite all the Muslim countries on the Pacific.

Jinnah was annoyed by this move. He knew that Islamistan was not a practical proposition even if it was desirable. He realised that the Arab League would never so much as shake hands with Pakistan whose inhabitants it looked upon as second class Muslims if they were Muslims at all. Moreover, the religious fanaticism fanned by Jinnah hardly found favour with the Arab countries where people instinctively distrusted Jinnah and his Pakistan because they felt that behind the creation of Pakistan there must have been some ulterior motive, not at all friendly to the Arab countries on Britain's part. Even assuming that such a proposal found favour and it actually materialised, Pakistan would be treated as a junior partner below age and relegated to the distant corner. For all these reasons, he became terribly angry when he discovered that Pakistanis were cutting the ground under his feet. But the mischief had been done.

Poor Jinnah was disillusioned. He had neither the strength nor the mental calibre to snub these mischief-makers. One by one, all his dreams were being shattered and reduced to dust. What could he do to stem the tide of indiscipline? He was powerless. He was also ill. The new developments aggravated the cancer of the tongue from which he had been ailing.

For all practical purposes, thereafter, he was merely the titular head of Pakistan. He was not even inclined to meet ambassadors. One day he told me that he had not the courage to face Shri Sri Prakasa, our High Commissioner in Pakistan in those days. Jinnah was a man to be pitied. A virtual prisoner in the Governor-General's House, he had little left to him but to mope alone and listen to his own voice of anger verging on madness. Had he a spark of moral courage he would have

was far less ambitious than Altaf Hussain's or, for that matter, Chowdhury Khaliqzaman's. In 1946, Jinnah had visited England. On his return he stayed for a day or two at Cairo. He had hoped that the Cairo press would give him the same spontaneous reception as it had meted out to Jawaharlal Nehru a few months earlier. In this hope, however, the Quaid-e-Azam was doomed to disappointment. For, not a soul in Egypt would take notice of the sojourn of the Sultan of Pakistan in their midst. So Jinnah employed a few journalists of the lower type to boost him. Three of them were prominent members of the Egyptian newspaper delegation of 1947. Even Jinnah could be grateful when it suited his purpose. In the present instance it did suit him admirably because these unknown adventurers had honoured Jinnah with a press conference at the latter's cost. The press conference, however, was a thorough failure. The more leading newspaper representatives plied him with questions which Jinnah was unable to answer. He was cornered at every stage. The *Dawn* which in those days used to be published from Delhi gave a graphic account of the magnificent reception supposed to have been accorded to Jinnah by the fourth estate in the capital of Egypt. But the *Hindustan Times* correspondent had already let the cat out of the bag by cabling a full report of the proceedings of the press conference in which Jinnah fared very badly indeed. When he appointed himself as Pakistan's Governor-General, Jinnah was the recipient of congratulations from the obliging Egyptian trio who offered to come to Pakistan on a "good-will mission". Jinnah responded. That is the story of the delegation.

But Altaf and Khaliqzaman had other plans. They wanted to utilise this delegation for the purpose of blackwashing India's reputation. But that was only a part of their plan and a very minor part at that. They entertained the visitors at a lunch party. There, Altaf Hussain revealed the major plan which he and his friend had in view. It was nothing short of a demand for the creation of a new continent to be composed of all the Islamic States from Europe, Africa and Asia, christening the new continent "Islamistan". The guests suitably responded and

XXXII

A RETROSPECT

Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir had a psychological background. The alleged concern for the Muslims of Kashmir was bunkum and the rulers of Pakistan knew that they were indulging in bluff and bluster. It was meant to be a kind of retaliation for what occurred in Junagadh. The Nawab of Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan without rhyme or reason. There was no contiguity between his State and Pakistan. His subjects were Hindus whose wish he did not think it necessary to consult. The people rose in revolt spontaneously and without any prompting. The result has been recorded by history. Pakistan lost Junagadh which simply would not recognise the existence of the new Dominion. This event wounded Jinnah's insatiable vanity. Mir Laikali who had been planning to tag the Hyderabad State on to Pakistan found in the Junagadh developments a warning which, however, he would not heed to. He came to Pakistan and persuaded Jinnah and Liaquat Ali to confer with him at Lahore because to his mind Karachi which still boasted of a majority of Hindus was an unsuitable *venue* for the important talks he had in mind. At Lahore it was decided to send a contingent of Pakistan troops dressed as frontier raiders.

It was meant to be a counter-blast to the Junagadh drama. It is difficult to say whether Jinnah really believed that he would succeed in getting himself crowned as the Sultan of Kashmir, although he had not opposed the idea of getting his sartorial outfit done by Seville Row for the occasion of his triumphal entry into Srinagar. But there is reason to believe that Laikali at least had no illusions. It was not that he did not want to bag Kashmir for Pakistan. He most certainly desired it for two reasons. One was his yearning for reprisals to avenge the humiliation suffered by Pakistan in Junagadh. The other was his belief that Kashmir, if taken over by Pakistan, would and might provide the ground for Hyderabad's own accession.

dissolved Pakistan. But all his mock heroics had vanished with the birth of Pakistan. He looked as one possessed. It was a pitiable sight which he afforded whenever he dared to show himself.

But the cleverest was the third factor. They banked on Gandhiji's opposition to anything like a war. Pakistan's espionage had already told its foreign office that, according to its information, Gandhiji had favoured or was likely to favour the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan and of Hyderabad to India. Whether Hyderabad should or would do what the Mahatma desired was another matter which might be considered at a later stage when the occasion arose. At the moment, if Gandhiji favoured Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, was it likely that Pandit Nehru would muster sufficient courage to defy Gandhiji himself and send an army to fight the "raiders"?

The three leaders believed that they already had crossed the three hurdles visualised by them. There was a fourth of course but they attached no serious importance to it. Pandit Nehru had accepted Kashmir's accession to India, albeit subject to ratification by a popular plebiscite on the basis of adult franchise in that Indian State. He had already promised military aid to Kashmir in the event of any armed aggression. This, however, did not seriously disturb the Jinnah-Liaquat-Laikali calculations. I was told many months after the "raiders" had been beaten back by India that the Himalayan miscalculations on the score of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru were Laikali's contribution which even Jinnah found it hard to resist or answer. Jinnah's gullibility was Laikali's strong point.

Laikali's arguments, so far as I could gather from a friend who met me at the Hyderabad airport for half an hour during the Christmas of 1947 on my way to Madras, were somewhat on these lines. Nehru should not be considered as a serious factor at all. The Indian Prime Minister was accustomed of course to use strong and uncompromising language which might strike terror into the hearts of the uninitiated but in the end his words counted for nothing. Congress would have no truck either with Jinnah or the Muslim League. Had he not vowed that he would resist the division of India? Had he not argued the Hindu case against Pakistan in convincing style? Yet was it not Jawaharlal Nehru who, on June 3, 1947, signed the agreement for the partition of India although he was aware that his

If he had no illusions, how is one to account for the lead which Laikali gave for the unholy causes of the invasion of Kashmir? Jinnah, Liaquat Ali and Laikali must have calculated the cost of a military invasion. They must have realised that they had not enough funds and that even the Hyderabad donations and loans would or could hardly help continue a struggle for any length of time. According to a front rank Pakistani leader whose name, for his own sake, I ought not divulge, the three leaders who met in Lahore to decide on the invasion of Kashmir relied more on certain psychological factors in India than on their own military might.

These psychological factors were mainly threefold. The first was the hope and belief that India would not risk her newly acquired international reputation by sending an army to fight the "raiders" because the task of hitting back the "raiders" would be the charge on the Kashmir Government rather than the Government of India. Before any reaction in Delhi was discernible, Pakistan could and should occupy all Kashmir, every care being taken that Pakistan's identity in the early stages was not revealed or even suspected. So long as there was no open war between Pakistan and India, even Mr. Attlee could not prevent the British officers in the Pakistan Dominion from giving "advice" to the armed "raiders" supposed to hail from the Frontier.

The second consideration was the quiet assumption that Lord Mountbatten and Sir Claude Auchinleck would passively help the Pakistan cause by putting obstruction in the way of India sending out her armed troops to meet the Pak aggression in Kashmir. Mr. Laikali at least thought that it was in Britain's interest to see that Kashmir fell into Pakistan's hands. Pakistanis could also convince America that, if Kashmir fell to India, the chances were that Moscow would find the means to penetrate into the Indian sub-continent. Indeed, Laikali suggested—that was the belief widely prevalent in Pakistan at that time—that America would fall for it, if Pakistan promised in advance that certain strategic areas would be ceded to Washington to develop its own air bases in Kashmir against possible Russian manoeuvres.

sary to rely on the rumours prevalent in Pakistan at the time. Korbél says: "I was invited to Nehru's home several times. Once, at a private dinner, I tried to convince him that India, under his inspiring leadership, should offer the whole world an example of peaceful settlement of international disputes by making reasonable concessions to Pakistan. He reacted by jumping on the chair and starting to preach vehemently." Then he goes on to report the Indian Prime Minister in what he calls the latter's own words which, according to Korbél, were: "You don't seem to understand our position and our right. We are a secular State which is not based on religion and grants everyone freedom of conscience. Pakistan is a medieval State with an impossible, theocratic conception. It should never have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind this foolish idea of Jinnah."

It was a pity that Jinnah was not alive to hear this report from Korbél's mouth and to rate Laikali for misleading him. But Liaquat Ali must have been impressed by the report, for the Pak Premier went on cultivating Korbél in the hope that the chairman of the U. N. Commission would make a present of Kashmir on a silver salver to Pakistan. How Liaquat Ali cultivated Korbél had better be told in the latter's own words which revealed the Pakistan Prime Minister's readiness to defy even the Prophet of Islam if by such defiance he could gain the friendship and co-operation of the U. N. Commission through its chairman. But let Korbél speak: "I remember once when the members of the Commission were invited to his (Liaquat Ali's) seaside home on the outskirts of Karachi. On all other such occasions, only soft drinks had been served but this time before lunch we were offered fine Scotch whisky. To my surprise, Liaquat Ali Khan joined us in a high ball. He took me to a corner of the room and said: "You know, Mr. Korbél, our religion forbids us to drink alcohol; I know I am sinning. But I have worked all my life for the good of my people. I hope when the day of judgment comes God will weigh my good deeds against my sin of having drunk here and there and that

own Master was against it? Had he not also forgotten his solemn promise that he would have no truck with Jinnah and the League? What then could be more certain than that Panditji would weaken at the last moment and surrender if only the Mountbattens tried to persuade him that it was no use fighting with Pakistan over this simple issue?

Gullible Jinnah who in his earlier days had convinced many a judge and jury found it difficult to resist Laikali's arguments which were calculated to flatter his own vanity. On his return to Karachi, Jinnah discovered that fate had cheated him of his high hopes on all fronts. Mr. Attlee had prohibited British officers from engaging themselves in the Kashmir fight. The Mountbattens were pretty enough to disoblige the great Quaid-e-Azam. For, the Governor-General of India fully backed his Prime Minister. Nehru himself, to all intents and purposes, appeared determined for once to teach Pakistan a lesson regardless of cost because the Indian Prime Minister sincerely thought and said that Pak bullying must be put an end to.

Although even today there seems to be a body of opinion in Pakistan which believes that Nehru might yet relent and surrender, there is reason to believe that informed sections amongst the leading men do not bank much on this score. Zaffrullah Khan at least must have been disillusioned long ago. For, according to my information, the Pakistan Foreign Minister was told in time by a high U. N. authority that it would not do for Pakistan to bank on the chances of Nehru relenting on the basis of Pakistan's hopes. Josef Korbel, formerly Czechoslovakia's ambassador to Yugoslavia, was the person who had conveyed this warning. Now, Korbel, who became chairman of the U. N. Commission for Kashmir was a friend of Pakistan and desired that Kashmir must be presented to Pakistan, law or no law, justice or injustice. At one time I used to doubt the veracity of the opinion attributed to Korbel. I am no longer in any doubt about it. He has himself admitted his partiality in the course of an article which he has contributed to an American paper. What Korbel was stated to have advised Zaffrullah was that Nehru was still unreconciled to Pakistan. It is no longer neces-

the balance will be in my favour. So let us drink to the future of Kashmir.”

A fine example indeed of the “Islamic State” built on casks of whisky! But for that matter, save for a very few exceptions whom one can count on one’s fingers, most of the leading men of Pakistan, albeit their professed allegiance to the Holy Prophet of Islam (may God’s Eternal Peace be upon him!), are devotees of Bacchus.

Korbel’s revelations made Pakistan a trifle anxious. So, the Pakistan Terrorist Society which had always been working in close alliance with the foreign office of Pakistan, decided then and there either to murder Sheik Abdullah or abduct him somehow. The Pakistan Royal Air Force trained a few desperados whose job it was to reach Srinagar or Jammu as refugees and seek service in Kashmir as the Kashmir Prime Minister’s personal pilots. These adventurers had been fully initiated into their nefarious work. If it was not possible to fly Abdullah to Karachi, they should kill him outright and fly back and thus glorify Islam of Pakistan’s un-Islamic conception.

The most tragic part of the whole show was that there was not a soul in all Pakistan to raise its voice against this unholy horror. Naturally enough, the Harijan member of the Pakistan central cabinet was a suspect in the eyes of both the Pakistan Terrorist Society and its patron—the Pakistan foreign office. Jogendra Mandal, when he heard of this development, expressed his horror to a mutual friend. The result was that he was looked upon as an Indian spy stationed in Pakistan and was rigorously excluded and treated as a *pariah*. My belief is that, if he had not escaped from Karachi, Jogendra Mandal who had walked into Jinnah’s parlour with other notions would have been murdered in cold blood.